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PREFACE
This thesis is dedicated to the memory of my mentor and former supervisor, Professor Helge
W. Nordvik. An eminent maritime historian, Helge was the one who ignited my interest in
maritime history, suggesting recent shipping history as the theme for a thesis. I valued Helge's
advice, admired his vast knowledge and impressive enthusiasm and - most of all - really
enjoyed working with him. I would like to think that he would appreciate this thesis the way it
has turned out, and I hope it lives up to his slogan "Jf it's worth doing, it's worth doing right. "
After Helge's death, the remaining members of my supervisory committee were presented
with the task of guiding me. I am grateful that Victor Norman found the time to take over as
supervisor - his excellent comments and suggestions, based on admirable knowledge of the
shipping industry in general and Norwegian shipowners in particular, have been a great help.
Moreover, Lewis Fischer and Tore Jørgen Hanisch have contributed to a larger extent than
what can usually be expected from dissertation committee members. Their encouragement,
helpfulness and scholarly comments have been valuable.
Several other people have contributed by reading and commenting upon some of the chapters,
or simply by being available whenever I had questions. Anders Martin Fon, Morten
Hammerborg, Edgar Hovland, Jan Tore Klovland, Hans Mjelva, Tore Nilsen, Anne Liv
Scrase, Siri Pettersen Strandenes, Arnljot Strømme Svendsen, Atle Thowsen, Tor Wergeland,
Søren Wiig and Gudbrand Øilo have all contributed in this respect. My colleagues at the
Economic History Section of the Department of Economics, Ola H. Grytten, Agnethe Harbitz,
Fritz Hodne, Harm Schroter and Espen Søilen, have also been a valuable source of
encouragement and help, and I am grateful for fruitful discussions and comments.
I have also had the pleasure to discuss the topic with several persons - too numerous to
mention - at the Second and Third International Congress of Maritime History. Moreover,
several of my friends, including Heine Didriksen, Erik Frønsdal, Sverre Lehland, Bjørn Liabø,
Eli Sørensen, Henrik Thune, Anders Unneland and Kjetil Visnes, have provided me with both
a forum for frustrations and an emergency reserve of encouragement.
My fellow doctoral student at the Economic History Section, Camilla Brautaset, deserves a
special mention. She has read the majority of the chapters, and given me valuable comments.
However, her friendship and enthusiasm - and our common fates - have been at least as
important.
Moreover, I would like to thank the library staff at the Norwegian School of Economics and
Business Administration for their relentless search for material in Norwegian and foreign
libraries, the staff at the Bergen Maritime Museum for letting me use their database on the
Norwegian fleet and the library staff at the National University of Singapore. I would also like
to thank the staff at the Norwegian Shipowners' Association and the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs for granting me access to their archives.
Finally, I am indebted to my parents and my brother, who from an early stage taught me the
value of learning and have always supported me, and my wife Marit, who has encouraged my
work and read and commented upon most of the chapters. She has involuntarily gathered a lot
ofknowledge about the Norwegian shipping sector.
In "The Science of Discworld", Terry Pratehett explains the accumulation of knowledge in
universities by the fact that "students arrive from school, confident that they know very nearly
everything, and they leave years later certain that they know practically nothing. Where did
the knowledge go in the meantime? Into the university, of course, where it is carefully dried
and stored. " With regard to this thesis, my feelings are much the same. When I started to
work on the project, I had the impression that I had garnered a lot of knowledge on the
shipping crisis of the 1970s and the plight of Norwegian shipowners. Today, I am left with
more questions - or what academics prefer to refer to as "topics for further research" - than I
had five years ago. Some ofmy knowledge has hopefully disappeared into this thesis ...
Bergen, 221200
Stig Tenold
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION AND BIBLIOGRAPHY
This thesis offers an analysis of an extremely turbulent period in the international shipping
sector, a sector with great importance for the Norwegian economy. In the 1970s and 1980s the
international market for shipping services went through great changes, even for an industry
usually characterised by large fluctuations. The shipping market had reached an all time high
in the autumn of 1973, when some shipowners were earning spectacular amounts of money.
This boom was replaced by gloom, as freight rates plunged, lay up-rates increased, vessel
values fell and newbuildings flooded an already saturated market.
1.1. The Theme
As the title of the thesis indicates, two main topics are analysed. The first aim of the thesis is
to increase our understanding of the international shipping crisis of the 1970s. The second aim
is to analyse the behaviour and fate of Norwegian shipowners during this turbulent period in
the international market for shipping services. Accordingly, the dissertation sets out to answer
the following questions:
1. What were the causes and effects a/the crisis in the shipping sector in the 1970s?
2. How did the crisis affect the Norwegian shipping industry?
The term "the international shipping crisis of the 1970s" is largely used to denote the period
from the strong fall in tanker freight rates in late 1973 until the temporary freight rate increase
in 1979. However, the development in the period prior to the freight market breakdown is
analysed in detail, as the strategies followed and actions undertaken in this period had
important ramifications for the subsequent development. Indeed, it is impossible to
understand why the crisis evolved without taking the pre-crisis development of expectations,
freight rates, demand growth and fleet expansion into account.
The boundary at the other side of the crisis will be treated flexibly. A lot of people,
particularly shipping industry insiders, would claim that the international shipping market has
been in a state of crisis ever since 1973. In the latter part of the 1970s, however, there was a
short period of recovering freight rate levels. In the analysis of the crisis and its short-term
effects, this rate increase denotes the end of the crisis. The development in the shipping
market in the period after this rate increase proved to be as serious as, or in some cases even
more severe than, the situation in the 1970s. However, the causes for this second shipping
crisis partly differed from those of the first. Whereas the first crisis came about as a result of
increases in supply and reduced demand growth, the second crisis was largely the result of
falling absolute demand.
The shipping crisis was accompanied by fundamental shifts in the shipping market,
both with regard to freight rates, lay up-figures and the international distribution of tonnage.
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To fully be able to comprehend the relationship between the crisis and these shifts, the
development in the 1980s must be taken into account as well. Accordingly, whereas the
analysis of the causes and effects of the shipping crisis in Chapter Three and Chapter Four
terminates with the freight rate increase in 1979, the development in the 1980s is included in
the analysis of the structural transformation of the shipping industry and the Norwegian
economy in Chapters Nine and Ten.
1.2. The Structure of the Thesis
The thesis is influenced by a distinct division, apparent in the choice of methodology as well
as in the use of sources. The presentation is an analysis of progressively smaller units. The
analysis starts at the international "macro-level", and moves through an analysis of the
Norwegian shipping sector in general to the company "micro-level", where the actions of
some Norwegian tanker-owning companies are analysed. The shipping crisis is thus examined
through three different lenses, each displaying a different magnifying capacity. The first part
is the "casual glance", where the international shipping crisis as a whole is analysed. The
causes and effects of the crisis are explained, but no particular weight is placed on the fate or
nationality of the individual agents in the international shipping market.
In the next part, I take a closer look at one specific group of agents, viz the Norwegian
shipowners. The aim of this part of the thesis is to investigate whether, as has often been
claimed, Norwegian shipowners were harder hit by the shipping crisis than their international
competitors. Subsequently, the factors which can explain the disparate Norwegian experience
are analysed.
In the third part of the thesis, some of the Norwegian shipping companies are
investigated more closely, and a "magnifying glass" is utilised to evaluate the influence of the
international shipping crisis on some of the leading Norwegian tanker-owning companies. The
focus is therefore being narrowed as we go along, leading to consistently smaller units of
analysis.
The analysis of the three interrelated parts - the shipping crisis, the Norwegian
shipping sector and the four Norwegian shipping companies - paves the way for a more
general discussion of the transformations of the international shipping industry, the
Norwegian economy and the Norwegian shipping sector.
Part One - Chapters Two, Three and Four
In the first part of the thesis, the causes and effects of the international shipping crisis are
examined. The analysis is based upon the assumption that the extent of the shipping crisis can
be explained by certain features of the internatiorialmarket for shipping services. Some of the
important aspects of the international shipping sector are presented in Chapter Two. This
presentation provides a backdrop for the analysis of the crisis, where specific features and
mechanisms of the international shipping market are given particular weight. In the analysis
of the causes of the crisis, I point out several factors, both on the demand- and supply-sides,
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which can explain the length, breadth and depth of the shipping crisis, The analysis focuses on
the actions, strategies and expectations of three groups of agents - shipowners, shipyards and
financial institutions,
Chapter Four traces the development of the crisis from a tanker crisis to a more general
shipping crisis. The presentation of the contagion of the crisis is followed by an investigation
of the short-term effects, where, among other things, the development of freight rates and lay
up-rates are discussed.
Part Two - Chapters Five, Six and Seven
The analysis in the second part of the thesis is conducted at a nationallevel, but must be seen
in close relation to the analysis of the causes and effects of the international crisis in the first
part. The aim is to find out whether Norwegian shipowners were harder hit by the crisis than
their competitors and, if this proves to be the case, to explain this feature of the shipping
crisis. The disparate experience of Norwegian shipowners is analysed by means of a
comparison of the strategies of Norwegian and international shipping companies. Due to the
heterogeneity ofboth Norwegian and international shipping, this examination requires a lot of
generalisation. However, the comparison of the Norwegian shipowners and their foreign
competitors reveals certain distinct differences.
The comparison of the different countries' fleets and the development in the period
surrounding the crisis will focus on three policy instruments. Strategic decisions regarding
fleet structure, chartering strategy and contracting are used to highlight the differences
between Norwegian and foreign shipowners and explain the variations in the economic
performance between Norwegian and international shipping companies.
The second part of the thesis ends with an analysis of the Norwegian authorities' initial
response to the shipping crisis. Due to the importance of shipping in the Norwegian economy,
the authorities actively intervened as a response to the predicament of the industry. The
establishment and effects of Norsk Garantiinstitutt for skip og borefartøyer AS [The
Norwegian Guarantee Institute for Ships and Drilling Vessels Ltd.], which was the main
channel for government intervention, are examined
Part Three - Chapter Eight
The fact that part two examines the Norwegian shipping sector at an aggregate level cloaks
the large differences between the various companies in the Norwegian shipping sector. The
analysis in Chapter Eight is conducted at the company level. Four Norwegian shipping
companies are presented in detail and used as cases illustrating the diverse effects of the
shipping crisis on Norwegian shipowners. The fate of the selected companies varied, and the
cases give an indication of the different strategies chosen by Norwegian shipowning
compames.
Again, the period leading up to the crisis is of great importance for our understanding
of the later development. The four cases show that for some companies the actions prior to the
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freight market breakdown had dramatic and irreversible consequences. Other companies,
following different strategies, were able to consolidate their position and improve their
financial basis.
Part Four - Chapters Nine and Ten
The final part of the thesis examines the shipping crisis in a longer perspective. Chapter Nine
is an analysis of the structural transformation of the Norwegian shipping sector in the period
from the early 1970s to the mid/late 1980s. For this purpose, I have compiled a database
containing information on every Norwegian-registered ship of more than 5.000 gross register
tons (grt) in the period from 1970 to 1987, as well as all companies owning such tonnage.
The analysis of the structural transformation of the Norwegian shipping sector focuses
on the concentration and localisation of the industry, with regard to ports and companies. The
differences between large and small companies, both in the expansive period until 1977 and
during the subsequent contraction of the Norwegian fleet, are analysed. Moreover, the
changes in the organisation of Norwegian shipping companies are briefly commented upon.
Almost 1800 vessels were sold in the Norwegian second-hand market in the period 1970-
1986, and the fate of these vessels has been analysed. The final part of the chapter is an
attempt to estimate the changes in the composition and sophistication of the Norwegian fleet.
Chapter Ten deals with three long-term developing trends. First, the changes in the
international maritime hegemony are presented. The shipping crisis coincided with a massive
transformation of the international shipping industry, and some of the factors behind this
development are discussed. Second, the transformation of the Norwegian economy, with
emphasis on the influence of the offshore oil industry, is examined. The expansion of the
offshore oil industry represented an attractive investment alternative for Norwegian
shipowners. The analysis shows that the disinvestment in Norwegian shipping was the result
oftwo trends - the reduced viability of the shipping sector and the opportunities presented by
the offshore industry. Third, the changes in the Norwegian shipping sector are analysed. The
shift from Norwegian-owned to Norwegian-managed tonnage is detailed, and the basis for this
development is explained in terms of the changes in Norwegian shipping policy.
Although the thesis is a monograph, the structure implies that the various chapters to
some extent may be read independently. Accordingly, someone interested in specific subjects
such as eg the causes of the crisis or the establishment and effects of Norsk Garantiinstitutt
for skip og borefartøyer AS, may proceed directly to the relevant chapters. It has been my
intention to structure the thesis in a manner which clearly illustrates the various aspects of the
crisis and its implications for Norwegian shipping. The overview of the shipping sector in
Chapter Two is intended as an introduction to the mechanisms and economics of this sector,
and may be skipped by those familiar with the industry.
1.2.1 Methodological aspects
In many respects, this thesis can be regarded as a combination of maritime economic history
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and shipping economics. A thesis on the shipping crisis of the 1970s could be approached
from a variety of angles. The high number of issues worthy of investigation is partly a
testament to the importance and linkages of the shipping sector. Indeed, this thesis could have
been written eg from a juridical, political, development or social perspective. I have chosen an
economic approach. Accordingly, the thesis focuses on the economic aspects of the crisis,
including its impact on the shipping market per se, its impact on the Norwegian economy and
its impact on the economic performance of individual shipowning companies. However, it has
sometimes been necessary to relate the economic development to adjacent themes, such as eg
economic policies in general and shipping policies in particular.
The thesis utilises a combination of deductive and inductive approaches, with
emphasis on the former methodology. This is partly a result of differences in the topics
analysed and partlya reflection of differences in the source material utilised. A deductive
approach implies that the researcher clearly defines a question or a series of questions, which
he then sets out to answer. An important feature of the deductive approach is the specific
formulation of the premises and assumptions on which the analysis is based. The deductive
approach is particularly protuberant in Chapters Three and Six.
An inductive approach implies that the analysis is of a more exploratory nature. This is
reflected both in the presentation of the subject matter and in the use of and weight given to
source material. Rather than seeking to answer an explicitly formulated question, a researcher
utilising an inductive approach t~es to gather knowledge based on the available sources. In
this thesis, Chapters Seven and Nine have to a larger extent than the rest been influenced by
an inductive methodology.
The barriers between deductive and inductive approaches to economic history have
sometimes appeared insurmountable. This was particularly the case in connection with the
development of the "new economic history" or "cliometric history" in the 1960s. l Whereas
the "classical economic history" was based on a traditional approach to history, with an
emphasis on qualitative evidence, the "new economic history" emphasised quantitative factors
and the application of methods from "the dismal science".
The separation between new and traditional economic history and between deductive
and inductive approaches may be exaggerated. Historical research is generally founded upon a
combination of the two approaches. An inductive approach is usually based upon certain
assumptions, even when these are not explicitly formulated. Hence, although the inductive
approach emphasises the knowledge garnered from the sources, the researcher must already
have some idea about what he wants to find, which has led him to these sources in the first
place.
The gaps between the approaches of new and traditional economic history can and
I See Fogel, R. W. and Elton, G. R., Which Road to the Past? Two Views of History, Yale University Press,
London, 1983. For an introduction to the development of the subject and its significance in Norway, see
Basberg, Bjørn L. and Grytten, Ola H., "Økonometrisk historie - iakttagelser om fagfeltets utvikling i Norge"
[Econometric history: Observations on the development of the discipline in Norway], Historisk Tidsskrift
4/1994, pp. 430-449.
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should be bridged. This may be accomplished by the combination of the explicit formulation
of problems from the former approach with the critical evaluation of sources which is
characteristic of the latter approach. Specific formulation of the assumptions underlying the
analysis makes it easier for the reader to assess the results presented. Moreover, by evaluating
the reliability and the validity of the sources, the basis for the analysis - and consequently its
quality - is improved.
The analysis of the causes and effects of the shipping crisis is based upon a deductive
approach. The initial assumption is that specific historical events and certain aspects of the
shipping market can explain the length, breadth and depth of the crisis. The crisis is explained
by means of separate investigations of the demand and supply sides in the shipping market,
and the analysis draws heavily upon the theories about the functioning and mechanisms ofthis
market. As such, the explanation of the shipping crisis can be viewed as an explanation of a
nomological form. It shows that the phenomenon - the shipping crisis - occurred as a result of
certain antecedent and concurrent conditions. According to Hempel, "any explanation that
accounts for a historical phenomenon by reference to economic factors [. ..] are nomological
in import, if not in explicit formulation. ,,2
The analysis of the predicament of Norwegian shipowners is based upon the
hypothesis that certain aspects of the business strategy - fleet structure, chartering policy and
contracting - can explain the disparate Norwegian development. Again, the deductive
approach is clear. The study shows that all three factors can contribute to an explanation, but
that the relevance of the various strategic elements may be different from what is commonly
claimed.
The strategic elements mentioned above are also utilised in connection with the
exploration of the fate of the four Norwegian tanker owning companies. However, this chapter
could to some extent be labelled "business history", as it focuses on economic agents, rather
than on aggregate variables. The aim of the chapter has been to analyse the strategic behaviour
of the individual agents and the effects of this behaviour.
The last part of the thesis analyses the long-term transformation at the Norwegian and
internationallevel. In Chapter Nine, the development of the Norwegian fleet and Norwegian
shipowning companies is analysed in a long-term perspective. The aim of the analysis is to
find out in which manner the Norwegian shipping community changed following the crisis. A
similar examination, focussing on the development of national fleets, is undertaken in Chapter
Ten. Some of the reasons for the changes in the international maritime hegemony are
investigated, and the basis for the Norwegian changes are analysed in more detail.
The thesis combines two distinct heritages at Norges Handelshøyskole [The
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration]. On the one hand, a lot of the
knowledge about the mechanisms of the shipping market and the adaptation of shipowners
originates with vanous research projects undertaken under the auspices of
2 See Hempel, Carl G" "Explanations in Science and History", in Dray, William H, (ed.), Philosophical Analysis
and History, Harper & Row, New York, 1966, p. 110.
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Skipsfartsøkonomisk Institutt [The Institute for Shipping Research], now a part of Senter for
Internasjonal Økonomi og Skipsfart [The Centre for International Economics and Shipping].
On the other hand, the utilisation of economic theory on historical subject matters has a
considerable tradition at the previous Institutt for Økonomisk Historie [The Department of
Economic History], now a section of Institutt for Samfunnsøkonomi [The Department of
Economics ].
1.2.2. Sources
The different approaches utilised in the thesis are to some extent reflected in the use of
sources. The presentation of sources is divided into two. First, an introduction to the main
sources - with emphasis on statistical sources, contemporary sources and archival sources - is
given. Then, Chapter 1.3. provides an introduction to the relevant secondary literature. Parts
of this secondary literature - concerning the published histories of Norwegian shipowning
companies - have been left out of the general bibliography. In order to avoid repetition, these
contributions are included in connection with the presentation of Norwegian shipowning
companies in Chapter Nine.
Statistical sources
One of the main sources, which is utilised throughout the thesis, is a large body of data
showing important development traits in the shipping market, including fleet size, contracting,
shipping demand and freight rate level. This information has largely been gathered from two
references. One is the annual publications from Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., a
Norwegian shipbroking company. Their Review contains a plethora of information on the
Norwegian and international fleet, as well as the demand side in the various segments of the
shipping market. Review gives a relatively short account of the current state of the shipping
market, but I have mainly used the accompanying statistics.
The other main source of general information is the annual Maritime Transport-
publications from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
These publications give a relatively thorough presentation of the state of the shipping market,
but also contain a detailed statistical appendix. Whereas the information in Review is divided
into a "Norwegian" and an "international" category, Maritime Transport details the
development of all important national fleets.
The statistics from Review and Maritime Transport more or less permeate the thesis.
Two other statistical sources have to a larger extent been utilised in specific chapters. One is a
set of historical statistics originating with the British shipping analyst Clarkson Research
Studies. Their data on the chartering behaviour of shipowners of various nations - which to
my knowledge have never been published in an analytical setting - have been vital to the
analysis of the chartering strategy of Norwegian and international shipowners.
The second statistical source is the registries of the Scandinavian fleets published by
Det Norske Veritas. These have been used to compile a database comprising all Norwegian
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vessels above 5.000 grt. The database details the development of the fleets of individual
shipping companies and ports, as well as the structure of the Norwegian fleet, in the period
1970-1987. The Veritas-database is more closely introduced at the beginning of Chapter Nine.
Contemporary sources
Certain elements of the analysis have been highlighted by means of contemporary sources.
One reason for this is the focus on the actions of the agents in the shipping market. By means
of contemporary sources it is to some extent possible to gain an understanding of the
environment in which these agents operated and the basis upon which they made their
decisions.
The most important contemporary sources can be divided into two groups. The first is
interviews with and lectures by leading agents. Several shipowners publicly explained their
policies and their views on the state of the shipping sector. The second group consists of
contemporary analyses of the situation - both before and after the freight market breakdown.
The analyses are a combination of industry analyses, eg undertaken by shipping analysts and
shipbrokers, and more general analyses, published in newspapers and industry journals.
As a large part of the thesis focuses on the actions of the agents in the Norwegian
sector, I have concentrated on Norwegian sources. The most important industry analyses
utilised originate with the Norwegian shipbroking firms R.S. Platou, Joachim Grieg and Johan
G. Olsen, in addition to the previously mentioned publications from Fearnley & Eger. The
most important published source has been the shipping journal Norwegian Shipping News,
which contains information on both the Norwegian and the international shipping
environment. Moreover, I have surveyed all articles in the three leading Norwegian business
periodicals, Farmand, Kapital and Økonomisk Rapport. Contemporary Norwegian
newspapers, and the British publications The Financial Times and The Economist have also
been used, the latter two in connection with international development traits.
Archival sources
One of the problems in connection with research on relatively recent topics is the limited
access to archival sources. Most Norwegian archives in the hands of the authorities are made
public after a period of 60 years, and this severely limits the access to information on more
recent topics. Moreover, it has not been customary for Norwegian businesses, including
shipowning companies, to organise their archives and make them accessible for researchers.
In Riksarkivet [The Norwegian National Archives - the Norwegian version of the
Public Record Office] there is little information of interest in connection with the period
analysed here. The archives contain material from the shipping department of the Ministry of
Trade and Shipping until 1965. However, the only available material of some relevance
concerns the Norwegian flag policy in the period up to 1960. There are no relevant archives
available for the period after 1965 in the Norwegian National Archives. I have therefore
concentrated on two other archival sources.
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The parts of the archives of the Norwegian Ministry of Trade and Shipping relating to
the Norwegian Guarantee Institute for Ships and Drilling Vessels Ltd. have been investigated.
These have not been handed over to the Norwegian National Archives, and are still located at
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The material consists of six boxes, containing 16
chronologically filed folders from May 1975 until the end of 1980. The archive contains
correspondence, internal memorandums and the quarterly reports from the auditors of the
Guarantee Institute. As the Ministry of Trade and Shipping were important in the
establishment and operation of the Guarantee Institute, the material reflects the development
both on the strategic level and in connection with specific engagements. This documentation
has been particularly important for the analysis in Chapter Seven.
I have also had access to parts of the archives of Norges Rederforbund [The
Norwegian Shipowners' Association], where two subjects have been investigated. The first is
14 folders about the shipping crisis, chronologically filed from January 1975 until February
1980. The material consists of correspondence, internal memorandums and analyses of the
state of the shipping market and the problems of Norwegian shipping. The second part of the
archive which I have used relates to the Norwegian shipping policy, but this material is
limited. The material from the Norwegian Shipowners' Association has been important for the
analysis in Chapters Six and Nine.
1.3. Bibliography
In a 1991 evaluation of Norwegian historical research on postwar shipping, the maritime
historians Arild Marøy Hansen and Atle Thowsen pointed out that "[t}he shipping crisis of
the 1970s and 1980s has been paid little or no attention by historians. ,,3 Neither on the
international arena have the causes and effects of the depression of the 1970s been a major
topic for maritime historians.
This lack of a historical interest does not imply that the problems of the shipping
sector in the 1970s and 1980s have been victim of analytical neglect. A large body of
literature was written about the difficulties at the time. Moreover, figures and statistics from
the period have frequently been used as the basis for models analysing the structure and
development of the shipping market. Additionally, books written about individual shipowning
companies from a business history perspective have dealt with the manner in which various
companies coped with the changed conditions. Thus, the problems of the shipping market
have been treated in a variety of settings, though not with an analysis of the causes of the
crisis and its effects on national shipowners as the main focus.
1.3.1. The shipping crisis in economic models
The market for shipping services has been a popular research arena for economists,
3 Hansen, Arild Marøy and Thowsen, Atle, "Sjøfartshistorie som etterkrigshistorisk forskningsfelt" [Postwar
maritime history as topic for research], LOS-senter Working paper 9116, Norwegian Research Center in
Organization and Management, Bergen, 1991,p. 20.
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particularly due to the idea of proximity between the bulk market and the theoretical model of
perfect competition. As empirical models seeking to explain the mechanisms of the shipping
market have to rely on historical data, the development of important indicators such as
contracting and freight rate levels has been treated in an analytical setting. The drastically
changed market conditions from 1973 onwards represented a watershed in the development of
the shipping industry. The post-OPEC era is of particular interest as it represents the lapse of
a century-long, generally uninterrupted period of tanker transport demand growth. Moreover,
some of the fundamentals of the market, eg the distribution of vessels between the spot and
the charter markets and the composition of the world fleet, shifted following the freight
market breakdown. Shifts of this kind are important to those attempting to get an
understanding of the underlying mechanisms of the market.
Economic and econometric models depicting the development and features of the
shipping market have, in passing, tended to give relatively brief presentations of the causes
and effects of the shipping crisis. The object of the historical presentation in the econometric
models is generally to give a foundation upon which the analysis can be based. An example of
a more detailed analysis can be found in Beenstock and Vergottis' "Econometric Modelling of
World Shipping", where the long cycles in the shipping market from 1870 onwards are
presented." The analysis of the shipping crisis in such presentations tends to be relatively
shallow, stating the obvious influences - oversupplyand demand growth reduction - but not
elaborating causes and consequences.
A large body of research on the shipping sector, with emphasis on Norwegian agents,
has been conducted at The Institute for Shipping Research at the Norwegian School of
Economics and Business Administration. Several of the publications have used data from the
turbulent period in the mid 1970s as the basis for analysis, and the contributions by Petter
Dragesund and Siri Pettersen Strandenes have increased the insight into the decision-making
of shipowners on an aggregated level.' In addition to the literature which deals specifically
with the crisis years, several articles written before the crisis erupted may increase our
understanding of the subsequent experience of the shipping sector in general, and Norwegian
shipowners in particular.
Some of these contributions have dealt directly with individual shipowners, including
the studies of the shipowners' attitude towards risk by Peter Lorange and Victor Norman,
undertaken before the crisis. Lorange and Norman found that the risk shipowners were willing
to take depended upon their liquidity. Consequently, this may explain the relatively large risk
4 Beenstock, Michael and Vergottis, Andreas, Econometric Modelling of World Shipping, Chapman & Hall,
London, 1993,pp. 1-69.
5 Dragesund, Petter, Kontraheringsatferd i tankmarkedet [Contracting behaviour in the tanker market],
unpublished thesis, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Bergen, 1990, Strandenes,
Siri Pettersen, Kontrahering og salg av norske tankskip 1963-76 [Contracting and sales of Norwegian tankers,
1963-76], Institute for Shipping Research, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration,
Bergen, 1979 and Strandenes, Siri Pettersen, Trekk ved konjunkturutviklingen i tankfarten [Aspects of the
business cycle development in tanker shipping], unpublished thesis, Norwegian School of Economics and
Business Administration, Bergen, 1977.
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proneness among Norwegian shipowners during the freight market boom in 1973. The
conclusion supports the idea that "Norwegian owners in particular, and Scandinavian owners
in general, are more risk prone both than other shipowners in the world and the oil
companies themselves. ,,6
An interesting follow-up study by Eckbo extends the analysis to include the period
after the shipping crisis.' Eckbo concludes that the preferences had changed in the seven-year-
period after Lorange and Norman conducted their study. He does not try to explain this
transformation, but the shipowners participating in the studyoffered the opinion that age and
the unfavourable economic environment may have affected their judgements.
In late August 1972, The Institute for Shipping Research organised a conference in
Bergen. Several of the articles presented at the conference, though obviously not dealing with
the shipping crisis as such, provide valuable insight into the mechanisms and structure of the
shipping market. 8 Among the topics discussed were forecasting, the structure of the shipping
market, uncertainty, risk and planning. The contributions highlight the challenges facing
shipowners, particularly "the decision-making problems within the bulk-shipping
management area. ,,9 The experiences of the remaining part of the decade proved the effects of
these problems in full.
An analysis published by The Institute for Shipping Research in the early 1980s,
commissioned by the Norwegian Guarantee Institute for Ships and Drilling Vessels Ltd.,
states that there are two crises in tanker shipping. ID The first was caused by insufficient
demand and a dramatic increase of tonnage. The second appeared as a result of the absolute
decline of oil consumption and transport following the strong increase in the oil price in
1979/80. However, the aim of the report is to analyse the future market for large tankers, and
the explanations of the two crises are not presented in detail.
Bennet, Huxham and Dando use a "hypergame-approach" to study the interaction
between various players," Their aim is to explain the crisis in the shipping sector, where
"[tjhe October 1973 oil crisis turned what might have been a conventional trough in the
shipping cycle (though this is debatable) into a depression of much more serious
6 Lorange, Peter and Norman, Victor D., "Risk preference in Scandinavian Shipping", Applied Economics, 1973,
Volume 5, pp. 49-59 and Lorange, Peter and Norman, Victor D., "How attitudes towards risk influence
investment decisions", European Business, No. 33, 1972, pp. 71-84.
7 Eckbo, Bjørn Espen, Risikoprejeransen blant noen skandinaviske tankredere jør og etter krisen i tankmarkedet
[Risk preference among some Scandinavian tanker owners before and after the tanker market crisis], Institute for
Shipping Research, Norwegian School ofEconomics and Business Administration, 1977.
8 Lorange, Peter, and Norman, Victor (eds.), Shipping Management, Institute for Shipping Research, AS John
Grieg, Bergen, 1973. Several of the contributions have been referred to where it is appropriate in the main part
of the thesis.
9 Ibid., p. 15.
10 Norman, Victor D. and Wergeland, Tor, Stortankmarkedet frem til 1985 - En analyse av markedet jor
tankskip over 200.000 dwt [The market for large tankers until 1985 - An analysis of the market for tankers
larger than 200.000 dwt], Center for Applied Research Report 511981, Norwegian School of Economics and
Business Administration, Bergen, 1981.
Il Bennett, P. G., Huxham, C. S. and Dando, M. R., "Shipping in Crisis: a Trial Run for 'Live' Application of
the Hypergame Approach", Omega, No.6, 1981, vol. 9, pp. 579-594.
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proportions. ,,12 They emphasise the importance of the overcapacity in the shipbuilding
industry and the governments' reluctance to reduce subsidies as factors preventing a return to
normal conditions.
The hypergame-approach illustrates one of the dilemmas facing shipowners, viz that it
would be rational for individual shipowners to reduce the size of their fleet, provided other
shipowners did the same. This implies that coordinated action would be necessary to reach a
preferred outcome, but means that an owner reducing tonnage unilaterally may get the worst
ofboth worlds. Despite some limitations, eg a relatively shallow understanding of some of the
mechanisms of the shipping sector, the analysis provides valuable insight, particularly into the
importance of the alliance between the shipbuilding industry and national governments for the
continuing subsidisation of vessels entering a saturated market. 13
The analysis of the turbulent period of the 1970s in economic and econometric models
is helpful to gain an understanding of the underlying factors explaining the development.
Moreover, these models indicate in which areas explanations of the crisis should be sought.
By combining the insights from these models with the actual experiences from the period, our
understanding of the causes and consequences of the shipping crisis may be enhanced.
1.3.2. The shipping crisis and company histories
Several Norwegian shipowners and shipowning companies have had their histories written,
and the more recent contributions have presented the shipowning companies' adaptation to the
changed state of the shipping market from the early 1970s onwards. However, the quality of
these accounts varies, and their formats range from the glossy, advertising-folder type, via the
biographical or autobiographical account, to books written from a business history angle."
Despite the variable scientific quality of these contributions, they are useful tools to
understanding the strategies, actions and ideas of individual shipowners, and most of them
provide detailed information about the development of the fleets of the various Norwegian
shipowning companies.
Business history accounts
Books written from a business history perspective are a valuable source of information about
shipowners and the basis of their strategic decisions. The book by Hanisch and Ramskjær on
Sigval Bergesen "represents a breakthrough for the idea of writing the history of a
Norwegian shipowning company in accordance with the scientific demands posed by a
12 Ibid., p. 580.
13 When using the term "shallow understanding", I refer to the lack of distinction between competitive markets,
eg the bulk market, and less competitive segments, such as the liner sector. The authors claim that "shipowners
have traditionally been able to help themselves by forming cartels ", but this is not correct for the bulk sector, on
which most of the study is based.
14 For examples of the various types, see Misje, Magne, Solstads Rederi AlS 1964-1989, Solstads Rederi,
Skudeneshavn, 1989, Reksten, Hilmar, Opplevelser [Experiences], H. Aschehoug & Co., Oslo, 1979 and
Hanisch, Tore Jørgen and Ramskjær, Liv Jorunn, Firmaet Sigval Bergesen, Stavanger: under vekslende vilkår
1887-1987 [The company Sigval Bergesen, Stavanger, 1887-1987], Dreyer bok, Stavanger, 1987, respectively.
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serious business history. ,,15 Subsequent contributions in the same vein, for instance Gunnar
Nerheim and Bjørn Utne's account of the Stavanger-based company Smedvig and Gunnar
Nerheim and Kristin øye Gjerde's book about the Ugland-companies, have followed this
trend."
The history of the Ugland-companies is of particular interest, as it analyses the
company's foray into the offshore industry, a strategy followed by several Norwegian
shipowning companies in the middle of the 1970s.17 As the authors point out, "[the company}
belonged to the relatively smal! group of shipowning companies which had managed a
transformation in time, before the crisis was a fact. ,']8 However, judging from the evidence
given in the book, this was as much a result of good luck, as of a conscious avoidance of the
most severely hit market segments. The shipowner's sketch of a 1980-fleet including four
large tankers and six tankers in the 100-130.000 dwt range was never effectuated due to the
breakdown of the tanker market." Uglands Rederi managed to cope with the operating losses
from the bulk carriers and tankers due to profitable investments in other segments. In the
period 1976-1979, profits from the car carrier fleet and the offshore investments secured a
positive bottom-line."
The business history of Norway's largest shipowning company in the 1970s, Sig.
Bergesen d.y., remains unwritten. However, the company's roots can be traced to the
Stavanger-based company Firmaet Sigval Bergesen, founded in the late 1880s and divided
between the founder's two sons in the mid 1930s. The detailed history of Firmaet Sigval
Bergesen illustrates the challenges facing shipowners in the turbulent period around the crisis.
In the early 1970s, the company's three remaining motor tankers, all from the 1950s, were
sold, and in 1974 the fleet consisted oftwo turbine tankers and four gas carriers. The company
also held three newbuilding contracts. According to Hanisch and Ramskjær, the contracting
was motivated by a perceived need for renewal of the fleet after a period of consolidation."
They argue, convincingly, that the current situation in the shipping sector should have led to
more caution, but that the company, like so many other agents, perceived the crisis as
temporary.
Interestingly, the authors pose the question why the company, unlike so many of its
15 Hansen & Thowsen, op.cit., 1991, p. 13.
16 Nerheim, Gunnar and Utne, Bjørn S., Under samme stjerne - Rederiet Peder Smedvig 1915-1990 [Under the
star- The shipowning company Peder Smedvig 1915-1990], Peder Smedvig AfS, Stavanger, 1990 and Nerheim,
Gunnar and øye, Kristin Gjerde, Uglandrederiene - verdensvirksomhet med lokale røtter [The Ugland
shipowning companies - international business with local roots], Andreas K.L. Ugland & Johan Jørgen Ugland,
Grimstad, 1996. The former book will not be discussed in the bibliography, but has been an important source for
the analysis of Smedvig in Chapter Eight.
17 Nerheim & øye, op.cit., 1996, pp. 191-227.
18 Ibid., p. 233.
19 These thoughts on the future fleet were presented in an internal memorandum in early 1973. Luckily, all the
large vessels had yet to be contracted by the time the tanker market broke down, facilitating a quick reversal of
the strategy; see Nerheim & øye, op.cit., 1996, p. 217.
20 For an illustrative presentation of the operating profits in the period, see Nerheim, & øye, op.cit., 1996, p.
228.
21 Hanisch & Ramskjær, op.cit., 1987, p. 146.
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competitors, did not leap into the offshore oil sector. Their answer is that Sigval Bergesen
chose to focus on their existing competence, continue the cooperation with other gas carrier
operators and at the same time perceived overcapacity to be as threatening in the offshore
sector as in the shipping sector. The newbuilding contracts led to an escalation of the
company's debts and increasing financial worries. In 1977 the company's directors realised
that it was no longer possible to manage their obligations "by means of accumulated reserves
and increased borrowing. ,,22 Negotiations with the creditors in practice led to a controlled
winding-up of the company. In the middle of the decade the company had owned two turbine
tankers, four gas tankers and three newbuilding contracts. In 1979 the company's sole vessel
was transferred to the Liberian flag.
Biographical and autobiographical accounts
Despite their analytical and scientific limitations, eg their total neglect of the use of notes and
the emphasis on anecdotal "evidence", biographical accounts may provide detailed
information about the strategic decisions of Norwegian shipowners." Notwithstanding the fact
that "the actual history" may be obscured by the selective memories of the subjects or the
advantage of seeing things with hindsight, biographies may still be an important source of
information. They reveal relevant features of the environment in which their subjects worked
and made their decisions, and the personality of the shipowner - and decision-maker - tends
to shine through.
The autobiography of Hilmar Reksten is of great interest, particularly when it is
viewed in contrast to other authors' accounts of several of the same events." Hilmar
Reksten's autobiography emerges as a rebuttal from a shipowner subject to massive criticism
for alleged tax evasion, as well as for his business policy. The differences in recollection,
presentation and apportioning of blame between this and other books dealing with the same
topic illustrate the challenges present when dealing with subjective memoirs. Nevertheless,
Reksten's autobiography is a valuable tool to understanding his strategies and judgements.
The controversy continued even after Reksten's death, and Thune and Haaland present greatly
contrasting views on the performance of the liquidators ofReksten's estate." The topic will be
dealt with in more detail in Chapter Eight.
In his autobiography, the shipowner Bendt Rasmussen, presents his initial reaction to
22 Annual report 1977, quoted in Hanisch & Ramskjær, op.cit., 1987, p. 152.
23 Mosvold, Torrey, Mitt liv [My life], published by the author, Kristiansand, 1982 is a very good example of the
fact that this is not always the case - only a very small part of the book deals with shipping at all.
24 Reksten, Hilmar, op.cit., 1979. Several of the most controversial topics are also presented in Borgen, Erling,
Hilmar Rekstens eventyr [The adventures of Hilmar Reksten], lW. Cappelens Forlag AS, 1981, Reksten,
Audun, Slik var det [The way it was], Gyldendal Norsk Forlag AS, Oslo, 1983 and Onarheim, Onar, Min tørn
[My bout], Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1984.
25 Haaland, Arild, Reksten-eventyret - en økonomisk tragikomedie i s_w akter og en epilog [The Reksten
Fairytale - an economic tragicomedy in seven acts and an epilogue], Vigmostad & Bjørke, Bergen, 1996 and
Thune, Jens Kristian, Jakten - på sporet av Hilmar Reksten [The Hunt - in Hilmar Reksten's Trail], H.
Aschehoug & Co., 1991.
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the oil price increase; "Out of the tanker sector. ,,26 The company's three tankers had been
disposed ofby May 1975. As in many other Norwegian shipping companies, the offshore oil
sector provided the new investment alternative, .and the company concentrated on their
engagements in the drilling vessel and supply ship markets. The most interesting part of the
book, however, deals with the company's development in the 1980s, and shows how the
control of the company gradually came in the hands of outside investors. Bendt Rasmussen,
who had been managing director and main shareholder in the middle of the 1980s, became
working vice-chairman of the board, without a share portfolio. This transfer of power, from
family ownership to institutional investors, characterised several Norwegian shipping
companies in the wake of the shipping crisis.
The Norwegian-born, US citizen Erling Dekke Næss is often presented as one of the
few shipowners who predicted the oncoming crisis and acted accordingly. In his
autobiography, he describes how, based on the development of the cycles in the shipping
market and uneasiness about the large amount of tonnage on order, "1started negotiations to
sell the fleet lock, stock and barrel. ,,27 In July 1973 the company Zapata Nomess Inc. received
more than $200 million for its vessels; the buyers, who got the bad end of the bargain, were
Hilmar Reksten and' the British shipping company P&O.28 However, Erling Dekke Næss'
position in the company Zapata Nomess Inc. in 1973 was that of "honorary chairman of the
board". After selling most of his own fleet at a relatively low price in the late 1960s, he was
no longer the major shareowner.
However, Dekke Næss continued to perpetuate the myth of his great sale, and in a
presentation entitled "61 years in the shipping business", he claims that "[wjhen in 1973 1
decided to sell my fleet which had grown from one ship to around 50, 1did so as an
Economist and, particularly, as a keen student of business cycles. There had been a boom for
a number of years, but my study of business cycles told me that it would not last. ,,29 Although
the details of the ownership are arguable, the sense of timing and the business cycle
foundation for the decision are interesting. Another Norwegian shipowner, and keen student
of business cycles, also predicted the changing conditions; "there is probably no one but
Fred. Olsen who can compliment himself on avoiding the shipping crisis of the century. ,,30
Fred. Olsen sold his tanker fleet, most of which ran on long-term charters, to foreign
26 Rasmussen, Bendt, Gjennom bølger på sjø og land [Through waves at sea and on shore], Vigmostad &
Bjørke, Bergen, 1996, p. 209.
27 Næss, Erling Dekke, Shipping - mitt liv, Hjemmet! Fagpresseforlaget, Oslo, 1981, p. 285.
28 As is usual when dealing with Hilmar Reksten, the sale is cloaked in controversy. Reksten claims that he only
acted as an agent for the buyers of the fleet, and did not invest personally. This is refuted by Erling Borgen in
Borgen, op.cit., 1981, pp. 63-76, who calls it "The shipping deal of the century" and in Reksten, op.cit., 1983,
pp. 119-125 where the transaction is labelled "The shippingpurchase of the century". Incidentally, the author of
the former book was the "editor" of the second
29 Næss, Erling Dekke, "61 Years in the Shipping Business", in Strandenes, Siri Pettersen, Svendsen, Arnljot
Strømme and Wergeland, Tor (eds.), Shipping Strategies and Bulk Shipping in the 1990s, Center for
International Business, Bergen, 1989, p. 1.
30 Hauge, Odd Harald, Fred. Olsen - uautorisert biografi [Fred. Olsen - unauthorised biography], Gyldendal
Norsk Forlag AS, Oslo, 1993, p. 108.
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investors in 1972, but neither he did manage to dispose of the fleet when the market was at its
peak. Nevertheless, he succeeded in selling his fleet of eight tankers before the market broke
down. Despite his acknowledgement that "the world has never seen over-contracting to such
an extent", the sale was partly prompted by the unprofitable long-term charters on which his
vessels were operating. Fred. Olsen admits that "it was very much fortune. ,,31
The complexity of this issue is evident when the question of shipbuilding is
introduced. Being the majority owner of the Aker-group, Fred. Olsen authorised the building
of large vessels on Reksten's and other Norwegian shipowners' account. After Fred. Olsen
himself had decided to withdraw from the tanker sector due to the potential oversupply of
tonnage, he continued to let other shipowners order large vessels. The question of Hilmar
Reksten, Fred. Olsen and the contracts at the Aker-Stord yard will be presented in more detail
in Chapters Seven and Eight.
Several of the biographies on Norwegian shipowners have a typically investigative
approach, particularly those dealing with the question of foreign funds, representing an
obvious contrast to the authorised biographies. Additionally, some give an impression of
being legal pleas, where controversies are being contested in public." Nevertheless, despite
their subjective approach, these publications may contain useful information. For instance,
though on no account a major theme in the book, the differing chartering strategies of
Bergesen and Reksten are splendidly illustrated in Erling Borgen's biography of Sigval
Bergesen d.y."
Other company-focussed presentations of the crisis
In addition to the publications focussing on the biographical history of shipowners, several
books have dealt with the historical development of individual shipowning companies. A
common feature is that these books tend to be commissioned and published by the company
in question. This has two important implications. On the one hand, it implies that several of
the most interesting objects of research, ie the major business failures, have not been in the
position to "purchase" a historical account of their experience. This is a crude example of
how, to use a cliche, history was written by the winners. On the other hand, it implies that the
quality and focus of the work may have been coloured by the authors' relationship and
obligations to their paymasters. This may have led to the negligence of controversial topics
and too much emphasis on the virtues of the companies, their owners and their personnel. 34
31 Ibid., p. 108
32 See for instance the opposing views in Borgen, Erling, Huset Bergesen [The House of Bergesen], Cappelen,
Oslo, 1984 and Jacobsen, AlfR., Dynastiet Bergesen [The Bergesen Dynasty], Atheneum Forlag, Oslo, 1984. In
his introduction to the latter publication the author states that his aim was to present "the heretical version of the
history of the Bergesen dynasty" as opposed to "the official version" represented by the former publication. See
also Jacobsen, AlfR., Eventyret Anders Jahre [The Tale of Anders Jahre], Oktober, Oslo, 1982.
33 See for instance the correspondence between Reksten and Bergesen in Borgen, op.cit., 1984, pp. 141-142,
more closely described in Chapter Eight.
34 There are several recent examples of commissioned company histories which have remained unpublished due
to the dissatisfaction of the company with either the contents or the quality of the material.
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The majority of the shipowning company histories guide us through the crisis years
with a narrow focus on the company in question. Despite the fact that this provides valuable
information about the companies per se, the authors generally fail to put the companies in an
analytical or comparative context which might have thrown light upon the alternatives
available. Rather than giving an extended outline of these contributions here, I have chosen to
present these publications in connection with the analysis of the effects of the crisis on
Norwegian shipowning companies in Chapter Nine.
Other companies in the maritime sector
The plethora ofrelatively small shipowners in the Norwegian maritime industry facilitated the
existence of a series of companies, such as brokers, financial advisors and technical
consultants, performing tasks which larger shipowning companies tended to internalise.
Consequently, it is necessary to extend the focus from the shipowning companies when
evaluating the effects of the shipping crisis for the Norwegian maritime industry. The books
about companies involved in auxiliary activities such as shipbroking, classification and
insurance generally have several of the same limitations as the bulk of the company histories.
Their focus is narrow, the analytical framework is limited or totally absent, and facts and
figures have had to give way to anecdotes."
However, some contributions stand out, in particular the history of the classification
society Det Norske Veritas. Håkon With Andersen and John Peter Collett have presented the
company's fate in the 1970s in an impressive manner, demonstrating the close relationship
between the economic performance of Norwegian shipping and the main Norwegian
classification society." The book also illustrates the transformation of the Norwegian
maritime industry from shipping to shipping and offshore engagements. Det Norske Veritas
played an important role in the development of the exploration facilities in the North Sea and,
as Norwegian offshore interests expanded, in other locations as well. The history of Det
Norske Veritas, a company originally based on the provision of services to the shipping
industry, illustrates the shift of the Norwegian economy from high dependence on freight
revenues to oil exports as the main earner, and the business opportunities presented by this
transformation.
The history of the Norwegian shipbroking company R.S. Platou shows the various
tasks undertaken by these companies and their importance in a maritime environment. R.S.
Platou was engaged in the sale and purchase of newbuildings and second-hand vessels,
chartering of tankers, car carriers and bulk carriers and also entered the offshore sector.
Traditionally, little attention has been paid to the role played by brokers, but the history of
35 The most striking example of this kind of "business history" may be Pettersen, Lauritz, Engelsen, Rolf and
Grieg, Per, The sound of Grieg, Joachim Grieg & Co., Bergen, 1984. This kind of publications serves a purpose,
usually as a keepsake for employees and customers, but not with regard to increasing the understanding of the
shipping crisis and the factors which shaped the shipping environment.
36 Andersen, Håkon With and Collett, John Peter, Anchor and Balance, Det norske Veritas 1864-1989, J.W.
Cappelens Forlag, Oslo, 1989.
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R.S. Platou illustrates the important functions these companies undertake."
In his account of the financing institution Redernes Skibskreditforening, Kaare
Petersen gives a detailed account of the changes in international economic relations in the
period around the oil price increase." His comparatively short comments on the shipping
crisis focus on the relationship between the oil price increase and the declining profitability of
shipping. Unfortunately, his detailed analysis of the international business cycle development
has left little room for an analysis of the effects of the crisis. Nevertheless, the relatively short
chapters on "Shipping financing in Norway after 1975" and "The Guarantee Institute for
Ships and Drilling Vessels Ltd." provide a brief introduction to some of the important aspects,
particularly the development of the Norwegian shipbuilding industry."
1.3.3. The shipping crisis in public documents
The negative effects of the shipping crisis on the Norwegian economy prompted public action.
A popular strategy was to appoint a committee of inquiry, and a series of public committees
have analysed the shipping and shipbuilding industries with a revision of public policies in
mind. A common feature of these reports has been a short commentary on the causes and
effects of the shipping crisis."
Despite their thematic focus on the Norwegian shipping sector and its problems, the
public reports tend to discuss policy challenges rather than analyse the situation creating the
difficulties in the first place. Consequently, little attention is given to the causes of the crisis,
but the effects, and possible remedies, are outlined.
Several public reports deal with the new situation for Norwegian shipping in the wake
of the crisis, where suggestions are presented as to how Norwegian shipowners and authorities
should respond to the transformed fundamentals in the international shipping sector. In
particular, the question about the acceptance of registering Norwegian-owned vessels under
Flags of Convenience gained importance following the reduction of Norwegian tonnage from
1978 onwards. The first public report to address this issue was Stortingsmelding nr. 23 (1975-
76), Om sjøfolkenes forhold og skipsfartens plass i samfunnet [On the situation of seamen and
shipping's position in the society], where it was rather categorically stated that Norwegian-
owned vessels should fly the Norwegian flag.
Despite the outspoken political attitude towards the use of Flags of Convenience, the
actual implementation of the policy was, at best, ambiguous. A former bureaucrat, Gisle Stray
37 Baa1srud, Terje and Gram, Hans Thomas, R.S. Platou A.S. 1936-1986 - Fifty Years of Shipbroking, published
by the company, Høvik, 1995.
38 Petersen, Kaare, Skipsfinansiering i medgang og motgang - Redernes Skibskreditforening, 1929-1979 [Ship
fmancing in good and bad times - Redernes Skibskreditforening, 1929-1979], Redernes Skibskreditforening,
Kristiansand, 1979, pp. 173-202.
39 Ibid., pp. 203-223.
40 See for instance Stortingsmelding nr. 23 (1975-76), Om sjøfolkenes forhold og skipsfartens plass i samfunnet
[On the situation of seamen and shipping's position in the society], Norges Offentlige Utredninger (1978:13)
Skipsfartsnæringen [The shipping sector], Stortingsmelding nr. 52 (1980-81), Om skipsfartsnæringen [On the
shipping industry] and Stortingsmelding nr. 53 (1984-85), Om skipsfartsnæringen [On the shipping industry].
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Breistein, with experience from the Ministry of Trade and Shipping, has dealt with the
question of Norwegian shipping and exchange controls, and concludes that there were several
instances where the authorities turned a blind eye to the foreign interests and investments of
Norwegian shipowners." This topic, and the relevant public documents, will be discussed in
more detail in Chapters Nine and Ten.
Due to the importance of Norwegian shipowners for the order books of the domestic
shipbuilding industry - their share of the total deliveries from Norwegian yards fluctuated
between 65 and 80 per cent in the early 1970s - the difficulties of the shipping sector have
received several comments in the public analyses of the predicament of the shipbuilding
industry. However, these presentations tend to be relatively short, and other analyses of the
shipbuilding industry have succeeded in integrating the significance of the shipping sector
development in a more convincing manner.
In 1975, the OECD devoted a special 25 page chapter of their annual shipping
publication, Maritime Transport, to the tanker crisis. The section, entitled "Oil transportation
by sea in a new context" gives a relatively short assessment of the causes of the oversupply of
tanker tonnage, and tries to analyse the prospective seaborne transport of oil in the period up
until 1985. Some options available to shipowners and governments are sketched, and the
situation in the shipping market is described as a "catastrophe". The report emphasises the
fact that both the oil companies and international organisations, including the OECD itself,
had previously made forecasts which have been far off the mark. However, they claim that
they do not go as far as "certain commentators and shipowners in denigrating forecasts. "
Hilmar Reksten is used as an example of such an attitude."
1.3.4. The shipping crisis in other publications
The causes and effects of the shipping crisis have been the main theme for a limited number
of publications. This thesis is the continuation of the work I began in 1995,which resulted in
a report published by Stiftelsen for samfunns- og næringslivsforskning [The Foundation for
Research in Economics and Business Administration]." An article introducing some of the
findings of this report was presented at The Fifth International Congress of Maritime History
and later published in the International Journal of Maritime History." Moreover, an article
based upon Chapter Seven of this dissertation is forthcoming in the same publication.
The shipping crisis, and its relation to the shipbuilding industry, has also been the
41 Breistein, Gisle Stray, Valutaregulering og skipsfart [Currency control and shipping], Institute for Shipping
Research, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Bergen, 1984.
42 OECD, Maritime Transport 1975, Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Paris, 1976,
pp. 93-118, quotes from p. 117 and p. 111.
43 Tenold, Stig, Skipsfartskrisen og norske redere - en økonomisk-historisk studie 1973-1980 [The shipping
crisis and Norwegian shipowners - an economic-historical study 1973-1980], SNF-Report No. 60/95, The
Foundation for Research in Economics and Business Administration, Bergen, 1995.
44 Tenold, Stig and Nordvik, Helge W, "Coping With the International Shipping Crisis of the 1970s: A Study of
Management Responses in Norwegian Oil Tanker Companies", International Journal of Maritime History,
Volume 8, No.2 (December 1996), pp. 33-69.
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subject of another fairly extensive analysis. However, the author states in his introduction that
"ft} he analysis has partlya political purpose and partlya theory-developing aspiration. f ...}
The diminishing importance f of the working classes caused by the shipping- and
shipbuilding-crises} may lead to a setback for the establishment of conditions for a socialist
development. ,>45 Although steeped in sloganeering and policy recommendations of a
revolutionary nature, the publication provides a fairly extensive, but disorganised, analysis of
the relationshipbetween the shipping crisis and the shipbuilding industry.
Another account of the shipping crisis - about "the dream of the golden 1970s and
why the dream was not fulfilled" - was given by Professor Arnljot Strømme Svendsen in The
Norwegian Yearbook of Maritime History 1978.46 Through an introduction to the demand and
supply conditions in shipping, as well as shipping market cycles and economic cycles in
general, he presents the development of freight rates, tonnage prices, lay up-rates and
demolition in the 1970s. Arnljot Strømme Svendsen also presented a lecture entitled "The
Shipping Crisis" at a seminar in Oslo Rederiforening [Oslo Shipowners' Association].
However, this manuscript deals with the image problems of Norwegian shipping in relation to
the public opinion, so the title may seem somewhat misleading from our focus."
Twenty years after the shipping crisis was presented in The Norwegian Yearbook of
Maritime History for the first time, another article dealing with the topic was included in this
publication." The shipping economist Victor Norman gives a detailed account of the causes
and course of "the strongest and most long-lasting period of recession in international
shipping in this century. ,,49 The article focuses on the structural causes of the crisis, including
the oil price increase and the high level of contracting.
K. Dabrowski, of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), published a short analysis of the shipping crisis in 1981.50 He emphasises, like in
this thesis, that "the breakdown in the world shipping market is attributed to the factors both
on the demand and supply side. ,,51 However, most of his explanation focuses on the supply
side, where he stresses the importance of the capital market and the ties between Japanese
shipbuilding and the Flag of Convenience fleets.
Publications from shipbrokers and shipping research companies are a valuable source
4S Røpke, Inge, Den internationale krise i skibsfart og værftsindustri i 1970 'erne [The international crisis in
shipping and the shipbuilding industry in the 1970s], unpublished thesis, University ofCopenhagen, 1981, p. I.
46 Svendsen, Arnljot Strømme, "Skipsfartskonjunkturene i 1970-årene" [Shipping cycles in the 1970s],
Sjøfartshistorisk Årbok 1978 [Norwegian Yearbook of Maritime History 1978], Bergen Maritime Museum,
Bergen, 1979, pp. 205-242.
47 Svendsen, Arnljot Strømme, "Skipsfartskrisen" [The Shipping Crisis], unpublished manuscript, Institute for
Shipping Research, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Bergen, 1976.
48 Norman, Victor D., "Skipsfartskrisen etter 1973 - forløp og årsaker" [The shipping crisis after 1973 - course
and causes], Sjøfartshistorisk Årbok 1998 [Norwegian Yearbook of Maritime History 1998], Bergen Maritime
Museum, Bergen, 1999, pp. 161-184.
49 Ibid., p. 183.
so Dabrowski, K., "Comments on the mechanisms of the world shipping market", Maritime Policy and
Management, Volume 8, No.2, 1981, pp. 85-98.
Sl Ibid., p. 85.
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of information, particularly with regard to the figures underlying the development of freight
rates, transport demand and fleets. Some of these publications, for instance the monthly and
annual reports from Platou, Fearnley & Eger, Grieg and Clarkson, emphasise statistics, thus
providing a useful basis for analysis. Furthermore, the research division of the British
shipping consultants H.P. Drewry have published a series of reports dealing with specific
aspects of the shipping market. The themes ofthese publications range from "World shipping
under flags of convenience" to "The role of independent tanker owners ", and the reports give
a thorough introduction to several aspects of the shipping market, substantiated by relevant
statistics." One of their reports, entitled "The tanker crisis: causes, effects and prospects to
1985" is a short analysis for industry insiders, with emphasis on the anticipated development
of the sector."
The Norwegian shipping analyst Birger Nossum, formerly director of research for
Fearnley & Eger, has given a detailed account of the development of the dry bulk fleet and the
evolution of dry bulk cargoes in the period 1960-1990. However, the emphasis of the book is
on data, rather than analysis. Even though Nossum gives a detailed account of the
development of the dry bulk fleet and trades, the mechanisms and policy choices which may
throw light upon the basis for the development are generally neglected."
A similar volume, emphasising data rather than analysis, has been collected by three of
the main analysts at the British shipbroking and research institution Clarkson. Subtitled "Key
statistics from the Clarkson oil tanker register and research publications over the last 30
years ", the volume contains a plethora of information about most aspects of the tanker
market." Although the amount of information gathered in the publication is impressive, the
usefulness is sometimes hampered by the lack of consistent, long time-series.
The shift in the international maritime hegemony following the shipping crisis has
been elegantly explained by Helen A. Thanopoulou." Her hypothesis is that nations at a less
advanced state of development entered the shipping market, offering a service that had
become standardised. This prompted the transfer of the capital of the Traditional Maritime
Nations to Flags of Convenience and Emerging Maritime Nations, withdrawal from
shipowning and the shift of capital to the more specialised segments of the shipping market.
The hypothesis seems well-suited to explain some of the most important long-term structural
shifts in Norwegian shipping.
52 The most relevant reports are Drewry, The Role of Independent Tankers Owners, H.P. Drewry Shipping
Consultants Ltd., 1976, Drewry, The Tanker Fleets of the International Oil Companies, H.P. Drewry Shipping
Consultants Ltd., 1979 and Drewry, The Trading Outlook for Very Large Tankers, H.P. Drewry Shipping
Consultants Ltd., London, 1975.
53 Drewry, The Tanker Crisis: Causes, Effects and Prospects to 1985, H.P. Drewry Shipping Consultants Ltd.,
London,1976.
54 Nossum, Birger, The Evolution of Dry Bulk Shipping, published by the author, Oslo, 1996.
55 Jenkins, Gilbert, Stopford, Martin and Tyler, Cliff, The Clarkson Oil Tanker Databook, Clarkson Research
Studies, London, 1993.
56 Thanopoulou, Helen A, "The growth of fleets registered in the newly-emerging maritime countries and
maritime crises", Maritime Policy and Management, Volume 22, No.1, pp. 51-62.
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The idea that the shipping market can be characterised by long-term cycles, has been
presented by Sletmo." He identifies the massive change in the composition of the world fleet
in the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s. His analysis goes further than only looking at the
increase in the share of the world fleet registered under Flags of Convenience, and he shows
that the share of the fleet controlled by the OECD-countries fell dramatically, from almost 83
per cent in mid 1970 to less than 67 per cent in 1986. However, he does not directly relate the
flagging-out to the shipping crisis, but rather sees it as a shipping sector version of the
establishment of overseas subsidiaries by multinational companies.
The changes in the shipping industry have also been touched upon in Bernhard J.
Abrahamsson's articles in Ocean Yearbook= He claims that the depression in the shipping
industry was the result of cyclical developments which were exacerbated by long-term
structural changes. Abrahamsson explains the changed structure of the shipping market
following the crisis by the increased fragmentation due to OPEC's attempts at loosening the
major oil companies' controlover transportation.
1.3.5. The shipping crisis and national fleets
The claim that the Norwegian shipowners were particularly hard hit by the shipping crisis is
repeated in "Norsk sjøfart" [Norwegian Shipping], a large, popularised book on Norwegian
shipping. 59 The presentation is to some extent hampered by its focus on aggregate figures and
trends - only a handful of Norwegian shipowners are mentioned in the 40 page description of
Norwegian shipping in the last decades of the 20th Century. The book is an accessible
presentation of some features of the Norwegian shipping industry, and as such it functions
well. However, it is on no account an analysis of the fate of Norwegian shipping in this
turbulent period.
Other national fleets have been analysed more properly. A relatively thorough account
of the success story of some of the Norwegian shipowners' most important competitors, viz
Greek shipowners, is given by Gelina Harlaftis in "A history of Greek-owned shipping. ,,60
However, her presentation of the causes and effects of the crisis is limited, and she does not
give a detailed account of the Greek shipowners' response to the shipping crisis.
Another book in the same series, Yrj6 Kaukiainen's "A history of Finnish shipping",
has a relatively short chapter on "The great shipping crisis ".61 Kaukiainen's analysis focuses
57 See Sletmo, Gunnar K., "Shipping's fourth wave: ship management and Vernon's trade cycles", Maritime
Policy and Management, Volume 16, No.4, 1989, pp. 293-303. The idea oflong cycles is expanded in Sletmo,
Gunnar K. and Holste, Susanne., "Shipping and the competitive advantage of nations: The role of international
ship registers", Maritime Policy and Management, Volume 20, No.3, 1993, pp. 243-255.
58 Abrahamsson, Bernhard l, "International Shipping: Developments, Prospects and Policy Issues", Ocean
Yearbook 8, University of Chicago Press, 1987, pp. 158-175 and Abrahamsson, Bernhard l, "Merchant
Shipping in Transition", Ocean Yearbook 4, University of Chicago Press, 1983, pp. 121-139.
59 Nilsson, Jan Evert, "Norsk sjøfart mot år 2000" (Norwegian Shipping towards the 21"' Century], in Berggren,
Brit, et. al., Norsk Sjøfart (Norwegian Shipping], Dreyer, Oslo, 1989, pp. 314-356.
60 Harlaftis, Gelina, A history of Greek-owned shipping: the making of an international tramp fleet, 1830 to the
present day, Routledge, London, 1996.
61 Kaukiainen, Yrj6, A history of Finnish shipping, Routledge, London, 1993, pp. 177-181.
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on the effects of the crisis, and he claims that "the event which has popularly been called 'the
great shipping crisis' was by no means as unexpected as the Wall Street crash of 1929. ,,62
Interestingly, he compares the Finnish and the Norwegian experiences when explaining the
relatively low level of flagging-out of Finnish vessels.
The only other major fleet which was hit by the shipping crisis to the same extent as
the Norwegian, was that of the United Kingdom. In his analysis of the problems of the British
shipping sector, Ronald Hope explains the slump by over-optimistic forecasting, the mismatch
between transport capacity and demand and the effects of government subsidies to
shipbuilding and the optimism of the banking fraternity."
Several historians have dealt with the 1970s in more long-term analyses of national
fleets. John Theotokas has given an interesting account of the organisational and managerial
patterns of Greek-owned shipping enterprises. He claims that the basic characteristics of
Greek shipping companies resulted in a competitive advantage which was beneficial in the
postwar environment. The Greek case is contrasted with the negative experience of
Norwegian shipowners, whose share of world shipping dwindled in the period following the
shipping crisis."
Shin Goto's account of globalisation and the development of the Japanese fleet gives
valuable insights into the effects of government manning and subsidy policies. Surprisingly,
Goto attributes the difficulties of Japanese shipowning companies from the mid 1970s to the
rising cost oflabour, the appreciation of the yen and the relatively low growth of the Japanese
economy. The oversupply of international tonnage and depressed freight rate levels are not
emphasised in the analysis."
Yukio Yamashita presents a brief analysis of the Japanese shipping industry's
response to the crisis." He claims that Japanese shipping companies initially responded by
developing more efficient vessels needing smaller crews, changing their relationship to
maritime labour and increasing the use of container ships. Later, the use of foreign registered
ships, manned by low-cost foreign labour, increased.
62 Ibid., p. 177.
63 Hope, Ronald, A New History of British Shipping, John Murray, London, 1990, p. 444.
64 Theotokas, John, "Organizational and Managerial Patterns of Greek-Owned Shipping Enterprises and the
Internationalization Process from the Interwar Period to 1990", in Starkey, David J. and Harlaftis, Gelina (eds.),
Global Markets: The Internationalization of the Sea Transport Industries since 1850, Research in Maritime
History No. 14, St. John's, 1998, p. 317. See also Fon, Anders Martin, "Norsk og gresk skipsfartsnæring 1945-
1995 - en sammenligning" [Norwegian and Greek shipping 1945-1995 - a comparison], Sjøfartshistorisk Årbok
1995 [Norwegian Yearbook of Maritime History 1995], Bergen Maritime Museum, Bergen, 1996, pp. 49-75 for
a comparison of two of the major shipping nations in the postwar period.
65 To some extent, this might be justified by the importance of Japanese imports and exports for Japanese
shipping. Nevertheless, the neglect of the shifting fundamentals in the shipping sector seems strange from an
international point of view. See Goto, Shin, "Globalization and International Competitiveness: The Experience
of the Japanese Shipping Industry since the 1960s", in Starkey & Harlaftis, op.cit., 1998, p. 367.
66 Yamashita, Yukio, "Responding to the Global Market in Boom and Recession: Japanese Shipping and
Shipbuilding Industries, 1945-1980", in Ville, Simon P. and Williams, David M. (eds.), Management, Finance
and Industrial Relations in Maritime Industries: Essays in International Maritime and Business History,
Research in Maritime History No.6, St. John's, 1994, pp. 167-184.
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Two elements of Frank Broeze's article on the containerisation and the globalisation of
liner shipping warrant an inclusion here." First, his description of "over-tonnage" is dated to
the late 1970s, a confirmation that the container market prospered for a long time after the
bulk market had broken down. Second, the list of the world's 15 largest container companies
is noteworthy due to the absence of any Norwegian participants. This shows how Norwegian
shipowners, who had played an important role in international shipping for more than 100
years, were unable - or unwilling - to compete in a relatively new and expanding branch of
shipping.
Ame Franck-Nielsen's report "Redere - tank - olje" [Shipowners - tankers - oil],
which was published as part of Maktutredningen [The Study of the Distribution of Power in
Norway] is a relatively short, analytical account of the shipping crisis. This report, written
while the crisis was unfolding, gives an indication of the reluctance to blame shipowners for
their own misfortune; "We have presented the daring claim that the shipowning companies
themselves must admit part of the blame for the considerable imbalance in the market. ,>68 As
the analysis in this thesis will show, historical evidence refutes the "boldness" of this
assertion. Shipowners' extrapolation of historical growth rates, and their consequent over-
contracting, is crucial to an explanation of the length, depth and breadth of the shipping crisis.
Another paper published as part of Maktutredningen, dealing with the structural
features of the shipping sector, provides a very good presentation of the Norwegian shipping
sector in the mid 1970s.69 Some of the topics investigated, eg the effect of depreciation rules,
the degree of concentration and the organisational- and owner-structure in Norwegian
shipping, are of importance to an analysis of the effects of the crisis for the Norwegian
shipping sector.
Dag Bakka jr. 's book "Byen ved de syv hav" [The City by the Seven Seas] is not about
a national fleet per se, but rather about the development of the shipping industry in the
Norwegian city of Bergen.?" Despite being a book with a distinctly local foundation, it
includes one of the most comprehensive analyses of the effects of the international shipping
crisis for a maritime environment. The far-reaching consequences of the crisis for the
maritime cluster in a relatively small Norwegian city is a testimony to the international
character of the international shipping industry and its Norwegian participants.
The strong element of Bakka's analysis is the ability to distinguish between the
companies for which the shipping crisis spelt disaster, and the companies that survived the
crisis through enterprise, novel technological solutions and emphasis on growing market
67 Broeze, Frank, "Containerization and the Globalization of Liner Shipping", in Starkey & Harlaftis, op.cit.,
1998, pp. 385-423.
68 Franck-Nielsen, Ame, Redere - tank- olje, [Shipowners - tankers - oil], Working paper No. 37, The Study of
the Distribution of Power in Norway, Bergen, 1975.
69 Franck-Nielsen, Ame, Skipsfartsnæringen - strukturelle trekk og arbeidsbetingelser [The shipping industry-
structural features and operating conditions], Working paper No. 29, The Study of the Distribution of Power in
Norway, Bergen, 1975.
70 Bakka, Dag jr., Byen ved de syv hav, [The City by the Seven Seas], Seagull Publishing, Bergen, 1998,
particularly pp. 135-196, but also the short presentation of the companies from page 217 onwards.
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segments.
1.3.6. The shipping crisis and other sources
An account of the shipping crisis and its short-term causes and implications was published by
Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt [Norwegian Institute of International Affairs] as a special
edition of their periodical Internasjonal Politikk [International Politics]. The seven
contributions, from members of government, the shipping industry and academia, all place the
historical development in a political context.71
In his book on ship finance, Peter Stokes has analysed the development of shipping
financing during the boom preceding the shipping crisis, and shown how the optimism
characteristic among shipowners had its counterpart in the banking sector." He claims that
"[among bankers} all sense of restraint evaporated in the early 1970s. ,m The same idea is
put forward by Peter S. Douglas, who notes that "the concept of standard credit terms for
creditworthy buyers of ships degenerated, in the boom atmosphere at the time, into the idea of
standard credit terms for almost anyone who wanted to buy ships. ,,74
There is ample evidence that the attitudes among the providers of financing, both
private and public, were of a kind which amplified, rather than hampered, the contracting of
over-optimistic shipowners. Douglas even goes so far as to claim that "the principal cause [of
the tonnage surplus}, is the ship-financing policy that prevailed in the early 1970s among the
majority of participants in the shipping industry in all the five categories I have mentioned -
shipowners, private and government; shipbuilders and their governments; and shipping
financiers. ,,75
Peter Stokes' book gives an indication of the extent to which the "favourable"
financing conditions contributed to the over-contracting and the freight market breakdown.
John P. Cashman, of Lloyd's Register of Shipping, gives a more balanced view, summarising
the main reasons for the problems in the early 1970s as over-optimistic forecasting,
mismatching of capacity to traffic volumes, subsidies for shipbuilding and excessive
optimism on the part of bankers. The result of these factors was that "[t}he bubble burst with
a vengeance. ,,76 A similar apportioning of blame was presented by Martin Stopford, who put
71 Internasjonal Politikk [International Politics], No. lB, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo,
1979. The contributions come from Mr. Hallvard Bakke, Minister of Trade and Industry, Leif Asbjørn Nygaard,
probably the most influential shipping bureaucrat, Professor Victor D. Norman, Researcher Olav Fagelund
Knutsen, Leif Terje Løddesøl, President and Chief Executive Officer of the major Norwegian shipping company
Wilh. Wilhelmsen, Kjell Storvik of Norges Rederforbund [The Norwegian Shipowners' Association] and Henrik
Aasarød, chariman of Norsk Sjømannsforbund [The Norwegian Seamen's Association].
72 Stokes, Peter, Ship Finance - Credit Expansion and the Boom-Bust Cycle, Lloyd's of London Press Ltd.,
London, 1992, pp. 23-48.
73 Ibid., p. 24
74 Douglas, Peter S., "Financial Policies for the Shipping Industry", in Ryden, Inger and von Schirach-Szmigiel,
Christopher (eds.), Shipping and Ships for the J 990s, Proceedings of the International Conference "Supply and
Demand of Water Transport", Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm, 1979, p. 169.
75 Ibid., p. 168.
76 Cashman, John P., "A worldwide view of shipping and shipbuilding", Maritime Policy and Management,
Volume 12, No.2, 1985, pp. 113-134.
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it simple; "the banks lent too much, the shipbuilders built far more shipyards than long term
demand forecasts justified and shippers issued timecharters which underpinned a false sense
of optimism. ,,77
The importance of soft financing is also emphasised in Mike Ratcliffe's history of
tanker shipping. His explanation of the crisis, in the chapter entitled "Energyquake - The Big
Slump ", focuses on the politics of the oil market and inexperienced bankers' willingness to
pander to the follies of the shipowners." Like Peter Stokes and most other international
commentators, Ratcliffe uses the fate of Norwegian shipowners to illustrate the disastrous
effects of the freight market breakdown, claiming that "Norwegians [' ..J were hit the hardest
of all ", as they were overconfident and were "caught with their trousers down. ,,79
1.3.6. Summary - bibliography
Despite the fact that the shipping crisis has received a lot of attention, there has been no broad,
coherent and thorough analysis of the shipping crisis, its causes and its effects for shipowners
and the maritime community in general. This might be a reflection of the shipping industry's
need to "look forward", or it might be the result of a reluctance to admit that something might
be learnt from past mistakes.
This short bibliography illustrates two facets of the shipping world. On the one hand,
the large amount of publications relating to the shipping crisis is evidence of the importance
of this sector for the world economy. A large share of the publications above emphasises the
relationship between the shipping sector and other segments, eg international trade,
shipbuilding or the financial community. On the other hand, the piecemeal nature of these
publications, and the lack of integrated analyses of causes and consequences, can be seen as a
testament to the shipping industry's aversion against a more holistic approach.
The subsequent analysis will show that uncritical reliance on past and current
development trends may spell disaster. However, an understanding of the factors which
created the shipping crisis of the 1970s may provide important insights which might aid the
decision making of shipping companies, governments and shipbuilders.
77 Stopford, Martin, "Challenges and Pitfalls of Maritime Forecasting in a Corporate Environment", in
Strandenes, Svendsen & Wergeland, op.cit., 1989, p. 42.
78 Ratcliffe, Mike, Liquid Gold Ships. A History of the Tanker 1859"1984, Lloyd's of London Press Ltd.,
London, 1985,pp. 152-167.
79 Ibid., p. 158. Short analyses may also be found in Peters, Hans 1., "The Maritime Transport Crisis", World
Bank Discussion Papers 220, World Bank, Washington, 1993, pp. 6-10 and Beth, Ludwig, Hader, Arnulf and
Kappel, Robert, 25 Years of World Shipping, Fairplay Publications, London, 1984, pp. 35-37.
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CHAPTERTwo
THE SHIPPING SECTOR
The following chapter is an overview of the international market for shipping services.
Initially, a basic introduction to the main types of ships and agents operating in this market is
given. Particular importance is placed on the presentation of the agents and mechanisms in the
tanker market. Subsequently, the postwar development in the shipping market is briefly
presented. The aim of this chapter is to construct a basis upon which the analyses of the causes
and effects of the shipping crisis, and the fate of Norwegian shipowners, can be performed.
2.1. The International Market for Shipping Services
The purpose of the international market for shipping services is to facilitate the transport of
finished goods, intermediate goods and raw materials from one geographical location to
another. In most contexts it may be misleading to talk about one international shipping
market. In reality we are faced with several closely related market segments, differentiated
according to factors such as types of ships utilised, amount, value and types of goods
transported, geographicallocalisation and the structure of competition. While it is important to
recognise the economic and commercial differences between the various market segments, it
must be acknowledged that the treatment of the shipping sector as one integrated market is the
more correct approach in some situations.
There are several links between the various market segments in the international
market for shipping services. Some shipowners, wishing to avoid putting all their eggs in one
basket, operate in more than one market segment, and may thus function as connecting links
between the different segments. Moreover, shipowners operating in only one section of the
market will influence companies in other parts of the shipping sector, as they will compete for
the same kind of labour, as well as the building capacity of the shipyards. Another important
form of interaction exists in connection with the competition for investment capital, both from
sources specialising in shipping financing and from ordinary investors.
A considerable share of the companies operating in the shipping market have some, or
their principal, interests outside the shipping sector, eg within manufacturing, the oil industry
or the transport sector in general. These agents play a particularly important role in the
shipping market because vertical integration enables them to control the market to a larger
extent than those of their competitors whose sole engagements are in the shipping sector. The
integration of oil companies into tanker shipping is one example of agents who are able to
secure engagement for their ships and transport of their goods through vertical integration.
Another kind of vertical integration altering the nature of competition in the shipping industry
comes from companies offering integrated transport solutions, involving land as well as sea
transport.
In an analysis of the international shipping crisis, the most critical short-term link
between the various market segments is that some ships can operate in more than one market
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segment. The existence of these vessels gives direct or indirect competition for freights
between ships operating in different segments of the shipping sector. In the longer run, the
competition for capital and shipbuilding capacity constitutes an important link between the
various parts of the shipping market.
The historical division of the shipping market
Traditionally, the international market for shipping services has been divided into two main
categories, liner shipping and tramp shipping, depending on the kind of transport service
which is being supplied and demanded. Liner shipping designates regular transport services
between specified ports on a shipping route where schedule and price are more or less fixed.l
The liner ships generally transport goods with a high value relative to their weight or volume.
Goods with a lower value/weight- or value/volume-ratio have usually been referred to as
tramp goods. If value, rather than volume, is the basis for comparison, liner shipping
transports a larger share of world trade than tramp shipping.'
Liner shipping
Regularity and reliability have usually been regarded as the main advantages offered by the
liner companies. The introduction of steamships by the end of the last century had given the
predictability necessary to offer regular services. At the same time, the new cost functions of
the liner companies, a result of the large amount of fixed capital required to acquire this new
technology, encouraged the suppliers of liner services to cooperate in liner conferences. These
conferences are agreements between shipowners and managing companies where the
participants decide freight rates, capacity allocation and sailing schedules.' The aim of the
liner conferences is to secure a higher and more stable freight rate level than that which would
occur if free competition was allowed to regulate the market. The British shipping economist
Richard Goss defends the conference system, claiming that liner conferences act as
coordinators rather than as regulators of competition, and that both the suppliers and
demanders benefit from the stability of rates and regularity of departures and arrivals offered
by the liner conferences." In the mid 1970s Norwegian shipowners participated in more than
100 of the 370 existing international liner conferences.'
I See for instance Kendall, Lane C., The Business of Shipping, Cornell Maritime Press, Centreville, Maryland,
1986, pp. 5-11 for a basic introduction to the main differences between liner shipping and tramp shipping.
2 Wergeland, Tor, Et konkurransedyktig Norge - Norsk skipsfarts konkurranseevne [A competitive Norway - the
competitiveness of Norwegian shipping], SNF-report No. 50/1992, The Foundation for Research in Economics
and Business Administration, Bergen, 1992, p. 54.
3 A management company is responsible for the daily operation of the ship, but does not, as a rule, own the ship
themselves. See Chapter Ten for an elaboration.
4 Goss, Richard, Studies in Maritime Economics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1968, pp. 16-17.
5 Stortingsmelding 23 (1975-76), Om sjøfolkenes forhold og skipsfartens plass i samfunnet [On the conditions
for seamen and the role of shipping in the society], p. 93.
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The demands regarding investments, risk spreading, and, in a maritime perspective,
large, land-based organisations, have resulted in the development of large liner companies. As
a result of this, the structure of the supply side' in the liner market is in many cases
oligopolistic. It has been claimed that the cautionary expansion in the liner sector in the
postwar period has led to a situation where tramp ships have had to complement the liner
sector's services in periods where the demand for liner services has been high." This, and the
fact that a lot of shipowning companies have chosen to operate ships in both market segments,
have been the most important linkages between the tramp and liner sectors.
Liner shipping has traditionally not been the most important mode of employment for
Norwegian ships. In 1914 only eight percent of the Norwegian fleet was engaged in liner
shipping. In the interwar period there was a marked increase in the liner ships' share of the
Norwegian fleet; it has been estimated that between 25 and 30 per cent of the Norwegian fleet
was engaged in liner trade in the peak year 1929. Despite the increased importance of liners,
tramp ships constituted the most important part of the Norwegian fleet towards the end of the
interwar period.' The structure of the liner companies, with relatively large, land-based
organisations playing. an important role in the day-to-day operation of the company, made it
difficult for the smaller Norwegian shipowners to engage in the liner trade.
The share of the Norwegian fleet engaged in liner trade was reduced after the Second
World War, and there was heavy expansion in the tanker and dry bulk sectors which had come
to dominate tramp shipping. As a result of this, the liner ships constituted only 15 per cent of
the Norwegian fleet at the start of the 1960s. The Norwegian engagement in the liner sector
continued to dwindle in the 1970s, absolutely as well as relatively. In 1967 approximately 300
ships, representing 1,4 million gross register tons (grt) and approximately eight per cent of the
Norwegian fleet, were engaged in the liner trade. Eight years later, the corresponding figures
were 173 ships, one million grt and four per cent of the Norwegian tonnage." One of the
reasons for the reduction of the Norwegian interests in the liner sector was the growth of
protectionist mechanisms making it difficult for cross traders to participate in some markets.
At the same time the development of standardised pallets and containers, a result of the on-
going technological improvement, further increased the capital intensity in the liner sector and
the demands on liner organisations. The low Norwegian involvement in the liner sector will
be further analysed in Chapter Six.
Despite the fact that the Norwegian involvement in the liner sector was small, tonnage-
wise, these ships accounted for approximately a quarter of the total freight earnings of the
shipping sector in the 1970s.9 However, as the Norwegian shipowners' liner tonnage only
6 Metaxas, Basil N., The Economics of Tramp Shipping, The Athlone Press of the University of London,
London, 1971,p. Ill.
7 For an outline of the structure of the Norwegian fleet in the interwar period, see Thowsen, Atle, "Krise og
krisetiltak i norsk tankskipsfart 1929-1936" [Crisis and crisis measures in Norwegian tanker shipping 1929-
1936], Sjøfartshistorisk Årbok 1978 [Norwegian Yearbook of Maritime History 1978], Bergen, 1979, p. l32.
8 Figures from Stortingsmelding 23 (1975-75), op.cit., Table 6-1, p. 89.
9 The figures representing the liner ships' share of freight earnings in this period are misleading in a somewhat
longer perspective. See Chapter Five for an elaboration.
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constituted between two and five per cent of total tonnage in the period around the
international shipping crisis, this sector will not play an important part in the analysis of the
Norwegian shipowners and the international shipping crisis." The small amount of tonnage
employed in this segment is not the only reason for this; the shipping crisis did not affect the
liner market to the same extent as the tanker and dry bulk markets, particularly in the first
period after the freight market broke down.
The main reason that several liner companies survived the crisis relatively unscathed
was their possibility to cooperate through conferences, and by means of these they were able
to avoid the enormous fall in freight rates suffered in the more competitive parts of the
shipping sector." The higher volatility of prices in a competitive market, as opposed to a
regulated market with oligopolistic competition and cooperation, is explained and analysed in
most basic textbooks on economics. The liner sector may be regarded as the least risky part of
the shipping industry, as it is well-known for having stable freight rates in the long run. In
1976, after one of the worst years for the Norwegian fleet ever, Charles Racine Bergesen,
chairman of Norges Rederforbund [The Norwegian Shipowners' Association], claimed that
the results in the previous year's international liner trade had been "fairly satisfactory". !2 Due
to the atypical development of the liner trade, the development in this sector will only be
expanded upon when it is of relevance to the analysis of the development in the tanker and dry
bulk sectors, or in connection with the analysis of shipping companies operating in the liner
sector.
Tramp shipping
Historically, the tramp sector has been regarded as the liner sector's counterpart. As a rule,
tramp shipping involves a one-off shipment of a product between two destinations, usually
transporting commodities which can be shipped in bulk. In general, tramp voyages are not
expected to be repeated; each trip is planned individually, depending on the goods to be
transported and the route to be followed. However, for some products, for instance oil and
coal, it is not unusual that the supplier and the demander of the transport service enter into
contracts about repeated shipments. Such contracts exist because of the volatile and
unpredictable nature of the market for single voyages, and this type of employment can on no
account be regarded as liner shipping. The various kinds of contracts which are used in the
international market for shipping services will be discussed later, and the rationale which
shippers and shipowning companies have for entering into contracts of the various kinds will
also be analysed.
10 See for instance Norwegian Shipping News, No. 20, 1977,p. 40.
Il Severe problems first appeared in the liner sector at the beginning of the 1980s. The conditions had then
become so unfavourable as to encourage rate-cutting and the violation of conference-agreements. Moreover,.
there was a marked increase in protectionist measures, which was more manifest in the liner segment than in
other parts of the shipping sector.
12 Quotation from Norwegian Shipping News, No. 20, 1976,p. 37, which gives a summary of Bergesen's speech
to the annual meeting of the Norwegian Shipowners' Association.
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2.2. The Bulk Sector
The division of the international shipping market into a liner and a tramp sector has
traditionally been sufficient to give an accurate presentation of the shipping sector. As a result
of the technological and maritime development which had taken place until the beginning of
the 1970s, however, other categorisations may be more fruitful for an analysis of the
international shipping crisis.
In this thesis, the division proffered by Alan W. Cafruny in his book "Ruling the
Waves" will be utilised. He divides the international market for shipping services into a liner
sector and a bulk sector according to the goods transported in the various market segments."
Cafruny has retained the term the liner sector, but defines this as the part of the shipping
sector in which finished goods and other products which are individually packed are
transported. Historically, this part of the shipping industry would handle goods wrapped in
various forms of packaging; bales, boxes, barrels, cartons and crates. From the beginning of
the 1960s, however, an increasing share of the goods shipped in this manner would be
transported in containers, and the definition has, by and large, come to designate container
shipping. 14
The other main part of the shipping market is the bulk sector, which primarily
transports raw materials. The term bulk cargoes is usually .used to characterise all
homogenous commodities which are transported in large quantities. It has, however, in some
connections been used to characterise all cargoes which are transported in the hold of the
ship." In the discussion of the causes and effects of the international shipping crisis, I will
stick to the relatively narrow definition of bulk cargoes, and only the most important bulk
goods will be examined. Particular importance will be placed on the development in the liquid
bulk market.
2.2.1. The dry bulk sector- supply side
The expression bulk cargo can be defined as "cargo which is loaded into a ship 's hold
without being boxed, bagged or hand-stowed or is transported in large tankers. ,,16 Basically,
13 Cafruny, Alan W., Ruling The Waves. The Political Economy of International Shipping, University of
California Press, Berkeley, 1987, pp. 6-7. The differences between this defrnition and the old tramp/liner-
classification are small, but the categories offered by Cafruny are nevertheless more suitable for a presentation of
the international market for shipping services in the 1970s.
14 For an introduction to the containerisation of the shipping sector and the implications this has had for shipping
companies, see Pearson, Roy, Container-line Performance and Service Quality, Marine Transport Centre,
University of Liverpool, 1979.
15 This last definition is far too wide, as it would defme goods such as fruit, cars and refrigerated products as
bulk cargoes; see for instance Stonebridge, Dennis, "Demand for Dry Bulk Shipping in the Mid-1990's", in
Ryden, Inger and von Schirach-Szmigiel, Christopher (eds.), Shipping and Ships for the 1990 's, Proceedings of
the International Conference "Supply and Demand of Water Transport", 18-19 June 1979, Handelshogskolan i
Stockholm, Stockholm, 1980, p. 86.
16 Defrnition taken from McGraw-Hill Multimedia Encyclopedia of Science and Technology. Layton defines a
bulk cargo as "a cargo such as grain, coal, iron ore, etc. that is loaded in bulk and not in packages or
containers" in Layton, C. W. T., Dictionary of Nautical Words and Terms, Brown, Son & Ferguson Ltd.,
Glasgow, 1982,p. 59.
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this definition is valid for dry as well as liquid products, but the large range of goods covered
by this definition makes it worthwhile to use the more precise terms liquid bulk and dry bulk
cargoes. Liquid bulk cargoes are mainly transported in purpose-built tankers, and will thus be
more closely analysed in the presentation of the market for tankers and tanker services. Dry
bulk cargoes are mainly shipped in dry bulk ships, which are usually called bulk carriers.
In the latter part of the 1970s, the transport of five commodities constituted more than
75 per cent of the international dry bulk shipments. These goods; iron ore, coal, grain,
phosphates and bauxite! aluminium, are all of utmost importance to the functioning of the
industrialised economies. In addition to these commodities, the dry bulk sector transports
wood-products, minerals, fertilisers, steel products etc.I 7
The market for dry bulk shipping has only to a small extent been the object of
historical research, but it has often been studied in connection with the development of models
attempting to explain and understand the functioning of the market.18 For presentation
purposes, it is fruitful to divide the supply side of the market for dry bulk shipping into three
segments, bulk, ore and combination carriers, according to the flexibility of the ships when it
comes to carrying different cargoes."
Bulk carriers make up the most important group, both when it comes to the number of
vessels and the total amount of tonnage. This group is further divided into three classes,
according to the size of the ships; Handy size (10-50.000 dwt), Panamax size (50-80.000 dwt)
and Cape size (more than 80.000 dwt). Cape size ships are too wide to enter the Panama-
canal, and are mostly used to transport iron ore and coal." Despite the fact that bulk carriers
of all sizes are often lumped together as one type of ships, it may be fruitful to regard them as
participants in different markets. The reason for this is that there might be a low level of
freight rates for ships larger than Panamax size, while, at the same time, there is considerable
demand for smaller bulk carriers."
Originally, the basis for the development of bulk carriers, as opposed to more general-
purpose 'tweendeckers and shelterdeckers, often called break bulk cargo ships, was the
increasing demand for iron ore and, consequently, purpose-built ore carriers. Except for the
size and shape of the holds, there are no major differences between bulk carriers and ore
17 For an introduction to the minor dry bulk commodities, see Nersesian, Roy, Ships and Shipping - A
Comprehensive Guide, PennWell Books, Tulsa, Oklahoma, 1981, p. 48.
18 Fon, Anders Martin, Norsk engasjement i internasjonal tørrbulkfart 1960-1990 [Norwegian involvement in
international dry bulk shipping, 1960-1990], Working paper No. 106/93, The Foundation for Research in
Economics and Business Administration, Bergen, 1993, p. 3.
19 This classification is by no means defmite or universal as ore carriers at times carry other bulk goods and other
bulk carriers to some extent can carry ores.
20 Osmundsvaag, Arne, Dry Bulk Shipping, SNF-report No. 55/1992, The Foundation for Research in Economics
and Business Administration, Bergen, 1992, pp. 2-3. This division into the various classes is, however, not
always consistent; Stopford, Martin, Maritime Economics, Unwin Hyman, London, 1988, p. 76 puts the division
between Handy size and Panamax size at 40.000 dwt, and Review 1974 calls bulk carriers of more than 70.000
dwt Cape size. One reason for the inconsistent definitions is that the capacity of the Panama-canal, with regard to
the size of the ships able to use it, has been increased.
21 For an example ofthis kind ofmarket situations, see Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review 1975, p. 8.
As a rule, the freight rates in the various sub-markets are correlated to a large extent.
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carriers. The economic success of the specialised ore carriers encouraged shipowners to try the
bulk concept in the transport of other commodities as well. The economic rationale behind the
development of larger, purpose-built ships can be found in the increasing demand for
commodities suitable for bulk shipping in the period after the Second World War.22 Another
important factor was the increased shipping distances which were a result of the growth in the
use of sources situated far away from the main consumption centres.
Ore carriers are purpose-built to transport high-density goods, ie goods which are
relatively heavy, rather than relatively voluminous. Originally, the competitive advantage of
the ore carriers was that they could transport larger volumes than general-purpose vessels,
without exceeding maximum possible draft limits. This was particularly advantageous in the
rather shallow British harbours, and the British Iron and Steel Corporation (Ore) was
important in this respect. This centralised purchasing organisation extolled the advantages of
purpose-built ore carriers at an early stage, and the technology and economics of specialised
vessels were subject to much research.
The problem with ore carriers was that even though they were particularly suited to
products such as iron ore, their excellence in this field came at the expense of their flexibility
in carrying other commodities. Generally, as a means of securing stability, the compartments
of ore carriers are narrower than those of other bulk carriers." As the advantages of the bulk
shipping concept proved to be applicable to more and more commodities, the specialised ore
carriers were replaced by more general bulk carriers, often strengthened for the carrying of
ores. From the middle of the 1960s the number of newbuilt ore carriers started to dwindle.
All-round bulk carriers had taken over some of the demand from the purpose-built ore
carriers, and a new class of ships, combination carriers, which had their breakthrough in the
1965-73 period, increased the competition for the ore cargoes further.
Combination carriers are flexible, and can offer their services in the liquid bulk as
well as the dry bulk market. These ships originated from the wish to create an economically
efficient type of ships by combining the features of the bulk carriers and the tankers. Most of
the early combination carriers were Ore/Oil-vessels, specially constructed for the transport of
ore and oil in separated cargo compartments." Ore/Oil carriers typically shift from the dry
bulk to the liquid bulk market, and vice versa, when there are sufficiently large differences in
22 This is one of the main hypotheses in Fon, Anders Martin, En stormakt i tørrbulk. En økonomisk-historisk
analyse av norsk tørrbullifart 1950-1973 [A Major Dry Bulk Nation: An Economic Historical Analysis of
Norwegian Dry Bulk Shipping 1950-1973], dissertation for the degree dr. oecon., Norwegian School of
Economics and Business Administration, Bergen, 1995; see particularly Chapter 4, pp. 110-135, where the
demand side development is analysed. For a presentation of the arguments concerning the development of the
bulk carriers from ore carriers, see Kendall, op.cit., 1986, p. 21.
23 The shape of the hull gives ore carriers much the same shape as tankers, and in the middle of the 1950s the
British started to convert tankers into ore carriers.
24 The first Ore/Oil-ships were built in the middle of the 1920s, and delivered to Bethlehem Steel; see Næss,
Erling Dekke, Shipping - mitt liv, Hjemmet! Fagpresseforlaget, Oslo, 1981, p. 181. The first vessels of the
postwar generation of combination carriers were built in Sweden around the end of the Second World War; see
Osmundsvaag, op.cit., 1992, p. 96.
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the rate levels, as a result of the supply and demand conditions in the two markets."
The Norwegian shipping community was among the first to recognise the potential of
the combination carriers, and these investments proved to be very profitable, particularly in
connection with the Suez-crisis in 1967.26 As a result of the success of the early investments,
Norwegian shipowners had a higher share of the world's combination carriers than their share
of the world fleet indicated. In the beginning of 1973, Norway had approximately 17 per cent
of the world's combination carrier fleet, whereas the corresponding figure for the total fleet
was 10 per cent. 27
2.2.2. The dry bulk sector- demand side
Large international companies are the most important agents on the demand side in the dry
bulk market. In 1976 the world's ten leading steel companies, mainly Japanese and American
corporations, accounted for more than half of the world trade in iron ore." The concentration
was even heavier in the international grain trade, where six countries were responsible for 92
per cent of the world's exports and where five companies had a dominant position. According
to Cafruny, concentration of this kind, either on the supply side or the demand side, can be
found for all of the five most important dry bulk goods. As a result of this, the bulk sector is
influenced by the fact that the agents operate in an environment which, on the transport
demand side, is dominated by vertically integrated international companies."
Despite the fact that the demand side is dominated by a small number of companies,
the bulk market has usually been regarded as a competitive market, particularly in connection
with the construction of market models. This assumption implies, among other things, that all
agents, both on the demand side and the supply side, see themselves as price takers, who by
definition are not important enough to dominate the market to such an extent as to influence
pnces.
In shipping market models, it is customary to regard the bulk sector as consisting of
four markets, all of which are competitive. The four markets are the spot market and period
market for bulk transport as well as the markets for newbuilt and second-hand ships. As an
increase in the supply of ships influences the supply of shipping capacity, a model depicting
the determination of freight rates must take into account the linkages between the two freight
25 Combination carriers may also reduce the time spent in ballast by combining various transport assignments.
26 It was particularly the customers of the Norwegian shipbroking firm Fearnley & Eger who were among the
first to invest heavily in combination carriers; see Fischer, Lewis R. and Nordvik, Helge W., "Economic Theory,
Information and Management", in Ville, Simon P. and Williams, David M. (eds.), Management, Finance and
Industrial Relations in Maritime Industries: Essays in International Maritime and Business History, Research in
Maritime HistoryNo. 6, St. John's, 1994, p. 23.
27 Calculations from Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review 1975, Table 3, p. 15 and Table 20, p. 24.
Fon, op.cit., 1993, Appendix 4, p. 33 claims that the Norwegian shares in July 1974 were 15,5 per cent and 19,3
per cent for Norwegian-registered and Norwegian-owned ships respectively.
28 Cafruny, op.cit., 1987, p. 258. The figures for steel production do not take China and the USSR into account.
29 See Casson, Mark, "Vertical Integration and Intra-firm Trade" in Casson, Mark (ed.), Multinationals and
World Trade - Vertical Integration and the Diffusion of Labour in World Industries, Allen & Unwin, London,
1986, pp. 104-137 for an introduction to the strategic basis for the integration.
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markets and the two markets for ships. The existence of a second-hand market for ships gives
shipping investments a flexibility which only to a more limited extent is present for other
investment decisions, but which plays an important role for the functioning of a competitive
market. The second-hand market is the result of an important feature of the international
shipping market, viz that the means of production are not bound by geographical restrictions.
2.2.3. The mechanisms in the markets for bulk shipping and bulk ships
The following presentation of the market structure will be applicable to the liquid bulk as well
as the dry bulk market. Some of the special features of the tanker market will, however, be
more thoroughly presented in connection with the analysis of the tanker sector. Initially, the
focus is on features which are applicable to the bulk market in general, and which separate this
market from eg the liner sector. As this thesis focuses on shipowners, the analysis commences
with an examination of the supply side, followed by a short presentation of the demand side.
Finally, the functioning of the market as a whole is discussed.
The market structure
The market for bulk shipping can be seen as part of the tertiary sector, where the service
which is bought and sold is the transport of commodities. The suppliers of this service are
shipowners and other agents who have transport capacity available, while the demand side
consists of producers or consumers who want to buy or sell goods in markets distant from
their place of origin. The product sold in the shipping market is therefore the transfer of
commodities from producer to consumer.
It is customary to extend the market for shipping services, and see the situation of the
suppliers, particularly capacity-wise, as closely related to the conditions in the market for
ships. In this market, shipowners and other agents interested in purchasing ships make up the
demand side. The agents on the supply side in the market for shipping services consequently
constitute the demand side in the market for ships. The supply side in the market for ships
consists of shipyards and shipowners who have tonnage which they are willing to sell, given
the right price.
As well as the aforementioned division into dry and liquid bulk shipping, several
smaller market segments can be identified within the market for bulk shipping services. These
are usually separated according to vessel size, equipment and the type of commodities which
is transported. This implies that there are periods in which the ships in some market segments
are performing satisfactorily, while conditions are grim in other parts of the market. As a rule
of thumb, however, it is correct to say that the aggregate demand for bulk transport capacity is
closely related to the industrial activity in the world economy. Consequently, the conditions in
most of the bulk market segments will change at approximately the same time and in the same
direction.
The supply side
The potential supply of transport services vanes strongly, depending on the perspective
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chosen for the analysis, In the short term, a transport capacity increase will be limited by
constraints connected to the amount and utilisation of the existing tonnage. In the medium
term, the main constraint on the supply side will be the world's shipbuilding capacity, while in
the long term, even this constraint can be considered flexible.
Supply increases - short term
As a response to a given demand increase, a short-term capacity increase is possible through
two mechanisms; increased tonnage or increased capacity utilisation. A tonnage increase
implies that the amount of tonnage available for shipping purposes increases, either through
the introduction of new tonnage or through the employment of tonnage previously not
engaged. Increased capacity utilisation does not require fleet growth as such, but rather an
increase in the employment of existing vessels.
In the short run it is to a limited extent possible to increase the amount of newbuildings
entering the market by speeding up the building of vessels already under construction in the
shipyards. This implies that previously ordered vessels are made available earlier than
scheduled. If the buil~ing of vessels is forced in this manner, it is usually the shipowner who
is expected to bear the costs associated with the higher activity."
Another way to increase the actual amount of tonnage employed, as a response to a
demand increase, is to introduce vessels which have previously not been offered in the freight
market, due to lay-up or other factors. An important source of tonnage supply comes from
ships which have previously been engaged in other market segments. A demand increase in
one of the market segments may make employment in this segment more profitable than
alternative markets. Combination carriers will be the ships most suited for this kind of market
switching, but several other types of vessels can also offer their services in a number of
market segments. It is the relative freight rates between various market segments, not absolute
rate levels, which encourage shipowners to change the employment of their ships from one
market to another. 31 Accordingly, a decrease in freight rates in one market segment may lead
to an increase in the amount of vessels in another market segment, despite the fact that the
demand in the latter segment remains unchanged.
The alternative to an increase in the actual amount of tonnage employed in a market
segment is an increase in the utilisation of the existing vessels. This type of capacity increase
is what Dobler calls an increase of the utilisation coefficient of the existing fleet." Such a
30 This means that the shipowner has to compare the additional costs in connection with the speeding up of the
building to the extra revenue obtained as a result of the early delivery of the ship.
31 There may, however, be costs in connection with the change of operation from one market to another. These
costs must be weighed against the expected increase in revenue stemming from a change of operation.
32 Dobler, Jean-Pierre, "The Use of Long-Term Forecasting in Maritime Economics", in Lorange, Peter, and
Norman, Victor (eds.), Shipping Management, Institute for Shipping Research, AS John Grieg, Bergen, 1973, p.
63. An alternative division between "tonnage increase" and "increased capacity utilisation" can be found in
Bennett, P. G., Huxham, C. S. and Dando, M. R., "Shipping in Crisis: a Trial Run for 'Live' Application of the
Hypergame Approach", Omega, No.6, 1981, vol. 9, p. 584, where a distinction is made between "real tonnage"
and "effective tonnage".
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capacity increase will be attainable through speeding up of loading and unloading or through a
reduction of the time the vessels spend "off-hire" or in ballast. 33 It is also possible to increase
the amount of commodities transported by increasing the speed of the ships. To achieve
efficiency in the use of fuel, optimal speed is only in particular circumstances equal to
maximum speed. The advantage of slow steaming is, of course, relatively greater when the
price offuel is high, for instance in connection with the oil crisis of the 1970s.34 The capacity
utilisation coefficient can also be increased by fully loading vessels which previously accepted
partial cargoes."
The limited possibilities to increase the aggregate transport capacity in the short run
result in a very inelastic supply of tonnage in periods where demand is heavy and the existing
tonnage is almost fully utilised. This implies that the tonnage supply can not be increased
much, despite large increases in the freight rate level. Moreover, some of the capacity
increasing mechanisms described above are quite costly to implement, and their effect will be
limited. The end result is that a short-term supply increase above a certain level will be nearly
impossible, and this gives a completely inelastic tonnage supply when demand reaches a
certain level. When there is a surplus of tonnage available, transport capacity increases are
relatively easy to introduce, and the effects of a demand increase on the freight rate level are
small.
One characteristic feature of the tonnage supply will therefore be that it is very elastic
when the freight rate level is low, but inelastic in periods with high rates. This feature was
apparent in the period around the international shipping crisis. Despite the extremely high
freight rate level, it was impossible to get the short-term capacity increase necessary to reduce
the freight rate level in the tanker sector. Later in the 1970s the amount of surplus tonnage was
so large that demand increases were hardly reflected in higher rates.
When there is a large amount of shipping capacity available, the tonnage supply in the
bulk market will generally be the tonnage which at a given rate gets marginal costs, less lay
up-costs, covered." Marginal costs refer to operating costs and voyage costs. Capital costs
will incur regardless of whether the vessel is trading or laid up. Thus, the shipowner will be
willing to offer the vessel at the rate which covers the voyage costs and the increase in
operating costs resulting from a shift from lay-up to active trading." Some factors, such as
33 The term "off-hire" refers to the vessel's idle time, eg time spent in harbours or docks for repairs. For
information on the importance of "off-hire" for large tankers, see the summary of Fearnley and Eger's "off-hire"
survey in Norwegian Shipping News, No. 17D, 1972.
34 Beenstock, Michael and Vergottis, Andreas, "An Econometric Model of the World Tanker Market", Journal
ojTransport Economics and Policy, 1989, vol. 23, Issue 3, p. 264 takes this into account, and the authors have
made a model which calculates optimal speed under different conditions.
35 The shipowners' willingness to accept partial cargoes depends on the alternative cost of having unused cargo
space, which again depends on the freight rate level.
36 For an elementary presentation of the supply side, see Stopford, op.cit., 1988, Appendix I, p. 353. Here, the
supply of sea transport is defined as a function of the size of the world fleet and the ships' productivity, where
the latter is represented by annual ton-miles per dead weight ton.
37 When vessels are laid up, some of the operating costs will be reduced, eg through crew reductions and lower
insurance premiums.
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maintaining the company's good reputation, the advantage of having ships in the markets
when rates rise or other long-term considerations may modify this postulation.
Supply increases - medium term
In the medium term, the world's shipbuilding capacity plays an important role in connection
with the supply of transport services. The reason for this is that the bulk fleet's transport
capacity may be increased by the introduction of new tonnage.
The shipyards' order books are influenced by a variety of factors, but the spot market
freight rates, and their influence on the expectation of future shipping demand, have proven to
be particularly important in determining the activity in the building berths. Several studies
have demonstrated the close relationship between the freight rate level and the shipowners'
contracting."
The shipyards' order books are also influenced by the cost of acquiring new vessels,
which again is determined by the relationship between the supply of ships and the demand for
newbuildings. When there is a heavy demand for vessels, eg in a situation where expectations
of the future freight level are high, the price of newbuildings increases and the shipyards take
the opportunity to fill up their order books. The combination of a high price level and long
delivery time will then contribute to a slowing down of contracting. The delivery time for
newbuildings may vary from less than a year in periods where there is little demand for new
vessels to more than five years in periods where there is a lot of activity in the shipyards.
Supply increases - long term
If a sufficiently long perspective is chosen, the world's shipbuilding capacity, in connection
with the number of shipyards as well as their technology, is a variable factor." The world's
shipbuilding capacity is to some extent determined by the owners' expectations about the
future demand and supply of various types of newbuildings. It is, however, also influenced to
a large degree by the various shipbuilding nations' policies regarding the preservation of
labour-intensive industries.
The growth of world shipbuilding capacity in the 1960s and the major role played by
several newentrants in the 1970s and 1980s illustrate that the capacity of the shipbuilding
industry can be increased relatively easily. However, the massive demand for shipping
tonnage resulted in an increase in the amount of tonnage on order. This indicates that there
was some degree of sluggishness in the matching of shipbuilding capacity to the demand for
ships. Ironically, the European development of the 1970s and 1980s has shown that a
38 For early analyses of the mechanisms of the shipping sector, see Einarsen, Johan, Reinvestment cycles and
their manifestation in the Norwegian shipping industry, Institute of Economics, University of Oslo, Oslo, 1938,
Koopmans, Tjalling C., Tanker Freight Rates and Tankship Building; an analysis of cyclical fluctuations, P.S.
King & son Ltd., London, 1939 or Zannetos, Zenon S., The Theory of Oil Tankship Rates, The MIT Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1966.
39 For an introduction to the technological development in Japanese yards, see Goto, Shin, "Competitive
advantage in the Japanese shipbuilding industry: the case of IRI" in Yuzawa, Takeshi (ed.), Japanese business
success - The evolution of a strategy, Routledge, London, 1994,pp. 119-133.
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reduction of the shipbuilding capacity may be just as difficult to implement.
The supply side - summary
The price of the ships and the shipowners' expectations about the future rate levels play an
important role in the shipowners' profitability analyses and investment decisions. The
competitive and capital-intensive nature of the shipping industry makes investments, and the
calculations forming the basis for these investments, particularly important in determining the
success of various shipowners. The investment decisions, regarding the types of ships the
shipowners choose to contract, are influenced by the shipowners' sentiments about the future
development of the various market segments. The supply side development in the market
segments is closely connected to the age and size composition of the existing fleet. On the
demand side, the development is influenced by changes in the trade volume of various goods,
as well as shifts in the international trade pattern. In addition to this, the technological
development, regarding shipping as well as shipbuilding, is of major importance. In the
medium term, the shipbuilding industry has great flexibility in their supply of various types of
ships. This flexibility makes it possible for shipowners, sometimes even after the original
contract has been signed, to choose ship types aimed at certain market segments as a response
to the development of the various market segments.
The demand side
It has been customary to regard the demand for bulk transport as relatively inelastic with
regard to freight rates. The main reason for this is that transport costs in most cases only
constitute a small part of the total price, and is therefore relatively insignificant to the
consumer." Another cause for this is that the alternatives to seaborne transport are limited for
most of the important bulk goods, and alternative sources may be just as scarce as alternative
means of transport. It is possible to detect some competition in the market for long-distance
shipping. One example is the possibility to transport oil in pipes, another is the choice of
shipping ports. Ports can be chosen as to minimise land- or sea-transport, and relative
transport costs at land and at sea form the basis for this decision. Eriksen has shown that the
notion of inelastic demand in the bulk shipping market should be modified. He has found that
the demand for tanker shipping services to a large extent is inelastic, while there is some
degree of elasticity with regard to freight rates in the demand for iron ore and coal transport."
The demand side in the bulk shipping market consists of exporters as well as
importers. The pattern of demand varies between the different market segments, and this
makes it fruitful to present these independently. However, a prominent feature of the bulk
market is that the demand for transport services is closely related to the general level of
40 This is not applicable to all goods; see for instance the discussion in Norman, Victor D., The Economics of
Bulk Shipping, Institute for Shipping Research, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration,
Bergen, 1979c, p. 9.
41 Eriksen, lb Erik, "The Demand for Bulk Ship Services", in Hope, Einar (ed.), Studies in Shipping Economics,
in honour of Professor Arnljot Strømme Svendsen, Bedriftsøkonomenes Forlag AlS, Oslo, 1981, p. 55.
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activity in the world economy, and the industrial production in Western Europe, Japan and
North America in particular. Of the six most important bulk commodities, grain is the only
one whose demand to some extent is determined independently of the world's level of
industrial production. The seaborne grain trade is mainly determined by the weather in the
various regions, but it is to some extent also influenced by the international political climate.
This was particularly important from the 1960s onwards, when the USSR emerged as an
important importer of grain.
Oil is undoubtedly the most important bulk commodity, and the demand pattern for oil
tanker shipping will be more closely analysed in the presentation of the market for tankers and
tanker shipping services. The most important dry bulk goods are iron ore and coal, both
crucial components in the production of steel. In 1972, the iron ore shipments accounted for
20 per cent of seaborne dry bulk shipping, measured in tons, while coal, mostly for the steel
industry, accounted for almost 10per cent."
Variations in steel industry production are often seen as a direct explanation of the
changes in the international demand for iron ore and coal transport. The variations in the level
of steel industry production are a result of cyclical changes in the level of investments in
various countries. These cycles, frequently lasting between seven and eleven years, are usually
called Juglar-cycles. A standard explanation of these cycles is that investors in prosperous
times invest too much, while their investments are too low during recessions."
Due to the considerable economies of scale in the transport of iron ore and coal, large
ships are generally used for this purpose. Steel production is a continuous process, where the
costs associated with temporary cessation of production are large. As a result of this, a secure
and consistent supply of iron ore and coal is of utmost importance to the world's steel
producers. The wish to secure the supply of inputs has led to a substantial degree of vertical
integration within the steel industry, and most of the iron ore- and coal-shipments are
consequently organised through long-term contracts between the steel producer and the
supplier of the shipping service."
The large amount of ore and coal resources, and steel production, in the United States
makes the country relatively insignificant for the world trade in these commodities. Japan and
Western Europe are the most important iron ore and coal importers. Japan undoubtedly has
particular significance; in the middle of the 1970s the country accounted for as much as 43 per
cent of the world's iron ore import, measured in tons, and 55 per cent measured in ton-miles.
42 Figures from Maritime Transport Research and Shipbuilder's and Repairer's National Association's analysis
of the dry bulk market, quoted in Norwegian Shipping News, No. 18, 1976, pp. 24-25. These figures are by and
large supported by Review 1972, Table l, p. 8.
·13 Tylecote, Andrew, The Long Wave in the World Economy - the current crisis in historical perspective,
Routledge, London, 1991, p. 8.
44 For an introduction to the rationale behind vertical integration, see Caves, Richard, American Industry:
Structure, Conduct, Performance, Foundation of Modem Economics Series, Prentice Hall Inc., Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey, 1964, pp. 42-49. In some countries, the authorities have advocated and sponsored the
formation of large, integrated steel producers, see for instance Hannah, Leslie, The Rise of the Corporate
Economy, Methuen, London, 1983, p. 151.
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The corresponding figures for Europe were 46 and 38 per cent respectively. The importance of
Japan as a major demander of dry bulk shipping services is even more apparent when it comes
to international coal trade. In the middle of the 1970s, more than half of the amount of coal
transported by sea was imported by Japanese corporations. To get a correct picture of the
demand for shipping capacity, we have to take into account transport distance as well as
transport volume, and this gives a further increase in the Japanese importance. As much as 72
per cent of the world's seaborne coal, measured in ton-miles, went to Japan. Because of the
continent's proximity to the sources, the European importance is reduced when ton-miles is
used as the basis for comparison. Europe accounted for 46 per cent of the imports, measured
in tons, but only 24 per cent measured in ton-miles."
The international grain trade is not as influenced by business cycles as the iron ore and
coal shipments, but, nevertheless, has larger fluctuations." The demand for grain transport
capacity is to a great extent determined by the crops in various regions, as well as by
international political relations. Due to the political influence on the international grain trade,
a substantial part of the seaborne grain is reserved for ships belonging to the import- and
export-nations. In connection with the USSR's large import of grain from the United States in
1972, two thirds of the shipments were reserved for Soviet and American ships." Because the
industrial activity in the world economy is of little importance for the level of grain
shipments, the demand for grain transport capacity does not necessarily follow the general
trend in the dry bulk market. Such atypical behaviour was apparent in 1975, when the demand
for grain transport increased in a market generally characterised by recession.
Of the five most important dry bulk goods, bauxite/ aluminium and phosphates are the
least significant. The demand for these commodities is strongly correlated with the world's
industrial activity, and the transport demand they generate is therefore connected to that of
iron ore and coal. As in the market for the other important dry bulk goods, there is a large
degree of concentration in the international bauxite/ aluminium and phosphate markets. Semi-
public companies in Jamaica, Australia and Guinea account for two thirds of the world's
bauxite exports, while four vertically integrated American corporations own 44 per cent of the
world's alumina-capacity. In the latter part of the 1970s, the United States imported more than
half of the world's bauxite- and alumina-export." This implies that long, trans-Atlantic
shipments of bauxite are taking place, despite the fact that every stage in the production
process, from bauxite to alumina and from alumina to aluminium, halves the weight of the
45 The figures quoted above are taken from Nersesian, op.cit., 1981, Table 4.5, p. 57.
46 According to calculations in Fon, Anders Martin, "Two Markets or One? - An Historical Study of Price
Behaviour in the Tanker and Dry Bulk Shipping Markets, 1955-1973", International Journal of Maritime
History, Vol. VII, NO.2 (December 1995), p. 120, the iron ore and coal rates correlate better than grain with the
fluctuations in an aggregate dry bulk-index. The correlation of iron ore can, to some extent, be explained by the
fact that this commodity weighs rather heavily in the same index.
47 Seland, Johan, Norsk skipsfart år for år 1946-1976, edited by Arnljot Strømme Svendsen, Fagbokforlaget,
Bergen, 1994, p. 207.
48 Nersesian, op.cit., 1981, p. 57.
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commodity which needs transporting." The heavy concentration in this market is one reason
that most of the transport is organised through long-term agreements, and in many cases there
is a long history of cooperation between the shipper and the shipowner.
On the demand side, where large, vertically integrated corporations tend to dominate,
the heavy concentration has led to a situation where a large share of the bulk shipping services
is performed by vessels owned by the companies themselves, or by the fleets of independent
shipowners who cooperate closely with the large corporations. In the case of commodities
which have to be transported in purpose-built vessels between otherwise little used ports, the
large corporations typically choose to integrate the transport service in their production
process."
An analysis conducted by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
claimed that less than ten per cent of the world's bulk tonnage was available in the open
market." Even though the above figure undoubtedly can be regarded as exaggerated - all
vessels on charters were regarded as closely connected to the charterers - there is little doubt
about the fact that the international market for bulk shipping services is influenced by the high
concentration on the demand side. Chida and Davies have shown how Japanese corporations
use long-term contracts to secure that the transport function is artificially integrated in the
company's production process." Large international companies are not the only agents known
to use their negotiating strength; another potential obstacle to the free market mechanism is
the discrimination performed in connection with the shipping policies of some importing and
exporting nations.
Freight rate determination
The freight rate is the price paid for the carriage of an item or a given volume of merchandise.
As previously mentioned, the development of the bulk market is often regarded as a result of
the supply- and demand-development in four closely related markets; the spot market, the
charter market and the markets for new and second-hand ships. The relationship between the
rate determination in the spot and period markets will be expanded upon in connection with
the analysis of the tanker sector."
49 Wells, Louis T. Jr., "Minerals: Eroding Oligopolies" in Yoffie, David B. (ed.), Beyond Free Trade - Firms.
Governments and Global Competition, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, Massachusetts, 1993, pp. 335-
337.
50 Barry, David, Casson, Mark and Horner, Dennis, "The Shipping Industry", in Casson, op.cit., 1986, p. 345.
51 UNCTAD, Merchant Fleet Development: Guidelines for Developing Countries, report from UNCTAD's
secretariat, TDIB/C.14/l86, United Nations, Geneva, 1979, p. 11, quoted in Cafruny, op.cit., 1987, pp. 259-262.
The criteria which are laid down by UNCTAD to characterise "free market availability" are extremely strict.
Consequently, organisations such as OECD, have voiced their scepticism regarding these results.
52 Chida, Tomohei and Davies, Peter N., The Japanese shipping and shipbuilding industries: a history of their
modern growth, Athlone Press, London, 1990, pp. 177-180.
53 A large number of models have been developed to estimate the rate determination in the international market
for bulk shipping. Eriksen, lb Erik and Norman, Victor D., Ecotank - modell for analyse av tankmarkedenes
virkemåte [Ecotank - Econometric Model for Tanker Companies], Institute for Shipping Research, Norwegian
School of Economics and Business Administration, Bergen, 1976, and Norman, Victor D. and Wergeland, Tor,
Nortank - A Simulation of the Freight Market for Large Tankers, Center for Applied Research Report 4/1981,
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In the long run, several adjustment mechanisms lead towards an equilibrium in the
market for bulk shipping by improving the balance between supply and demand. The long-
term market equilibrium, where actual transport capacity equals the, at any time, optimal
capacity, is re-established by changes in the freight rate level, the price of vessels and the
capital structure in the market.
One of the most important adjustment mechanisms is that the market reacts to surplus
capacity by a reduction in freight rates, in tum reducing the shipowners' profit and the value
of their vessels. The reason for this is that when the actual transport capacity exceeds the
transport demand, the competition in the freight market will make the suppliers of transport
services offer their ships at lower rates in order to secure employment for their vessels. The
decrease in freight rates will reduce the profit of shipowners, and simultaneously lead to a fall
in the value of the company's ships. This reduction in the value of the shipowning company's
assets is a result of decreasing prices for second-hand vessels due to a fall in expected revenue
per ship and, consequently, shipping profits.
The reduction in ship values will make it profitable to demolish the least economical
ships, leading to a reduction in supply, that is, a reduction in the number of ships." The
mechanisms underlying this demolition process might be seen as a micro-version of what
Schumpeter calls "creative destruction". In this connection, the least economical ships, not the
least efficient businesses, end up as casualties of the crisis." Moreover, the decreasing ship
values lead to a reduction in capital costs for agents purchasing vessels, thus making it
economically justifiable to use these vessels in a less intensive manner. Consequently, there
may be a reduction in the productivity of each vessel, ie a decrease in the utilisation
coefficient. The combination of these mechanisms - the reduction in the number of ships and
the reduced productivity per ship - can contribute to increased balance between supply and
demand in the market for bulk shipping services."
The fact that the international market for shipping services incorporates several of the
factors characterising a free market is insufficient to secure an optimal fleet structure in the
long run. The market for bulk shipping, in its dry bulk as well as liquid bulk variety, is
characterised by long periods where the actual fleet deviates from the economically optimal
capacity. The period which is the focus of this thesis is a very good example of a tremendous
imbalance in this respect. One result of the deviations between actual and optimal transport
capacity is a considerable waste of resources. In periods with overcapacity, the laid-up
tonnage is left idle, and this is an obvious type of inefficiency. In periods where transport
demand exceeds tonnage supply, there are costs associated with the fact that the fleet is
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Bergen, 1981b are examples of models which
describe important aspects of the market.
54 For an introduction to how organised demolition may be beneficial, see Andreassen, Jan A. Berg, "Some
aspects ofa scrap-and-build scheme", Norwegian Shipping News, No. 21, 1978, pp. 14-16.
55 See Schumpeter, 1. A., The Dynamics ojCompetition and Monopoly, in Hunter, Alfred (ed.), Monopoly and
Competition, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1969, pp. 40-42.
56 This presentation is extremely simplified, and leaves out several of the mechanisms influencing the dynamics
of such a model. It is, however, valid and useful as a structural framework.
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operating at higher than optimal speed, as well as adverse effects on world trade and the
international division of labour,"
It has been claimed that even though overcapacity in the international market for
shipping services can be regarded as ineffective resource-utilisation in an international
perspective, some countries may benefit from the fact that freight rates are kept at a relatively
low level. The large Japanese need for raw material imports makes the country extremely
sensitive to high transport costs. Due to this, Japan may benefit from a situation where the
supply of shipping transport capacity exceeds demand, and transport costs are kept at a
relatively low level. 58
Shipping, and the dry bulk and tanker markets in particular, is characterised by large
fluctuations in the short-term spot market rates." This has historically been one of the most
significant features of these markets, and some of the earliest applied econometric models
were attempts at estimating rate movements in the international market for shipping services."
The freight rates are often regarded as unpredictable, as it has been impossible to find a clear
and unambiguous pattern in their movements. These strong fluctuations, which are often
called the cycles in the market for shipping and ships, exist as a result of more general
business cycles; fluctuations in the level of activity in the world economy in general. The
fluctuations created by these business cycles are amplified by imbalances in demand and
supply, caused by erroneous expectations on the demand and supply sides in the shipping
market. 61 The fluctuations in the level of activity in the world economy can have a variety of
causes, for instance multiplication effects of investment and inventory increases or random
shocks.
Stopford has analysed the dry bulk market and found that the fluctuations in the level
of activity in the world economy is a powerful influence on the freight rate level and ship
prices." The indirect effect, the influence of economic activity on ship prices, is in accordance
with the strong correlation between the freight rate level and ship prices found by several
researchers. The shipping market's response to international business cycles is to a large
extent the same as those predicted in a model of a perfectly competitive market. Norman has,
however, pointed out that the actual market development deviates from that of a "textbook"-
57 Norman, Victor D., "Shipping Problems - has the market mechanism failed?", Norwegian Shipping News, No.
7, 1976, pp. 25-27; edited summary of a lecture held in Polyteknisk Forening.
58 Poeth, Guy, "Encoding the Probabilistic Character of the Freight Market in Decision-making Models", in
Lorange & Norman, op.cit., 1973, p. 132. The benefits from the low level of freight rates must be weighed
against the reduction in income for the Japanese fleet as a result of the low freight rate level. As Japan was the
most important shipbuilding nation, another important factor which must be taken into account is the negative
effects on newbuilding prices.
59 For a short introduction to the implications ofthese fluctuations on shipowning companies, see Goss, Richard
O., hA Comment on Risk Preference and Shipping Decisions", in Lorange & Norman, op.cit., 1973, p. 182.
60 See for instance Koopmans, op.cit., 1939.
61 Bøe, Øystein and Hope, Einar, "Investment Behaviour in Norwegian Bulk Shipping", in Hope, op.cit., 1981,
p.44.
62 Stopford, op.cit., 1988, pp. 84-85. Among other things, he claims that it is possible to detect a one year lag
between the movements, probably as a result of the inventory effect.
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market on two accounts." The first divergence is a result of the fact that the markets for ships
- newbuildings as well as second-hand ships - react relatively slowly to changes in transport
demand. In addition to this, and more importantly, there are imperfections with regard to long-
term capacity adjustments.
2.3. The Markets for Tanker Transport and Tankers
This subchapter is first and foremost a more thorough introduction to the markets for tanker
transport and tankers, with particular emphasis on the features which separate these markets
from the previously presented segments of the bulk sector. The main reason for the thorough
presentation of the tanker market is the hypothesis that some of the particular features of the
markets for tanker transport and tankers play an important role in explaining the extraordinary
development of these markets in connection with the international shipping crisis. The
structure of the international tanker market is of particular relevance in this explanation.
As previously mentioned, the bulk sector covers the transport of dry as well as liquid
goods, and it is primarily the liquid goods which are shipped in tankers. Tankers may also be
used for transport or storage of some dry bulk goods, principally grain and cement, but this is
usually an exception rather than a rule, and not of particular importance for the functioning of
the markets for tanker shipping and tankers. There are, however, several connecting links
between the markets for tanker and dry bulk shipping, and in this connection it is in particular
the existence of combination carriers which may make an isolated analysis of the tanker sector
misleading.
The goods transported in the liquid bulk market are usually divided into three groups,
and these accounted for approximately half of the world' s seaborne trade, measured in tons, at
the start of the 1970s. The decidedly biggest part of this market segment is the transport of oil
and oil products, and it is this part of the liquid bulk market which I refer to when I use the
term the tanker market at later stages in the thesis. In the middle of the 1970s, the transport of
crude oil was approximately ten times as large as the transport of oil products, measured in
ton-miles. In addition to crude oil and oil products, the tanker market covers the transport of
liquefied gases and chemicals in purpose-built tankers.
Gas tankers are built for the transport of condensed gases in tanks. In 1974 these ships
made up 0,8 per cent of the world fleet, and in extent of one per cent of Norwegian tonnage."
Chemical tankers accounted for 1,6 per cent of the Norwegian fleet in 1975, and these
participate, like gas tankers, in a very specialised segment of the liquid bulk sector." Gas and
chemical tankers operate outside what is generally regarded as the tanker market, and there
are several differences between these and the more conventional oil tankers. The advanced
63 Norman, op.cit., 1979c, p. 26.
64 These percentages denote the share of gross tonnage and originate with Stortingsmelding nr. 23 (1975-76),
op.cit., p. 38. The relatively high cost per dead weight ton of gas and chemical tankers implies that the
investments in these vessels are higher than the grt- or dwt-share of the fleet indicates. See Chapter Nine for an
elaboration.
65 Calculations from Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co., Review 1974, Table 19 and 20, p. 21.
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technology utilised in the construction of gas and chemical tankers makes them more
expensive than similarly-sized oil tankers, and the operating costs per dwt are higher than for
larger tankers. As gas and chemical carriers operate in a very limited segment, seen in relation
to the total market for oil and oil product transport, they will by and large be omitted from the
presentation of the markets for tankers and tanker services. If it is not particularly pointed out,
the term tankers therefore refers to oil tankers."
The demand for tankers and tanker services can be derived from the demand for crude
oil and oil products. Accordingly, there is a very close relationship between the world's oil
import and the international demand for tanker shipping. Originally, the market for oil was an
oligopolistic market where five American and two European corporations maintained a
dominant position. Until the start of the 1960s, these Seven Sisters controlled production,
distribution and sale in all the important oil-producing countries in the non-Communist
world." As a result of this, tanker owners and oil-producing countries found themselves in a
situation where they to some extent depended on the large oil corporations."
In 1960, five of the most important oil producing countries founded OPEC, the
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries, with a view to creating a cartel which could
succeed in reducing the power of the international oil corporations." OPEC's membership and
importance in the market for oil gradually increased. However, the large oil companies
continued to be an important influence in the markets for oil transport and oil tankers. This
was primarilya result of the fact that the oil companies operated on both the demand and the
supply side in the market for tanker shipping.
2.3.1. The supply side
The supply side in the market for tanker transport will to a large extent function in the same
manner as in the market for bulk transport in general. Just like in the rest of the bulk market,
the scope of analysis is important in determining the shape of the supply curve. In the short
term, the existing tonnage constitutes an upper end limit for the supply of tanker capacity; in
the medium term, the only supply restriction is the capacity of the shipyards. A characteristic
feature of tanker transport supply is that the supply curve is shaped in a manner which
66 The markets for gas, chemicals and oil tankers are, however, related in a lot of the areas presented at the start
of Chapter 2.1. For an introduction to the markets for gas and chemicals transport, see for instance Svendsen,
Ann Elisabeth, Gass-skipsfart [Gas shipping], SNF-report No. 5411992, The Foundation for Research in
Economics and Business Administration, Bergen, 1992 and Østensjø, Pernille, Chemicals shipping, SNF-report
No. 5311992, The Foundation for Research in Economics and Business Administration, Bergen, 1992.
67 The Seven Sisters were the American companies Chevron, Exxon, Gulf, Mobil and Texaco and their two
European siblings British Petroleum and Shell.
68 Bennett, P. G. and Giesen, M. O., "Aristotle's Fallacy: A Hypergame in the Oil Shipping Business ....", Omega,
Volume 7, No.4, 1979, p. 310.
69 The founding members of OPEC were Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. The five founding
members were joined by Qatar in 1961, Indonesia and Socialist Peoples Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in 1962, United
Arab Emirates in 1967, Algeria in 1969 and Nigeria in 1971. Ecuador and Gabon have also been members of the
organisation. For a short introduction to the effects on shipping of the creation of national oil corporations, see
Taher, A. H., "The future role of the national oil companies in the world petroleum industry", Norwegian
Shipping News, No. l, 1978, pp. 15-16.
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indicates that the supplyelasticity, with regard to freight rates, is small when the transport
capacity is fully utilised, but very large in periods where there is excess transport capacity.
The shape of the tanker market's supply curve is very important in explaining the large
fluctuations in the spot market rates.
In economic models, the short-term supply of tanker tonnage is usually presented as a
function of freight rates, the price of inputs and the production possibilities, which first and
foremost denote the technological level." These models of tanker shipping supply are based
on the postulation that the international market for tanker transport is a competitive market,
where the agents are unable to influence the rate determination through utilisation of market
power.
A lot of the early studies of the international market for tanker services regarded it as
one market, where perfect substitutability existed between the vessels of different sizes."
Strandenes has later shown that complimentarity, rather than substitutability, is the best way
to describe the relationship between the very large and the very small tankers." This effect has
become more important with the increase in vessel size which has made loading and
unloading impractical or impossible in many harbours. In some situations, it is possible to
substitute tankers with other vessels in different classes, but only tankers in the
"neighbouring" classes will represent a full-fledged alternative means of transport. Due to this
lack of substitutability, it is correct to claim that, even within the tanker sector, several market
segments exist, and these do not necessarily develop in the same manner. One of the particular
features of the development of tanker freight rates in connection with the international
shipping crisis was the increasing differences in freight rate levels between various classes of
ships.
One of the common assumptions in economic models is that the supply side of the
international market for tanker services is atomistic, and thereby embodies the same
characteristics as the supply side in a competitive market model. Some of the features of the
supply of tanker services indicate that this assumption is not obvious. Historically, the oil
companies have integrated the transport service in their own production function. By the turn
of the century, the oil corporations owned more than 90 per cent of the world's tanker
tonnage. Gradually, the transport was separated from the oil companies' other areas of
activity, making it possible for independent shipowners to perform a larger share of the
world's oil transportation. The oil companies retained parts oftheir fleets, however, and in the
70 See for instance Myklebust, Ivar Hansson and Rasmussen, Per-Hermod, Rusty Buckets and Bitter Lemons?,
unpublished thesis, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Bergen, 1992, pp. 27-28 for
a presentation of the supply side in a simple model of the tanker market. For a more advanced model, see
Norman & Wergeland, op.cit., 1981b,pp. 22-25.
71 In Glen, D., Owen, M. and van der Meer, R., "Spot and Time Charter Rates for Tankers 1970-77", Journal of
Transport Economics and Policy, No. l, 1981, p. 49 it is claimed that the little attention paid to the lack of
substitutability between ships of different classes resulted in erroneous conclusions in a classic study; Zannetos,
op.cit., 1966.
72 Strandenes, Siri Pettersen, "Demand Substitution Between Tankers of Different Sizes", in Hope, op.cit., 1981,
p.72.
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1960s and 1970s roughly one third of the world's tanker tonnage was owned by the oil
companies.
The tanker sector is therefore a rather good example of a market where large
international companies were vertically integrated into the market for shipping services. In
1974, the seven largest oil companies owned approximately 50 million dwt of tanker capacity,
equalling approximately 25 per cent of the world fleet. The biggest tanker operator was
Exxon, which accounted for approximately 28 per cent of the tonnage owned by the Seven
Sisters." The oil companies' share of the world fleet increased in the wake of the international
shipping crisis; in 1972 they owned 33 per cent of the tanker transport capacity, whereas the
corresponding figure for 1978 was 40 per cent. However, the fact that approximately two
thirds of the fleet was controlled by independent owners indicates that there is a high degree
of competition in the market for tanker shipping.
Most of the tonnage which the oil companies did not own, was owned by independent
shipowners. They sold their services in the tanker market, either as short-, medium- or long-
term contracts or in the spot market, where shipping capacity was sold on a single voyage
basis. It has been common to regard approximately 60 per cent of the independent tanker fleet
as tied to the oil companies through contracts of various length, whereas the rest of the
independent tonnage was offered in the spot market. However, the amount of the independent
tonnage operating in the spot market varies with the freight rate level. Tormod Rafgård,
managing director of Intertanko, claimed at the end of the 1970s that while only ten per cent
of all oil shipments were transported in the spot market, at very high rates, in 1973, as much
as 25 per cent of the tanker tonnage was engaged in this market, at very low rates, in 1978.74
The freight rate level in the spot market is extremely flexible; in the autumn of 1973, the spot
market rates fell so much that the gross income of a trip from The Persian Gulf to Western-
Europe was reduced by $8 million within a three-week-period."
The oil companies initially cover their transport requirements by means of their own
ships. There has always been large differences between the various companies with regard to
the size of the "in house"-fleets. Some companies owned as much as 80 per cent of their
tonnage requirements in the 1970s, but in aggregate about a third of the fleet was owned by
the oil companies in 1972.
Capacity requirements which exceed the company's own and chartered tonnage has to
be bought in the spot market. If the supplyelasticity with regard to freight rate levels had been
constant, the rate variations for the ships in the spot market would correspond to the variations
for ships in other markets. However, as a result of the reduced elasticity in periods with large
73 These calculations are based on Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review 1975, Table 3, p. 15 and
Ratcliffe, Mike, Liquid Gold Ships. A History o/the Tanker 1859-1984, Lloyd's of London Press Ltd., London,
1985, pp. 127-128.
74 Rafgård, Tormod, "Oil transportation in tankers - getting cheaper and cheaper", Norwegian Shipping News,
No. 21, 1979, p. 29. This development will be analysed in detail at a later point.
75 Porter, Michael, "The Oil Tanker Shipping Industry", in Porter, Michael (ed.), Cases in Competitive Strategy,
Free Press, New York, 1983, p. 55.
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demand, the spot market tonnage, also called "the marginal tonnage", is exposed to the largest
variations in the freight rate level. On the inelastic part of the supply curve, small changes in
tanker transport demand wi11lead to large changes in the freight rate level. In contrast to this,
there will be small or no changes in the freight rate level if the demand increases on the rate-
elastic part of the supply curve.
An analysis of the spot market supply- and demand-conditions shows that the rate
determination to a large extent depends on the initial freight rate level. If the initial rate level
is relatively low, a considerable demand increase will not lead to any large changes in the
freight rate level. The reason for this is that the elasticity of the tanker supply is extremely
high when there is a large unutilised tonnage capacity. In periods with a high freight rate level,
a small increase in the demand for tanker transport services will lead to large changes in the
spot market rates. Consequently, a characteristic feature of the spot market rate determination
is that freight rate fluctuations are large in periods where most of the fleet is employed, but
small in periods where there is a large tonnage surplus available.
Figure 2.1. Supply and demand for shipping services
Dl D2
Tanker tonnage
Figure 2.1 illustrates the manner in which the determination of freight rates varies with the
state of the shipping market. In periods with high demand, the price shippers are willing to
pay to obtain transport capacity may be considerable. The reason for this is that at these times,
the rates are determined by the value that the buyers of transport services put on additional
transport capacity. The value of the goods transported is relatively high compared with the
cost of transportation. This implies that there are considerable costs for shippers if they are
unable to transport their goods to the market in which the goods are to be sold. The demand-
determined value of additional transport capacity may thus be significantly higher than the
cost of providing this capacity, leading to a great profit-potential for shipowners with
available tonnage. The mechanism is particularly manifest in the tanker sector, as the
proportion of the freight rate relative to the value of the cargo transported is considerably
smaller than for any other bulk commodities.
As expected, rates tend to be low in periods of overcapacity. A demand increase will
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attract laid up tonnage, accepting the prevailing rate level, and rates will not increase in the
manner seen when there is no unused capacity. The price is determined on the supply side,
and the price of additional capacity is determined by the shipowner's costs of providing this
capacity, rather than the value of the transport capacity for the shipper.
Despite the fact that the structure in the market is of a kind which makes it possible for
the agents to reduce competition through cooperation, it is the conduct of the agents which
indicates whether the market functions in accordance with the principles of perfect
competition. There are several indications that this is the case in the spot market for tanker
transport. A similar distinction between market structure and market conduct has played an
important role when questions of abuse of market power have been taken to the American
judiciary.
One indication is the fact that what we can call the secondary markets, the markets for
freight contracts, newbuildings and second-hand ships, are developed. It is necessary for these
markets to function if the primary market, ie the spot market for tanker transport, is to be
considered a perfectly competitive market. Shipping is one of a handful of industries where it
is sometimes possible to sell the means of production after five to ten years of use for a price
in the same range as historic costs. This is of course a reflection of the fluctuations of the
prices in the markets for new and second-hand ships. In addition to this, the shipping sector
only has limited economies of scale at the company level. The economies of scale are as a rule
connected to the size of the ship, and as a result of the division of the shipping market into
segments composed of relatively similar ships, economies of scale have little effect on the
marginal cost curves of the various suppliers.
The strong fluctuations in the spot market indicate that the price determination process
is extremely flexible. To have a flexible price determination mechanism, information must be
easily available and personal preferences can not influence the decisions of suppliers and
buyers to any conside. .ble extent. The way the international market for tanker services is
organised, it is easy for suppliers and demanders to find the "correct" price, seen in relation to
aggregate supply and demand. This price will then only to a negligible extent be influenced by
factors such as personal relations, structural factors or other forms of regulation." The
efficiency of the market is to a large extent a result of the work done by shipbrokers,
spreading information and linking agents on the supply and demand sides. As a result of the
work of the shipbrokers, the agents have information about elements such as marginal costs
and marginal demand. This is necessary for a competitive market price determination to take
place.
Despite the near perfect competition in the international market for tanker services, it
is possible to detect some aspects which do not fulfil the conditions usually associated with a
76 There is little doubt about the fact that personal relations are extremely important in the shipping business. The
main effects of the personal relations are however of a kind which do not generally interfere with the price
determination process. The relationship between someone who supplies and someone who demands a shipping
service may influence the ranking of approximately identical offers, but has little relevance outside this situation.
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perfectly competitive market. The large oil companies may reduce the competition on the
supply side as they own or control a considerable share of the world tanker fleet, but this
possibility is generally not taken advantage of. The ability to use monopsonistic measures to
reduce competition is regulated by the American Antitrust-measures, and this influences the
behaviour of the large American oil companies. Moreover, it is doubtful whether it is feasible
for the oil companies to make long-term profits from monopsonistic behaviour, even if it was
legal, and, consequently, they are not necessarily in favour of a depressed freight rate level."
The first reason for this is that it will be difficult to behave in a monopsonistic manner
indefinitely unless there are certain barriers to entry or exit, and there are no such barriers in
the oil tanker shipping market. According to Bailey and Baumol, "...neither large size nor
fewness of firms necessarily means that markets need function unsatisfactorily. Impediments
to entry and exit, not concentration or scale of operations, may be the primary source of
interference with the workings of the invisible hand. ,m In addition to this, manipulation of
freight rates by means of market behaviour would necessitate large investments in additional
storage capacity. The costs of a monopsonistic behaviour may therefore easily exceed the
gains resulting from this behaviour. Consequently, there are strong indications that the supply
side in the international market for tanker services is very much like the ideal in the theory of
perfect competition.
2.3.2. The demand side
Oil is of utmost importance to the industrial activity and infrastructure of the modem world,
and the replacement of oil with alternative sources of energy is in most cases a difficult and
time-consuming process. As a result of this, it is customary to regard the demand for oil as
very inelastic in the short run, and the seaborne volume of oil will therefore only to a small
extent be influenced by changes in the price of the commodity or the transport service.
Because there are few alternatives to maritime transport in connection with the international
sale of oil, the demand for oil transport will only change marginallyas a result of changes in
the freight rate level.
The demand for oil tanker transport can, in a very simplified manner, be seen as a
function of the demand for oil and the distance between the most important production- and
consumption-centres." In such a setting it is relatively easy to identify the factors that will
give an increase in the tanker transport demand. The most straightforward link is between an
increase in the demand for oil, for instance as a result of increased demand for energy or a
shift between various sources of energy in favour of oil, and an increase in tanker transport
77 Zannetos, Zenon S., "Market and Cost Structure in Shipping", in Lorange & Norman, op.cit., 1973, p. 38.
78 Bailey, Elizabeth E. and Baumol, William l, "Deregulation and the Theory of Contestable Markets", Yale
Journal on Regulation, Volume l, 1984, p. Ill.
79 In this connection, the fact that oil demand to some extent is seasonal and the fact that transport demand has
tended to have two annual peaks is not taken into account. One peak is late in the autumn in connection with the
demand for fuel oil and the other is in the winter months in the northern hemisphere, when the weather reduces
the speed of the tankers. These seasonal variations are of little consequence to the analysis presented here, and
will therefore be neglected in the rest of the analysis.
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demand. Alternatively, there will be a shift in tanker tonnage demand if there is a change in
the relative importance of the major production centres. If the oil producing areas with
increased importance are situated further away from the consumption centres, there will be an
increase in tanker transport demand." The same effect will of course be the result of an
increase in the importance of consumption centres relatively far away from the main sources.
In addition to this, oil tanker transport demand will increase, or decrease, as a result of
changes in the shipping routes which can be used by the tankers. One example of this is the
closure of the Suez-canal which contributed massively to the 25 per cent increase of average
oil shipping distances between 1966 and 1968. Finally, a reduction of the transport of oil in
pipelines will give an increase in the demand for tanker transport."
In the long run, there will be far greater flexibility in the demand for oil and,
consequently, in the demand for oil tanker transport. The technological development is
responsible for much of this flexibility. The demand for oil increased enormously in the
period after the Second World War, both as a result of its increased importance relative to
other sources of energy and as a result of a massive increase in the consumption of energy per
capita. In addition to this, there was a strong increase in the use of oil for other purposes than
energy, first and foremost in connection with the production of petrochemical products such
as plastics and synthetic fibres."
The demand for seaborne oil transport grew faster than the oil consumption in the
postwar years, among other things as a result of a considerable increase in shipping distances.
In 1948, the United States were forced, for the first time, to import oil to cover their own
consumption, and approximately 20 per cent of American oil imports were delivered from the
Middle East. 83 This was one of several examples of the increase in distance between the
source and the consumer. In addition to this effect, there was the effect of the increases in
average shipping distances resulting from the closures of the Suez-canal. In the decade after
1962, the seaborne trade in crude oil, measured in tons, increased by 220 per cent. If the
changes in distances are taken into account as well, the crude oil transport growth exceeds 350
per cent. 84 Another reason for the increase in tanker transport demand was the movement of
the oil refining process from the producing to the consuming country. As a result of this
development, the tankers had to transport crude oil, which is relatively voluminous compared
with oil products.
In a longer perspective the world economy's dependence on oil is more flexible.
80 Of course, this also implies that a relative increase in the production centres near to where the oil is consumed,
for instance in the North Sea, Alaska and China, will give a reduction in the importance of the Middle East, and
consequently reduced transport demand.
81 An example of this can be found in 1970, when a shovel destroyed Tapline, a pipeline annually transporting
25 million tons of oil from Arabia to the Mediterranean. At the time, this was used as an explanation of the
tanker transport demand increase, see Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review 1970, p. 16.
82 For an introduction to the importance of the oil crises on the production of petrochemical goods, see "The
impact of the oil crises", Chemica/week, August 2, 1989,pp. 64-72.
83 Harlaftis, Gelina, Greek shipowners & Greece 1945-1975, The Athlone Press, London, 1993,p. 41.
84 Calculations from Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review 1972, Oslo, 1973, Table l and 2, p. 8.
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Consequently, the demand for oil can be reduced if the price, relative to alternative sources of
energy, increases as a result of an increase in the price of oil itself or in the price of oil
shipments. Again, the technological development plays a prominent part in the determination
of demand. On the one hand, the technological development makes it possible, or
economically justifiable, to utilise alternative sources of energy or factors of production. On
the other hand, it will be possible to find production methods which reduce the oil
consumption, for instance by means of energy-saving measures which will be more profitable
to implement given a higher price of oil.
It is not only the demand for oil which will be more flexible in a long-term
perspective; there will also be greater elasticity in the demand for oil tanker transport. A
strong increase in the price of oil tanker transport will make it relatively more profitable to
construct and utilise alternative means of transportation, for instance pipelines. A freight rate
increase can also make it more advantageous to develop oil fields which previously were
unprofitable to exploit, but which are situated near the most important consumption centres.
These oil fields will become profitable to utilise as a result of the relative price increase of oil
from more distant sources. As a result of this, the demand for tanker transport can be seen as
considerably more flexible in the long term than in the short term.
Rate determination in the tanker market
Generally speaking, the market for tanker services will be regulated by the same mechanisms
which create an equilibrium in the market for dry bulk shipping. As previously mentioned, the
rates are a result of the demand- and supply-side development in the period market, the spot
market and the markets for new and second-hand tonnage. Thus, the shape of the demand- and
the supply-curves in the spot market plays an important role in a presentation of the rate
determination process in the tanker market.
The rate determination in the market for tanker transport has important linkages to the
markets for newbuildings and second-hand vessels." The spot market is influenced by these
markets through their importance for the size of the tanker fleet, which determines the long-
term supply of tanker services. Moreover, the spot market affects these markets because the
demand for tankers is determined by the shipowners' expectations about the future freight
rates. Price differences between newbuildings and used tonnage will come about as a result of
differences in expected profits from new and second-hand vessels. Second-hand vessels can
be offered in the spot or period markets immediately, whereas newbuildings will not be
available until after a building period which in some instances may last as long as five years.
Differences in technological standards and financing possibilities are additional reasons for
price differences between newbuildings and second-hand tankers.
There are some differences between the tanker market and the dry bulk market
85 Hawdon, D., "Tanker freight rates in the short and long run", Applied Economics, 1978, vol. 10, pp. 203-217
sees the spot market rate as determined by a series of relations between the market for tanker services and the
market for tankers.
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regarding the construction of newbuildings, Because most yards in general can produce both
tankers and bulk carriers, the supply of tanker newbuildings will be negatively correlated to
the price ofbulk carriers. Ifthe price ofbulk carriers increases relative to the price of tankers,
the yards are more likely to build bulk carriers. This will happen if, for instance, the rate level
or expectations about the future freight rate level increase more in the dry bulk market than in
the tanker market. The demand for newbuildings is determined by several factors, but it has
been suggested that it can be seen as a result of the spot market rates, the size of the shipyards'
order books and the size of the fleet at the moment a contract is entered into. 86
The differences between the two major suppliers of transport capacity, oil companies
and independent shipowners, are particularly significant in connection with the supply of
second-hand ships. The oil companies have, in contrast to independent shipowners, a
responsibility to cover internal transport requirements. Accordingly, it is difficult for them to
dispose of tonnage in periods with a high freight rate level and high second-hand ship prices,
without being exposed to a large risks in connection with the transport of the company's oil.
Independent shipowners consequently have a higher degree of freedom in their sale and
purchase decisions.
The relationship between rate determination in the spot- and period-markets
The period market acts as a distributor of risk, securing the existence of a market through
which both suppliers and demanders of shipping services can reduce their uncertainty. Oil
companies wishing to contract tankers for more than a single journey manage to reduce the
risk regarding their future transport needs and freight costs. Nevertheless, they might find
themselves in a situation where the transport costs they have to pay are higher than those
which would have been applicable if the transport assignments had been bought in the spot
market. Independent shipowners offering their ships in the period market achieve increased
certainty about their future freight revenues. Even in the shipowners' case, there is a
possibility that losses, in the case of foregone profits, may appear as a result of the
commitment of their vessels to charter contracts, particularly in periods where there is a large
increase of the spot market freight rate level." It has been a common feature of the shipping
86 Devanney, lW., "A Model of the Tanker Market and a Related Dynamic Program", in Lorange & Norman,
op.cit., 1973, p. 106. Expectations about future demand and supply conditions will of course be an important
factor in determining the demand for newbuildings. In Devanney's model this is accounted for by the influence
these factors have on spot market rates. According to Eriksen & Norman, op.cit., 1976, p. 85, the relationship
between the spot market and vessels prices probably is indirect. Their estimates show that period rates give the
best indication of the development of vessel values.
87 For an example of a model calculating the discounted expected profit from having a ship in the spot market,
see Glen, Owen & van der Meer, op.cit., 1981, Appendix 1, p. 58. Theoretically, a charter contract does not
necessarily exclude the possibility to earn money in the spot market. A shipowner can buy or lease a ship by
means of the income from the charter contract and relet this vessel in the spot market. For an introduction to why
this largely remains a hypothetical possibility, see Gjærum, Per Ivar, Om fleksibilitet, strategi og
simultanvurdering av beslutninger i sjøtransport [On flexibility, strategy and simultaneous decisions in
shipping], unpublished thesis, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Bergen, 1975, pp.
29-32.
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industry that independent shipowners have used their long-term charter contracts as
"collateral" in connection with the financing of newbuildings."
As a considerable part of the world's oil transport is undertaken by the oil company
i
itself, one part of the tanker market is characterised by the situation that the shipper is also
supplying the shipping service. In other cases, the shipper has to buy the shipping service
from outsiders, either in the spot market or as long-term contracts. There is a large degree of
flexibility in the design of charter contracts, but a certain degree of standardisation of charter
contracts has evolved for various commodities on certain trade routes. There are generally
four types of contracts which are used in the charter market. The various contracts vary by the
extent to which the various parties are responsible for the costs associated with the transport
service.
Timecharter agreements were introduced as early as during the Crimean War. These
contracts imply that the shipper pays freight much in the same way as a tenant pays rent, and
the freight, the so-called tic-rate, is expressed on a weekly, monthly or annual basis, per dead
weight ton." Timecharter contracts can be further divided into timecharter-trip, which is a
timecharter-like agreement covering a given journey or period-timecharters, where an
agreement is entered into for a limited period of time. The shipowner pays the fixed costs,
while the shipper is responsible for the voyage costs, ie the costs associated with each
particular trip. Thus, the shipowner is responsible for the costs of capital, crew, insurance,
maintenance and overhauling. This implies that the shipper has to pay bunkers costs, port- and
canal-duties and costs in connection with loading and unloading. In some cases, the journey
may have to be covered by extra insurance premiums, and this is also the shippers
responsibility. A timecharter agreement can have a duration of anything from three months to
twenty years.
Voyage charters can be entered into for single or consecutive journeys. Single trip
voyage charters are not regarded as a part of the period market. In connection with
consecutive voyage agreements the shipowner is responsible for most of the costs in
connection with the trip. He receives payment for the transport of cargo between two or more
ports, and must usually pay all voyage and operating costs." The party chartering the ship
pays an agreed price per ton of goods which is transported.
Bareboat-charters are similar to timecharters, but the shipper is responsible for all
88 Norwegian shipowners have often used charter contracts as a means of fmancing investments, the most
prominent example probably being the sale of Anglo Saxon Petroleum Limited's tanker fleet in the period 1927-
1930; see for instance Nørgård, Leif, Tankfartens etablerings- og introduksjonsperiode i norsk skipsfart 1912-
1913 og 1927-1930 [The period of tanker shipping introduction in Norwegian shipping 1912-1913 and 1927-
1930], Institute for Shipping Research, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Bergen,
1961, p. 46.
89 Norges Rederforbund, Momenter til belysning av norsk og internasjonal skipsfart [Aspects illuminating
Norwegian and international shipping] Oslo, 1979, p. 37.
90 The distribution of the payment of costs in connection with loading and unloading may vary from contract to
contract. For a more thorough introduction to this kind of charters, see Gram, Per, "Intertankvoy", Nordisk
Skibsrederforening Medlemsblad, No. 490, 1971, pp. 4260-4265 and Gram, Per, "Intertankvoy 76", Nordisk
Skibsrederforening Medlemsblad, No. 501, 1976, pp. 4455-4461.
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costs; the shipowner only pays interest and instalments if the vessel was financed by incurring
debt. The ship is operated by the charterer as though he owned it. The shipowner thus acts
more or less as a financier, whose risk is connected to the development of interest rates and
the value of the vessel in a future sale. A bareboat-charter can be compared to a rental
agreement for an empty ship, and the payment is expressed in dead weight tons for the
duration of the agreement. This kind of charters is the basis for the Japanese Shikumisen,
where an owner with relatively low crew costs using a Flag of Convenience forms a company
which then hires out the ship and its crew to a Japanese company. Shikumisen-agreements
with Japanese yards, banks and oil companies were one of the main reasons that Hong Kong
shipowners could acquire a considerable part of the world' s tanker tonnage in the 1960s and
1970s. In some of these transactions, the shikumisen-agreement was the only collateral
necessary to secure Japanese financing and delivery of newbuildings. A bareboat charter is
also known as a demise charter.
Contracts of Affreightment are the last of the common types of contracts used in the
charter market. According to these agreements, the shipowner accepts responsibility for the
transport of a certain amount of a product between two or more ports for a given period of
time. In the case of a Contract of Affreightment, the shipowner is free to decide which vessels
he chooses to use to satisfy the transport requirements.
Some of the contracts in the charter market include escalation clauses which secure the
parties full or limited compensation for extra costs in connection with inflation, thereby
contributing to a more even distribution of risk between shipowner and shipper.
2.4. A Short Assessment of the Postwar Development
The description of the mechanisms in the international market for shipping services is to a
large extent based on observations of the historical development. The models and theories are
usually formulated by means of assumptions about the processes in the market and the
behaviour of various agents given certain conditions or circumstances. Consequently, they
attempt to explain and predict the development of the market in different situations. It is
important to keep this generalising and simplifying feature in mind when using models and
theories.
The assessment of the historical development in this subchapter consists of three parts.
First, I give a short presentation of the postwar development in the market for shipping
services. Then, I see this in relation to the development of the international economy in
general, and international trade in particular, in the 1970s. Some of the factors which led to the
crisis in the international shipping market in the 1970s can be identified in these areas.
Finally, the development of the shipping sector in the 1970s is briefly introduced.
2.4.1. The postwar development in the international shipping market
The international demand for transport services is closely related to the level of world trade,
and the first quarter of a century after the end of the Second World War was a period largely
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characterised by strong growth in international trade. It is in this connection important to keep
in mind that it is the volume rather than the value of world trade which determines the demand
for transport. Accordingly, it is possible to have a reduced volume of traded goods, but an
increase in the value of world trade, for instance if the ratio of relatively expensive goods to
relatively bulky goods increases. Furthermore, a decrease in the volume of seaborne trade may
come about if the increase in the demand for alternative means of transport such as lorries,
planes and pipelines is larger than the increase in international trade.
The growth of Gross Domestic Product was considerable in most Western nations in
the initial postwar decades, but a characteristic feature of the international economic
development is that world trade grew even faster than production. While world production
trebled from 1953 to 1973, international trade grew by 350 per cent, measured in volume."
This growth was particularly high when seen in relation to the development in the interwar
period. The volume of goods transported by sea increased by from 490 million tons to more
than 3.200 million tons, ie more than 550 per cent, from 1948 to 1973. The increasing
volumes were augmented by an increase in average shipping distance.
Figure 2.2. Development of world seaborne trade, million tons, 1948-7392
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In the first postwar decades there was only one year, 1958, when world trade contracted." The
shipping sector was responsible for the transport of a considerable share of the international
raw material and merchandise exports. A commonly cited figure for the shipping sector's
91 van der Wee, Herman, Prosperity and Upheaval. The World Economy 1945-1980, Pelican Books Ltd.,
Harmondsworth, 1986, p. 260. The volume of manufactures exports increased by more than 500 per cent.
92 The figures come from OEEC/OECD Maritime Transport, and are quoted in eg Harlaftis, Gelina, A history of
Greek-owned shipping: the making of an international tramp fleet, 1830 to the present day, Routledge, London,
1996, p. 250, Fon, op.cit., 1995, p. 112 and Metaxas, op.cit., 1971. OEEC/OECD claims that the figures come
from the United Nations, but uses figures from Fearnley & Eger for later years. One problem is the inconsistency
between Review/ OECD figures in the years where both sources present figures. OECD figures tend to
overestimate and Fearnley & Eger tends to underestimate oil transport in the early 1960s. The trend is
nevertheless clear, although the point when oil transports exceeds other cargoes is shifted from 1960 to 1968
when Fearnley & Eger's rather than OECD's figures are used.
93 Kenwood, A.G. and Lougheed, A.L., The Growth of the International Economy, 1820-1990. 3rd edition,
Routledge, London, 1992, p. 286.
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share of total transport demand is two thirds, but a figure ofthis type is relatively useless. The
share of international trade transported by ships varies depending on manner of reporting. If
value is used as basis, the shipping sector's share of total transport demand will be relatively
low. The same will be the case if only volumes, and not distances, are taken into account. For
our purpose, however, it will be sufficient to acknowledge that world trade grew fast in the
postwar period, and that this resulted in a large increase in the demand for seaborne transport.
In the postwar period there has been a strong underlying growth trend in international
trade, and thus also in the demand for shipping services. Despite this general trend, there have
been large differences in the rate of growth between different periods and miscellaneous
goods.
The most important feature of the development of bulk transport was the enormous
increase of liquid bulk shipping. In the beginning of the 1960s the transport volume of liquid
bulk goods for the first time exceeded that of dry bulk goods. This contributed to, and was a
result of, the most important structural change on the supply side, viz the massive growth of
the world tanker fleet.
Figure 2.3. The world fleet, the oil tanker fleet and the tanker share, 1963-8094
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The supply oftonnage increased tremendously in the period after the Second World War, and
the annual growth of the tanker fleet was approximately 13 per cent." One of the reasons for
this was the strong increase in the world's shipbuilding capacity, and the amount of tonnage
launched increased from 2,1 million gross register tons in 1946 to more than 35 million in the
94 The source for this chart is figures from Table 3 in Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review, various
issues. Combination carriers have not been registered as tankers. In the charts depicting Norwegian and
international tonnage development, combination carriers are registered as bulk carriers; a division of these
between the categories tankers and bulk carriers would have shown an even stronger growth of the tanker fleet.
This type ofdistribution of the combination carriers has been done in Stortingsmelding nr. 23 (1975-76), op.cit.,
p. 72, but I have chosen to treat the combination carriers as bulk carriers, in order to give as conservative an
estimate of the tanker sector as possible.
95 Beenstock, Michael and Vergottis, Andreas, Econometric Modelling of World Shipping, Chapman & Hall,
London,1993,p.26.
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middle of the 1970s. This was four times as much as the amount of tonnage which had been
launched in 1960.96 Parallel with this growth of shipbuilding capacity, there was a strong shift
in the geographicallocalisation of the world shipbuilding industry. In 1974, the order books of
the British yards were three times the level from 1946. Japanese yards, on the other hand, had
order books which were 27 times as large as those from 1946, and Japan delivered
approximately half of all newbuildings in the 1970s.97 However, the fact that the world order
book increased from every year to the next after 1963 implies that the shipbuilding industry,
despite the tremendous capacity increase, was unable to cope with the strong pressure from
the demand side.
It has been claimed that a latent demand surplus existed in the shipping industry as a
result of the fact that transport demand increased stronger than expected in most of the
postwar period." Even though the market conditions varied between different periods of time
and different market segments, there were periods which deserve to be characterised as booms
for the shipping sector as a whole. In the period from 1945 to 1970, there were three instances
where the development in world trade led to a particularly high freight rate level in the
international market for shipping services.
As international economic relations were restored in the first period after the Second
World War, there was an immense increase in the demand for shipping services. However, the
limited capacity of the shipbuilding industry made a corresponding tonnage supply increase
difficult. The first boom appeared in the summer of 1950, when the rate level increased, partly
as a result of the outbreak of the Korean War. The stockpiling in Western countries led to a
short-term demand increase, and the boom period lasted approximately 16 months. Due to the
restrictions imposed on their contracting, Norwegian shipowners were unable to fully take
advantage of the beneficial conditions in the freight market. Moreover, the favourable
newbuilding contracts which the Norwegian shipowners were prohibited from honouring due
to the contracting ban were taken over by exile-Greek shipowners, facilitating their tanker-
expansion."
The second boom appeared in the middle of the 1950s, and once again international
political developments influenced the conditions in the shipping market. The strong growth of
96 Slaven, Anthony, "Marketing Opportunities and Marketing Practices; The Eclipse of British Shipbuilding,
1957-1976", in Fischer, Lewis R. (ed.), From wheel house to counting house; Essays in maritime business
history in honour ofprofessor Peter Neville Davies, Research in Maritime History No.2, St. John's, 1992, pp.
125-127.
97 For a very informative survey ofmarket shares in the world shipbuilding industry from 1965 to 1990, see de
Voogd, Cees, Public Intervention and the Decline of Shipbuilding in the Netherlands, paper presented to the
North Sea History Conference, Stavanger, Norway, August 1995, Table l, p. 4.
98 Norman, Victor D., "Har det vært for lett å drive internasjonal skipsfart i Norge?" [Has Shipping been too easy
an Enterprise in Norway?], Internasjonal Politikk, No. lB, Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt, Oslo, 1979, pp. 176-
177.
99 Thowsen, Atle, "Skipsfart og planøkonomi. Kontraherings- og lisensieringspolitikken overfor norsk skipsfart i
den første etterkrigstiden (1945-1953)" [Shipping and the mixed economy: The contracting- and licensing-
policies with regard to Norwegian shipping in the initial post-war period (1945-53)], Sjøfartshistorisk Årbok
1985 [Norwegian Yearbook of Maritime History 1985], Bergen Maritime Museum, Bergen, 1986, p. 23. The
"contracting prohibition" was abolished by the turn of the year 1950/51.
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world trade had led to an increase in freight rates, and this was amplified by the demand
increase in connection with the closure of the Suez Canal in November 1956. As a result of
the Suez crisis, crude oil transports were redirected around the Cape of Good Hope, the
southern tip of Africa. Consequently, there was a strong increase in .the demand for tanker
transport capacity, particularly for large tankers. After approximately 18 months, this period
of prosperity finished. There were several causes for this; a four per cent decrease in OECD
industrial production which reduced transport demand, the re-opening of the Suez Canal in
April 1957 which reduced average shipping distances and an increase in the supply of
tonnage."? As a result of the adverse conditions in the market for shipping services, the lay
up-rate in the dry bulk market subsequently reached a new postwar high.
The last boom in the period 1945-1970 was the five month long period of high freight
rates in connection with the Six Day War between Egypt and Israel in 1967. Again, the Suez
Canal was closed, and the spot market tanker rates in the period June-October were four times
higher than they had been six months previously.'?' As a result of the closure of the Suez
Canal, the shipping distance between the Persian Gulf and Europe increases by 80 per cent,
and in the period 1966 to 1968, the average distance of international crude oil shipments
increased by 25 per cent.'?' Simultaneously, bulk carrier rates increased as well, largelyas a
result of the fact that combination carriers previously offered in the dry bulk market entered
the booming tanker market, thereby reducing the supply of tonnage in the dry bulk market.
If one takes a cursory glance at the statistics, it may seem as though no major changes
took place in the geographical distribution of international trade in the first decades after the
Second World War. The industrialised countries, which had been extremely important for the
growth in international trade in the 1950s, continued to play the leading role in the 1960s'
world trade as well. However, in spite of the fact that the industrialised countries' share of
international trade appeared more or less "constant" at approximately two-thirds of world
trade, changes in the relative importance of the various industrialised countries had a major
impact on the demand for shipping services.l'" The emergence of Japan as a major exporter of
manufactures was of great importance for the shipping industry, as the country's lack of raw
materials made large imports necessary. However, the most dramatic change in the
international trade pattern in the postwar period was the incredible increase in the significance
of oil exporting countries.
The increasing dependence on oil as the main source of energy in the postwar period
had paved the way for this change in the trade pattern. Due to the geographical concentration
of oil reserves it was necessary for most industrial nations to import a considerable part of
100 The increased supply oftonnage was a result of the regular growth of the fleet, as well as increased utilisation
of the American tonnage reserves; see Seland, op.cit., 1994, pp. 76-77.
101 Ibid., p. 169.
102 Calculations based on figures from Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review 1972, Table l and 2, p. 8.
103 GATT, International Trade 197911980, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Geneva, 1980, p. 5. The
category "industrialised areas" is used to denote the industrialised Western nations and Japan, and, consequently,
conceals the effect of Japan's increasingly important position as a major participant in the international
economy.
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their energy requirements, and by far the largest part of the oil imports was transported by sea.
Consequently, the most important change in the demand in the international market for
shipping services was the aforementioned growth of tanker transport relative to dry bulk
shipments.
During the 1960s, the demand for tanker tonnage grew faster than the demand for bulk
carriers, and, for the first time, tanker shipping became more important than the other kinds of
shipping, measured in tons as well as in ton-miles. In 1970, the transport of oil and oil
products accounted for more than half of the world seaborne trade, measured in tons, whereas
this share of shipping transport demand was reached early in the 1960s, when ton-miles is the
basis for the comparison. In 1968, one year after the second postwar closure of the Suez
Canal, tankers performed approximately 60 per cent of all seaborne transport.'?' The
difference between the tankers' share of seaborne trade measured as tons and as ton-miles is a
result of the relatively longer average distance of oil transports.
Figure 2.4. World seaborne trade, billion ton-miles, 1962-70105
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As a result of the increase in international trade, transport demand in the international market
for shipping services grew considerably in the period after 1945. At the same time, there was
an increase in the tonnage supply, both as a result of the technological development and as a
result of the increase in the world's shipbuilding capacity. The technological development was
evident in connection with the large increase in the average size of vessels, the increasing
importance of purpose-built, specialised vessels and the improvements in maritime
infrastructure, particularly facilities for loading and unloading in terminals as well as on the
ships.
Despite the continuous demand increase, the shipping sector continued to fall victim to
104 All calculations based on figures from Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review 1972, Table I and 2, p.
8. The aforementioned distinction between OECD and Fearnley & Eger's figures implies that the shift occcured
earlier if OECD data are utilised.
105 The source of this chart is figures from Table 2 in Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review, various
issues. Billion refers to one thousand million, and is thus used in the American rather than the British sense.
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relatively violent business cycles. By analysing the business cycles in the shipping market in
the postwar period, Professor Strømme Svendsen has found that 34 of the 120 months in the
1950s can be characterised as booms, whereas the next decade witnessed only five boom
months.!"
2.4.2. The development of the world economy in the 19705
Stable international conditions, regarding the exchange of goods between nations as well as in
international monetary relations, contributed to the massive growth of the international
economy in the first decades after the Second World War. By the end of the 1960s, however,
it was evident that the existing international monetary regime, characterised by fixed exchange
rates and full convertibility, no longer reflected the actual balance of power in the world
economy.'?'
Differences in the economic development of the Western countries in the years after
1945 had given rise to major disequilibria in the international economy. In the beginning of
the 1970s the conditions for international settlement were radically changed as the existing
monetary regime, the gold-dollar standard, collapsed. The 1970s were characterised by lower
growth rates for industrial production and international trade, compared with the previous
postwar period. Unemployment and inflation rates, however, increased severely, and so did
the uncertainty regarding the stability of and conditions in the international economy.
A liberal regime for trade and stable monetary relations were important for the growth
of international trade in the period before 1970. Indirectly, these aspects were important to
shipowners, by facilitating an increase in the demand for seaborne transport. The fixed
exchange rates had a direct impact on shipowners as well. They created a stable, consistent
and predictable framework in which it was relatively easy to calculate costs and revenues,
perform profitability judgements and enter into contracts with foreign business relations. As a
result of the international aspect of shipping, shipowners usually have income and expenses in
different currencies, and exchange rate adjustments will therefore influence profitability
calculations in connection with newbuilding contracts and charter agreements.
The stable exchange rates in the 1960s' growth period was secured by means of the
gold-dollar standard, an international monetary system where there were no competitive
devaluations and exchange rates could be considered fixed.!" At the same time, it became
106 Svendsen, Arnljot Strømme, "Skipsfartskonjunkturene i 1970-årene" [Shipping cycles in the 1970s],
Sjefartshistorisk Årbok 1978 [Norwegian Yearbook of Maritime History 1978], Bergen Maritime Museum,
Bergen, 1979, p, 209.
107 Some scholars claim that there, at any given time, will have to be one nation which must be able to maintain a
leading role in the world economy and other international relations. According to these theories, the problems
which surfaced at the end of the 1960s were a result of the fact that the United States had lost their position as
hegemonic power and no nations were in a position to take over the international leadership; see for instance
Keohane, Robert O., After Hegemony - Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1984.
108 There was room for some adjustment of the parities. However, these events, such as the devaluation of the
British pound in 1967, were the result of pressures from speculation and systemic weaknesses, rather than
motivated by purely national considerations.
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evident that the system of fixed exchange rates, which was important for the growth of world
trade after the introduction of non-resident convertibility in 1958, could not be adapted to the
increasing fluctuations and complexity of a steadily growing international economy. In the
early autumn of 1971, the disequilibrium in the international monetary system became so
large as to force the American authorities to suspend the gold convertibility of the dollar and
introduce a ten per cent import tax. This marked the end of the system of fixed exchange rates,
a system which fell victim to lack of confidence and the increasing imbalances in the
international economy.
Despite the demise of the gold-dollar standard, new parities were introduced. There
were no genuinely fundamental changes in international monetary relations in connection with
the Smithsonian Agreement, an attempt at introducing monetary stability signed four months
after the gold convertibility of the dollar had been suspended.'?" A year after the signing of the
Smithsonian Agreement, it was once again time for significant changes in international
monetary relations. The British pound left the framework of the agreement in the middle of
1972, and the American dollar was further devalued early in 1973. It has been estimated that
the changes in the exchange rate parities from the autumn of 1967 until February 1973
reduced the secure Norwegian freight income, ie the revenue from charter agreements, by
NoK 5.700 million. Approximately one third of this amount can be seen as "returned" to
Norwegian shipowners as a result of expenses denoted in British pounds or American
dollars. I lO
The reduced value of the dollar led to a strong decrease in the income of the oil-
producing countries, due to the fact that the price of oil, like international freight rates, was
quoted in American dollars. Coupled with a strong increase in the price of foodstuffs and
manufactures, of which the oil-producing countries were net importers, the dollar devaluation
led to a massive worsening of the terms of trade for most oil-producing countries.
Deteriorating terms of trade and political considerations were the main reasons for the oil
price increase in October 1973. Given the importance of oil in the world economy, the
increase in the price of oil and oil products had devastating effects and resulted in a reduction
of energy-intensive industrial production. The oil crisis triggered a general recession, which
exacerbated the negative development of business cycles from 1973 onwards.'!'
The strong increase in international trade which had taken place in the 1950s and
1960s was reduced in the period after the 1973 oil crisis. Another result of the oil price
109 As a result of the Agreement, the dollar was devalued by ten per cent relative to gold and the other exchange
rates were given a wider margin for fluctuation around their parities. Kenwood & Lougheed, op.cit., 1992, pp.
268-269 have called these changes "temporary and margina/". However, the new parities implied a seven per
cent reduction of the value of the dollar relative to Norwegian kroner. According to Stortingsmelding nr. 23
(1975-76), op.cit., pp. 101-102, Norwegian shipowners had their income reduced by NoK 1.500 million as a
result of the devaluation of the dollar.
110 Ibid., pp. 101-102.
III Solomon, Robert, The International Monetary System, 1945-1976, An Insider's View, Harper & Row, New
York, 1977, pp. 292-295. The average annual growth of Gross Domestic Product in the Western industrial
countries was reduced from 4,6 per cent in the period 1965-73 to 2,9 per cent in the period 1973-80.
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increase was a change in the composition of world trade. Due to the change in relative prices,
there was a sharp increase in the share of oil in the international exchange of goods. Again it is
important to emphasise the difference between trade measured by value and volume
respectively. The oil price hike resulted in an increase of oil's share of international trade,
measured by value. More important in this connection, however, is the fact that the growth of
oil demand, and the growth of oil transport demand, was drastically weakened. The
geographical pattern of international trade was also to some extent transformed as a result of
the oil price increase."!
Figure 2.5. World seaborne trade, billion ton-miles, 1970-80113
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The growth of international trade was reduced relative to the situation in the 1960s, when the
increasing demand for oil and oil products had played a prominent part. During the 1970s, oil
and oil products had a stable, or even diminishing, share of the international exchange of
goods.'!"
The two most important events in the international economy in the 1970s were the
breakdown of the gold-dollar standard and the massive increase of the price of oil and oil
products. The most important development trait, however, was the recession, illustrated by the
considerable reduction of the economic growth in the Western economies and the growth of
international trade. In 1975 a decrease in world trade was recorded, for the first time since
1958.
1I2 GAIT, op.cit., 1980, p. 5. The oil-exporting countries' share of world exports, measured by value, increased
from 7,5 per cent in 1973 to 13 per cent in 1975 and 1977. The export revenue of the OPEC-countries increased
strongly as well, from $14,5 billion in 1972 to $110 billion in 1974; see Todaro, Michael P., Economic
Development in the Third World, Second Edition, Longman, New York, 1981, p. 491.
ll3.The source of this chart is figures from Table 2 in Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review, various
issues.
114 Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review 1981, Table 1 and 2, p. 16.
64 Chapter Two _ The Shipping Sector
Stig Tenold: The Shipping Crisis of the 1970s: Causes. Effects and Implicationsfor Norwegian Shipping
2.4.3. An introduction to the development of the shipping market in the 1970s
The fundamental shift in international economic and monetary relations had large implications
for the shipping industry. On the one hand, the reduced growth of international trade removed
the basis for the continuing high growth of shipping transport demand. On the other hand, the
breakdown of international monetary stability increased uncertainty and had both direct and
indirect consequences for shipowners. The history of shipowners and international shipping in
the 1970s is dominated by the effects of the transformation of the international economy and
the extent to which shipowners were able to cope with the structural changes.
There were two characteristic features in the international market for shipping services
in the 1970s, viz the strong demand growth reduction and the massive tonnage supply
increase. However, the development was by no means homogenous, because large market
fluctuations were witnessed in this decade as well, and there were differences in the
development of the various market segments. This subchapter aims at giving a basic
introduction to the conditions in the international market for shipping services in the 1970s.115
The most appropriate manner in which to present the development is by dividing the decade
into two separate parts, and analyse the conditions before and after the strong increase in the
price of oil and oil products, often called OPEC I, independently. In the first part of the decade
there were periods where the freight rate level was relatively high, but after the autumn of
1973, the conditions in the most important parts of the international market for shipping
services can be described as depressed.
The market conditions before OPEC I
The remarkably strong growth in shipping demand which was experienced in the 1960s,
continued in the first part of the 1970s as well, despite the changes in international monetary
relations. 1969 had not been a particularly good year for the shipping industry. Tonnage
supply had grown faster than transport demand and freight rates were decreasing. However,
some unforeseen events caused a freight rate increase from June 1970 onwards; the
development in Libya and Saudi-Arabia resulted in a reduction of oil shipments from the
Mediterranean countries.'!" Thus, the European countries increasingly had to rely on the
Persian Gulf for the delivery of oil, and these transports had to go around the Cape due to the
fact that the Suez canal was closed. In addition to this, the continuing growth of the Japanese
steel industry had a positive effect on the dry bulk demand. However, a reduction in the
growth of international trade and a consistently large supply of new tonnage led to a
breakdown offreight rates after approximately a year of high rates.
In the summer of 1972, freight rates started to rise again, but despite an increase in the
115 As the analysis of the conditions in the international market for shipping services in the 1970s is one of the
main topics of the thesis, such an "introduction" may seem superfluous. I have, however, chosen to include this
subchapter in order to give a short and less detailed assessment of the development before the major analysis.
116 The pipeline Tapline was damaged, and the oil supply from Sidon was reduced. The end result of this was an
increase in transport distance as well as in seaborne transport. Moreover, the newly established Libyan
dictatorship introduced restrictions on the delivery of oil to European countries.
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growth of international trade, a large amount of tonnage, particularly bulk carriers, was still
left in lay-up. In the dry bulk market, the rate increase can be seen as a result of the strike of
Japanese seamen, as well as the increase in Soviet import of grain. The real boom, however,
took place at the beginning of 1973, when the conditions were particularly good for tankers
operating in the spot market. This development was closely tied to expectations about growth
in the American import of oil. During 1973, the freight rates in the tanker segment continued
to increase, and in the period from May to September the rates shot up from Worldscale (W)
100 to W 475.117 The Yom Kippur War in October 1973, between Egypt and Syria on one side
and Israel on the other, had dramatic consequences for this development. Even though the war
was over within a month, it led to important changes in the international power structure and
in the international economy. In the market for large tankers, the voyage rates fell from more
than W 450 in October to W 55 in November.!" The rates for bulk carriers maintained the
level from the period before the Yom Kippur war, but after approximately six months these
ships also experienced the effects of the radically changed conditions in the shipping market.
The market development after OPEC I
A short while after the Yom Kippur War, the status of oil had changed. It was no longer just
the most important commodity in the international market place - it had become an important
means in a political game as well. The member-countries of OAPEC, The Organisation of
Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, which were responsible for 60 per cent of the oil
delivered to Western Europe, Japan and the developing countries, decided to reduce their oil
production by 25 per cent.!" The five month long quasi-ban on oil exports to "Israel-friendly"
countries such as The United States and The Netherlands indicates that the actions of the
OAPEC-countries were politically as well as economically motivated.!"
The growth in the world's consumption of oil, and the geographical concentration of
oil production, had given the members of OPEC a market power which they, before the Yom
Kippur War, had failed to exploit. The war functioned as a catalyst, leading to the use of
117 Worldscale represents the daily revenue for a standard tanker, independent of the voyage the ship performs.
In principle, a tanker operator will therefore be indifferent between two offers of Worldscale 100. However,
there may be special circumstances which cause the shipowner to prefer one of the offers. For a basic
introduction to the principles surrounding the use of Worldscale, see Nersesian, op.cit., 1981, pp. 21-22. A rate
ofWorldscale 475 indicates 475 per cent of the published rates.
118 Svendsen, op.cit., p. 228. Strømme Svendsen gives no further indications as to which ships and routes he
refers to, but most probably it is the distance The Persian Gulf (PG)-Europe. In Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co.
Ltd., Review 1973, Table 13, p. 13, the rate development for a 100.000 dwt. tanker on the distance PG-United
Kingdom/Continent peaks at W 342 in September, from which it decreases to W 134 in November and further to
W 77 one month later. These figures are based on weekly averages.
119 OAPEC had been formed by Kuwait, Libya and Saudi Arabia in 1968, and was expanded two years later to
include Algeria, Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Dubai and Qatar. The OAPEC-countries, the Arabian members of the
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries, were responsible for approximately 60 per cent of the OPEC
production. A reduction of OAPEC-extraction by a quarter therefore resulted in a 15 per cent reduction in the
supply of OPEC-oil.
120 Sheik Ahmed Zaki Yamani, the Saudi oil minister, later acknowledged that "the embargo was more symbolic
than anything else." See Adelman, M.A., The Genie out o/the Bottle - World Oil since 1970, The MIT Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1995, p. 113.
66 Chapter Two - The Shipping Sector
Stig Tenold: The Shipping Crisis ojthe 1970s: Causes, Effects and Implicationsjor Norwegian Shipping
cartel-pricing in the international market for oil. As a result of this, the price of crude oil
increased by almost 300 per cent, leading to a massive reduction in the growth of the demand
for and traded volume of oil. In 1975 the demand for tanker transport fell by eight per cent. To
make matters worse, there was simultaneously a 15 per cent increase of the tanker tonnage.
The growth of the tanker fleet was one of the most serious problems in the
international market for shipping services. Despite the terribly low freight level and high lay-
ups, the world fleet continued to grow as a result of the backlog of ordered, but not delivered,
newbuildings. The good liquidity ofshipowners following the high income in parts of the
period 1967-1973 is one of the reasons that the number of newbuilding contracts entered into
reached record-breaking levels. If the history of tanker demand growth was indiscriminately
used as the basis for investment decisions, there were no particular reasons for the shipowners
to expect their new vessels to be left idle.
Before the analysis of the causes of the crisis, some of the most significant
development traits will be briefly illustrated. The first feature which shows the dramatic
transformation of the shipping sector after OPEC I is the development of the demand for crude
oil tanker transport.
Figure 2.6. Demand for crude oil transport, billion ton-miles, 1962-85121
_Demand for oil transport _Trend 1962-1973 __ Trend 1974-1985
Figure 2.6 shows the substantial change in the development of the demand for seaborne
transport of oil following the oil price increases in the early and late 1970s. Up until 1973, the
tanker market had experienced 100 years of more or less uninterrupted increase in demand. In
addition to the reduction of seaborne oil transport as a result of the oil price increase, the
exploitation of sources close to the main consumption centres and the reduction of average
shipping distances led to stagnating demand in a market with a growing tonnage supply. In the
period from 1973 to 1979, the annual growth of the fleet was seven per cent, whereas the
121 Based on Figures from Table 2 in Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review, various issues.
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annual demand increase was 0,5 per cent.!" In 1979, there was a temporary resurgence of
freight rates. Following the second major oil price increase, the demand for tanker transport
contracted considerably in the beginning of the 1980s. The causes and effects of the crisis in
the tanker market in the period 1973 to 1979 will be elaborated in detail in the next chapters.
The other feature which can be used to illustrate the changes in the tanker sector after
OPEC I is the development offreight rates and lay up-figures. The tanker freight rates peaked
in the autumn of 1973, when the amount of tanker tonnage laid up was negligible. After the
sudden dramatic decrease in the freight rate level, tanker lay-ups increased considerably.
Figure 2.7. Tanker freight rates and lay up-figures, 1972_79123
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The development traits presented above will be analysed in more detail later in the thesis, but
have been included here to illustrate the considerable changes in the tanker sector from 1974
onwards. Chapter Three analyses the causes of the development, whereas Chapter Four
presents the contagion and short-term effects ofthe shipping crisis.
2. 5. Summary - The Shipping Sector
The theories about the mechanisms of the international market for shipping services presented
in this chapter are an important aid in describing and understanding this market. 124 The
motivation for the inclusion of these theories is the fact that they form a good basis for the
analysis of the international shipping crisis. In the next chapters I show how the mechanisms
which have played a prominent part in the economic models have contributed to the massive
crisis experienced in the international shipping market. These mechanisms are important in
explaining the breadth, depth and width of the crisis, and some of the features presented in this
chapter will also be used to explain the deviating behaviour and fate of Norwegian
shipowners.
122 Beenstock & Vergottis, op.cit., 1993, p. 62.
123 Based on the freight rate for crude oil on the distance Arabian Gulf-The Continent as shown in Figure 4.4 and
the lay up-rate for tankers as shown in Figure 4.7.
124 For a discussion of pros and cons in connection with the use of market models, see Wergeland, Tor,
"Shipping Companies and Market Research", in Hope, op.cit., 1981, pp. 39-42.
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The presentation in this chapter reveals a series of important linkages. One is the
connection between the shipping sector and international trade and economy, ie the fact that
shipping transport demand is closely correlated to the activity and structures in the
international economy. Although the roots of the shipping crisis can be found in the shipping
sector itself, the international economic development was important for the contagion and
amplification of the shipping crisis. In particular, unexpected changes in the growth and trade
pattern of some of the most important bulk goods contributed to the shipping depression.
The linkages between the freight markets and the markets for new and second-hand
vessels are also of importance for an understanding of the functioning of the shipping sector
and the basis for the shipping crisis. The freight markets are crucial to the shipowners'
contracting of new vessels and also largely determine second-hand vessel values. Another
significant linkage exists between the shipbuilding industry and the shipping sector. To fully
comprehend the importance of this association, it must be viewed in relation to financial
institutions and domestic policies.
Even though there are several segments in the shipping market, these are interrelated in
both the short and the long term. The relative development of the various market segments is
important in an analysis of the crisis and in an understanding of the effects of the crisis on
shipowners operating in these segments.
The three linkages presented above - between shipping and the international economy,
between the freight market and the market for vessels, and between the various shipping
market segments - will be essential to the subsequent explanation of the shipping crisis.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE CAUSES OF THE TANKER CRISIS
The purpose of the previous presentation of the international market for shipping services and
the historical development of this market was to create a basis upon which the causes and
effects of the international shipping crisis of the 1970s can be analysed. I suggest that certain
features of the international market for shipping services can explain the seriousness of the
shipping crisis; its breadth, depth and length.
The breadth of the crisis refers to the number of agents affected. The depth of the crisis
is a measure of the seriousness of the conditions. The length of the crisis denotes the time
aspect before a recovery. The historical development is given explanatory power, as specific
historical events and development traits played an important role in determining the actions of
the agents. The analysis of the causes and effects of the crisis is based on the following set of
assumptions:
The magnitude of the shipping crisis in the 1970s was the result of specific historical
events and the effects of certain mechanisms in the international market for shipping
services. Historical events triggered a reaction by the agents in the shipping market,
and their behaviour, amplified by external factors and certain characteristics of the
shipping market, can explain the breadth, depth and length of the crisis.
The exploration of the causes of the shipping crisis has a dual structure, where the demand and
supply sides are dealt with separately. The structural development of a market is determined at
the point of intersection of the demand and supply curves, and is thus influenced by changes
in both demand and supply. In the analysis of the supply and demand sides, I show how the
historical development influenced the expectations and actions of the economic agents. The
historical circumstances can be seen as necessary conditions for the shipping crisis; these were
the impulses which triggered the responses in the market, ultimately leading to a severe
depression.
Because the focus of this thesis is shipowners and the shipping market, it commences
with an analysis of the supply side. The growth of the world fleet was one of the main causes
of the severe mismatch between supply and demand in the international market for shipping
services. Particular importance is placed on the connection between the historical
development of supply and demand and the strategic behaviour of the agents.
Subsequently, the development of demand is analysed. The reduction in the growth of
world trade in general - and oil transport in particular - resulted in an increasing imbalance
between the size of the world fleet and the demand for transport services. Thus, the
development on the demand side is another important factor in explaining the magnitude of
the international shipping crisis.
Before the analysis of the shipping crisis, it might be fruitful to discuss what
constitutes a crisis. A traditional definition of a depression, or slump, is a situation
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characterised by under-utilisation of the factors ofproduction and a falling level of demand. In
the shipping industry, under-utilisation of resources is a common and recurring phenomenon,
but prior to 1973 only one of the postwar slumps occ~rred amidst falling demand.
The three pre-I970 booms were presented in Chapter 2.4.1, and in aggregate these
lasted approximately 39 months. This implies that there were more than six lean months for
every fat month. These lean months were characterised by market balance or a surplus of
tonnage. Indeed, in the late 1950s the dry bulk fleet's lay up-rate was between seven and eight
per cent. This figure is twice as high as the lay up-rate in the dry bulk market in connection
with the shipping crisis of the 1970s.1 Oversupply of tonnage is a typical example of under-
utilisation of resources.
Despite the temporary periods of overcapacity in the shipping market, any talk of a
crisis in the postwar shipping market before 1973 is misleading. On the one hand, the periods
of overcapacity were too short to have any fundamental effect on the long-term profitability
and structure of the shipping industry. Even the shipowners who were hardest hit by the
overcapacity, and had a considerable share of their fleets laid up, generally managed to
weather the storm unt~l the recovery. On the other hand, the demand for shipping services was
on a strictly upward-sloping trend. There was room for a considerable expansion and
modernisation of the world fleet, particularly with regard to tanker tonnage, and shipowners
were able to make substantial profits.
In the 1970s and early 1980s, however, the use of the term crisis can be justified. First,
the depression - characterised by miserable rates, absolute reduction of transport demand and
considerable overcapacity - lasted long enough to severely affect the financial position of
most shipowners. The recoveries simply took more than a decade to materialise.' Second, the
depression was accompanied by fundamental changes in the shipping sector. Several
traditional shipowners and shipowning nations saw their fleets dwindle. The shift was
accompanied by bankruptcies, flagging-out, increased government involvement and the
collapse of the shipbuilding industry, particularly in Western Europe. The dire conditions
were also felt in auxiliary industries, including ship financing, insurance, shipbroking and
classification.
There is a large degree of consensus about the fact that an analysis of the international
shipping crisis should focus on the market for tanker services. This was the part of the
shipping market in which the freight rate breakdown was first evident, and it was also the
market segment in which the effects of the crisis were the most prominent.
The analysis begins with an exposition of the supply side in the market for tanker
services. Particular importance is placed on the factors which can explain the extraordinary
high level of investment, ie the large amount of newbuildings contracted. Two aspects of the
I Beenstock, Michael and Vergottis, Andreas, Econometric Modelling of World Shipping, Chapman & Hall,
London, 1993, Figure 1.32,p. 36.
2 There was a short recovery in the latter part of the 1970s. However, OPEC, through the second oil price
increase, often called OPEC II, again influenced the freight rate development in a negative manner.
Chapter Three - The Causes of the Tanker Crisis 71
Stig Tenold: The Shipping Crisis of the 1970s: Causes, Effects and Implications for Norwegian Shipping
market for newbuildings are given special attention. The first is the relationship between the
shipowners' expectations of future demand conditions and their contracting of newbuildings;
the fact that expectations tend to be formed on the basis of current market conditions, rather
than an evaluation of future demand and supply conditions. This was an important reason for
the over-ordering which took place in the period before the international shipping crisis. The
other feature which is elaborated is tax policies and the use of subsidies. These elements can
also contribute to an understanding of the high contracting level; due to the subsidisation of
newbuildings and the preferential treatment of vessel investments, new contracts were entered
into even after it should have been evident that there was going to be overcapacity on the
supply side.
In the analysis of the demand side, the reduced growth of tanker transport demand is
emphasised. This reduction was largely a result of the decline in the growth of the
international trade of oil and oil products. Another element which is analysed is the effect of
the concentration of the agents on the demand side, and particularly the fact that the oil
companies play an important part on both the demand and the supply side in the market for
tanker services.
3.1. The Supply Side
Stopford has summarised the causes of the international shipping crisis of the 1970s in the
following manner: "Looking back to 1973, the influence [ofthese institutions} is clear - the
banks lent too much, the shipbuilders built far more shipyards than long-term demand
forecasts justified and shippers issued timecharters which underpinned the false sense of
optimism. ,,3 Accordingly, a prominent question in any analysis of the international shipping
crisis will be: "What were the reasonsfor the strong growth a/the supply side?"
The following analysis of the supply of shipping tonnage focuses on three groups of
agents; shipyards, shipowners and financial institutions. These agents play crucial roles;
shipyards produce the tonnage, shipowners order the tonnage and the financial institutions
facilitate the investments in new tonnage. The analysis of the supply side follows this outline.
Initially, the growth of the shipbuilding industry is presented. This is followed by an analysis
of shipowners, who make up the demand side for the shipbuilding industry, and their
contracting. Finally, the ship financing institutions and their role for the massive contracting
of shipowners are analysed.
3. 1. 1. The foundation for growth - the shipbuilding industry
The strong growth of the world fleet is closely connected to the massive increase in the
3 Stopford, Martin, "Challenges and Pitfalls of Maritime Forecasting in a Corporate Environment", in
Strandenes, Siri Pettersen, Svendsen, Arnljot Strømme and Wergeland, Tor (eds.), Shipping Strategies and Bulk
Shipping in the 1990s, Proceedings from the International Shipping Seminar, Bergen, 6-8 August, 1989, p. 42.
Presented in the manner above, this quote seems to omit the actions of the most important group of agents, viz
the shipowners. Stopford's topic of discussion, however, is the factors which made shipowners contract
newbuildings.
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world's shipbuilding capacity in the period after the Second World War. In the period from
1945 to 1975 there was an extremely strong growth in the actual and potential supply of
newbuildings. Despite the capacity increase in the shipbuilding industry, the large demand for
tonnage caused the world' s order books to increase from 18 million gross register tons (grt) in
1960 to more than 133 million grt in 1974.4 The amount of new tonnage launched increased
from almost 17 million dead weight tons (dwt) in 1965 to a record 61,8 million dwt in 1975.
The object of this subchapter is to relate the strong growth of the world fleet to the conditions
in the shipbuilding industry, by attempting to answer the question: "How did shipyards and
governments in important shipbuilding countries contribute to the strong growth of shipping
supply? "
Figure 3.1. Deliveries of newbuildings, million dwt, 1962-795
50 -;
5
,
I
o
N ..... """ on -o r-, 00 e- o-o -o -o -o -o -o -o -o ,.._:::: :::: :::: :::: :::: :::: :::: :::: ::::
-+- Tankers _Others
The increased production capacity of the shipbuilding industry in the postwar period was the
result of an increase in efficiency as well as capacity increases in several countries. The
increased efficiency was largely connected to improvements in technical methods and better
organisation of production. One of the most important features in this respect was the increase
in the maximum size of ships, which represented an opportunity for expansion of shipyards
and technological change in the shipbuilding industry.
4 Slaven, Anthony, "Management Policy and the Eclipse of British Shipbuilding", European Shipbuilding - One
Hundred Years of Change, Proceedings of the Third Shipbuilding History Conference at the National Maritime
Museum, Greenwich, 13-15 Apri11983, p. 82.
5 Based on figures from Table 4 in Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review, various issues.
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Figure 3.2. Production in world shipbuilding, million grt, various years, 1965-806
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Parallel with the capacity increase, there had been a shift in the geographical localisation of
the world's shipbuilding industry. Japan had increased her market share from 20 per cent in
1960 to approximately 50 per cent eight years later, mainly at the expense of Great Britain and
other European countries. The Japanese expansion was to a large extent a result of the
country's policy of industrial integration, where crucial sectors such as shipbuilding and
vehicle production were nurtured due to their employment potential, their large backward
linkages to eg steel production and the availability of a large international market. However,
the market shares gained by the Japanese shipbuilding industry was to some extent "paid for"
by subsidisation and generous financing terms.
The shipbuilding industry's role as a key labour-intensive industry is reflected in the
central position of the industry in domestic industrial, employment and regional policies.
Shipbuilding was responsible for a large share of industrial employment in many countries, eg
Norway and Sweden.' Moreover, the shipbuilding industry was a key employer in certain
regions and cities. In Sweden in the mid-1970s, the shipyards were the major employer in
some relatively small towns, such as Landskrona and Uddevalla, where shipyard employment
accounted for 39 and 52 per cent of industrial employment. However, shipbuilding was
important in larger cities as well, accounting for 25 per cent of industrial employment in
Gothenburg and 19 per cent in Malmo."
The strong international competition in the shipbuilding industry led to extensive use
of subsidisation and cheap financing in order to attract newbuilding contracts. In several
countries the authorities were responsible for the cheap financing by means of such
mechanisms as export credits, direct subsidies and investment support. The end result of the
6 Figures from Lloyd's Register of Shipping, reprinted in de Voogd, Cees, Public Intervention and the Decline of
Shipbuilding in the Netherlands, paper presented to the North Sea History Conference, Stavanger, Norway,
August 1995, p. 4.
7 Nordvik, Helge W., "The Norwegian Shipbuilding Industry - the Transition from Wood to Steel 1880-1980",
in European Shipbuilding - One Hundred Years of Change, Proceedings of the Third Shipbuilding History
Conference at the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, 13-15 April 1983, p. 201.
8 Figures from Berggren, Lars, The Effects of the Shipyard Crisis in Malmo, Southern Sweden, paper presented
to the North. Sea History Conference, Stavanger, Norway, August 1995.
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high level of national subsidisation was a vicious circle in which the various shipbuilding
nations constantly increased their support to the industry in order to strengthen their
competitive position in the international market." The influence of this vicious circle can be
illustrated by a statement from the period, which ironically was used to justify national
support to the Swedish shipbuilding industry. According to an OECD-report, "[tjhe
profitability problems of the Swedish shipbuilding industry are to a great extent due to the
State subsidies given in other countries. "lO
The variety of measures and mechanisms through which the shipbuilding industry was
subsidised makes it nigh on impossible to quantify the effects of the subsidisation. In 1969
OECD formulated an Understanding on Export Credits in an attempt to secure a higher
degree of real competition in the shipbuilding industry and neutralise the effects of the various
support measures which had been introduced. According to the OECD-Understanding, the
participating countries were obliged to comply with some maximum limits for direct or
indirect support; the financing could not be better than six per cent interest rate, eight years'
down-payment and 20 per cent cash payment." At the time, the OECD-countries delivered
more than 90 per cent of the newbuilt tonnage.
The support which was given to the shipbuilding industry in all the major shipbuilding
nations contributed to the over-ordering, and consequently to an exacerbation of the
international shipping crisis. The favourable conditions, first and foremost through the
provision of cheap financing, led to a shift in demand from second-hand tonnage to
newbuildings.
The subsidised financing contributed to an increase in the contracting activity by
reducing the demands on the ships' revenue. Because the purpose of cheap financing was to
create a competitive advantage for the country's shipbuilding industry, it was directly tied to
the contracting of newbuildings in the country providing this subsidy. Due to this intervention
in the market for ships, shipping capital was not allocated to the investments which would
have given the highest socio-economic profit. Instead, shipbuilding subsidies functioned as an
incentive to invest in a market where there already might have been signs of overcapacity.
As a result of the large extent of subsidies available, shipowners wishing to acquire
new tonnage did not face the correct price, resulting in a tonnage growth which exceeded the
level necessary to maintain long-term balance in the shipping sector. The shipyards do not
9 For a short introduction to the use of subsidies in shipbuilding and shipping in the unregulated period in the
first decades after the Second World War, see Sturmey, s. G., British Shipping and World Competition, The
Athlone Press, London, 1962, pp. 188-209. A very instructive introduction to the mechanisms influencing the
shipbuilding industry in the period after Sturmey's focus is de Voogd, op.cit., 1995, where the emphasis is on
the Dutch shipbuilding industry.
10 OECD, The Industrial Policies of 14 Member Countries, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development, Paris, 1971, p. 318. Subsidisation is rational for the Swedish authorities, if regarded separately.
However, this behaviour is collectively irrational. The sum of the measures is an increase in the supply, which
reduces profitability and which, when the agents are acting rationally individually, forms the basis for further
support.
Il Stortingsproposisjon nr. 101 (1976-77), Om tiltak på skipsbyggingssektoren [On measures for the shipbuilding
sector], pp. 19-20. The minimum interest rate was raised to 7,5 per cent in 1971.
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determine their capacity on the basis of the amount of tonnage which the shipping sector can
absorb; rather, they build the amount of tonnage which they can make shipowners and oil
companies contract. Subsidies play an important role in this connection, and the size of the
subsidies is negatively correlated to the prospective market conditions, as it becomes more
important to use subsidies to secure newbuilding contracts in periods where the shipbuilding
business is slack. The shipyards will therefore give shipowners incentive to order more
tonnage in periods where the market prospects dictate a reduction of newbuilding volumes.
The position of the shipbuilding industry in an analysis of the shipping crisis depends
on the period examined. Prior to 1973, the shipbuilding industry partly created its own
demand by the provision of relatively favourable financing. However, the effect of subsidies
in the period immediately before the crisis should not be overemphasised. In boom periods the
authorities have relatively little incentive to subsidise shipowners, as the favourable conditions
in the shipping market should be enough to secure newbuilding orders. Nevertheless, due to
the generous financing terms which had evolved during the scramble for shipbuilding market
shares in the 1960s, there was a certain degree of subsidisation even at times when the market
was good. The terms laid down in the OECD-Understanding represented a "minimum
assistance" that shipowners could expect to receive. The OECD-Understanding succeeded in
avoiding cut-throat subsidy competition. Prior to the arrangement, it had been possible to get
8-10 year credit at 5,5 per cent. Nevertheless, even the OECD-terms represented an interest
rate-subsidy which led to a distortion inflating contracting.
Though the aid to the shipbuilding industry influenced the high contracting level in the
period before 1973, the effects of the subsidisation were even more dramatic after the freight
market breakdown. The reluctance on the part of governments to reduce shipbuilding capacity
must be understood in terms of the industry's social significance. Initially, the market for
shipping services was affected through the shipyards' reluctance to accept cancellations of
newbuilding orders. Moreover, their demand that tanker contracts were converted to other
types of tonnage contributed to the contagion of the shipping crisis from the tanker sector.
These effects are further analysed in Chapter Four.
A shipowner who is interested in investing in new tonnage will, all things equal,
choose a newbuilding instead of second-hand tonnage if the terms of financing are more
favourable for the newbuilt ship. This will be particularly relevant in periods with a low
freight rate level. Then, empty building berths imply that the new vessels may be delivered
relatively fast, as opposed to after half a decade during booms, thus reducing the difference
between the time of operation for the newbuilding and the second-hand vessel. Furthermore,
short order books tend to encourage governments to secure orders by using subsidies. The
short delivery time after the backlog of orders from the tanker boom had been delivered
reduced the difference between new and second-hand tonnage, and generous financing terms
made newbuildings particularly attractive.
In the longer term, the growth of shipping supply was exacerbated as shipbuilders
finishing newbuildings competed for new engagements. In 1979, John B. Yolland claimed
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that "[ijt is an established fact that the world shipbuilding overcapacity is causing
governments of all countries with shipyards to ignore many agreements in order to attract
employment and alleviate social and economic problems. ,,12 Additionally, some non-OECD
countries, notably South Korea, Taiwan and Brazil, which were not bound by the agreements,
were expanding their shipbuilding industries, adding to the competition and the shipyard
overcapacity.
In most shipbuilding nations, the authorities took great interest in maintaining
shipbuilding capacity even after the tonnage surplus and the demand reduction had led to a
breakdown in the market for tanker services. According to Johnman, "Europe 's response to
the international shipbuilding crisis was to subsidise on the expectation of an improving
market and to reduce the capacity on the assumption that it would not. "13 However, at least in
the 1970s, the former strategy was more prominent than the latter. In Sweden, the
shipbuilding industry received SeK 12 billion in state-support in the period 1977-79, in
addition to subsidies reducing the price of steel. 14 This can be compared with the SeK 2 billion
which had been given in subsidies to all sectors of Swedish industry in the seven previous
years." Moreover, the Swedish Guarantee Fund were willing to lend as much as 75 per cent of
the value of vessels built for stock, ie vessels for which no order had been received." The
building "on speculation" illustrates the lengths to which shipyards and governments were
willing to go in order to avoid a drastic and sudden reduction of production and employment.
3.1.2. Shipowners and contracting
The criteria which shipowners use in an investment situation can form part of an explanation
of the massive growth of the world fleet in the period surrounding the international shipping
crisis. The purpose of this subchapter is to answer the questions "To which extent did the
actions of shipowners contribute to the oversupply?" and "Which factors can explain their
actions? " The analysis is based on the following elements:
o The myopic analysis of shipowners when entering into newbuilding contracts, ie the fact
that they put inordinate emphasis on the historical and current freight rate levels.
o The long growth period preceding the crisis, in which rapid fleet expansion had generally
12 Yolland, John B., "Ship finance and Euro-markets", Maritime Policy and Management, Volume 6, No.3,
1979, p. 175.
13 Johnman, Lewis, Public Intervention and the 'Hollowing Out' of British Shipbuilding: The Swan Hunter
Closure, paper presented to the North Sea History Conference, Stavanger, Norway, August 1995, p. l. The focus
of this paper is the crisis which appeared in the shipbuilding industry when the newbuildings ordered in the
beginning of the 1970s had been cancelled or delivered, but several of the situations presented in the paper are
parallel to those in the period before the breakdown of the markets for shipping and ships.
14 The enormous transfer of money was motivated by the fact that the Swedish shipyards were extremely
important for the industrial employment in a number of Swedish cities. See Stråth, Bo, "Industrial Restructuring
in the Swedish Shipbuilding Industry", Labour and Society, Vol. 14, No.2, 1989, p. 106.
15 Kuuse, Jan, "The Relations between Swedish Shipbuilding Industry and other Industries 1900-1980," in
Kuuse, Jan and Slaven, Anthony, Development Problems in Historical Perspective, Scottish and Scandinavian
Shipbuilding Seminar, Glasgow, 1980, p. 233.
16 See the article "The many aspects of the shipbuilding crisis", Norwegian Shipping News, No 17D, 1976, pp. 6-
15.
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been a very profitable strategy.
I:J The lag between contracting and delivery of vessels, which is particular y long in boom
periods with full building berths. The lag implies that the shipping market may change
drastically between the time of contracting and the time of delivery.
In addition to this, some of the factors which influenced the contracting of independent
shipowners are analysed in connection with financing and the contracting of Norwegian
shipowners, viz:
I:J The increasing competition in the ship financing industry which lowered bank margins
and eased credit terms.
I:J The abundance of capital in the Eurodollar market, which was related to the American
economic policy, and which contributed to high liquidity and low real interest rates.
I:J The effects of the low real interest rates, which made contracting seem more attractive due
to the low alternative return on shipowners' capital and the low cost of debt capital.
I:J The effects of the tax system, which made contracting a preferable alternative to paying
tax in years with high profits.
The period 1970-73 was characterised by extremely high contracting activity in the tanker
market. Figure 3.3 clearly shows the enormous increase in the level of contracting from 1965
until the peak in 1973. The amount of tanker tonnage contracted in 1973 was twice as high as
the previous year, in itself an all time high. The tanker tonnage contracted, as share of total
contracts, increased from almost 47 per cent in 1969 to more than 84 per cent in 1972.
Figure 3.3. World contracting and tanker share, million dwt, 1965-7517
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17 This chart is based on figures from Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review 1976, Table 10, p. 18.
Combination carriers have been included in the category "other vessels". Ifthese had been registered as tankers,
the tanker share of contracting would have peaked at 87,5 per cent in 1972, and amounted to approximately 84
per cent of all contracting the following year.
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The strong increase in the amount of tonnage contracted illustrates the extraordinary
development in the early 1970s. However, the expansive strategy becomes even more
conspicuous when we compare the figures for contracting with the size of the existing fleet,
and when the order book is compared with the existing fleet. As Figure 3.4 shows, the tanker
tonnage on order amounted to less than 50 per cent of the existing fleet at the beginning of
1970. This was high compared with the situation in the mid-1960s, but low compared with the
more than 90 per cent recorded at the beginning of 1974. One reason for the increasing size of
the order book was the growing average size ofvessels on order. In 1965 the tankers on order
were on average 123 per cent larger than the average vessel in the current fleet. This figure
had increased to 165 per cent by 1974. Moreover, tanker contracting as share of the current
fleet, which had been less than 15per cent in 1965,peaked at more than 55 per cent in 1973.
Figure 3.4. Tanker contracting and order book, per cent of the tanker fleet, 1965-7918
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One of the main causes of the large amount of newbuilding contracts was the increase in the
demand for tanker transport capacity and the high rates obtained in the tanker market,
particularly in 1970 and 1973. The fact that the amount of tonnage contracted persisted at a
relatively high level in 1974, when freight rates were on their way to rock bottom, may seem
to undermine the high correlation between the freight rate level and contracting activity.
However, a considerable part of the contracting undertaken in 1974 was by Middle East oil
companies wishing to supplement their increasing control of oil production with increased
control of oil transport. This contracting was therefore motivated by political and structural
factors, rather than economic considerations." It is also possible that some of the contracts
reported in 1974were in fact negotiated and signed before the freight market breakdown.
18 This chart is based on figures from Tables 9 and 10 in Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review, various
issues. The figures for contracting refer to contracting undertaken during the year, whereas the figures for the
order book refer to the situation on 1 January .
19 For an introduction to the growth of the fleet of the oil exporting countries, see the editorial "The Middle East
Fleet - a threat or an opportunity" in Norwegian Shipping News, No. 8B, 1975 and the presentation in Chapter
10.2.
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Figure 3.5. Distribution ofnewbuildings, per cent, quarterly figures 1970-7420
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Figure 3.5 illustrates the importance of the various agents with regard to their share of
newbuilding orders for tankers above 100.000 dwt. The representation shows the activity of
the various groups - oil companies, independent shipowners with employment secured and
independent shipowners ordering tonnage which had not been fixed on charters. Figure 3.5
does not take inti>account the variations in contracting between different periods. Moreover,
the figures refer to the number of orders, and do not reflect the amount of tonnage ordered by
the various groups.
In 1970 and 1971 the oil companies accounted for approximately 40 per cent of the
newbuilding orders. This was slightly higher than their share of the world fleet, but
considerably above their share of the contracting in the subsequent years. The oil companies'
large contracting at the start of the decade may be connected to a fear of lack of capacity in
connection with the anticipated high demand for transportation. Their share of newbuilding
contracts in 1972 and 1973was considerably smaller, and the fall was particularly large when
the independent shipowners' tanker contracting ballooned in the latter part of 1972. The
number of new oil company contracts for tankers above 100.000 dwt was more than halved
from the first to the fourth quarter of 1973, whereas the number of newbuilding contracts
signed by independent shipowners increased by almost three quarters over the same period.
Another conspicuous feature is the high share of unfixed newbuilding orders signed in
the period from the second quarter of 1972 until the tanker market broke down in the last
quarter of 1973. Moreover, this was the period with the highest contracting activity, a fact
which is taken into account in the subsequ. it analysis.
20 The figure is based on quarterly data on the number ofnewbuilding contracts ofmore than 100.000 dwt from a
Norwegian shipbroker and Fairplay, as presented in Dragesund, Petter, Kontraheringsatferd i tankmarkedet
[Contracting behaviour in the tanker market], unpublished thesis, Norwegian School of Economics and Business
Administration, Bergen, 1990, p. 49. The annotation of the year on the x-axis refers to the first quarter.
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Figure 3.6. Annual growth of tanker fleet and the rest of the fleet, million dwt, 1963-8021
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Figure 3.6 illustrates the considerable growth of the world fleet from the beginning of the
1960s until the end of the 1970s. The demand for new tonnage, which is the basis for the
growth of the supply side in the market for shipping services, is closely related to the
shipowners' assessment of the profitability of investing in additional transport capacity. The
result of an evaluation of profitability, for instance in connection with the question of whether
to sign a newbuilding contract or not, depends on the investor's expectations regarding the
future costs and revenues associated with the project and his evaluation of the risk involved.
Andreas Vergottis uses an asset pricing-approach when describing the demand for new
tonnage."
In Vergottis' framework, the price shipowners are willing to pay for a new vessel
equals the discounted stream of expected profits in connection with the newbuilding, plus a
price subsidy, the value of cheap finance and the value of tax advantages. I will briefly discuss
each of the elements which determine what shipowners are willing to pay for vessels, and
which therefore influence the demand for newbuildings.
The discounted stream of expected profits is a measure of the future earnings related to
the investment. The magnitude of this part of the equation is determined by the shipowner's
expectations about the future demand and supply conditions in the shipping market, ie
expectations about prospective rate- and cost-levels. The assessment of potential income,
represented by the freight rates, and costs, encompassing eg costs of operation and interest on
borrowed capital, is associated with a considerable degree of uncertainty. Specifically, the
uncertainty of expected profits is particularly high in volatile markets with large fluctuations,
such as the shipping market, and in periods with economic, financial and political instability,
21 The chart is based on figures from Table 3, Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co, Ltd., Review, various issues. Due
to the fluctuating level of scrapping there is a deviation between fleet growth and new tonnage delivered, as
presented in Figure 3.1.
22 Vergottis, Andreas Rokos, "The City University Econometric Model of the Shipping Markets", in Strandenes,
Svendsen & Wergeland, op.cit., 1989, pp. 24-38.
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such as the early 1970s.
One of the cashflows included in the discounted expected profit stems from the sale of
the ship, either for scrapping or to new owners. This element may constitute a considerable
part of the income. A vessel's discounted expected profit is thus influenced by the
shipowner's expectations regarding the future supply and demand conditions in the market for
ships. Moreover, due to the high correlation of second-hand prices and freight rates, the
discounted value of the sale of the vessel is closely related to the general conditions in the
freight market at the time when the vessel is disposed of.
A price subsidy will reduce the shipowners' cost of investment, as part of the price of
the ship is paid by other agents than the shipowner himself. As the value of the subsidy grows,
the revenue needed for the shipowner's investment to be profitable is reduced." Due to the
subsidisation of the shipbuilding industry, shipowners are not facing the real costs in
association with an increase in transport capacity, as they are not paying the "correct", ie
unsubsidised, price for newbuildings.
The value of cheap finance mayor may not be part of the subsidisation, and has two
important connotations. First, shipowners tend to evaluate fewer alternative areas of
investment than general industrial corporations. Second, cheap financing provided by
shipyards and related to the contracting of new ships often functions as a kind of indirect
subsidy.
It has been claimed that shipping investments appear to be more sensitive with regard
to interest rates than other investments, an assertion which can be explained by the fact that
the shipowners' main alternatives to shipping investments are short-term investments in the
finance market. Non-shipping long-term investments are avoided as their relatively low
liquidity reduces the financial freedom of action of the company. This perceived lack of
investment alternatives implies that deficiencies in the finance market may result in
uneconomical investments in ships." If shipowners get misleading signals regarding the
alternative value of their capital from the finance market, the level of shipping investments
may be elevated." On the other hand, if the interest rates on borrowed capital are artificially
low.jshipowners may be encouraged to increase their borrowing, as the revenue necessary to
service the debt is relatively low.
23 The fact that the demands regarding the ship's revenue decrease implies that the shipowner, given his
expectations about the freight rate development, is willing to "pay more" for the ship. The accumulated payment
will be the shipowner's payment plus the subsidy, but the shipowner will only take his own investment into
account when evaluating the profitability of the investment. As long as the subsidies are directly tied to the
contracting of newbuildings, the existence of subsidies leads to an increase in the amount of tonnage ordered.
24 This point is emphasised in Norman, Victor D., "Shipping Problems - has the market mechanism failed?",
Norwegian Shipping News, No.7, 1976,p. 27.
25 A good discussion of the use of the concept alternative value in shipping can be found in Gjærum, Per Ivar,
Om fleksibilitet, strategi og simultanvurdering av beslutninger i sjøtransport [On flexibility, strategy and
simultaneous decisions in shipping], unpublished thesis, Norwegian School of Economics and Business
Administration, Bergen, 1975, pp. 5-6 and 29-32.
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Cheap financing may be part of a price subsidy, for instance with regard to loans
provided by the shipyards on preferential terms. This will be the case when the loans offered,
tied to the contracting of new vessels, have better terms than those the shipowner would be
given in the financial market. The result of this kind of subsidisation will again be a reduction
in the revenue necessary for a shipowner to go through with the investment, and a fleet which
is larger than it would have been if the shipowners had faced the actual costs of building the
vessel.
The effect of tax advantages is another factor which can influence the expected profit
from a shipping investment. In some countries, the tax system may be arranged in a manner
which means that part of the risk or costs associated with the investment is borne by the
authorities. If this is the case, the profit- and risk-evaluation of the shipping company will be
altered, and it is possible that shipping companies will undertake investments which would
not have been carried out without the influence of the tax system. It is evident that the
combination of low real interest rates and large depreciation allowances led to extremely low,
or even negative, real aftertax interest rates in the first part of the 1970s. The result was a
situation which promoted contracting and fleet expansion.
Contracting - the influence from the rate level
Several research projects have shown that period rates are strongly correlated to the spot
market rate. Consequently, rather than reflecting the long-term trends in the market, they
reflect short-term fluctuations in supply and demand." This has important implications for the
development of the fleet, and can explain why the amount of tonnage ordered reached record-
breaking proportions in 1973.
Returning to the asset-price approach, an important determinant of the expected stream
of profits is the freight rate level. If period rates are used when making investment decisions,
ie if shipowners choose to contract due to a high rate level in the period market, the long-term
investment decisions will indirectly have been influenced by temporary demand fluctuations
in the spot market.
This mechanism is simple: The shipowners' decision to contract ships is determined
by their own assessment of the future demand and supply of transport services, an assessment
which to a large degree is influenced by the current level of freight rates in the period market.
The rates that a shipowner may obtain by fixing the newbuilding on eg a five year timecharter,
may be viewed as an "objective" indication of the freight rate level in the five year period. By
ordering a new vessel, and by chartering it on the available terms, the shipowner may fix the
expected revenues for a given period. The uncertainty regarding the discounted stream of
expected profits is then basically reduced to uncertainty about the shipping - and second-hand
26 See for instance Eriksen, lb Erik and Norman, Victor D" Ecotank - modell for analyse av tankmarkedenes
virkemåte [Ecotank - Econometric Model for Tanker Companies], Institute for Shipping Research, Norwegian
School of Economics and Business Administration, Bergen, 1976 or Strandenes, Siri Pettersen, Kontrahering og
salg av norske tankskip 1963-76 [Contracting and sales of Norwegian tankers, 1963-76], Institute for Shipping
Research, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Bergen, 1979.
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ship - markets at the time when the charter terminates and uncertainty about the movements
of exchange and interest rates."
The fluctuations in the charter market freight rate level are to a large degree correlated
with fluctuations in spot market rates, and the current state of the shipping market is therefore
important for the shipowners' contracting decision. This is the element which was referred to
by Stopford as "timecharters which underpinned the false sense of optimism. ,,28 Norman has
found that variations in the spot rate in the period 1962-71 can "explain" 84 per cent of the
variations in contracting activity." The highest correlation is between the fluctuations in the
contracting level and the freight rate level of medium-term charter contracts. However, due to
the close relationship between period rates and spot market rates, the influence of spot rates on
contracting activity is considerable.
Due to the fact that the contracting of newbuildings is influenced by current freight
rates rather than by independent evaluations of the future market situation, periods with a high
freight rate level result in considerable over-ordering of ships." This mechanism was evident
in the period immediately before the freight market breakdown.
One type of newbuilding contracts which is of particular interest in an analysis of the
contracting activity in the period around the international shipping crisis is speculative
contracts, ie contracts by independent shipowners who have not secured the employment of
their newbuilding through long-term charters. Dragesund has analysed the contracting of
tankers of more than 100.000 dwt in the period 1970-74, and has found that the element of
speculative contracting was considerably more evident in 1972 and 1973 than at other times in
this period." He claims that the main causes of the over-ordering were the investment-horizon
of the independent shipowners, erroneous expectations and general insecurity about the
demand side development."
27 For some types of charters there is the added uncertainty about the development of costs.
28 Stopford, op.cit., 1989, p. 42.
29 Norman, Victor D., Internasjonal Sjøtransport [International sea transport], Institute for Shipping Research,
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Bergen, 1973 - the results are referred to in
Norman, Victor D., The Economics of Bulk Shipping, Institute for Shipping Research, Norwegian School of
Economics and Business Administration, Bergen, 1979c, p. 18. In Norman, Victor D., "Har det vært for lett å
drive internasjonal skipsfart i Norge?" [Has Shipping been too easy an Enterprise in Norway?], Internasjonal
Politikk, No. lB, Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt, Oslo, 1979, p. 182, it is claimed that current revenue can
explain 70 per cent of the fluctuations in the contracting volume of Norwegian tanker owners in the period 1963-
76, and less than this for foreign shipowners.
30 Over-ordering implies a level of contracting which is so large as to cause future imbalances between supply
and demand.
31 One particular type of speculative contracting was the ordering of ships motivated by an expected increase in
newbuilding prices, ie the agents sign the contracts with the intent to sell them on to other shipowners, with a
profit, later in the "building boom". Unless these contracts are based on expectations about an increase in the
long-term freight rate level as well, they tend to influence the market for ships in a destabilising manner.
32 The short-term investment-horizon can explain the contracts entered into to reap the benefits of rising
newbuilding prices. The increased insecurity about the demand side was a result of the uncertainty regarding the
development of oil prices and international monetary relations.
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Another way to explain the importance of the current freight rate level may be by the
concept of adaptive expectations. When the adaptive expectations-hypothesis is applied to the
development of the shipping market, it posits that shipowners put inordinate emphasis on the
current and historical rate levels and development. The result is that the level of contracting
becomes relatively high in periods with increasing or high tanker transport demand and freight
-_ra1eJevels. Such a situation may occur despite the fact that the conditions which lead to the
high freight rate level may be temporary. One example of this is the unexpected demand
increase in connection with the 1967 Suez crisis. For shipowners, one of the most important
results of the closure of the Suez Canal, was that it became increasingly profitable to build
Very Large Crude Carriers and Ultra Large Crude Carriers. These vessels could only be
operated profitably when the oil shipments were relatively long-range."
Figure 3.7. Existing tanker fleet and tanker order book, million dwt, 1963-8034
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Figure 3.7 illustrates both the growth of the fleet of existing and contracted vessels and the
growth of the tanker order book after the good years 1967, 1970 and 1973.35 Due to the good
markets in these years, the amount of tanker tonnage on order increased by 69, 36 and 65 per
cent respectively. The basis for this contracting activity was the large fluctuations in the spot
market rate which come about as a result of a short-term shortages of transport capacity.
In a "chain of consequence", historical events, for instance the Yom Kippur War, will
lead to a high rate level in the spot market and the charter market. These historical events then
initially trigger a freight rate and contracting boom. Due to the high rates in the period market,
contracting activity increases, despite the fact that the prognoses about the future demand and
33 The customers of the Norwegian shipbrokers Fearnley & Eger were among those who invested in VLCCs and
ULCCs at an early stage; see Fischer, Lewis R. and Nordvik, Helge W., "Economic Theory, Information and
Management", in Ville, Simon P. and Williams, David M. (eds.), Management, Finance and Industrial Relations
in Maritime Industries: Essays in International Maritime and Business History, Research in Maritime History
No.6, St. John's, 1994, p. 23.
34 Based on Tables 3 and 9 in Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review, various issues. Reductions in the
aggregate size of the tanker fleet and order book are due to scrapping and cancellations.
35 Due to the fact that the figures represent the order book at the beginning of the year, the effect on the order
book of the se freight market peaks materialised in 1968, 1971 and 1974.
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supply conditions in the tanker market may be unchanged. A long-term disequilibrium
between supply and demand may occur due to the fact that the high demand and the high
freight rate level are unsustainable in the long run. One cause for this may be that the situation
which initially gave a high freight rate level has been changed. This occurred in connection
with the closure of the Suez Canal in 1956.When the canal reopened in April 1957, there had
been a considerable capacity increase in the world fleet as a result of newbuildings and the
utilisation of the American reserve fleet. The reopening of the Suez Canalled to a reduction of
average distances. Consequently, the demand increase on which the capacity increase was
based was no longer evident. The subsequent imbalance in the shipping market was then a
result of shifts in both the demand and the supply curves.
An independent shipowner may have limited resources for detailed monitoring of the
shipping market, and may therefore rely on external sources when evaluating future demand
and supply conditions. Oil companies and larger shipowning companies base their projections
of future market conditions on more sophisticated analyses. One manner in which smaller
shipowners may obtain the results of these analyses is through the freight level in the period
market. A high freight level in the period market implies that the major shippers and shipping
companies see a future capacity shortage as likely, and low rates in the period market may
reflect a perceived long-term overcapacity.
An independent shipowner may therefore see a high freight rate level in the period
market as a signal to order more shipping capacity. If this contracting is secured future
employment by means of a long-term charter, it will be rational from the shipowner's point of
view, as the charter secures the long-term revenue of the shipowner. There is a small element
of risk regarding the financial strength of the charterer, ie whether he or she is in the financial
position to fulfil the agreement. In general, however, the risk associated with an over-supply
oftonnage is borne by the company buying the transport capacity, ie the charterer.
When the high level of freight rates leads to contracting which is not secured through
long-term contracts, the situation is somewhat different, particularly with regard to the risk the
shipowner incurs. Such contracting was one of the main causes of the problems of the
Norwegian shipping industry."
Figure 3.8 shows the number of contracts for tankers above 100.000 dwt signed by the
various agents. The figures show that the oil companies bore the risk with regard to 80 per
cent of the contracts signed in 1970, 1971 and the first half of 1972, either by contracting
vessels themselves or through charters which implied that the oil companies were responsible
for the employment of the vessels. Accordingly, less than 20 per cent of the tonnage
contracted during this period was unfixed. However, for the vessels contracted in the second
half of 1972 and in 1973, almost 50.per cent had not been secured employment. As a result of
this, the risk in connection with overcapacity was increasingly borne by the independent
shipowners themselves.
36 The relationship between contracting and charter rates which forms the basis for this argument is elaborated in
Norman, op.cit., 1979c, pp. 17-19.
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Figure 3.8. Number ofnewbuilding contracts, quarterly figures, 1970-7437
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The shift in the composition of newbuilding orders is evident from Figure 3.8. The amount of
unfixed newbuilding orders signed increased from less than ten in the first three quarters of
1972, to an average of more than 30 in the following five quarters. Accordingly, the
independent tonnage contracted in 1972 and 1973 was to a lesser extent than in previous
periods based on secure long-term employment. A large share of the risk in connection with
overcapacity had been transferred from the oil companies to the shipowners themselves.
Another notable feature is that the boom in independent contracting took place from
the fourth quarter of 1972 onwards - the spot market rates had been increasing steadily since
April, and had been trebled in the period April to. September. As a result of the close
correlation between the freight rate level and the level of contracting, the effects ofthe freight
rate increase on the contracting of independent shipowners did not take long to materialise.
Indeed, the contracting in late 1972 is typical of the herd behaviour often observed in
the shipping market. The Norwegian shipbroking firm R.S. Platou remarked in their 1972
annual review that H[ijn October, the contracting market exploded into activity. [ ...j In trying
too understand the activity that took place in October and November, [...} we believe it is
necessary to appreciate that the general pessimistic outlook for the future [. ..} had been
turned to cautious optimism.], ..}The constant flow of reports on the American energy crisis
indicated the needfor afuture vast increase offoreign oil supply. ,,38
The close relationship between the freight rate and contracting levels, with periodic
over-ordering as its consequence, is undoubtedly an important factor in an explanation of the
considerable tonnage increase in the beginning and middle of the 1970s. The over-ordering
contributed to an increase in the breadth, length and depth of the shipping crisis.
The breadth of the shipping crisis, ie the number of agents who was affected, can be
directly attributed to the large supply ofnew vessels entering the market. Shipowners who had
37 The figure is based on quarterly figures of the number of newbuilding contracts for vessels above 100.000 dwt
from a Norwegian shipbroker and Fairplay as presented in Dragesund, op.cit., 1990, p. 49. The annotation of the
year, eg "1970", refers to the first quarter.
38 R.S. Platou, The Platou Report 1972, Oslo, 1973, pp. 17-18.
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ordered large tankers without securing employment in advance or were operating their
existing fleet in the spot market were particularly hard hit. The fact that their vessels had to be
laid up or offered in the market at low rates, pushed down the rate level even for shipowners
who had refrained from contracting during the boom. The existence of a pool of inactive
tonnage implies that an increase in the demand for transport will attract laid-up vessels, rather
than contribute to a rate increase.
As the oil companies changed their chartering strategy, turning to an increase in spot
chartering and the use ofrelatively short-term contracts after 1974, even the shipowners who
had secured their ships' employment through medium- or short-term charters were hit by the
crisis. The average duration of the charters entered into prior to the freight market breakdown
was approximately 30 months, reflecting the fact that the majority of the charters had a
duration ofbetween two and three years." As these charters expired relatively shortly after the
freight market breakdown, it became increasingly difficult to enter into profitable new
contracts of this kind. Independent shipowners were forced to lay up their vessels, accept the
dismal rates in the spot market or enter into charter contracts at a level only slightly higher
than operating costs, with little room for the renumeration of capital costs.
The length of the shipping crisis was also influenced by the high contracting level.
Traditionally, the lifetime of a ship has been estimated at approximately 20 years. This implies
that a large share of the ships which were contracted during the booms at the start of the
1970s, offered their services in the international market for shipping services throughout most
of the 1980s and the 1990s.40 Most of the international tanker tonnage was between 13 and 19
years' old in 1992, reflecting the high amount of contracting in the beginning of the 1970s and
the large deliveries from the middle of that decade.
The over-ordering also influenced the depth of the shipping crisis, particularly in
.connection with the amount of tonnage entering lay-up. It is unlikely that the rate level would
have reached a higher level with a smaller degree of surplus tonnage. In theory the marginal
freight rate will be attained regardless of whether the tonnage surplus is ten or two hundred
ships." New tonnage was introduced to a market where there was no hope of securing
profitable employment, and it was not uncommon for newbuildings to go straight from the
shipyards into lay-up. The share of the world fleet laid up was so high as to have a profound
effect on most agents in the tanker market. Even the oil companies, who had the privilege of
securing cargoes for their own fleets, had to lay up some of their own and chartered vessels.
39 See Table 3.5 and Figure 3.22, as well as the accompanying footnotes.
40 The long-term influence of the contracting boom is evident from surveys of the age-composition of the tanker
fleet; see for instance Lensberg, Terje and Rasmussen, Heine, A Stochastic Intertemporai Model of the Tanker
Market, SNF-report 25/92, The Foundation for Research in Economics and Business Administration, Bergen,
1992, p. 9, for a survey of the situation in 1990.
41 However, it may be argued that the capacity potential of the inactive fleet is of importance; if ten vessels are
laid up the demand increase necessary for an upward movement in freight rates is far smaller than if two
hundred vessels are laid up. The high level of contracting is nevertheless of importance for the depth of the
crisis, as the demand growth gave a rate level which was so low that even the most effective vessels had to enter
lay-up.
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This was a result of the fact that they had overestimated their future transport needs,
particularly in connection with their large newbuilding orders in 1970 and 1971.
The growing imbalance between tanker demand and supply is crucial to an
understanding of the international shipping crisis of the 1970s. The contracting boom in the
beginning of the 1970s is important to explain the strong growth of the supply side, and the
effects of the periodically high freight rate level can explain much of the basis for the
contracting boom. However, one significant question remains: "Why did the tanker fleet
continue to grow even after the demand surplus had become evident?" This puzzle can be
explained by the lag between contracting and delivery, and the fact that cancellations were
costly. It could be expected that shipowners, who adapt relatively swiftly to increases in the
freight rate level by increasing their contracting, would choose to cancel the contracts when
the freight rates plunged. However, a considerable period of time passed before the owners of
transport capacity and newbuilding contracts were fully able to fathom the extent of the crisis.
The lag between contracting and delivery varies with the size of the order book and
consequently with the state of the shipping market. In periods with high freight rates and
contracting volumes, it might take as long as five to six years from vessels are contracted until
they are delivered. Some of the large tankers ordered shortly before the freight market broke
down in the end of 1973 were thus scheduled to be delivered as late as 1978-1979.42 The effect
of such lags for the supply of new tonnage is evident from Figure 3.9.
Figure 3.9. Contracting and delivery of tankers, million dwt, 1963-7943
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The amount of tanker tonnage delivered reached record-breaking levels in both 1974 and 1975
- when market conditions suggested that both short- and long-term capacity reductions would
be necessary. The fleet continued to grow despite the bleak prospects. More than 40 million
dwt were delivered in 1976, even though a report from a group of British shipping consultants
more than a year previously had stated that "there will be continuing over-supply of VLCC-
42 Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review 1973, Oslo, 1974, p. 5.
43 Based on figures from Table 4 and Table 10 in Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review, various issues.
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tonnage throughout the remainder of the 1970s. ,>44 In 1976 OECD estimated that balance
could be restored from 1983 onwards." Some newbuilding contracts were cancelled, but the
amount of cancellations was far too small to bring about a balance between tonnage supply
and demand.
Table 3.1. Estimates of Cancellations, 1974-7646
Tankers cancelled Other tonnage cancelled Conv ersion
1974 7-9 million
1975 26 million dwt 9-12,5 million dwt
1976 9,5-13 million dwt 1,2 million dwt
In 1977, the Norwegian brokers Fearnley & Eger concluded that "the yard industry has [ ...]
faced a total cancellation volume of 64 million dwt, of which 15 million dwt were registered
as conversions ." 47 The exact volume of cancellations is difficult to estimate due to the
existence of newbuilding options which mayor may not have been declared, the treatment of
conversions and the existence of newbuilding orders which were not "genuine". The figures
usually cited are in the region of 60 million dwt."
Figure 3.10. Cancellations of newbuildings by time of contracting, 1971-7449
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44 Drewry, The Trading Outlookfor Very Large Tankers, H.P. Drewry Shipping Consultants Ltd., 1975, p. 50.
45 OECD, Maritime Transport 1975, Paris, 1976, p. 93.
46 Based on estimates from various issues of OECD, Maritime Transport and Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co.
Ltd., Review.
47 Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review 1976, Oslo, 1977, p. 5.
48 See for instance Beth, Ludwig, Hader, Arnulf and Kappel, Robert, 25 Years of World Shipping, Fairplay
Publications, London, 1984, p. 36 or OECD, Maritime Transport 1976, p. 80.
49 The figure is based on quarterly data on the number of newbuilding contracts of more than 100.000 dwt and
corresponding cancellations from a Norwegian shipbroker and Fairplay as presented in Dragesund, op.cit., 1990,
p. 60. On the x-axis, the annotation of the year, eg "1971", refers to the first quarter. The figure includes
newbuilding contracts which were later cancelled, with no information about when the cancellation took place.
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Unfixed vessels contracted by independent shipowners constituted slightly more than a third
of all contracts in the period 1971-1974, but approximately 50 per cent of the vessels which
were later cancelled. However, the development of the shipping market later in the decade and
in the 1980s clearly showed that these cancellations were insufficient to restore the balance in
the tanker sector. There are three main reasons that the amount of cancellations remained
relatively low despite the changed conditions in the tanker sector.
First, it is obvious that it took considerable time before the agents in the shipping
sector had realised the extent of the crisis and the drastic change of freight market conditions.
The transformation was both sudden and dramatic, representing a fundamental break with the
development of the previous decades. Only after a while did the agents in the shipping market
adapt as though they were faced with a permanent shock, rather than a transitory glitch." In
1976, the OECD remarked that "[elven after the impact of the oil crisis there was a
considerable time-lag before it was realised that a long-term depression on the tanker market
would probably take place, and only recently have shipowners, oil companies, shipbuilders,
bankers, and under force of circumstances, governments also started to look seriously at
solutions to adjust the situation. ,,51 It is thus evident that even though the expectations
regarding the future tanker market development were changed, the break was so fundamental
and the projections were associated with such a large degree of uncertainty that the agents
were unwilling to reduce the capacity in order to comply with a "worst case scenario".
Second, cancellations did not appear as a viable alternative for some groups of agents
with large newbuilding orders on their hands. Shipowners who had secured employment for
their newbuildings through long-term charters were reluctant to pay cancellation fees. They
were - at least for a temporary period - secured income from the agreed charters. If they
expected the market to improve in the long term, the cancellation of tonnage implied that they
would have to forego future profit opportunities. Similarly, it would usually be unprofitable
for the oil companies to pay cancellation fees if they later had to buy the necessary transport
capacity in the open market."
Third, the cancellation of newbuilding contracts imposed severe penalties on the
shipowners in question. Shipowners looking for outright cancellation, would usually have to
pay a penalty of at least 10-20 per cent of the contract price, but sometimes as much as 50 per
cent. 53 Some vessels, in the later stages of the production process, were impossible to cancel.
As shipyards realised that neworders would be increasingly hard to secure, cancellations
became even more difficult to arrange. Conversion of tonnage was an alternative to
cancellation, but implied a penalty as well. Although the fees paid were smaller for
conversions than for cancellations, the contagion of the crisis and the subsequent deterioration
of the conditions outside the tanker sector made conversions a less attractive alternative.
SO This is further discussed in connection with the effects of the oil price increase,
SI OECD, Maritime Transport 1975, Paris, 1976, p, 100,
52 As Figure 3.10 shows, some oil companies, for instance those which had seriously overestimated their
transport requirements, found it profitable to cancel newbuilding contracts.
53 In some instances the contract was cancelled by mutual agreement, ifthis was in the interest ofboth parties.
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The sometimes exorbitant level of cancellation fees can be illustrated by the case of
one Norwegian shipowning company. The company had ordered four 150.000 dwt tankers, at
an average price of $32,5 million, for delivery in the period 1976-1977. When the company
approached the yard, with the intention of cancelling one or more of the contracts "the
demand from the yard was approximately 2/3 of the building price. ,,54
3.1.3. The funding - the importance of the ship financing institutions
Two of the factors which can explain the large supply' of new tonnage, viz the availability of
shipbuilding capacity and the shipowners' desire to invest, have already been analysed. A
third condition for the increasing supply of transport capacity was the access to financing. The
possibility of acquiring subsidised financing from the shipbuilding countries was discussed in
connection with the influence of the shipbuilding industry. Even though the interest rates were
at least as good as those available in the unsubsidised markets, the requirement to complete
repayment over an eight year period could represent such a drain on resources and cash flows
that government financing had to be combined with long-term debts in the financial market.
Moreover, the fact that the government financing of some countries, notably Japan and
Germany, was increasingly linked to the domestic currency, added an element of exchange
rate risk to the yard credits.
As it was the authorities of the major shipbuilding nations and institutions with little
experience in shipping financing which funded a large share of the shipping investments, the
demands for collateral and equity may have been lower than they would have been in the
private sector. The banks which had a long experience of the shipping industry, and
consequently a competitive advantage in the evaluation of shipping projects, were initially
seen as conservative relative to the state-supported institutions and the banks which entered
the shipping sector with large amounts of capital after 1967. The specialised shipping banks
often regarded long timecharters as crucial for the investment's long-term profitability and
security, and they were accused of forcing shipowners to enter into unprofitable timecharters.
However, as competition intensified, even the established shipping financing institutions lost
some of their traditional prudence.
The basis for the growing importance of financial institutions in the shipping market
was the increased size, and hence higher price, of vessels. Due to the increase in the capital-
intensity and -requirements of the shipping sector, the financing of vessel acquisitions from
the company's internal resources became increasingly difficult. Furthermore, relatively low
real interest rates and the fact that increasing debt capital reduces the amount of the
shipowners' own resources which is put at risk, made borrowing a favourable alternative to
equity financing.
Stokes claims that "the volume of finance available has not been a constraint. [ ...j Jf
anything, the reverse was the case, and shipowners' inherent lack of self-discipline has been
54 Letter from a Norwegian shipowner, dated 24 November 1975, The Archives of the Norwegian Shipowners'
Association, folder marked 6 B K 75 - Krisen 1975 IV, 011075-301175.
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dangerously encouraged by the profusion of funds proffered by the banks and credit
agencies. ,,55 One reason for this high supply of capital was the influx of new agents into ship
financing in the 1960s, and particularly after the Suez crisis boom in 1967. The strong growth
of international trade and the volume of seaborne transport in the first postwar decades had
created a need for fleet expansion, with a corresponding demand for the financing of shipping
investments. Additionally, the profits made by the banks and financial institutions that
facilitated these investments were sufficient to attract the interest of institutions without
specialist shipping financing departments. The result was an increase in the shipping
portfolios of traditional shipping finance institutions such as Hambros Bank, Chemical Bank
and Chase Manhattan, as well as the entry of new agents with little experience in the shipping
sector.
The increased competition in ship financing led to a reduction of the margins the
financial institutions could achieve. In addition, financial institutions also competed on terms,
ie they secured business by offering more attractive conditions than their competitors. One
result of this was that the traditional conservative terms were abandoned; it became
increasingly easy to finance a larger share of the newbuilding with loan capital. Peter Stokes
calls the period 1967-73 "The ship lending boom" and claims that the market "had lost all
sense of restraint" as "some deals were transacted in which the borrower actually received
finance for more than the cost of the vessel. ,,56 The extent of such transactions should not be
overstated, but it is beyond doubt that the shipping financing industry was very liquid, and the
conditions offered to shipowners became increasingly generous.
Two other aspects of the development in the 1960s are important to understand the
state and development of the shipping financing industry. First, there was a shift in the
geographical distribution of the industry, with London becoming increasingly important at the
expense of New York. Second, the economic and foreign policies the United States were
important for the creation of a booming market for dollar financing outside of the United
States. In 1963 the American authorities introduced the Interest Equalization Tax on foreign
borrowing, which raised the costs of foreign bonds sold in the US market. The result was the
fast growth of a Eurodollar market, where American banks were among the most eager
participants. The liquidity of this market was secured by the expansionist policies of the
American government, particularly after 1969, which made an ample supply of dollar
available. The dollars printed by the Johnson and Nixon Administrations greatly increased
world liquidity.
55 Stokes, Peter, Ship Finance - Credit Expansion and the Boom-Bust Cycle, Lloyd's of London Press Ltd.,
London, 1992,p. 115.
56 Ibid., p. 24.
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Figure 3.11. The growth of the Eurodollar market, billion dollar, 1964-7557
500 -
50 _o~--
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
450 ., --
400 ~--
350 -
300 -
250 -
200 -
150 _:
100 -
• Eurodollar market • Eurocurrency market
The access to easy financing for shipowners was the result of a variety of factors. At the
international level, the American Balance of Payments deficit contributed to the abundance of
capital in the Eurodollar market. The massive dollar outflow resulted in a contagion of
inflationary tendencies from the United States, as the European countries had to accept the
dollars which flooded the international financial markets in the late 1960s and early 1970s in
order to maintain the fixed exchange rates of the. Bretton Woods system. Moreover,
government subsidies to shipbuilding and the entry of new and relatively inexperienced agents
into the ship financing market also increased the capital available for shipowners. Competition
within shipping financing reduced bank margins, and led to lower interest rates and more
generous conditions for borrowers. These development traits benefited shipowners who were
looking to outside sources for the financing of fleet renewal or expansion. The abundance of
capital was accompanied by increasing rates of inflation which made real interest rates
relatively low, and investments particularly attractive.
57 Figures from Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, reprinted in Spero, Joan Edelman, The Politics of
International Economic Relations, St. Martin's Press Inc., London, 1990, p. 42. The growth of the Eurodollar
market after 1975 was enormous, mainly due to the influx of Petrodollars. By 1980, the market had more than
trebled relative to 1975, and in 1985 the Eurocurrency market amounted to almost $3.000 billion, of which
American dollars accounted for three quarters.
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Figure 3.12. Nominal and real short-term interest rates, 1960-8358
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The development of real interest rates can contribute to an explanation of the large
investments in the shipping sector in 1972 and 1973. The shipping market development is
closely correlated to the general business cycle development, implying that high freight rates
often occur in periods with high inflation. In such periods, high inflation leads to low real
interest rates, as nominal interest rates adjust relatively slowly to the increasing rate of
inflation. The real interest rate reflects the assessment of current values relative to future
values and affects the saving and investment decisions of shipowners. High inflation reduces
the attractiveness of placing the capital in the short-term money market, where nominal
interest rates have not been sufficiently increased to take into account the higher inflation.
Moreover, low real interest rates increase the attractiveness of investments in the shipping
sector where expected yields are relatively higher.
For shipowners with surplus capital, a short-term investment in the money market is
the most common alternative to shipping investments. Long-term investments are seldom
regarded as an alternative, as they tie up the resources of the company in the longer run,
reducing the company's freedom of action. Low real interest rates make it less profitable for
shipowners to invest their resources in the short-termmoney market, and increase the value of
investing in new transport capacity correspondingly.
The state of the international capital markets and the ship financing industry in the
beginning of the 1970s is important in an explanation of the high contracting volume and thus
the magnitude of the shipping crisis. The high volume of shipping capital available was
58 The figure is based on data from OECD, OECD Economic Outlook - Historical Statistics 1960-1983,
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris, 1985, Tables 10.7 and 10.8, p. 101. They refer
to monthly averages based on American Certificates of Deposit and British 3-month interbank loans after 1975
and 3-month Treasury Bills prior to 1975. To find real rates, the nominal rates have been divided by the ratio of
the GDP implicit price index for the current year to the previous year. The figures for 1960-67 and 1968-69 are
annual averages.
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partlya reflection of the abundance of capital in international capital markets, but also a result
of the good returns from shipping investments in the period prior to the crisis. In this respect,
the financial institutions fell victim to the same forces as the shipowners to whom the loans
were granted; they put inordinate emphasis on the strong historical development of the
shipping sector and failed to anticipate the changes in market conditions.
Just like the high freight rate level can be said to have removed some of the sobriety of
shipping investors, the increased competition and capital abundance eliminated some of the
traditional prudence of the shipping financiers. The expectance of continuing transport growth
and booming markets led banks and other financial institutions to abandon traditional
requirements such as long-term charters for the vessels financed. This development was
gradual, but increased from the late 1960s onwards. Initially, established shipowners with
relatively safe portfolios were granted mortgages for more speculative investments. Later,
gearing was increased in all kinds of companies, and the conservative collateral requirements
were wavered. Douglas claims that the cause of the problems was that "the concept of
standard credit terms for creditworthy buyers of ships degenerated, in the boom atmosphere
of the time, into the idea of standard credit terms for almost anyone who wanted to buy
ships. ,,59 According to one industry insider "{Wle tended to make up the rules as we went
along. f...] (Flew lending officers actually had any experience of problem loans in
shipping. ,,60
The development of ship prices is important to understand the softening of financing
conditions. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, ships were seen as "floating real estate", based
on the fact that inflation and favourable market conditions usually enabled shipowners to sell
their assets for more than the original price, sometimes after a considerable period of
profitable operation. Figure 3.13 shows the development of second-hand vessel prices in the
late 1960s and early 1970s, and can illustrate the basis for the optimism in the financing sector
with regard to loans to the shipping sector. Why should banks hesitate to finance investments
which retained their value after several years, sometimes even after the effects of inflation had
been accounted for? An 80.000 dwt tanker built in 1966/67 could be sold for more than the
original price in every year 1969-1973 - it could be purchased in 1968, and sold with almost
150per cent profit two years later."
S9 Douglas, Peter S., "Financial Policies for the Shipping Industry", in Ryden, Inger and von Schirach-Szmigiel,
Christopher (eds.), Shipping and Ships for the 1990s, Proceedings of the International Conference "Supply and
Demand of Water Transport", Stockholm School ofEconomics, Stockholm, 1979, p. 169.
60 Quoted in Stokes, op.cit., 1992, p. 25.
61 Based on figures from Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review 1972, p. 16. Refer to the publication for
more information on the types of vessels and the estimate of values.
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Figure 3.13. Second-hand prices, tankers and dry cargo, million dollar, 1966-7362
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Shipping was a favourable sector for Eurodollar-mortgages, due to its high capital
requirements and a well-functioning market for second-hand vessels which made investments
relatively liquid compared with other sectors. Nevertheless, due to the high level of tanker
prices, loans were often undertaken through syndicates, as the capital required was too large
even for the major banks. The syndication implied that a number of banks, sometimes as
many as 20, participated in a financing scheme organised by a lead bank, which usually was
one of the traditional shipping banks. On the one hand, the syndication reduced the risk
exposure of the participants. On the other hand, it increased the possibilities for inexperienced
financial institutions to gain a share of the supposedly lucrative ship financing business.
The amount of money lent to the shipping sector increased heavily in the latter part of
the 1960s and the first part of the 1970s. The concern about the state of the shipping industry
had resulted in the establishment of the International Maritime Industries Forum in 1976, and
they established a study group in order to quantify the debts of the shipping sector. Their
estimates from the middle of 1976 reveal mortgage debts in the region of $25 billion on the
existing world fleet of tankers, combination carriers, medium and large bulk vessels and oil
rigs. In addition to this, debts amounting to more than $12 billion could be attributed to
vessels and rigs on order.
More than half the debt could be attributed to the largest group of tankers, vessels of
more than 200.000 dwt. Otto Norland, a London-based Norwegian banker and the chairman of
the study group undertaking the survey, estimated that $4,3 billion of the tanker loans were
related to tankers without fixed employment. Itwas estimated that this figure could increase to
$10 billion by 1980, if all payments of principal were deferred, due to delivery of new unfixed
vessels and the termination of existing charters."
62 Based on figures from Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review 1973, pp. 16-17.
63 Figures from IMIF quoted in Stokes, op.cit., 1992, p. 55.
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Table 3.2. Mortgage debts in Shipping, million dollar, July 197664
Tankers Tankers Tankers Comb. Bulk
Year of deli, ery 200-+ RO-200 <80 carriers 60+ Grand total
1969 120 12 4 5 3 144
1970 309 40 50 54 28 481
1971 530 63 74 172 113 952
1972 1.050 108 120 484 217 1.979
1973 1.802 212 338 642 333 3.327
1974 2.725 712 370 440 335 4.582
1975 4.122 1.681 829 424 561 7.617
1976 Ql&2 2.113 956 562 274 420 4.325
Total 12.771 3.784 2.347 2.495 2.010 23.407
On order 4.381 1.593 1.864 869 2.550 11.257
The booming Eurodollar-market and the financing sector's positive expectations regarding the
shipping market development facilitated the shipowners' eagerness to expand their fleets.
Similar to the case of the shipowners, this was not irrational, given the historical development
of the shipping sector, the development of ship prices and the prevailing market prospects.
However, again the demand side development played havoc with expectations, and it became
obvious that the eagerness of financial institutions to gain shares of the ship financing market
had led to a laxity which became costly once the market shifted from strong growth to
stagnation.
The Effects of the Tax System
The preceding analysis has presented some of the. aspects which facilitated the large
investments in the period before the freight market breakdown. One additional element which
should be taken into account is the effects of the tax system in the major shipping nations. The
direct links between the tax policy and the high investments by shipowning companies are
more thoroughly examined in the chapter about Norwegian shipowners, as the Norwegian
system encompassed many of the factors which led to the over-ordering. However, the
importance of the tax systems for the high contracting on an international level warrants a
short introduction here.
In several of the most important shipping nations the design of the tax system made
large investments an attractive proposition for shipowners with high revenues, thus
contributing to the close relationship between the rate level and contracting. The combination
of low real interest rates and advantageous tax deductions often resulted in a negative post-tax
real interest rate on shipping investments. The end result was that contracting may have been
undertaken for tax reasons; shipowners found it favourable to order tonnage which would not
have been contracted in the absence of the influence from the tax system.
The authorities may, through their of taxation of income, investments or capital,
64 Based on figures from the International Maritime Industries Forum, quoted in Stokes, op.cit., 1992, p. 54. The
figures are estimates, and may deviate from actual debt by ten per cent for individual figures and five per cent
for aggregate figures.
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contribute to a change in the strategic behaviour of shipowners. This will be the case if the
design of the tax system influences the actions of the person or company taxed, inducing them
to adapt their business decisions to the tax system. in the case of investments, the situation is
analogue to the influence of the authorities in the shipbuilding sector, where subsidies and soft
financing reduced the revenue necessary for ship investments to be profitable.
If the tax system reduces the actual price that shipowners have to pay to acquire
tonnage, the volume of tonnage contracted will increase. The most blatant example of this
kind of influence is the direct investment grants of 20 to 25 per cent which were available to
British shipowners." In an international perspective, the tax treatment of depreciation was a
particularly important source of distortion. Some of the costs of new investments could be
offset by tax reductions due to liberal depreciation rules, making it profitable to have high
investments in years with high revenues. In the United Kingdom the investment grants were
combined with "free depreciation", which enabled British shipowners to write off the cost of a
new ship in the first year of operation if sufficient profits were made."
The effect of the tax system on contracting can be illustrated by the hypothetical
situation of a newly-established shipowning company. For a typical shipping investment, the
development of costs and revenues follows an S-shaped curve. Depreciation and high interest
payments lead to negative results in the initial period, which generally encompasses the first
years of the investment. Later, net revenues from the operation of the vessel become positive,
and the company becomes liable for the payment of taxes. This liability may, however, be
reduced or eliminated by new investments which lead to interest payments and depreciation
which can be deducted from the revenue of the initial investment.
Figure 3.14 illustrates the possibilities to reduce total tax liabilities by continuous
investment in new tonnage. Only when the company refrains from investing in new tonnage,
do the taxes at the company level become positive. The columns in Figure 3.14 show how the
total tax liability of a shipping company is negative for some time after the company has
invested in a new vessel, but turns positive when the income from this vessel exceeds the
depreciation and other deductions. By undertaking investments in new vessels, the company's
total tax liability may be reduced, due to the depreciation with regard to the new investments.
If the vessels are operated at a considerable profit, it is necessary to expand the fleet at an
increasingly fast rate.
65 Goss, Richard O., "Rochdale remembered", Maritime Policy and Management, Volume 25, No.3, 1998, pp.
220-221.
66 Hope, Ronald, A New History of British Shipping, John Murray, London, 1990, p. 462. According to Goss,
op.cit., 1998, p. 220, the Chamber of Shipping, in connection with the 1970 Committee of Inquiry into British
Shipping, sought to enlarge the depreciation allowance to include the proportion already covered by the
investment grant.
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Figure 3.14. Shipping operation and the tax effect of reinvestment"
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One important element, which is only partly captured in Figure 3.14, is the fact that tonnage
acquisitions tended to become more expensive, concomitant with the increase in ship size and
vessel specialisation. This amplified the positive effect of investments on taxes. Moreover,
Figure 3.14 does not take into account the fact that the revenue, and thus tax liability, of the
existing fleet varies with the fluctuations of the shipping market. Accordingly, the desire to
reduce the taxable income of the existing fleet through investment in new tonnage is
particularly high when the freight market is good.
The fact that tax-induced contracting is particularly attractive in periods with high
revenues makes the distorting effects of the tax system on contracting particularly harmful. As
discussed in connection with the contracting of shipowners, over-contracting principally takes
place in the periods where high rates spur shipowners to expand their fleets. The influence
from the tax system could of course be the sole reason for this, if all contracting was
motivated by the desire to reduce the taxation of the high income in boom periods. A more
likely explanation, however, is that contracting is based on high expectations regarding future
freight rate developments, and that the high contracting in boom periods is exacerbated by the
effects of the tax system.
3.1.4. The supply side - summary
The massive increase of tanker transport capacity is one of the keys to an understanding of the
international shipping crisis. Several elements contributed to the high contracting prior to the
67 Figure 3.14 is a purely illustrative chart, based on a hypothetical investment pattern. The total tax liability in
the latter part of the period has been deleted to improve the visual presentation of the argument, but will be
considerable unless new investments are made. The figure does not take into account the effect of revenues from
the sale of vessels.
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freight market breakdown. The shipbuilding industry had increased its capacity considerably
and was able to supply a large amount of new tonnage, albeit with a lag between contracting
and delivery. Shipowners were willing to contract vessels. An expansive strategy had proved
profitable in the growth period in the first postwar decades, and it was hard to envisage a
sudden change in the development. The financial community fought for market shares in the
shipping financing market, and due to developments in the international economy a large
amount of capital was available for investment purposes. The combination of sufficient
shipbuilding capacity, shipowners' eagerness to contract increasingly large vessels and an
ample supply of financing are important factors in an explanation of the contracting boom.
The amount of tonnage contracted and the size of the order book reached unprecedented
levels. This development was spurred by the high level of period and spot market rates,
particularly from the middle of 1972 onwards, which resulted in a favourable view of future
tanker transport demand. The actual demand development, however, did not live up to
expectations, and represented a clear break with the historical demand development.
3.2. The Tanker Transport Demand Side
The full extent of the deep crisis in the market for tanker transport services can not be
explained solely by supply side developments. The following analysis shows how the
development of the demand side influenced the crisis in the tanker market. In this connection,
two factors are given particular attention; the effects of the oil price increase and the
concentration of the agents on the demand side in the market for tanker transport.
3.2.1. The oil price increase
In 1973, the Norwegian government's long-term programme stated that a strong increase in
the demand for oil and oil products was to be expected, unless there were any major
disruptions in the price or supply conditions." The OPEC oil price increases on 16 October
1973 and 1 January 1974, and the OAPEC-countries' subsequent economically and politically
motivated supply reduction, constituted such a disruption.
The oil price shock which OPEC I constituted revealed the short-term inelasticity of
oil price demand. This can be explained by the important position of oil in the energy
consumption of the industrialised countries, the high costs of available substitutes and the fact
that an adaptation to other sources of energy is time-consuming. Moreover, there were no
alternatives to oil for slightly below 50 per cent of the oil consumption." The OPEC-cartel's
oil price increase contributed to a radical transformation of the market's stability, as well as
uncertainty and scepticism about the future development of the oil price and the oil supply. 70
68 Stortingsmelding nr. 71 (1972-73), Langtidsprogrammet 1974-77 [Long-term programme, 1974-77], p. 18.
69 Andersen, Bård Solheim and Haugerud, Ottar, Oljeprisens innvirkning på tankmarkedet [The influence of the
oil price on the tanker market], unpublished thesis, The Norwegian School of Management BI, 1992, p. 37.
70 Bergman, Lars, Maler, Karl-Gøran, Nordstrom, Thomas and Ysander, Bengt-Christer, Energy and Economic
Adjustment, The Industrial Institute for Economic and Social Research, Stockholm, 1983 shows the far-reaching
consequences of this insecurity for an industrialised, energy-importing country such as Sweden.
Chapter Three - The Causes of the Tanker Crisis 101
Stig Tenold: The Shipping Crisis of the i970s: Causes, Effects and implicationsfor Norwegian Shipping
The shipping sector was particularly hard hit by the price increase. In addition to a very strong
reduction of the growth of the demand for tanker transport, the cost of providing transport
services increased.
In Review 1973 the consequences of the oil price increase for the shipping industry
were evaluated, and four aspects were given particular importance: 71
D Initially, the demand for tankers decreases when the oil supply is reduced.
D Increased inflation is an inevitable result of the oil price increase.
D The lack of oil may cause a difficult bunkers situation.
D Increased demand for relatively cheap sources of energy, such as gas and coal, wi11lead to
an increase in the demand for tonnage in the markets where these products are transported.
Figure 3.15. Monthly oil prices, dollar, 1970-8172
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In most of the postwar period, the real price of oil had fallen, as oil price increases were
unable to keep up with general inflation. From the beginning of the 1970s, a series of oil price
increases were introduced in an attempt to alleviate the fall in the real price of oil. On 16
October 1973 OPEC announced an increase in posted oil prices by two thirds. This was
supplemented by a further increase, from approximately $5 to more than $11 per barrel,
adopted in late December 1973 and effective from 1 January 1974.
71 Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review 1973, pp. 3-4.
72 The data in Figure 3.15 are taken from OPEC, OPEC 1989 Statistical Bulletin, The Secretariat - Organization
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, Vienna, 1989, pp. 126-127. The figures denoting the year refer to
January. The chart refers to the posted prices for oil, which may deviate from the spot market selling price. In
early 1979, spot prices had increased as much as $8 above the posted price, and this was one of the reasons for
the increases in the posted price later that year; see Spero, op.cit., 1990, p. 275.
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Table 3.3. Major oil price changes"
Date Price before increase Price after mcrease Change - per cent
15 February 1971 $1,800 $2,180 21,11
16 October 1973 $3,011 $5,119 66,96
1 January 1974 $5,036 $11,651 131,35
1 October 1975 $11,251 $12,376 10,00
1 June 1979 $15,461 $19,355 25,19
1November 1979 $19,355 $25,806 33,33
1980 - several changes $27,957 $34,409 23,08
The oil price increases of 1973 and 1974 led to a fundamental structural change in the market
for energy, as oil was transformed from a relatively cheap and abundant factor of production
to a costly commodity. However, the magnitude of the structural change was not evident in
the short term. According to Blanchard and Fischer, "[ijt was frequently argued that the oil
price shock was transitory, likely to last about six months; in fact, it was simply not clear at
the time whether the shock was permanent or transitory. Uncertainty about the permanence of
the shock must have slowed real adjustment to it, for instance, the adaptation of the capital
stock to the higher price of energy. ,,?4 The shipping sector is evidence of the difficulties
assessing the extent of change and embarking on a proper course of action.
The unexpected oil price increase caused sudden problems, but the high degree of
uncertainty about the long-term effects for the shipping sector is also important to an
understanding of the magnitude of the problems later in the decade. Thus, the severity of the
shipping crisis was not just a result of an unanticipated reduction of demand growth, but also a
result of the failure to adapt to the changed conditions after the freight market had broken
down.
There are three main reasons for the incapability of adapting to the new situation. First,
due to the magnitude of the shock it was extremely difficult to assess the short- and long-term
consequences. The shift which the oil price increase represented was more dramatic than any
previous peacetime shocks. Second, the more drastic measures which could have been
introduced to mitigate the situation, eg mass cancellations of newbuilding contracts, were
shunted due to the long-prevailing notion that the shock was temporary, rather than
permanent. Third, the rigidities in the market for ships, particularly in connection with the lag
between contracting and delivery, made adaptation of the capital stock to the new conditions
difficult.
An analysis of the effects of the oil price increase for the shipping sector will have to
take into account both the influence on tanker transport demand and the effect on the costs of
shipowners. On the one hand, the oil price increase led to stagnating demand for tanker
transport capacity. This affected shipowners unevenly, but all shipowners operating in the spot
market were instantaneously faced with drastically reduced rates. The number of shipowners
73 Figures from OPEC, op.cit., 1989, pp. 126-127.
74 Blanchard, Oliver Jean and Fischer, Stanley, Lectures on Macroeconomics, The MIT Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, 1989, p. 525.
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who had to offer their vessels at the lower rates increased as old charters expired and
profitable employment became difficult to come by. On the other hand, the oil price hike
increased the cost of bunkers. This affected all shipowners, as the provision of transport
services became more expensive following the increased price of one of the most important
factors of production. However, the extent to which shipowners were affected by the bunkers
price increase varied with their technology and the types of charters on which they were
operating.
3.2.2. The reduced growth of tanker transport demand
In the early 1970s oil consumption was expected to increase by 6,5 per cent annually."
However, the net effect of the OPEC-induced oil price increases was a reduction in
consumption in the industrialised countries and lower than expected growth in other regions.
In the period from 1973 to 1982, the oil consumption of the OECD-countries fell from 37,4
million barrels a day to 32,2 million barrels a day, and their share of world oil consumption
dropped from approximately 70 to 57 per cent."
The United States provide a good example of the large discrepancies between actual
and anticipated oil consumption. In a testimony to the US Senate Foreign Relations
Committee in late May 1973, William E. Simon, the deputy secretary of the Treasury,
estimated that domestic demand for oil in 1980 would be about 25 million barrels a day.
Moreover, the United States would have to increase the share of imported oil in their
consumption from 33 per cent in 1973 to 50 per cent in 1980.77
The actual consumption of oil in the United States in 1980 amounted to 16,5 million
barrels a day. The share of imported oil in total consumption had increased to more than 40
per cent, but was stabilised at the 1973-level of approximately a third of consumption in the
early 1980s. Thus, the US average daily import of oil in 1980 was not 12,5 million barrels a
day, as expected by Simon, but rather 6,7 million. By 1983 the figure had fallen to less than
five million."
Figure 3.16 shows the annual development of oil consumption and oil exports, and
these figures are only partially related to the demand for oil transport capacity. Nevertheless,
the large discrepancies between the anticipated development and the actual development is
striking. The anticipated development of demand outstripped the actual development of
demand for both oil consumption and oil exports.
75 Figure taken from Zannetos, Zenon S., "Market and Cost Structure in Shipping", in Gordon, Richard L.,
Jacoby, Henry D. and Zimmerman, Martin B. (eds.), Energy: Markets and Regulation - Essays in Honor of MA.
Adelman, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1987, pp. 244-245.
76 Farrell, Trevor M.A., "The world oil market 1973-1983, and the future of oil prices", OPEC Review, No.4,
Volume 9,1985, p. 391.
77 Ahrari, Mohammed E., OPEC - The Falling Giant, The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 1986, p. 37.
78 Calculations based on figures from British Petroleum, BP Statistical Review of World Energy 1984, British
Petroleum, London, 1984, pp. 7-8 and 16.
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Figure 3.16. Development ofoil consumption and exports, 1973-83 (1973=100)79
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The growth of seaborne oil transport was drastically reduced during the 1970s, particularly
compared with the growth in the period before the oil price increase. At the same time the
balance in the market for tanker services deteriorated, exacerbated by the enormous
contracting which took place at the start of the decade.
Figure 3.17 Annual growth of seaborne oil transport, per cent, 1963-8080
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Figure 3.17 illustrates the development of the demand for tanker transport capacity in the
1960s and 1970s. The strong break from the previous trend is evident when the actual
79 Based on figures from British Petroleum, BP Statistical Review of World Energy 1984, British Petroleum,
London, 1984,pp. 8 and 16 and the expected 6,5per cent increase in consumption as presented by Zannetos,
op.cit., 1987,pp. 244-245.
80 This chart is based on calculations of ton-mile figures from Table 2 in Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd.,
Review, 1972 and 1981,and refers to the transport of crude oil and oil products. The linear trend represents the
least squares fit. See also the drastic shift presented in Figure 2.6.
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development of transport demand after 1973 is compared with the average growth in the
period 1967-1973. The drastic change in the demand development would have been even
more conspicuous if the demand for the transport of oil products had been left out. In the
period 1967-1973 the average annual increase in the demand for crude oil transports was 19,7
per cent, compared with an average reduction of almost 1 per cent in the period 1974-1980.
Even though the fall in growth rates is substantial, some degree of reduction should have been
anticipated, as one of the reasons for the growth in the period from 1967 to 1973 was the
closure of the Suez Canal and the subsequent increase in average shipping distances.
There was no significant decline in the seaborne transport of oil and oil products in the
first year after the oil price increase. Measured in ton-miles, the seaborne transport in 1974
was higher than in 1973, in itself an all time high. There was a small reduction in the seaborne
transport of oil and oil products measured in tons, from 1640 million tons in 1973 to 1625
million tons in 1974, but this decrease was more than offset by an increase in average
shipping distances. Despite the fact that demand continued to grow, the increase in the
transport of crude oil and oil products was considerably smaller than the historical growth and
the expected increase.
In 1975, there was an absolute reduction in the seaborne transport of crude oil and oil
products, in a period where the agents - at least before the oil price increase - had expected a
considerable increase in the demand for tanker transport. It was the first time since the Second
World War that such a decline occurred, so expectations about demand founded on recent
historical experience would under no circumstances predict such a development. Thus, it was
in the market for tanker transport that the influence of the oil price increase on the shipping
sector first emerged. Due to the Middle East-countries' oil embargo, the expected demand
growth was replaced by a reduction in the need for tanker transport, instantaneously resulting
in depressed freight rates and soon leading to high lay up-rates as well.
The demand for oil is relatively inelastic in the short run, but in the longer run it is
possible to increase the use of those sources of energy whose price has declined relative to the
price of oil. A long-term effect of OPEC's cartel pricing policy was therefore a relative
reduction in the consumption of oil due to the use of alternative sources of energy in Europe
and the United States. In addition to this, there was a relative reduction in the consumption of
Middle East oil due to an increase in the exploration and exploitation of oil wells situated
relatively close to the major consumption centres. Some of these were oil wells which were
economical to exploit only after the increase in the price of oil. 81 The annual growth of oil
production in Western Europe was 24,1 per cent in the period from 1973 to 1982.82
81 The close relationship between the oil price increase and the exploitation of Norwegian oil resources is
presented in Stortingsmelding nr. 25 (1973-74), Petroleumsvirksomhetens plass i det norske samfunn [The role
of the petroleum business in the Norwegian society], p. 6.
82 Figures from Ait-Laoussine, Nordine and Parra, Fransisco R., "The development of oil supplies during the
energy crises of the 1970s and some questions for the future", OPEC Review, Volume 9, 1985, p. 33.
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Figure 3.18. Seaborne transport of oil and oil products, 1970-8183
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There were two major reasons for the reduction in the seaborne transport of oil and oil
products in the latter part of the 1970s. First, there was a reduction of oil consumption in the
OECD-countries as energy-saving measures were introduced. The effect of these energy-
saving measures on oil consumption was exacerbated by an increase in the utilisation of
alternative sources of energy. In 1973 oil had constituted more than 53 per cent of the primary
energy consumed in Western Europe, North America and Japan. By 1982 the figure had fallen
to 45 per cent, with coal, hydro-power and in particular nuclear energy gaining importance."
Second, there was a considerable increase in the utilisation of oil wells in countries
situated relatively close to the major consumption centres. OPEC's share of world oil
production declined from more than 54 per cent in 1973 to approximately a third in 1982.
Table 3.4. Countries registering significant increases in oil production, 1973-8385
1973 production 19R3 production Increase - per cent
Mexico 28.200 149.000 428,4
Brazil 8.284 16.500 99,2
Egypt 8.367 38.000 354,2
Norway 1.575 30.000 1.804,8
Denmark 135 2.400 1.677,8
United Kingdom 89 114.500 128.551,7
India 7.199 24.000 233,4
Malaysia 4.293 18.050 320,5
China 50.000 105.000 110,0
USSR 427.250 618.000 44,6
83 Based on figures from Tables l and 2 in Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review 1981. The bars refer to
ton-miles, shown on the left axis. The lines show the development in metric tons, and refer to the right axis.
84 Farrell, op.cit., 1985, p. 394.
85 The figures refer to thousand metric tons, and are taken from Farrell, op.cit., 1985, p. 398.
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The shift of oil production from the OPEC-area to non-OPEC oil producers exacerbated the
effects of the falling oil consumption growth on transport demand, as it led to a reduction of
average shipping distances. From 1977 onwards the average shipping distance of oil was
reduced as several non-OPEC countries increased their exploration and exploitation. A larger
share of the world's need for oil and oil products was thus covered by sources which were
relatively close to where the oil and the oil products were consumed.
Figure 3.19. Average shipping distance of crude oil and oil products, miles, 1962-8186
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The closure of the Suez Canal in 1967 can explain much of the increase in the average
shipping distance of oil in the late 1960s. The reopening of the Suez Canal in June 1975 did
not, however, lead to the expected reduction in average distances, and this effect was
particularly evident for large tankers. The main reason for this was that the depressed freight
rates for large tankers made use of the canalless advantageous.
It was expected that the reopening of the Suez Canal would lead to a five per cent
reduction in dry bulk demand and a maximum ten per cent reduction in tanker demand. The
actual reduction of demand corresponded to approximately one per cent for dry bulk vessels,
whereas the reduction of oil shipping demand was negligible." According to Review 1975,
only one VLCC went through the canal in 1975. The reopening of the Suez Canal
demonstrates the structural change in the market for shipping services. Before the canal was
closed, approximately three quarters of the cargo carried through the canal was transported by
tankers. In 1975, liquid cargoes only accounted for approximately 15 per cent of the tonnage
transported through the canal. The reason for this was that tanker owners regarded it as
unprofitable to pay the canal fees in order to shorten the ballast voyage to the Gulf by ten
days, when the market was characterised by overcapacity and difficulties finding profitable
employment.
86 The chart is calculated on the basis of figures from Tables 1 and 2 in Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd.,
Review, various issues.
87 OECD, Maritime Transport 1975, Paris, 1976, p. 25.
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3.2.3. Bunkers
The most important effect of the oil price increase for the agents in the market for shipping
services was the reduced growth, and later absolute reduction, of tanker transport demand.
However, the oil price increase also influenced the costs of providing transport services, due
to a major increase in the price ofbunkers.
Figure 3.20. The development ofbunkers prices, $ per ton, 1967-8188
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Bunkers are available in a variety of quantities and qualities at various locations, and may
therefore be influenced by local supply and demand conditions. Figure 3.20 thus only gives an
indication of bunkers prices, and conceals large monthly variations. On a monthly average
basis, the price of "Bunker C" free-on-board Rotterdam increased from less than $20 per ton
in October 1973 to more than $120 per ton in December the same year. Thereafter, bunkers
prices levelled out and were stabilised at around $70 per ton in 1974.89
The optimal speed of vessels is not constant, but varying with the freight rate level and
the price of fuel. The price of bunkers is one of the factors determining the shape of the
supply-curve in the market for shipping services." In a market with a low freight rate level
and high bunkers prices, the shipowners choose to let their ships run at a pace well below their
maximum speed. Thus, high bunkers prices, relative to freight rates, led to increased use of
slow steaming in an attempt to improve economic results. Moreover, in connection with the
international shipping crisis, some vessels involuntarily had to operate at slow speed due to
88 Based on the prices in the bulk market centred on North West Europe, often termed the Rotterdam or ARA
(Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp )-market, presented in Jenkins, Gilbert, Stopford, Martin and Tyler, Cliff, The
Clarkson Oil Tanker Databook, Clarkson Research Studies, London, 1993, p. 269.
89 Data from Drewry, op.cit., 1975, p. 17.
90 A presentation of the differences in optimal speed between a situation with high prices of bunkers and a
situation with low prices can be found in Hagen, Kåre Petter and Strandenes, Siri Pettersen, Shipping Risk and
Tax Policy, SNF-Report 23/92, The Foundation for Research in Economics and Business Administration,
Bergen, 1992, p. 16.
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the limited availability of bunkers."
The development of bunkers are important in determining the cost of providing
transport services. A group of British shipping consultants have tracked a fleet of 50 VLCCs
in 1973 and 1974. Their data exemplify the changes in the employment pattern of VLCCs
after the oil price increase. From 1973 to 1974, the annual average speed fell by eight per cent.
From an average speed of 14,3knots in 1973, the decline occurred progressively, stabilising at
around 12,5 knots in the latter part of 1974. This represented a reduction of approximately
12,5per cent.
Figure 3.21. Speed and bunkers costs, quarterly figures, 1973-7492
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Figure 3.21 illustrates the enormous increase in the price of bunkers and its effect on the
bunkers costs for a given transport service, in this case the route from the Persian Gulf to
Western Europe. Moreover, the decreasing difference between the development of bunker
prices and total bunker costs - which becomes evident from the second quarter of 1974 -
illustrates the savings from slow steaming.
The quadrupling of the price of bunkers greatly increased the cost of providing
transport services. However, changes in the price of fuel had different consequences for the
various agents. Vessels which were using much fuel were adversely affected by the changes in
fuel prices relative to ships which could be run in an economically efficient way despite the
increase in the price ofbunkers.
Diesel engines were more expensive to maintain and install than steam turbine
engines, but could use fuel more efficiently. Accordingly, the cost of operation of steam
propulsion plants increased considerably more than the cost of operating diesel engines when
91 In the spring of 1974, there was a bunkers crisis, when some ships failed to obtain bunkers for weeks. For an
introduction to the kind of problems which the lack of bunkers could cause for the shipowners, see the article
about the oil situation in Nordisk Skibsrederforenings Medlemsblad, No. 497, 1974, pp. 4387-4389.
92 Based on data for the route Persian Gulf - Western Europe as found in Drewry, op.cit.,1975, p. 16. The bars
refer to the left axis, and show the price of bunkers in dollar and the total bunkers cost on the loaded leg in 1000
dollar. The line refers to the average speed, represented on the right axis.
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the oil price increased. Another result of the oil price increase was that the use of means of
transport which function independent of bunkers, eg pipelines, became relatively more
profitable. The effects of the increased price of bunkers on the utilisation of the fleet will be
analysed in more detail in connection with the effects of the crisis.
3.2.4. Consequences of the concentration on the demand side
The fact that the oil companies both supply and demand transport capacity makes them
difficult to place in an analysis of the causes of the tanker crisis, particularly due to the fact
that there is no clear pattern as to how companies solve the transport function. The following
analysis examines two ways in which the oil companies affected the conditions in the tanker
market. First, the question of chartering is analysed. By changing their chartering strategy, the
oil companies contributed to the spreading of the crisis. Second, the effect of the oil
companies' policies on the size of the fleet is analysed.
As previously shown, the close relationship between the freight rate level and
contracting, resulting in periodic over-ordering, is important to explain the tonnage surplus.
The freight rates are also of influential when it comes to the timing of charter contracts, ie
when time charter contracts are entered into." In periods where the freight rate level is high,
shipowners are interested in tying large parts of their fleet to medium- or long-term contracts.
Correspondingly, oil companies are willing to commit themselves to charters in order to
reduce the negative effects of an anticipated future tonnage shortage. This mechanism can
explain the high level of activity in the chartering market in the latter part of 1970 and in
1973.94
Table 3.5. - Number of dirty fixtures by length of charter, 1970-7795
The large variations in the number of charter agreements signed are evident from Table 3.5.
The high level of chartering in periods with high freight rates affects the levd of contracting
through two separate mechanisms. First, the existence of charter contracts is of direct
importance for the contracting activity, as these contracts are often used as collateral in
93 Taylor, A. 1., "Chartering Strategies for Shipping Companies", Omega, No. l, 1982, p. 29.
94 Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review 1970, pp. 17-18.
95 The figures come from H. Houlder & Partners, referred to in Glen, D., Owen, M. and van der Meer, R., "Spot
and Time Charter Rates for Tankers 1970-77", Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, No. l, 1981, p. 47
as well as Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review, various issues. I have calculated the total number of
charters signed, referred to in the column "Sum".
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connection with the financing of newbuildings. It is thus easier to acquire financing in periods
where the freight rate level is high, and correspondingly difficult to arrange financing in
periods where the long-term freight rates are at a low level. However, the generally soft
conditions in the shipping financing industry in the period before the crisis reduced the
importance of this mechanism.
Second, the level of contracting is influenced by shipowners who act as though the
period rate reflects future demand and supply conditions. As a result of the strong correlation
between the spot- and period rates, contracting will be determined by temporary fluctuations
rather than attain the level necessary to create a balance between long-term demand and
supply of tanker services.
Figure 3.22. Chartering and freight rates, 1970-7796
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Figure 3.22 shows the close relationship between the freight rate level and the chartering of
the oil companies. The figure also illustrates the spectacular change in the chartering strategy
of the oil companies following the oil price increase. In 1973 charter contracts amounting to
more than 990 "charter years" were signed. This can be compared with a total of 847 "charter
years" in the four year period 1974-1977. Moreover, the average length of charter contracts
was drastically reduced, from more than 29 months in 1973 to 16,7 months in 1975 and 19,2
months in 1977. In the latter year, more than 80 per cent of the charters had a duration of less
than one year. In 1973, however, charters of such short duration made up less than a quarter of
96 The freight rate, based on spot rates from the MiddleEast to North West Europe or the US East Coast in dollar
per ton, is represented on the right axis and originates with Jenkins, Stopford & Tyler, op.cit., 1993, p. 250. The
number of charters is taken from Table 3.5, and the "years"-bars represent the number of charters of various
length, multiplied by the average duration of the group. Thus, in 1970, the 206 charters of24-36 month duration
give a total of [(30*206)/12] 515 years. Charters in the "60+"-bracket have been assigned a duration of 120
months. The large number of charters signed in 1972 was due to the Sanko-deals, which will be presented later.
If these more than 50 contracts of ten years' duration are deducted, the fit between freight rates and "years" in
1972 improves considerably. The "non-Sanke" level is indicated by the black line in the 1972 bar.
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all charters.
The fact that the oil companies both demand and supply transport capacity did not
initially change the conditions in the market for tariker transport. They did not discriminate
against the independent shipowners in connection with the delivery of fuel. 97 The oil
companies nevertheless contributed to a transformation of the market conditions by reserving
cargoes for their own ships and those to which they were tied through charter contracts, in a
period where the demand for tanker transport was limited.
Initially, the effects of the freight market breakdown were different for the various
shipowners. The shipping companies which had tied their tonnage to long-term charter
contracts in the period with high freight rates in the beginning of the 1970s, or in connection
with the boom just before the oil crisis, had to some extent secured their revenues in the first
period after the freight market breakdown." The profitability of the ships tied to long-term
charter contracts varied according to when the contract was entered into and which kind of
contract the two parties had chosen. A voyage charter, where the shipowner is responsible for
the payment of bunkers, was due to the oil price increase far less profitable than a bareboat-
charter or a period timecharter where the charterer had to cover the bunkers costs. 99
After the breakdown of the freight market, it became increasingly common that oil
companies, when old charters expired, chose not to enter into new long-term charters. Rather,
they covered a consistently larger share of their tonnage requirements in the spot market. The
share of the oil transport contracts which were closed in the spot market thus rose from 10 per
cent in 1973 to 25 per cent in 1978.100
In addition to this, the amount of charter contracts was reduced as a result of an
increase in the oil company owned tonnage. The share of the tanker fleet which was owned by
the oil companies increased from 33 per cent in 1972 to approximately 40 per cent in 1977. Of
the international tanker fleet, 21 per cent was owned by The Seven Sisters.t'" Due to the
increased spot market chartering and the growth of the oil-company owned fleets, the share of
vessels operating on charter contracts fell from approximately 55 per cent before the oil price
97 The Norwegian shipping correspondent Johan Seland writes in Seland, Johan, Norsk skipsfart år for år 1946-
1976, edited by Arnljot Strømme Svendsen, Fagbokforlaget, Bergen, 1994, p. 224 that "luckily, the oil
companies managed to allocate bunkers in a fair manner. "
98 The most profitable charter contracts in the first part of the 1970s were medium-length, and entered into in the
spring of 1970. The highest rates were found in the short-term charters, most of which expired in 1972. Ships
which had been tied to very long charters in the middle or end of the 1960s were not particularly profitable due
to the exchange rate development.
99 In Gram, Per, "Kansellering av certepartier" [Cancellation of charter parties], Norwegian Shipping News, No.
12/13, 1975, p. 9 it is claimed that one shipowner was willing to pay an oil company to get a contract from The
Persian Gulf to Europe. The rationale behind this was that the oil company under this contract was liable to pay
the bunkers cost, and the shipowner wanted to get the ship to Europe where it would be laid up.
100 Rafgård, Tormod, "Oil transportation in tankers - getting cheaper and cheaper", Norwegian Shipping News,
No. 21, 1979, p. 29. The figures are largely supported by other sources, although the 1973 figure is relatively
small. See the analysis in Chapter Six for a more detailed assessment.
101 Based on figures from Drewry, The Tanker Fleets of the International Oil Companies, H.P. Drewry Shipping
Consultants Ltd., 1979, p. 74. The figures vary between different sources; compare for instance the figures from
Drewry, op.cit., 1979, p. 72 with those presented in Ratcliffe, Mike, Liquid Gold Ships. A History of the Tanker
1859-1984, Lloyd's of London Press Ltd., London, 1985, p. 161.
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increase to 35 per cent in 1978.
One factor which can explain the reduced activity in the charter market was the fact
that some of the oil companies had to lay up their own as well as previously chartered ships. It
is evident that the oil companies after 1974 were hesitant about entering into contracts with a
duration of more than a year. 102 Another reason that both shipowners and oil companies were
more cautious about signing long-term contracts may have been the increased uncertainty in
connection with exchange rates and cost development.l'" In the white paper Stortingsmelding
nr. 23 (1975-76), Om sjøfolkenes forhold og skipsfartens plass i samfunnet [On the conditions
for seamen and shipping's position in the society] it is claimed that the extensive use of short-
term charters in the Norwegian fleet was a result of changes in the policy of charterers, the
Norwegian cost development and the exchange rate turmoil.'?"
According to Abrahamsson, the changes in the use of long-term contracts was a result
of structural changes in the international market for oil. He also claims that it was primarily
the oil companies who were reluctant to enter into new contracts as the old charters expired.!"
In addition to this, an increasing share of the transport capacity was bought by small and state-
controlled oil companies.!" Parallel with the increased fragmentation of the demand side, the
most important oil-producing countries reduced the average length of their exploitation
contracts with the oil companies, and the activity in the spot market for oil increased at the
expense of long-term exploitation contracts. The share of internationally traded oil based on
long-term contracts fell from 90 per cent in 1973 to 42 per cent in 1979.107
The reduced utilisation of long-term contracts and the increasingly important position
of smaller oil companies may also explain the decline in the use of charter agreements in
connection with oil shipments. It could be expected that the charter market activity increased
when small companies on the transport demand side, owning little tanker tonnage themselves,
needed to secure their delivery of oil. This appears not to be the case. Whereas the seven
majors on average covered approximately seven per cent of their tonnage requirements in the
spot market in 1978, the leading non-majors on average covered 24,5 per cent of their
requirements in the spot market.l'" However, this difference in chartering strategy was not
102 Glen, Owen & van der Meer, op.cit., 1981. In Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review 1975, p. 12, it is
claimed that only two of the large American oil companies had undertaken period chartering of any significance
in 1975.
103 The Norwegian shipowner Jørgen Jahre claims in Norwegian Shipping News, No. 2A, 1976, p. 25 that the
basis for the long-term charter contracts disappeared before the oil crisis as charterers were reluctant to accept
escalation clauses in connection with costs and exchange rates.
104 Stortingsmelding nr. 23 (1975-76), Om sjøfolkenes forhold og skipsfartens plass i samfunnet [On the
conditions for seamen and shipping's position in the society], pp. 57-58.
105 Abrahamsson, Bernhard 1., "International Shipping: Developments, Prospects and Policy Issues", Ocean
Yearbook 8, University of Chicago Press, 1987, p. 172.
106 Abrahamsson, Bernhard J., "Merchant Shipping in Transition", Ocean Yearbook 4, University of Chicago
Press, 1983, p. 176.
107 Bjerkholt, Olav, Offerdal, Erik and Strøm, Steinar (eds.), Olje og gass i norsk økonomi [Oil and gas in the
Norwegian economy], Universitetsforlaget AS, Oslo, 1985, p. 56.
108 Calculations are unweighted averages based on the percentage breakdown of the oil companies' owned,
period and spot tonnage in Drewry, op.cit., 1979, p. 73.
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necessarily a result of the structural changes in the oil market. A plausible explanation may be
that the relatively small oil companies did not perceive lack of tonnage as likely in a market
characterised by considerable tonnage surplus for the foreseeable future, and that they
accordingly chose to buy relatively cheap transport capacity in the spot market.
The behaviour of the oil companies, characterised by a strong reduction of the activity
in the charter market, was one factor which contributed to the spreading of the international
shipping crisis to agents which initially had escaped from the freight market breakdown
relatively unharmed. After the oil price increase, shipowners whose strategy was based on
securing employment for their vessels in the period market, were unable to renew their
existing contracts or sign new contracts when the current contracts terminated. They were
therefore forced to lay up vessels or accept the abysmal rates in the spot market. The high
degree of concentration on the demand side, where a small number of companies buy a large
share of the transport capacity, made it easy for the oil companies to keep an eye on the
chartering policies of their competitors.
As a result of the massive tonnage surplus, the need for oil companies to insure their
business against tonnage shortages byentering into long-term charters was reduced. This can
explain why an increasing share of the transport service was undertaken at extremely low rates
in the spot market. The fact that a relatively small number of oil companies demand most of
the tonnage supplied by the independent shipowners may therefore be important in an
explanation of the spreading of the crisis in the market for tanker shipping. The Norwegian
shipowner Erling Dekke Næss had previously claimed that the oil companies chose to enter
into charter contracts one by one, thereby forcing the rates to a lower lcvel.l'" However, he
does not refer to any evidence which can substantiate this argument, and there is no support
for it in any of the literature which has been written about the use of charter contracts.
The change in the chartering strategy of the oil companies thus contributed to the
spreading of the crisis. Moreover, the chartering policies may have resulted in a lengthening
of the shipping crisis as well. This would be the case if the oil companies through their actions
in the period before the oil price increase, consciously or unconsciously gave the independent
shipowners an economic motivation to undertake large investments. There is little doubt about
the fact that the high level of rates in late 1972 and 1973 stimulated independent shipowners
to invest in newbuildings. However, it is an impossible task to prove that this was some sort of
planned manoeuvre, intended to lead to a tonnage surplus. On the other hand, the increase in
the size of the tanker fleets of the oil companies during the 1970s shows that the companies
did not hesitate to take advantage of the low second-hand prices. This more than compensated
for the relatively low contracting activity in 1972 and 1973, when the oil companies' share of
newbuilding was smaller than their share of the world tanker fleet.
Another manner through which the oil companies contributed to the tanker market
imbalance was by neglecting to cancel newbuilding orders on a large scale when the
109 Næss, Erling Dekke, Tankfartens problemer og utsikter [The problems and prospects of tanker shipping],
Kristofer Lehmkuhl Lecture, Norwegian School ofEconomics and Business Administration, 1965, p. 13.
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overcapacity became evident. Some oil companies, which had drastically overestimated their
future transport requirements, chose to cancel newbuilding orders. However, as the OCED
remarked, "it is hard to see oil companies being sufficiently altruistic as to pay cancellation
fees for the privilege of chartering tonnage to jill the requirement. ,,110
Of the newbuilding contracts signed by the oil companies in the period 1971-74, one
out of five was cancelled. III Furthermore, a quarter of the contracts for which employment
was secured was cancelled. The bulk of the cancellations were undertaken by the independent
shipowners with unfixed tonnage. They were responsible for 35 per cent of the newbuilding
orders, and almost half of the cancellations.
If we look at the most intense period of the contracting boom, in 1973 and the last
quarter of 1972, the costs of the speculative contracting become evident. By this time, the oil
companies had drastically reduced their share of contracting, and only 12 per cent of their
newbuilding orders had to be cancelled. Of the contracts for which charters had been secured,
almost 39 per cent had to be cancelled. Shipowners could cancel tonnage without faulting on
their obligations to the charterer if the charter party was cancelled through a mutual
understanding, or if they had other vessels to which the charter could be transferred. Of the
158 vessels which had been contracted before employment was secured, 45 per cent had to be
cancelled. The fact that the shipyards demanded massive cancellation fees is one of the
explanations that the amount of tonnage cancelled was not higher.
The inordinate emphasis that shipowners placed on the current freight level and the
subsidised newbuilding prices was undoubtedly important in explaining the high contracting
activity. The oil companies could have co-ordinated their activity in the charter market in the
period before the oil crisis, thereby abusing this mechanism by increasing the independent
shipowners' expected profit from newbuilding contracts. However, the most plausible reason
for the large amount of contracting in the period before the freight market breakdown was the
expectations about continuing transport growth prevalent among both oil companies and
shipowners.
3.3. Summary
The tanker crisis was triggered by the oil price increases of October 1973 and January 1974
and the subsequent cartel policy of the OPEC. The magnitude of the crisis can to a large
extent be explained by the actions of the agents in the tanker market in the period around the
freight market breakdown and the strong, unexpected reduction in the growth of tanker
transport demand. In particular, the relationship between shipyards, shipowners and bankers,
and the expectations of these agents in the period leading up to the crisis, are important for an
understanding of the subsequent development.
Two aspects of the strategic behaviour of the shipyards, shipowners and bankers were
110 OECD, Maritime Transport 1975, Paris, 1976, p, 106.
III The following figures are based on the number of contracts, and are derived from calculations based on
Figure 3.8 and Figure 3.10.
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particularly important. First - in the period prior to the freight market breakdown - their
strategies reflected the anticipation of sustained strong growth in the demand for tanker
transport. Due to the oil price increase, the growth failed to materialise. Second - in the period
after the freight market breakdown - the inertia can be explained by the fact that the agents
largely acted as though the problems were transitory.
The effect of the strategic decisions - both prior to and after the oil price increase -
was that the volume of tanker tonnage grew considerably despite stagnating demand. Indeed,
the shipping crisis was the result of considerable discrepancies between expected and actual
development, and reflected the fact that a transition to the changed fundamentals of the tanker
market was difficult to implement.
The behaviour of and relationships among the agents can be explained by some
specific features of the markets for ships and long-term charters. In this connection, the
support given to the shipbuilding industry, the access to easy financing and the indirect use of
spot rates as a basis for investment decisions are of particular importance. Moreover, the
effects of tax-policies and the concentration among the agents on the demand side may have
aggravated the situation.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE CONTAGION AND SHORT-TERM EFFECTS OF THE CRISIS
This chapter deals with the contagion of the crisis from the tanker sector to other segments of
the shipping market, as well as the short-term effects of the crisis. Initially, the supply-side
transmission of the crisis from the tanker sector is analysed, with emphasis on the effects of
changes in the employment of combination carriers and the conversion of newbuilding
contracts. The effects of the demand side development in the bulk sector are also taken into
account. Second, the short-term effects of the crisis are analysed, and the development of
freight rates, vessel values and capacity utilisation is emphasised. In term with the topic of this
part of the thesis, the analysis of the effects of the crisis primarily focuses on the period from
the freight market breakdown until the temporary resurgence of freight rates in 1979.
Moreover, some of the more long-term effects of the crisis are mentioned, but will be analysed
in more detail in Chapter Ten.
Itmay to some extent be difficult to differentiate between the causes and consequences
of the crisis. For instance, the freight rate fall was an effect of the imbalance in the tanker
sector, ie the high tanker transport capacity relative to demand. However, the freight rate fall
was a cause of the problems encountered by most shipowners. In this respect, the term the
"crisis" in this subchapter is used to denote the disparity between the supply of tanker
transport capacity and the demand for tanker services. Accordingly, the term the "effects" of
the crisis represents the development traits appearing as a result of this imbalance. Moreover,
some auxiliary aspects, such as the recession in the industrialised countries, are important.
This recession aggravated the imbalance between supply and demand in the tanker sector, and
implies that several parts of the shipping industry would have been negatively affected, even
without the influence from the tanker market.
4.1. The Contagion of the Crisis
In the first period after the oil price increase, the large imbalance between shipping supply and
demand was dubbed "the tanker crisis". However, two mechanisms on the supply side, viz
the inflow of combination carriers and the conversion of newbuilding contracts, can explain
the spreading of the crisis to the dry bulk sector. At the same time, it is likely that a recession
would have taken place in the dry bulk sector even without the impact from the tanker market.
The main reason for this is the reduction of the world 's industrial production. The situation is
analogous to the one in the tanker market - the outcome of a recession would have been
particularly strong as the agents expected a continuing growth of demand.
In the market for dry bulk transport, the immediate effect of the oil price hike was a
strong increase in the price of bunkers. Again, this particularly affected the shipowners who
were operating relatively fuel-inefficient vessels, eg older ships or large ships with turbine
engines. However, due to the differences in the size distribution of ships, turbine-driven
vessels were less important in the dry bulk sector than in the tanker sector.
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The long-term influence on the demand for dry bulk transport was a more important
effect of the oil price increase. After a while, the increased the price of oil contributed to an
amplification of the downward business cycles which were already evident in the world
economy. Due to the strong correlation between the demand for dry bulk transport and the
world's industrial activity, the recession had negative consequences for the bulk transport
demand.
4.1.1. The recession
The effect of the oil price increase on inflation and the trade balance of oil importing countries
was one of the main causes of the international economic recession of the 1970s. It is,
however, possible to find some signs of disequilibrium in the world economy in the period
prior to the oil price increase, an indication of which was the development in international
monetary relations. The world economy was hit by heavy inflation, primarily in connection
with an increase in the price of raw materials and wages. In addition to this, the stability and
predictability of international trade relations were reduced as a result of the fact that some of
the major currencies had experienced a loss of confidence.
Due to the disequilibrium in the international economy, a reduction of the high
economic growth experienced in the first postwar decades could be expected. The
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) even suggested that
"1974 was likely to be a recession year even without the oil crisis. ,,) However, the oil price
increase reinforced both the inflationary tendencies and the recession in the industrialised
countries. Moreover, as governments sought to counter the inflationary effect of the oil price
increase, contractionary forces became even more prominent. As inflation control became the
primary policy goal, the contractionary impact of the oil price increase and the upcoming
recession was magnified. Table 4.1 shows the reduction of economic growth and the increased
inflation.
Table 4.1. OECD - Development of main indicators, annual averages, per cent'
1965-1973 1973-1979 1979-19R5
Real output growth 4,9 2,8 2,1
Inflation 5,1 9 7,7
Employment growth 1,1 1,1 0,6
The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries' manipulation of the oil price aggravated
a negative trend in the international economy. The oil price increase led to considerable
changes in the international terms of trade. The oil-exporting countries experienced a dramatic
increase in their foreign earnings, whereas the countries which were net importers of oil
developed increasingly large trade deficits. The result of the oil price increase was an
I OECD, Towards Full Employment and Price Stability, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development, Paris, 1977, p. 70.
2 Figures are OECD-averages from OECD, Structural Adjustment and Economic Performance, Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris, 1987, p. 54.
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international transfer of monetary reserves, and the oil producing countries spent some of their
new-found wealth on consumption, particularly consumption of industrial goods from
Germany, the United States and Japan. Moreover, a considerable share of the petrodollars was
returned to the industrialised countries through deposits in the Eurodollar market.
A stable world economy would have reacted to the oil price increase in a different
manner than the international economy in the early 1970s did. The development of business
cycles revealed that the most important industrial nations were heading towards a recession.
The oil price increase amplified the effects of this recession, as it in practice constituted a
considerable tax on the consumption of oil products in the industrialised world.' Moreover,
national economic policies were tightened to control the inflationary forces stimulated by the
boom of the early 1970s and the subsequent increase in the price of one of the most important
factors of production.
In January 1974, the finance ministers of the leading industrialised countries agreed to
avoid policies that would exacerbate the problems posed by the oil price increase. However,
as the shipping analysts H.P. Drewry emphasised six months later; "since that meeting, Italy
has resorted to impo~t restrictions, the UK has had a deflationary budget, the US has pushed
up interests to record heights, Denmark has imposed large purchase tax increases to stem
imports, Japan has launched a vigorous export campaign f...] and the new French
government is preparing an austerity programme (ie deflation) matched by a drive to
accelerate exports. ,1'\ The responses thus aggravated, rather than alleviated, the difficult
situation resulting from the oil price increase, as the various nations responded in assumed
self-interest.
The demand side basis for the predicament of shipowners varied. For shipowners
operating in the tanker market, the direct consequences of the cartel behaviour of the oil
producers were more important than the effects of the general recession. Those operating in
the market for dry bulk transport, however, were more affected by the reduction in economic
activity in the wake of the oil price increase, although the higher price of bunkers increased
the cost of providing transport services.
4.1.2. The supply side
After the oil price increase there were large changes in the supply of tonnage in the dry bulk
sector, in the short as well as in the long run. Initially, the cause of the supply side growth was
the introduction of combination carriers previously employed in the tanker market. The
reemployment was a direct effect of the tanker market breakdown. In the longer run, there was
a large increase in the supply of dry bulk tonnage as a result of the conversion of tanker
3 van der Wee, Herman, Prosperity and Upheaval. The World Economy 1945-1980, Pelican Books Ltd.,
Hannondsworth, 1986, p. 494. According to van der Wee, "[tjhe raising of oil prices had important
consequences for the world economy and the working of the international monetary system. [. ..} It was
inevitable that total demand in the industrialised countries would fall, and this largely explains the seriousness
of the world recession of 1974-1976."
4 Drewry, Shipping Statistics and Economics, No. 44, June 1974, p. 5.
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newbuilding contracts into bulk carrier contracts. As the crisis unfolded, shipbuilders even
managed to secure contracts for the construction of new dry bulk tonnage, despite the
portentous dry bulk tonnage surplus.
The impact of the combination carriers
The severe problems in the tanker market have often been used to explain the negative
development in the dry bulk sector in the period after the oil price increase.' As a rule,
combination carriers switch between the tanker and dry bulk markets when there are
considerable changes in the supply and demand conditions in the two markets. In the period
immediately before the international shipping crisis, 80 per cent of the total combination
carrier tonnage was employed in the tanker market due to the strong demand for oil transport
capacity. As a result of the freight market breakdown, the tanker market's share of the
combination carrier employment had been reduced to 58 per cent by 1974 and further to 51
per cent by 1975. One result of this declining share was that the proportion of the combination
carrier fleet offered in the dry bulk market increased. Whereas dry cargo had only constituted
approximately 15 per cent of the volume of goods transported by the combination carrier fleet
in 1972, the share had increased to approximately half of the goods by 1975.
Two features can explain the fact that as much as half of the combination carrier fleet
was still engaged in the depressed tanker market in 1975. First, the crisis had by this time
made a considerable impact on the dry bulk market as well. Second, approximately 28 per
cent of the total combination carrier fleet were committed to oil on period charters." In
addition to this, the ships which were hardest hit by the adverse conditions in the tanker
market were larger than many of the combination carriers offered in this market. However, the
effects of the influx of combination carriers from the tanker market on the balance in the dry
bulk market was considerable.
In 1972 combination carriers amounting to approximately three million dead weight
tons (dwt) were employed in the dry bulk sector. Three years later the amount oftonnage had
increased almostsevenfold, to more than twenty million dwt.' As a result of the growing
imbalance between tanker supply and demand, the share of the combination carrier fleet
operating in the dry bulk market continued to increase throughout the decade. In 1981 more
than three quarters of the volume transported by combination carriers consisted of dry bulk
goods.
5 For examples of the use of this causality, refer to Stortingsmelding nr. 52 (1980-81), Om skipsfartsnæringen
[On the shipping industry], p. 16 or Beenstock, Michael and Vergottis, Andreas, Econometric Modelling of
World Shipping, Chapman & Hall, London, 1993, p. 37.
6 OECD, Maritime Transport, Paris, 1975, paragraph 126. This figure was expected to fall to less than ten per
cent by the end of 1978.
7 Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review 1976, Table 3, p. 15 and Table 15, p. 21. See Figure 4.1 for
information on how the tonnage has been measured. According to the article "Markedet for kombinerte skip"
[The market for combination carriers] in Kapital, No. 11, 1973, p. 22, Ore/Oil-ships accounted for slightly more
than half of the combined carrier fleet. 75 per cent of the fleet comprised ships larger than 80.000 dwt, and
almost 60 per cent of the fleet was accounted for by ships of more than 100.000 dwt.
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As a result of the reemployment of vessels and the net growth in the combination
carrier fleet until 1979, the amount of tonnage in the dry bulk market increased considerably.
In the early 1980s almost 35 million dwt of combination carrier tonnage was employed in the
dry bulk market. At the same time, the bulk carrier fleet amounted to some 142 million dwt,
so the combination carriers operating in the dry bulk segment actually contributed to an
increase in the supply of approximately 25 per cent.
Figure 4.1. Employment of combination carriers, 1966-808
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The changes in the employment of the combination carrier fleet led to a strong increase in the
supply of dry bulk tonnage in the period after the breakdown in the tanker market. The
combination carriers offered in the dry bulk market made up less than five per cent of the total
transport capacity in this market in 1972, compared with more than 17per cent in 1975.
The combination carriers which switched from the tanker to the dry bulk market did
not do this immediately after the freight market breakdown. The companies offering dry bulk
transportation therefore generally received reasonable profits in the first half of 1974,
primarilyas a result of a continuing increase in the international trade of important dry bulk
commodities. However, by the summer of 1974, the dry bulk sector had started to feel the
effects of the oil price increase as well. The combination carriers leaving the tanker market put
a downward pressure on bulk market freight rates. Initially, rates fell to a particularly low
level for large dry bulk vessels and combination carriers, and by the end of 1974 dry bulk
rates had plunged to a level where it was no longer profitable for the largest combination
carriers to switch from the tanker to the dry bulk market."
Due to the fact that combination carriers can offer their services in the dry bulk as well
8 The chart is based on figures from Table 3 and Table 15 in Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review,
1972 and 1981. The amount of combination tonnage operating in the dry bulk market, measured in dead weight
tons and represented on the left axis, has been found by multiplying the share of the combination carriers'
activity in the dry bulk market by the size of the combination carrier fleet. The figure for 1978 may be
exaggerated, due the inclusion of to inactive tonnage. The right axis refers to the share of combination carriers
operating in the dry bulk market, as per cent of the total combination carrier fleet.
9 Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review 1974, p. 33.
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as the tanker sector, what was initially a tanker crisis spread to other segments of the
international market for shipping services. When the tanker sector overcapacity had led to a
depressed freight rate level, it became profitable to switch employment to the dry bulk market.
The combination carriers entering the dry bulk market created a situation of overcapacity even
here. The existence of combination carriers is thus important to explain the spreading of the
crisis from the tanker market to other sectors of the shipping market. The shift in the
employment of combination carriers from the tanker to the dry bulk market contributed to an
increase in the breadth of the international shipping crisis by affecting even those shipowners
who had refrained from investing in the tanker sector.
The conversion of newbuilding contracts
Within the shipbuilding industry there were two mechanisms which contributed to the
spreading of the crisis from the tanker market to the dry bulk sector. Initially there was a large
amount of conversions. Tanker newbuilding contracts were converted to bulk or combination
carrier contracts when the tanker freight market broke down. lO In addition to this, the tanker
market overcapacity led to a situation where the shipyards, when the tankers under
construction had been finished, had to concentrate on attracting orders for vessels intended for
other segments of the shipping industry.
As a result of the last contracting boom before the freight market breakdown in the
autumn of 1973, the order books of the world's shipyards were more extensive than ever
before. The world tanker order book on I January 1974 amounted to 193 dwt, almost ten
times as much as the corresponding figure only eight years earlier. The world order books for
combination and dry bulk carriers were 10 and 23 million dwt respectively. By the end of
1974, several shipowners had realised that there would be a persistent oversupply of tanker
tonnage, and consequently wanted to avoid the delivery of vessels to a market in which there
were large possibilities that the ships had to be laid up immediately after delivery.
One way through which the shipowners could avoid the delivery of superfluous tanker
tonnage was by cancelling their existing orders, and in several instances it was in the interest
of both the shipowner and the shipyard to cancel the newbuilding orders. Several shipyards
had not foreseen the enormous increase in building costs when accepting newbuilding
contracts, and were therefore willing to cancel contracts which would be as unprofitable to
themselves as to the contracting shipowner. In some instances, shipowners were willing to
bail their way out of unprofitable contracts which they had entered into. The losses, usually
the cancellation fee stipulated in the original contract, could be necessary to secure the
economic freedom and the financial position of the company. I I
10 In the article "Konverteringenes år" [The year of conversions], Norwegian Shipping News, No. 10, 1975, p.
44, which is a survey of the contracting activity in 1974, it is claimed that most of the converted tanker contracts
were substituted by OBO or bulk carrier orders, particularly for Panamax-size vessels.
11 Nordvik, Helge W., "Norwegian Maritime Historical Research during the past Twenty Years: A Critical
Survey", Sjøfartshistorisk Arbok 1990 [Norwegian Yearbook of Maritime History 1990], Bergen Maritime
Museum, Bergen, 1991, p. 253.
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An alternative to the cancellation of tanker contracts was the conversion of
newbuilding orders. In 1975, tanker contracts comprising approximately lOmillion dwt were
converted to combination or bulk carriers. The dry bulk ships which were built as a result of
the conversions were delivered after 1976 in a dry bulk market which then experienced a
tonnage surplus as well. There is little doubt about the fact that the conversion of tanker
contracts contributed to the spreading of the shipping crisis to the dry bulk sector and a
lengthening of the crisis in this market segment.
As previously mentioned, the size of the subsidies in the shipbuilding industry are
negatively correlated with the market prospects - when the activity in the shipyards is slack,
the authorities are more willing to use subsidies to secure assignments. When the tankers
contracted during the order boom had been cancelled or delivered, and shipbuilding capacity
was no longer in short supply, shipyards had to look to other segments to secure business.
Given the conditions prevalent in the tanker market, it was as good as impossible to build
tankers at prices which were acceptable for the shipyards and profitable for the investors. -The
subsidies and the shipyard capacity were consequently allocated to the relatively well-
functioning parts of the shipping market. As it was no longer profitable to build tankers, and
because the shipyards were in a position where they could use subsidies as bait, the available
construction capacity was used to build combination and bulk carriers."
Figure 4.2. Dry bulk and combination tonnage - per cent of total contracting, 1963-8013
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The long-term result of the conversion of tanker contracts and the increased construction of
combination carriers and dry bulk tonnage was that the supply side in the market for dry bulk
services continued to grow, despite the restrained market conditions. However, this was not
12 See for instance Mottershead, Peter, "Shipbuilding: adjustment led intervention or intervention led
adjustment", in Shepherd, Geoffrey, Auchen, Francois and Saunders, Cristopher (eds.), Europe's industries:
Public and private strategies for change, Francis Pinter, London, 1983 for a survey of the activity in the world's
shipbuilding industry from 1966 until the end of the 1970s. In addition to dry bulk vessels, ships intended for
other market segments represented alternative employment for shipbuilders.
13 The chart is based on figures from Table 10 in Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review, 1972 and 1980.
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the only reason for the deterioration of the dry bulk market conditions. Again, the demand
side aggravated the already negative development.
4.1.3. The demand side
In Review 1975, four factors are highlighted to explain the development in the dry bulk market
in 1975.14 The first factor, which is pointed out in other sources as well, is the negative impact
of the tanker market development. In addition to this, the reduction of steel production, the
conditions in international grain trading and the congestion of vessels outside important ports
are used to explain the market conditions."
It was primarily the inflow of the surplus combination carriers from the tanker market
which led to a reduction of freight rates in the dry bulk market in 1975. Later, the effect of
conversions and newbuilt tonnage assumed importance. However, the demand side
development is also important in an explanation of the extent of the crisis in the dry bulk
market.
The demand for bulk transport capacity is closely related to the world's industrial
activity, and the industrialised countries had entered a recession by the middle of the 1970s.
Despite the fact that industrial production and world trade increased in the 1970s, the growth
was weaker than in the previous decades and far lower than what had been expected. At the
same time, the international monetary system was radically changed and the industrialised
countries had to combat the combined evils of inflationary pressure and high unemployment.
The focus on inflation-reducing measures in domestic economic policies, exemplified by
deflationary monetary policies and relatively tight fiscal policies, aggravated the recessionary
forces.
Table 4.2. Annual growth of total production, average for decades, 1950-8016
1950-59 1960-69 1970-79
Japan 9,5 10,5 4,9
West Germany 7,8 4,8 2,8
Great Britain 2,7 2,8 1,8
The United States 3,2 4,3 3,0
Strandenes has analysed the demand for bulk transport services in the period 1965-1975, and
has found that the fluctuations of actual and potential GNP in the OECD-region can explain a
large portion of the variations in the demand for seaborne transport. The difference between
14 Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review 1975, p. 8.
15 In 1975, the development of grain transports exercised a positive influence on the demand for dry bulk
transport capacity. This illustrates that one of the most important dry bulk goods developed independently of the
world's industrial activity.
16 Japan, a country which due to its geographical position and large need for imported raw materials is of
particular importance for the demand for shipping services, was the country which experienced the largest
relative decrease in production growth. The source of this table is van der Wee, Herman, op.cit., 1986, p. 50.
When averages denoting the growth in the various decades are used, the high economic growth in the beginning
of the 1970s partly cloaks the differences between economic growth in the 1960s and the 1970s.
Chapter Four - The Contagion and Short-term Effects of the Crisis 12S
Stig Tenold: The Shipping Crisis of the 1970s: Causes. Effects and Implications/or Norwegian Shipping
actual and potential GNP can be seen as a measure ofunused capacity." The reduced transport
demand growth may therefore be explained by variations in the production of the
industrialised countries, and the business cycle development in some key sectors in particular.
In Japan, the recession appeared at the tum of the year 1973174, and in the United
States it was evident a few months later." In the latter part of 1974, there was a reduction in
industrial activity in Europe as well. Despite the recession in the world economy and the
reduction of steel production, demand in the dry bulk transport market increased in 1974.19
However, in 1975, a year after the recession had first come into view, the conditions were so
serious as to lead to a demand decrease in the dry bulk sector. Of the industries which were
particularly hard hit by the economic slump, the steel industry was of most importance to the
dry bulk sector. It has been estimated that the steelworks only utilised 60-70 per cent of total
capacity in 1975, and this resulted in a large reduction in the steel sector's demand for iron ore
and coal, the two most important dry bulk commodities. However, whereas the seaborne
transport of iron ore fell by almost seven per cent from 1974 to 1975, the seaborne transport of
coal grew by more than eleven per cent due to the increased used of coal for energy purposes
outside the steel sector.
Figure 4.3. World seaborne trade of non-liquid goods, billion ton-miles, 1970-8020
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The dry bulk market decreased in 1975 for the first time since the end of the 1950s, as the
increase in the transport of grain and coal was insufficient to neutralise the negative influence
17 Strandenes, Siri Pettersen, Trekk ved konjunkturutviklingen i tankfarten [Aspects of the business cycle
development in tanker shipping], unpublished thesis, Norwegian School of Economics and Business
Administration, Bergen, 1977. A similar study of the dry bulk sector is referred to in Norman, Victor D., The
Economics of Bulk Shipping, Institute for Shipping Research, Norwegian School of Economics and Business
Administration, Bergen, 1979c, p. 6. Potential GNP is used as an indicator of the long-term demand for transport
services. Actual GNP, which deviates from the long-term trend as a result of, among other things, fluctuations in
the level of industrial activity, appears to be twice as important as potential GNP in explaining transport demand.
18 Seland, Johan, Norsk skipsfart år for år 1946-1976, edited by Arnljot Strømme Svendsen, Fagbokforlaget,
Bergen, 1994, p. 235.
19 Part1yas a result of the fact that steelworks are unable to adapt immediately to the changed prices of energy
and transport, there was a growth in the transport of iron ore and coal in 1974.
20 This chart is based on figures from Table 2 in Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review 1980.
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from the reduction in industrial activity." The seaborne transport of iron ore fell every year
from 1975 to 1978, and in 1978 it was approximately 12 per cent lower than the 1974-level,
measured by ton-miles. Again, the reduction in volume was partly neutralised by the increased
average distance of shipments, as the volume reduction was approximately 15 per cent. The
demand for coal transport was unstable, but on average 20 per cent above the level of the pre-
crisis years. The main reason for the growth of coal shipments was the increased use of coal
for energy purposes as a result of the oil price increase.
Due to the increase in the price of oil, the industrialised countries tried to reduce their
need for energy or cover it by means of other sources than petroleum. Oil's share ofprimary
energy consumption in Western Europe, North America and Japan was reduced from 53,4 per
cent to 45,4 per cent in the period 1973-1982, whereas the share of nuclear power increased
from 1,2 per cent to 5,3 per cent over the same period. The share of coal increased from 18,3
per cent to 21,4 per cent. Energy saving measures were important as well, and the total
amount of energy consumed, which had increased heavily throughout the postwar period, was
in 1982 lower than it had been nine years earlier."
The development on both the demand and supply side is therefore important in
explaining the breakdown of the dry bulk market. Initially, the influence came from
combination carriers which had previously been employed in the tanker market. In time, the
inflow of new tonnage and the industrial recession contributed to the creation of a full-scale
crisis in the dry bulk market as well.
4.2. The Short-term Effects of the Crisis.
The analysis of the causes of the shipping crisis in the Chapter Three showed that the crisis
can not be explained in a mono-causal manner - it is impossible to explain the crisis in the
international shipping market solely by looking at the demand or supply side development.
In 1974 the international tanker fleet grew by 18 per cent. The average annual growth
of tanker transport demand had been 17,4 per cent in the period 1966-1973. Based on the
historical development of tanker transport demand, the tonnage growth in 1974 would
therefore seem to maintain the equilibrium in the market for tanker transport. However, one of
the reasons for the strong increase in tanker transport demand in the aforementioned period
was the increased average distance of oil shipments brought about by the closure of the Suez
Canal. Consequently, there was little reason to believe that the demand growth in the period
1966-1973 should indicate a long-term trend. During the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s
the imbalance in the shipping market increased considerably.
21 Some of the increased demand for grain transportation was satisfied by means of tankers. According to
calculations based on figures from Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review 1977, Table 6, p. 16 and Table
1, p. 14, approximately five per cent of the grain shipments were undertaken by tankers.
22 Figures from British Petroleum, BP Statistical Review of World Energy 1984, British Petroleum, London,
1984, pp. 27-28. The figures from 1982 include the effect of OPEC II, which prompted the introduction of
further energy-saving measures. In the period from 1973 to 1979 the total consumption of primary energy in
Western Europe, North America and Japan increased by approximately ten per cent.
Chapter Four- The Contagion and Short-term Effects of the Crisis 127
Stig Tenold: The Shipping Crisis of the i970s: Causes. Effects and implicationsfor Norwegian Shipping
The effects of the changed conditions in the tanker market were enormous. The
transformation initially became evident through the development of tanker freight rates.
Moreover, due to the large amount of contracting in the beginning of the 1970s, and the lag
between contracting and delivery, the fleet continued to grow despite the oversupply. The
disequilibrium between supply and demand had disastrous consequences, not only for the
value of vessels, but also for the capacity utilisation in the tanker and dry bulk markets.
4.2.1. The freight rate development
The strong fluctuations in the spot market freight rates indicate that the price-making process
in this market is extremely flexible, and the development of freight rates in the aftermath of
the oil price increase is a very good example ofthis flexibility. As early as one month after the
Arabian countries had announced their reduction of the oil supply, the rates on some of the
spot market voyages had fallen by an astonishing 88 per cent."
The spot tanker rates declined first and most severely. In time, the strong expansion of
the world tanker fleet and the reduced growth of oil shipments fundamentally changed the
conditions in the tanker market. The freight rates in the spot market remained at a low level
until the moderate resurgence in the summer of 1979. This temporary freight rate increase was
a result of the tonnage shortage which came about as a result of the high price of bunkers,
which facilitated slow steaming and other types of inefficiency in the tanker fleet." It mainly
affected tankers smaller than 100.000 dwt.
The short-lived increase in the freight rate level was followed by a recession which
was as serious as the one experienced in the 1970s. In the beginning of the 1980s, the tanker
market was in a worse state than ever before. The basis for the continuing depression in the
tanker market, which might be called "the second shipping crisis", will be elucidated in
Chapter Ten.
23 Svendsen, Arnljot Strømme, "Skipsfartskonjunkturene i 1970-årene" [Shipping cycles in the 1970s],
Sjøfartshistorisk Årbok 1978 [Norwegian Yearbook of Maritime History 1978], Bergen Maritime Museum,
Bergen, 1979, p. 228; calculations from the aforementioned example of rates at Worldscale (W) 475 and W 55.
The variations in Figure 4.4 are not as violent, as this chart is based on monthly registrations ofweekly averages.
The example cited in Strømme Svendsen's article is based on the extreme observations, and the difference will
therefore be larger than for weekly or monthly averages. Petersen, Kaare, Skipsfinansiering i medgang og
motgang - Redernes Skibskreditforening, 1929-1979 [Ship fmancing in good and bad times - Redernes
Skibskreditforening, 1929-1979], Redernes Skibskreditforening, Kristiansand, 1979. p. 190 claims that the spot
market rates fell from W 450 to W 100 from 24 to 26 October 1973.
24 Beenstock & Vergottis, op.cit., 1993, p. 62.
128 Chapter Four - The Contagion and Short-term Effects of the Crisis
Stig Tenold: The Shipping Crisis of the I970s: Causes, Effects and Implicationsfor Norwegian Shipping
Figure 4.4. Monthly freight rates in the spot market, Worldscale, 1970-7925
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Figure 4.4 shows the development of spot market freight rates in the 1970s. The rate level in
this period is not necessarily a good indication of the profit of the ships, and is therefore not
perfectly correlated with the economic performance of the shipowning companies. The main
cause for the changing relationship between freight rates and profitability was the massive
increase in the cost of bunkers, which implied that Worldscale 'Cmvarious occasions was
insufficiently adjusted to take into account the changed cost situation. Before the oil price
increase, W 100 constituted ten dollar per ton of cargo on trips from the Persian Gulf to
Europe. The increase in bunker prices was particularly important in 1974. W 100 constituted
14,5 dollar per ton of cargo on the aforementioned journey in 1975 - an increase of 45 per
cent." In the period after 1974, fuel costs have accounted for the larger part of the operating
costs of tankers and bulk carriers, so there is no doubt about the fact that changes in bunker
costs are important for the fluctuations in the profitability of ships."
An important aspect of the freight rate development was the increased differences
between rates for ships of various sizes. The freight rates for the largest vessels, VLCCs and
ULCCs, had fallen to particularly low levels. One of the reasons for the increased variation of
rates was differences in the supply and demand development between the various size classes
of ships. The supply side growth of the larger ships had been markedly stronger than for other
classes. In addition to this, the smaller vessels are far more flexible than the largest tankers
with regard to the variety of liquid goods which they can transport. As a rule, supertankers
were purpose-made for the transportation of crude oil across long distances, and were of
25 The source for this chart is figures from various international indices, quoted in Fearnley & Egers Chartering
Co. Ltd., Review, various issues.
26 Worldscale rate levels in different years will thus not be comparable because there exists a lag in the cost
situation in years where there are large changes in the cost of bunkers. It is also necessary to take into account
the exchange rate fluctuations, which were more violent in the 1970s than previously in the postwar period.
27 Beenstock, Michael and Vergottis, Andreas "An econometric model of the world market for dry cargo freight
and shipping", Applied Economics, No. 21, 1989b, p. 52.
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limited use outside this market."
The freight rate fall in the dry bulk market was neither as pronounced nor as rapid as it
had been in the tanker sector. Itwas not until the latter part of 1974 that the crisis really made
a serious impact on the dry bulk rates. Again, there were large differences between the various
classes of ships. In 1974 the rate level was satisfactory for vessels smaller than the Panamax-
class, whereas the rate development for ships larger than 70.000 dwt was more similar to the
development in the tanker sector. The low rate level spread to larger parts of the dry bulk
segment, and in 1975 only vessels of 30-40.000 dwt and less achieved satisfactory rates.
In the dry bulk market, the rates remained at a low level until the temporary freight rate
increase in 1979. The demand for bulk transport then grew faster than the fleet, leading to a
reduction of the surplus bulk carrier capacity. In addition to this, the market conditions were
influenced by port congestion, labour conflicts and the effects of slow steaming.
The demand side influence was favourable as well. As a result of the second major oil
price increase, precipitated by the Iranian Revolution and often called OPEC II, the agents in
the dry bulk market expected an increase in the seaborne trade of coal. Due to the expected
improvement in demand conditions, and the aforementioned positive supply side influences,
period rates were more than doubled during the year."
As a result of the low rate level, a large share of the shipping companies encountered
severe economic difficulties. In the spot market for tanker transport, the rate level in the
period 1974-1978 was so lowas to make it impossible to cover operating and capital costs. At
the same time, shipping companies increasingly had to base their business strategy on the spot
market development as the oil companies were less willing to commit themselves to long-term
charters. This reduced the shipowners' opportunities for risk spreading.
4.2.2 Changes in the value of vessels
Parallel to the close relationship between the freight rate level and contracting, there is a high
degree of correlation between the freight rate level and the price of ships." The freight market
breakdown in the autumn of 1973 initially resulted in a halt in the sale of used tankers, with
Review commenting that "...the buyers [in the second-hand tanker market} were equally cool
as they were hot at the same time last year. " During 1973 the second-hand value of tankers
increased strongly. The value of a 100.000 dwt vessel, built in 1967/68 was estimated at $
13,5 million at the start of the year, whereas the value in October was $ 30 million."
28 See Glen, David, "The emergence of differentiation in the oil tanker market, 1970-1978", Maritime Policy and
Management, Volume 17, No.4, 1990, pp. 289-312.
29 Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review 1979, Table 14, p. 23.
30 Most models depicting the international market for shipping services contain assessments of the relationship
between shipping and shipbuilding. One example of a survey where this relationship is the main focus of the
model is Charemza, W. and Gronicki, M., "An Econometric Model of World Shipping and Shipbuilding",
Maritime Policy and Management, No.8, 1981, pp. 21-30.
31 Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review 1973, Table 17, p. 16. The ship prices listed in Review are
meant to be representative of the value of a given type of vessels, and they are calculated on the basis of current
transactions in the second-hand market.
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Figure 4.5. Second-hand vessels, average values, million dollar, 1970-7932
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The effects of the strong increase in the value of tankers which had taken place in 1973 had
been neutralised a year later, and the activity in the market for second-hand tankers was
minimal in 1974, compared with the large amount of tonnage changing hands in 1973. The
considerable change in the development of vessel prices between the late 1960s/ early 1970s
and the period after the freight market breakdown is evident when Figure 4.5 is compared
with Figure 3.13. Parallel with the decline in values, there was a change in the relative price of
turbine and motor tankers, as turbine-driven vessels experienced a far greater reduction in
their value than motor tankers." A turbine-driven VLCC, which in 1972 had been valued as
more than twice as expensive as a 100.000 dwt motor tanker, was given the same value as the
far smaller ship a few years later.
According to Tolofari, there "is no doubt that the type of engine will play an important
role in deciding what rate a shipowner would accept and a charterer pay, in view of the
enormous fuel consumption differential between turbine and diesel tankers. ,,34 Shipowners
operating turbine tankers were adversely affected by the oil price increase. They lost
competitiveness as they were unable to compete with the more economical diesel ships in
what was essentially a transport buyer's market. Another reason for the relative decline in the
value of turbine tankers was that this technology had primarily been used on the largest
vessels, and these were the ones which were faced with the most adverse demand and supply
conditions. The importance of propulsion is further analysed in Chapter Six.
32 The prices are market value estimates at valid exchange rates for a charterfree vessels in good condition and
with fairly prompt delivery on a cash basis, taken from Table 18 and Table 19 in Fearnley & Egers Chartering
Co. Ltd., Review, various issues. The legends indicate the type of ship, ie bulk, motor tanker or turbine tanker,
followed by vessels size in 1000 dead weight tons and year of construction.
33 In Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review there is no comparison of the price development for motor-
and turbine tankers in the same size class, due to the fact that most of the turbine driven vessels were large
tankers.
34 Tolofari, S. R., "Open registry costs and freight rates", International Journal of Transport Economics, No, 1,
1987, p. 90.
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The depressed freight rates made their presence felt in the market for newbuildings as
well, and the price of new VLCCs and ULCCs fell by approximately 20 per cent during
1974.35 It is thus obvious that the violent fluctuations apparent in the second-hand market did
not occur to the same extent in the market for newbuildings. This is a result of the fact that
newbuilding prices are relatively rigid, whereas there is an extremely large degree of
flexibility in the second-hand market."
When the international market for shipping services is the victim of a large exogenous
shock, such as the one resulting from the oil price increase, second-hand prices adapt to the
new circumstances relatively fast, whereas it takes time before the price of newbuildings is
adjusted to the new conditions." Moreover, material and labour costs represent a floor through
which newbuilding costs, at least in theory, should not fall. However, the shipbuilding
industry does not necessarily conform to common economic principles such as this; due to the
increased subsidisation of the shipbuilding industry, new vessels were sold at prices which did
not reflect the actual cost ofbuilding them.
The fall in the value of ships did not appear at the same time in all markets. Again, the
response in the dry bulk market was slower and less violent than the tanker market experience.
In 1974 the price of some dry bulk carriers continued to increase, partlyas a result of the small
amount of modem tonnage available following the tanker contracting boom in the preceding
years. As the world's shipbuilding capacity is limited, the extremely large amount of tanker
tonnage built in the beginning of the 1970s resulted in a correspondingly low newbuilding
activity in the dry bulk sector. The strong growth in the costs of building ships, particularly
related to the rising material and labour costs, contributed to the increase in the price of
second-hand dry bulk tonnage in 1974. Contrary to the situation in the tanker market, the
expectations about future demand were not so bleak as to warrant a reduction in vessel values.
The reduction in the value of the world fleet did not have a uniform effect on the
shipping companies. A reduction of the value of a company's vessels implies a deterioration
of the equity of the company. Thus, the assets of the companies which had largely invested in
the biggest, turbine-driven tankers developed in a particularly negative manner. Moreover, as
the largest, turbine-driven vessels generally were both relatively new and relatively expensive,
only a small share of the loan principal had been repaid. As a result of the large loans usually
necessary to finance these vessels, the financial costs in connection with these investments
were particularly high. This situation was aggravated by the existence of "minimum value"-
clauses, an element which will be elaborated in more detail in connection with the analysis of
the situation of Norwegian shipowners.
35 Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review 1974, p. 38.
36 Beenstock, Michael, A Theory of Ship Prices, Working Paper No. 68, The City University Business School,
London,1984,p.9.
37 According to Beenstock & Vergottis, op.cit., 1993, p. 62, "Overnight, VLCCs valuesjell by $ 20 million." A
very interesting graphic representation of the influence of freight rates on second-hand values of tankers is given
in Tolofari, S. R., Button, K. J. and Pitfield, D. E., "The Cost Structure of the Tanker Sector", International
Journal ojTransport Economics, No. l, 1987, p. 76.
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4.2.3. Tonnage surplus increase and capacity utilisation
As a result of the surplus capacity in the international shipping market, a large share of the
world fleet had to be laid up, find alternative forms of employment or run at speeds far slower
than their pre-crisis pace. The large lay-ups were perhaps the most conspicuous feature of the
international shipping crisis, particularly in Norway, where a considerable amount of large
tankers was laid up in the fjords. Accordingly, the effects of the crisis became glaringly visible
for other than industry insiders. Several attempts were made to find employment, other than
transport, for the ships, and in some countries vessels were used for storage purposes." In
addition to this, the effective transport capacity was strongly reduced as a result of the fact that
it was no longer economical to operate the vessels at full speed.
Fearnley & Eger's Chartering Co. have estimated the tonnage overcapacity in the
international market for shipping services for the years between 1974 and 1978. They used
1973 as a base year, where there was an assumed equilibrium between tonnage supply and
transport demand." With this as a starting point, they estimated the tonnage surplus during the
crisis and calculated how the excess tonnage was utilised."
Table 4.3. The tonnage balance at the end of the year, million dwt, 1973-7941
World Fleet Tonnage Surplus Slow Steaming LaId up Waiting and Storage
1973 439,9 l l
1974 493,9 15 11,5 3,5
1975 543,7 105,7 40 48,7 17
1976 591,3 78,3 36 36,3 6
1977 624,6 99 52 41 6
1978 632,7 96,9 44 28,9 21
1979 637,9 52,8 30 9,8 13
The figures in Table 4.3 show that a considerable part of the tonnage surplus was absorbed
through other mechanisms than lay-ups. It is interesting to note that in most of the years
during the crisis, slow steaming, the effects of which are sometimes neglected in the
discussion of the crisis, was more important than lay-ups in reducing the tonnage surplus.
Slow steaming
Two related factors, the overcapacity and the effect of the oil price increase on fuel prices, can
account for the slow steaming of large tankers following the breakdown of the freight market.
38 One imaginative suggestion was the use of tankers as a source of electricity; see the article "Use of tankers as
auxiliary electricity suppliers can absorb excess tonnage" in Norwegian Shipping News, No. 19, 1978, pp. 8-10,
where it is claimed that the tonnage laid up in Norwegian fjords at the start of 1978 could cover 13 per cent of
the Norwegian demand for electricity.
39 Despite the fact that tonnage comprising l million dead weight tons was laid up or waiting for cargoes at the
end of the year, it is correct to regard 1973 as a year with reasonable balance between demand and supply.
40 The calculations in Table 4.3 and Figure 4.6 are estimates based on the assessments of the tonnage balance in
Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review, various issues. These assessments were not always internally
consistent, but the estimates can nevertheless indicate the manners through which the tonnage surplus was
expressed.
41 Figures from Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review, various issues. Fleet size refers to l January the
following year.
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On the one hand, shipowning companies chose to let their ships sail at speeds which were
lower than what had previously been usual as a result of the reduced availability of cargoes
and bunkers. This is usually called "capacity slow steaming", and is typically undertaken by
an independent owner who has little hope of securing new employment when the current
assignment terminates. Charterers, eg oil companies, will also opt for capacity slow steaming
when the bunkers cost savings of the in-house and chartered fleets are higher than the cost of
obtaining additional transport capacity in the spot market. Even though the low freight rate
level implied that the cost of buying additional transport capacity was low, the high price of
bunkers made a reduction of the speed of both company-owned and chartered tonnage
profitable.
On the other hand, as the price of bunkers increased, it became increasingly rational,
from an economic point ofview, to operate the vessels at reduced speed; this is usually called
"economical slow steaming". Economical slow steaming is undertaken when the fuel cost
savings are higher than the profits foregone with regard to additional transport assignments.
Due to the increased price of bunkers, the optimal operating speed of the vessels became 3-4
knots lower than what had previously been the optimal tempo. The reason for this is that the
use of bunkers increases disproportionally with an increase in speed. Optimal speed is
therefore negatively correlatedto the price ofbunkers. When freight rates decrease, it becomes
increasingly profitable to reduce the speed of the ship. During the shipping crisis, speeds of
less than ten knots were recorded - see the analysis in Chapter 3.2.3 for an introduction to the
changes in bunkers prices and speed in the initial period after the freight rate plunge.
Table 4.4. Fuel consumption of a 270~OOOdwt oil tanker"
As a result of the increase in the price of bunkers and the difficulties securing employment,
there was a permanent reduction in the utilisation coefficient of the vessels. The annual
transportation undertaken by each vessel was reduced. Aggregated, this implies that there was
a reduction in the effective tonnage, ie the amount of cargo which the world fleet was able to
transport decreased." The effective tonnage is reduced when ships sail at lower speeds, are
used for storage rather than transport purposes or when segregated ballast-tanks are used. 44
42 Figures taken from Du Jonchay, Yvan, The Handbook of World Transport, The MacMillan Press Ltd.,
London, 197&, p. Il.
43 However, this was more than offset by the increase in real tonnage in the first years after the freight market
breakdown.
44 Confer the analysis of the supply side in Chapter 2, and the definition of the terms real and effective tonnage in
Bennett, P. G., Huxham, C. S. and Dando, M. R., "Shipping in Crisis: a Trial Run for 'Live' Application of the
Hypergame Approach", Omega, No.6, 1981, vol. 9, p. 584.
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Figure 4.6. Estimated tonnage surplus as share of the total fleet, per cent, 1974-7945
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Following the severe imbalance between the supply of and demand for transport capacity, a
larger share of the international fleet encountered difficulties securing employment. During
the slump in the beginning of the 1970s, the dry bulk vessels were most affected by the
adverse conditions, and approximately four per cent of the dry bulk fleet had to be laid up. In
connection with the more serious crisis later in the decade, the tanker sector was far more
severely hit than the dry bulk sector. This was result of the enormous gap between the size of
the tanker fleet and the demand for oil transport.
Figure 4.7. Percentage of the world fleet laid up, quarterly figures, 1972-7946
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45 Based on figures from Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review, various issues. Corresponding figures of
the surplus of the tanker fleet would be considerably higher.
46 Figure 4.7 is based on dwt-figures from Table 3 and Table 7 in Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review,
various issues.
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Figure 4.7 shows the strong increase in the lay up-rate. The figure is based on estimates of the
world fleet and the tonnage laid up measured in dwt, and only takes into account tankers, bulk
carriers and combination carriers above 10.000 dwt. Consequently, the lay up-rate may differ
from surveys based on gross register tons or lay-ups as share of the total fleet, including liner
ships and passenger vessels.
The advantage of laying up ships is the subsequent reduction of operating costs.
However, financial costs are accrued despite the fact that the vessel is laid up, and there are
also costs which are specifically connected to the preparation of ships for lay-up. Expenses for
laying up a VLCC may amount to as much as $ 75.000 a month, in addition to a one-off cost
of preparation and site acquisition in the region of $ 700.000.47 Chapter Five includes a
comparison of internationallay up-rates.
The use of ships for storage purposes
An alternative to the laying up of ships was the use of vessels for storage purposes, sometimes
as part of a transport assignment. The low alternative value of the tonnage in a market affected
by overcapacity - in many cases the only option was to lay up the vessel - resulted in a
situation where it became economical to use the world fleet for other purposes than merely
transportation.
In some instances, the oil companies offered the shipowners to let their ships "wait"
outside the land-based terminals before delivering the cargo. This implied that the oil
companies utilised the tankers in a strategic manner, speculating in oil price changes and
supplementing the storage capacity of the refineries by means of tankers. In 1978, five million
dwt of tanker capacity was used for storage purposes outside the coast of Japan."
Another reason that tankers were positioned outside the coastline was the reloading of
oil from large tankers, drafting to deep to go into ports, to smaller tankers which were able to
distribute the oil to the terminals ashore. Following the growing use of large tankers, the level
of port constraints increased in the period 1973-79, indicating that a higher share of the tanker
tonnage was unable to use the most important ports or terminals ifthey were fully loaded."
It was particularly deliveries from the Middle East to The United States which were
organised in this manner, as there existed no port-facilities which could cater for the largest
vessels. In 1975 three Canadian, but no US ports, were capable of taking fully loaded or part
loaded VLCCs.50 The largest American ports, Richmond and Ferndale, could only
accommodate ships smaller than 150.000 dwt, in a period where most of the long-range
American oil imports were transported on VLCCs and ULCCs. Ships were also left idle when
they were waiting for employment. These vessels would not be considered laid up, and at
47 Cost data from the International Maritime Industry Forum, quoted in OECD, Maritime Transport 1975, Paris,
1976, paragraph 221.
48 Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review 1978, p. 38.
49 Glen, op.cit., 1990, pp. 297-298.
50 Drewry, The Trading Outlook/or Very Large Tankers, H.P. Drewry Shipping Consultants Ltd., London, 1975,
p.34.
136 Chapter Four- The Contagion and Short-term Effects of the Crisis
Stig Tenold: The Shipping Crisis of the 1970s: Causes, Effects and Implicationsfor Norwegian Shipping
times, as many as fifty tankers were waiting for cargoes outside the Kharg Island.
Sarcastically, this area was nicknamed Reksten Bay, due to the large amount of ships which
this Norwegian shipowner had waiting here.
Scrapping
Despite the large temporary imbalances in the shipping market, there are some mechanisms
which contribute towards an improvement of the tonnage balance. One important such
mechanism is scrapping. When the freight rate level and the second-hand prices fall, an
increase in the demolition of ineffective tonnage usually follows. From the second half of the
1970s, the adverse conditions in the shipping sector contributed to an increase in the number
of vessels leaving the world fleet. Even though the breaking prices were fairly stable
throughout the latter part of the decade, the fall in second-hand values made scrapping
relatively profitable.
Figure 4.8. Scrapping - vessel type and average tanker size, 1000 grt, 1972-8051
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Figure 4.8 shows the strong increase in the scrapping of tanker tonnage as the shipping crisis
unfolded. One important aspect was the increase in the average size of tankers scrapped,
which grew from approximately 7.500 grt in 1972 to 24.000 grt in 1980. In 1977 the largest
vessel broken up was 170.000 dwt, whereas in 1978 several VLCCs in good trading condition
were sold for breaking." However, the average size of tankers scrapped in Figure 4.8 is
51 The chart is based on figures for tonnage broken up from the table of "Tonnage broken up and lost" in OECD,
Maritime Transport, various issues. As previously mentioned, the tanker share of total scrapping would have
been more prominent, and general cargo less so, if dead weight tons had been used as the basis for comparison,
The figures correspond with similar data from Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co, Ltd., Review - 6,6 million grt of
tanker tonnage and 1,8 million grt of general cargo tonnage was broken up in 1978. This corresponds to 13,5
million dwt and 2,6 million dwt respectively.
52 Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review 1978, p. 42,
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relatively low due to the inclusion of gas and chemical tankers in the figures.
4.3. More Permanent Effects of the Crisis
The international shipping crisis led to drastic changes in the freight rate level, the value of
vessels and the capacity utilisation. When the imbalance between supply and demand was
temporarily reduced near the end of the 1970s, the freight market, the markets for second-hand
ships and newbuildings and the lay up-rates responded quickly. There was an almost
immediate increase in freight rates, ship values, contracting and capacity utilisation.
In the period from March to December 1979, the tanker lay up-rates were reduced by
approximately two thirds. The spot market index for VLCCs and ULCCs rose from
Worldscale 22 in February to a peak at W 71 five months later, and the value of the largest
class of tankers was almost doubled from 1978 to 1979.53 Moreover, the volume of tanker
tonnage contracted increased from three million dwt in 1978 to more than 14 million dwt the
following year.
Despite the shipping sector's apparently swift reaction to this temporary "end" of the
crisis, more permanent marks had been made on the international market for shipping
services. The structure of the shipping market had to some extent become transformed
following the crisis, and some of the agents in the international market for shipping services
changed their strategies radically in the period after the freight market breakdown.
It is difficult to say to which extent the shipping crisis exacerbated, curtailed or altered
development trends in the international market for shipping services in the 1970s and 1980s.
Some features, such as the process of internationalisation, had been going on for decades, but
the speed, if not the direction, of these development traits might have been changed. The
structural evolution in the period after the oil price increase will thus be analysed in relation to
the pre-crisis experience.
On the demand side, there is little doubt about the fact that it was the years preceding
the crisis which can be characterised as extraordinary, displaying demand growth which was
high in a historical perspective. On the supply side, the strategy of the agents during the
contracting boom resulted in an oversupply which to some extent haunted the shipping and
ship markets well into the 1990s.
The changes in the structure of the tanker market
As previously shown, there was a conspicuous lack of oil company contracting in the 1973
boom. However, when the value of the vessels had dwindled as a result of the freight market
breakdown, some oil companies took advantage of the situation, increasing the size of their
fleets considerably. The share of the international tanker fleet owned by the oil companies
53 Lay up-figures from Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review 1979, Table 7, p. 19; freight rate figures
from Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review 1979, Table 13, p. 22 and ship values based on the value
estimation of a 350.000 dwt turbine tanker, estimated at 16 million dollars in 1977,22 million in 1978 and 40
million dollars in 1979; see Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review 1981, Table 19, p. 25.
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consequently increased from 33 to 40 per cent in the period from 1972 to 1977. One feature of
this trend was that OPEC, and particularly the OAPEC-countries, used this situation to
establish their own tanker fleets, thereby reducing the market power of the international oil
companies."
In addition to increasing their fleets through the acquisition of low-price tanker
tonnage, the oil companies have influenced the structure in the tanker market through changes
in their use of charter agreements. Finding themselves in a market where tonnage shortages
were an unlikely event, the oil companies greatly reduced both the amount of charter contracts
which they entered into and the average length of these assignments,
The reduction in the use of charter contracts does not necessarily indicate a structural
change; the amount of contracts signed in the charter market usually varies in accordance with
the freight rate level. A high freight rate level may lead to fear of future tonnage shortages,
inducing charterers to entering into timecharters. However, after the oil price increase, the use
of charter agreements was reduced in an unprecedented manner. Moreover, the companies' .
reluctance to sign long-term charters appears to be the result of a long-term strategy, rather
than short-term adjustments. The fact that the amount of tonnage given long charter contracts
during the boom at the end of the 1970s was considerably lower than the levels previously
experienced in similar situations can be seen as an indication ofthis.
The process of internationalisation
As a result of the crisis, several of the agents in the international market for shipping services,
large as well as small, disappeared due to economic difficulties. The fleets of the Flag of
Convenience-countries increased faster than the fleets of Traditional Maritime Nations,
indicating a greater separation of ownership from country of registration. Moreover, some
newentrants acquired an important position in the world shipping industry. According to
Thanopoulou, the international shipping crisis in the 1970s created favourable conditions for
the rise of the lower cost fleets of developing countries." This development will be elaborated
in Chapter Ten.
The shipping crisis also instigated changes in other sectors, particularly the
shipbuilding industry. The authorities in several of the most important shipbuilding nations
increased their engagement in the shipbuilding industry as the demand for newbuildings fell.
In the shipping industry there was a corresponding increase in government involvement,
particularly in connection with the growing use of cargo reservation."
54 This decision has been the result of political, as well as economic, considerations, and can be seen as a gradual
liberation of larger shares of the oil production value chain from the hands of the Western oil companies. See
Chapter Ten for an introduction to the fleets of some of the oil-producing countries.
55 Thanopoulou, Helen, "The growth of fleets registered in the newly emerging maritime countries and maritime
crises", Maritime Policy and Management, Volume 2, No.1, 1995, pp. 51-62.
56 SeeNorwegian Shipping News, No. 21,1977, p. 14.
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Increased cooperation of tanker owners
One result of the shipping crisis was that several of the most important independent tanker
owners tried to cooperate in an attempt at reducing supply, thereby hoping to increase freight
rate levels. This was not a new situation for tanker owners, as there had been a similar
response to the freight market breakdown in the interwar period." Intertanko, The
International Association of Independent Tanker Owners, had been formed in Oslo in the
autumn of 1970. In 1972, the members of the organisation included shipowning companies
which controlled 90 million dwt of tanker tonnage, approximately two thirds of the world's
independent tanker fleet.58
Initially, the purpose of Intertanko was to function as a pressure group, aimed at
improving the conditions for independent tanker owners. This was to be achieved through an
improvement and standardisation of contracts and through lobbying in questions about
pollution and security." When the crisis struck the tanker market, the organisation was turned
into a forum where tanker owning companies could discuss a variety of responses to limit the
damages brought about by the crisis.
At a meeting in Tokyo in 1975, representatives from Intertanko suggested that
shipowners should increase scrapping and that tankers should be used for storage purposes to
curtail the negative effects of the crisis. Moreover, Intertanko was to function in a
coordinating manner, working towards tanker owners in an attempt at creating a lay up-
scheme. It was suggested that "whilst it has been Intertanko 's declared policy not to develop
lay up-schemes. it was nevertheless recognised that owners in certain categories might jointly
consider ad hoc solutions in this context and that Intertanko should assist in bringing these
members together .• -so
One year later, an Intertanko Working Committee suggested that overcapacity should
be reduced through cancellation of contracts, increased scrapping, the introduction of
segregated ballast tanks, slow steaming and the use of ships for storage purposes. The
Working Committee, where Intertanko's Norwegian Chairman Jørgen Jahre participated,
suggested that cooperation regarding lay-ups and minimum freight rates should be
introduced." In practice, however, no coordinated plans of the type introduced in the interwar
period came into effect.
57 Confer the presentation of international tanker cooperation and the Schierwater-plan in Thowsen, Atle, "Krise
og krisetiltak i norsk tankskipsfart 1929-1936" [Crisis and crisis measures in Norwegian tanker shipping 1929-
1936], Sjøfartshistorisk Årbok 1978 [Norwegian Maritime Yearbook 1978], Bergen Maritime Museum, Bergen,
1979, pp, 125-204,
58 Norwegian Shipping News, No. 17D, 1972, p. 48. The fleet controlled by the Intertanko members had been
increased to IlO million dead weight tons, accounting for almost 80 per cent of the independent fleet, in 1973;
see Norwegian Shipping News, No.3, 1973, p. 66.
59 For an introduction to the structure of Intertanko and the original purposes of the organisation, see Jonassen,
Karl-Otto, INTERTANKO og skipsfartskrisen [Intertanko and the shipping crisis], unpublished thesis, Agder
College, Kristiansand, 1976, pp. 8-15.
60 Norwegian Shipping News, No. Il, 1975, p. 28.
61 Norwegian Shipping News, No, l, 1976.
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4.4. Summary
Initially, the most important effect of the oil price increase was the drastic reduction of tanker
freight rates, particularly with regard to spot market fixtures. As the crisis escalated, other
market segments were affected by the dire market conditions, and there was an increase in the
difference between rates for ships of different types and size classes. Through the influx of
combination carriers and the conversion of newbuildings, the tanker crisis evolved into a more
general shipping crisis. The difficulties were aggravated by the recession in the industrialised
countries.
Following the strong freight rate reduction, vessel values plunged. Again there were
differences between the various types of vessels. As the agents adapted to the changed
fundamentals of the shipping market, the overcapacity of tonnage manifested itself through
slow steaming, high lay-ups and the utilisation ofvessels for storage purposes.
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CHAPTER FIVE
NORWEGIAN SHIPPING
The presentations of the international market for shipping services and the causes and effects
of the international shipping crisis constitute the basis of the analysis of Norwegian
shipowners in Chapter Five and Chapter Six. Initially, the importance of shipping in the
Norwegian economy is outlined. Then, the effects of the crisis on Norwegian shipping are
analysed. Central to this discussion is the question whether Norwegian shipowners were
harder hit by the shipping crisis than their foreign colleagues, and, if this proves to be the case,
how this can be explained.' The Norwegian shipowners' strategy is analysed in Chapter Six.
International shipping is by definition a very mobile industry. The primary means of
production are vessels which transgress national borders, and the owners do not have to
conform to the same restrictions on geographicallocalisation as agents in most other markets.'
The shipping sector has gradually become detached from national markets in connection with
the provision of capital and labour, and consequently acquired an increasing share of the
factors of production in the international market. Nevertheless, a large proportion of the
transport capacity is owned by agents in a handful of important shipping nations. Norwegian
shipowners have played an important role in the international market for shipping services
since the middle of the 19th century.
The importance of Norway as a major maritime nation is not only reflected in the size
of the Norwegian fleet. Support functions such as shipbroking, shipping insurance, shipping
research and classification are areas where Norwegian companies are among the world market
leaders. Moreover, there has been a relatively strong relationship between Norwegian
shipowners and the domestic shipbuilding and ship equipment industries. Despite the fact that
shipowners purchase their vessels in the international market, the Norwegian shipping
industry has functioned as a catalyst for and been an important purchaser from the Norwegian
shipbuilding industry. As a result of the considerable maritime environment in Norway, other
parts of the maritime business community were negatively influenced when the shipping crisis
hit the Norwegian shipowners.
I I will by and large use the term shipowners when referring to Norwegian shipowning companies. The main
reason for this is that most of the Norwegian shipowning companies were managed by an owner who took most
of the important decisions regarding the daily operation of the company, as well as the long-term strategic
decisions. This can be contrasted with foreign shipowning companies, where important decisions regarding
contracting and chartering to a larger extent were discussed and decided by the companies' board of directors.
However, in some instances, eg among shipowners of Greek origin, the organisation of the shipping companies
was very much like in Norway.
2 The implications of this feature of the shipping market are discussed in Tenold, Stig, "Norwegian Shipowning
Companies and Foreign Direct Investment", SNF Working Paper No. 23/00, The Foundation for Research in
Economics and Business Administration, Bergen, 2000.
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5.1. Shipping in the Norwegian Economy
In 1976 Norway, with approximately 0,1 per cent of the world' s population, was the world' s
fourth greatest maritime nation. At the same time, the Norwegian tonnage accounted for 7,5
per cent of the world fleet.' Keilhau has claimed that the large amount of Norwegian agents in
the international shipping market was the result of geographical circumstances. In a book
commissioned by Norges Rederforbund, he claimed that "[tjhe environment made the
Norwegians a seafaring people. " An even more retrospective explanation has been offered by
Du Jonchay, who claimed that "[tjhe unequal development of certain maritime nations can be
traced in history dating back to the Vikings of Norway and to the Greeks of the fifth century
BC. ,,4 In addition to the historical influence, the lack of more profitable investment
alternatives, favourable taxation of shipping investments and the consistently large supply of
labour with maritime training have been offered as explanations of the relatively large
Norwegian fleet.
The importance of Norwegian shipping in an international context was reflected in the
importance of shipping in the Norwegian economy. In 1974 the Norwegian shipping sector
accounted for nine per cent of Norwegian capital and four per cent of employment. These
figures are based on domestic/coastal as well as foreign-going shipping. The foreign-going
fleet is more capital-intensive than the coastal fleet and uses foreign seamen to a larger extent,
so the difference between capital and employment will be even more marked if only the
Norwegian merchant marine is considered.' The Norwegian fleet operating in international
waters accounted for 2,6 per cent of Norwegian employment.
The shipping sector has always been of considerable importance to the Norwegian
economy." However, during the last 200 years, Norwegian shipping has changed from being
mainly a means oftransporting Norwegian imports and exports, to becoming a service sector
in which most of the demand originates abroad. Due to the fact that Norwegian shipping
services have largely been traded in the international market, the development of this sector
has been of great importance to the Norwegian Balance of Trade and Balance of Payments. In
addition to the economic importance of Norwegian shipping, the sector has played an
3 Stortingsproposisjon nr. 46 (1978-79), Om støttetiltak for skipsfartsnæringen [On support measures for the
shipping industry], Table 5, p. 5. This was a considerable decrease from the peak year 1968, when as much as 12
per cent of the world fleet was owned by Norwegians; see Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review 1968,
p. Il.
4 Keilhau, Wilhelm, Skipsfartens betydning for Norge [The shipping sector's importance for Norway], Norges
Rederforbund, Oslo, 1948, p. 7 and Du Jonchay, Yvan, The Handbook of World Transport, Macmillan Press,
London,1978,p.56.
5 Stortingsmelding nr. 23 (1975-76), Om sjøfolkenes forhold og skipsfartens plass i samfonnet [On the conditions
ofseamen and the role of shipping in society], Table 1-3, p. 15.
6 In Hodne, Fritz, Norges økonomiske historie 1815-1970 [The economic history of Norway, 1815-1970],
Cappelen, 1981, p. 132, shipping in the period 1815-1914 is presented as "the third large export sector". The
two other important export sectors were the fish and timber trades. Shipping has played a crucial role in the
Norwegian economy in the postwar period as well. In Aukrust, Odd, Norges økonomi etter krigen [The
Norwegian economy after the war], Samfunnsøkonomiske Studier [Studies in Economics], Central Bureau of
Statistics, Oslo, 1965, p. 190 it is claimed that "[tjhere may be reason to emphasise the great extent to which the
[foreign trade} figures in the postwar period have been influenced by the development in the shipping sector. "
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important part in connection with the development of the Norwegian society, socially as well
as culturally.
In his analysis of the history of Norwegian shipping, Hanisch states that gross freight
earnings - the remuneration from the sale of transport services - accounted for somewhere
between 35 and 50 per cent of the total Norwegian exports in most of the years in the period
1870-1970.7 To put this another way; the Norwegian shipping sectors' foreign revenues
facilitated between 35 and 50 per cent of Norwegian imports in this period, and largely
neutralised the deficit with regards to merchandise trade. Naturally, a considerable part of the
income was spent by the shipowners themselves, for instance in connection with the purchase
of ships from foreign yards, or as costs accrued abroad.
Figure 5.1. Gross freight earnings by Norwegian vessels, million kroner, 1960-808
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Figure 5.1 shows the importance of the various markets in which Norwegian shipowners
operated. However, it may give a somewhat distorted picture of the development of the
revenues from Norwegian shipping. A more convenient approach when evaluating the long-
7 Bergh, Trond, Hanisch, Tore Jørgen, Lange, Even and Pharo, Helge, Norge fra U-land til I-land. Vekst og
utviklingslinjer 1830-1980 [Growth and development: the Norwegian experience 1830-1980], Gyldendal Norsk
Forlag, Oslo, 1983, p. 136. In most of these years, the share of gross freight earnings in total exports exceeded
40 per cent. As this figure denotes gross freight earnings, here as well as in official statistics, it is easy to ignore
the fact that a considerable share of these earnings were returned to foreign sources.
8 Figure '!S.1 is based on Table 20.18 in Statistisk Sentralbyrå, Historisk Statistikk 1994 [Historical Statistics
1994], Central Bureau of Statistics, Oslo, 1994. This is a survey of gross freight earnings by Norwegian vessels
in ocean transport, and these figures deviate from the gross freight earnings presented in Utenriksregnskap -
Driftsregnskap overfor utlandet [Balance of Payments - The current account], Table 22.8. The figures in Table
20.18 are based on replies from shipowners on gross freight earnings from ships of 500 gross register tons and
more, employed in international trade. The figures presented in the Driftsregnskap are estimated figures whose
purpose is to give an indication of the relative importance of the various parts of the Norwegian economy. These
are consistently higher than the figures in Table 20.18. The difference between the two sets of data increases in
time. The differences are a result of the fact that Table 22.8 takes into account revenues from Norwegian-
managed and -owned ships registered in foreign registries. In the rest of the thesis, I will use the figures which,
in each separate case, emphasise the points made and situations described.
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term trend is to depict the gross freight earnings in real terms. The importance of the different
market segments remains similar to in Figure 5.1, but the apparent growth in Figure 5.1 is
neutralised when inflation is taken into account. Moreover, the data on which Figure 5.2 is
based illustrate the dramatic reduction of the income from timecharters parallel with the
shipping crisis and the changes in the structure of the shipping industry.
Figure 5.2. Gross freight earnings, million 1980-kroner, 1960-809
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Strømme Svendsen has estimated the "trade balance" of the shipping sector, that IS, the
relationship of shipping exports to imports, and shows how the contribution of the shipping
sector to the Norwegian economy has become considerably reduced after 1974.10 This
development is also evident in estimates of the shipping sector's contribution to Gross
Domestic Product, which was reduced from 8,6 per cent in 1973 to 3,8 per cent in 1977.11 The
shipping sector's contribution to the Net Domestic Product was even smaller as a result of the
relatively large depreciation of the capital equipment utilised in the shipping sector." The
sector's contribution to the Net Domestic Product dwindled from 5,9 per cent in 1973 to 1,1
per cent four years later.
The increasing export surplus after 1977 was to a large degree a result of stable income
from the sales of second-hand vessels coupled with a reduction of ship imports. In 1978 the
export of second-hand vessels was higher than Norwegian ship purchases abroad. This implies
that the trade in vessels contributed positively to the Norwegian shipping sector's surplus, and
that a smaller share ofthis surplus was due to shipping services. However, this trend varied in
9 The source of the figures is the same as Figure 5.1, but the gross freight earnings have been deflated by the
Norwegian consumer price index, with 1980 as the base year.
10 Svendsen, Arnljot Strømme, "Skipsfartskonjunkturene i 1970-årene" [Shipping cycles in the 1970s],
Sjøfartshistorisk Årbok 1978 [Norwegian Yearbook of Maritime History 1978], Bergen Maritime Museum,
Bergen, 1979, p. 240. Similar calculations are presented in Kloster, Knut Ulstein, "Eventyret om norsk skipsfart"
[The tale of Norwegian shipping], Kapital, No.5, 1974, pp. 28-29.
Il Statistisk Sentralbyrå, op.cit., 1994, Table 22.12, pp. 549-550.
12 The sector had less than ten per cent of the Norwegian capital, but accounted for 25 per cent of the
consumption of fixed capital.
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the late 1970s.
Table 5.1. The shipping sector's export surplus, million kroner, 1970-8113
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Gross receipts 12.490 13.990 14.175 16.705 19.220 16.720
Expenditure abroad 4.700 5.695 5.540 6.450 7.935 7.970
Ship imports 2.978 3.771 3.478 5.884 4.959 6.586
Sales of ships (second-hand) 1.369 802 2.242 3.798 4.072 2.946
Surplus 6.181 5.326 7.399 8.169 10.398 5.110
Surplus (1980-kroner) 13.833 11.223 14.451 14.934 17.393 7.634
1976 1977 197R 1979 19i10 19RI
Gross receipts 17.325 17.470 18.205 22.255 26.980 30.934
Expenditure abroad 8.895 9.495 9.960 12.769 16.265 18.894
Ship imports 8.103 7.639 3.352 3.443 1.434 4.541
Sales of ships (second-hand) 2.579 3.440 3.536 3.417 2.425 3.406
Surplus 2.906 3.776 8.429 9.460 11.705 10.905
Surplus (1980-kroner) 3.979 4.740 9.803 10.494 Il.705 9.590
The shipping sector has undoubtedly been of great importance to the development of the
Norwegian economy. Until the late 1970s it was generally the most important sector in
connection with foreign exchange earnings and the Balance of Trade. 14 In the postwar period,
the shipping sector has been competitive compared with other Norwegian sectors regarding
the allocation oflabour and capital. As a result ofthis, the return on the capital invested in this
sector has been higher than it would have been if the capital had been invested in other
Norwegian sectors." In addition to this, the income of Norwegian employees in the shipping
sector has also been at a higher level than in the sectors where this labour could alternatively
have been employed.
When the importance of the shipping sector in the Norwegian economy is discussed,
the importance to the Norwegian Balance of Trade and foreign exchange earnings has
traditionally emphasised. The shipping sector lost its position as the most important export
sector to the oil industry in the late 1970s.16The size of the shipping sector, and its influence
on the Norwegian economy, was an important factor in the development ofNorway's external
economic relations.
The liner sector has accounted for the most stable share of the Norwegian shipping
revenue. Despite the fact that the share of the Norwegian fleet engaged in the liner trade
dwindled in the 1970s, this market segment's share of gross freight earnings accounted for
13 Figures taken from Statistisk Sentralbyrå, op.cit., 1994, Tables 22.8, 18.2 and 18.3. Financial costs are not
included.
14 Hodne, Fritz and Grytten, Ola Honningdal, Norsk økonomi 1900-1990 [The Norwegian economy 1900-1990],
Tano, Oslo, 1992, p. 143.
15 For a discussion of the return on capital invested inNorwegian sea transport, see Eriksen, lb Erik and Norman,
Victor D., "Skipsfarten i norsk samfunnsøkonomi" [Shipping in the Norwegian economy], Statsøkonomisk
Tidsskrift, No.3, H. Aschehoug & Co., Oslo, 1973, pp. 133-137.
16 Confer Statistisk Sentralbyrå, op.cit., 1994, Table 22.8, pp. 544-545 and the analysis in Chapter Ten.
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more than 20 per cent of the aggregate Norwegian earnings every year this decade.'?
Itmay seem surprising that the liner vessels' share of gross freight earnings has been
systematically higher than 20 per cent in a period where the sector's share of the Norwegian
tonnage has been as lowas five per cent. This does not necessarily indicate that the liner trade
was the most profitable segment of Norwegian shipping in the period 1960-1980. The
relatively large share of gross freight earnings accounted for by the liner companies is a partly
offset by the fact that these ships operate in the high-cost segment of the international
shipping market. Consequently, the relative importance of the liner sector is reduced if costs
are embodied in an analysis of freight earnings. This will be the most fruitful approach in a
discussion of profitability.
Figure 5.3. The different markets' share of gross freight earnings, 1960-80!8
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A closer look at the development of gross freight earnings also reveals the reduced importance
of the charter market in the period after the oil price increase. The difficulties which
shipowners encountered when attempting to secure long-term charters for vessels led to a 50
per cent reduction of gross charter market earnings between 1974 and 1979. In addition to
this, there was a further deterioration of profits as a result of the unfavourable development of
bunkers and crew costs. According to figures from the current account, Norwegian shipping's
expenditures abroad were almost doubled between 1973 and 1979, whereas the increase in
gross freight earnings in this period was approximately 33 per cent."
The freight earnings from the bulk sector have fluctuated much more than those of the
liner trade, partlya result of the fact that the bulk segment is characterised by a large degree of
competition. The rates in the liner trades, on the other hand, have been maintained at an
artificially high level as a result of conference cooperation. The large fluctuations in the bulk
17 Ibid., Table 20.18, p. 489.
18 The chart is based on figures from Statistisk Sentralbyrå, op.cit., 1994, Table 20.18, p. 489.
19 Ibid., Table 22.8, p. 545. In an analysis of the reduced importance of the charter market, it is important to take
into account the fact that the effects of an abrupt stop in chartering activity only will manifest themselves
gradually, as it takes some time before previously signed charters expire.
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sector revenue are by no means surprising, considering the violent changes in freight rates in
this part of the shipping market
In the 1970s, the fluctuations in gross freight earnings from the tanker sector were
particularly large, as the shipping crisis manifested itself through lower freight rates and
reduced employment. In spite of the fact that the Norwegian tanker fleet, measured in dead
weight tons, increased by 46 per cent from 1973 to 1977, the gross freight earnings from this
part of the Norwegian merchant marine were reduced by 25 per cent. In aggregate, however,
the tanker sector was responsible for the largest share of Norwegian gross freight earnings in
the period 1960-1980.
Figure 5.4. Gross freight earnings by vessel type, million kroner, 1960-8020
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Gross freight earnings denote income, and can therefore not be used to depict profits, unless
costs are also taken into account. Fon has estimated the economic return from the Norwegian
shipowners' activity in the tanker and dry bulk markets in the years from 1960 to 1990. The
estimates are based on an assumption that operating costs per unit of tonnage are identical for
the tanker and dry bulk segments." In addition to this, the figures have been adjusted to take
into account economies of scale and the declining costs ofbuilding ships.
20 The chart is based on figures from Statistisk Sentralbyrå, op.cit., 1994, Table 22.8, p. 545.
21 The estimates are based on the notion that ".....it is not unreasonable to assume [that} the operating costs per
unit of tonnage for tankers and bulk carriers are largely similar for vessels employed in international waters. "
For a discussion of the problems related to the use of sources and scientific methods in connection with these
estimates, see Fon, Anders Martin, Norsk engasjement i internasjonal tørrbullifart 1960-1990 [Norwegian
involvement in international dry bulk shipping, 1960-1990], Working paper No. 106/93, The Foundation for
Research in Economics and Business Administration, Bergen, 1993, pp. 43-69. For other estimates of the
economic results of shipping, see for instance Gjermoe, Eilif, Lønnsomheten i skipsfarten [The profitability of
shipping], Institute for Shipping Research, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration,
Bergen, 1968.
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Figure 5.5. Corrected gross freight earnings per dwt, real terms, 1965-8022
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The estimates show that the revenues from the tanker and dry bulk sectors by and large have
followed the same pattern in the latter part of this period. The differences in the period before
1972 may be a result of the fact that it was possible for tanker owners to utilise the economies
ofscale at an earlier stage. This can be illustrated by the fact that more than 20 million dead
weight tons' worth of tanker vessels larger than 80.000 dead weight tons were on order in
December 1966. This accounted for 80 per cent of all tankers on the world order books. At the
same time, 24 bulk carriers of more than 80.000 dead weight tons were on order, constituting
little more than 2 million dead weight tons, or less than ten per cent of the dry bulk tonnage on
order." Another factor which may explain the large revenue from tanker operations in the
1960s, compared with the dry bulk sector, is that the estimates of the Norwegian tanker fleet
are too conservative, implying that the gross freight earnings should have been divided on a
larger amount oftonnage, thus reducing earnings per dead weight ton."
5.2. Were Norwegian Shipowners Particularly Hard Hit?
The question above is central to the analysis of the international shipping crisis and
Norwegian shipping. This question may be approached in several ways, but due to differences
in international statistics, domestic regulations and institutions and the structural arrangement
of the shipping industry, none of the approaches can be considered entirely satisfactory.
One approach to judging whether Norwegian shipowners were particularly hard hit by
the shipping crisis would be to compare the revenues earned and profits generated by
Norwegian shipowning companies with those of foreign companies. Such an analysis would
enable us to judge how the economic performance of Norwegian shipping companies rates in
an international perspective. It is, however, an extremely difficult task. Precise and
22 Based on Fon, Anders Martin, op.cit. 1993, pp. 68-69. The figures are presented in 1990-kroner.
23 Contracting figures are taken from Table 2 in Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review 1966, p. 7.
24 The figures denoting the fleet size originate with Fearnley's, and, according to Fon, there is reason to believe
that their estimates of the tanker fleet were too low in the beginning of the 1960s. If this is the case, the actual
revenues per dead weight ton from the tanker sector in this period are exaggerated.
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informative accounting details are difficult to come by and will seldom be comparable across
national borders. The same applies to figures for bankruptcies and liquidations, as the
institutional approach to companies in distress and the structure of the shipping industry varies
from nation to nation." An analysis of the entry and exit of shipowning firms is complicated
by structural differences between countries. In some countries it has been common to establish
a company for every ship owned, in other countries all tonnage is registered as owned by a
single company, and in several instances shipping companies are divisions or subsidiaries of
companies primarily operating in other sectors. An analysis of shipping revenues and
structural development traits would consequently be fraught with uncertainties, and the results
would largely be determined by the definitions and methods used.
The extent of the shipping industry difficulties may also be analysed at the aggregate
national level, eg by a comparison of the fleet development in the period after the crisis
erupted. Neither this approach will be perfect. First, it will be difficult to distinguish the
elements caused by the crisis from long-term development traits which would have occurred
even without the freight market breakdown. Second, developments outside the shipping sector
will influence the increase or decline of the national fleets and will vary from country to
country. One such factor would be the appearance of more profitable investment alternatives,
making a reduction of the fleet a rational alternative, rather than a crisis-induced measure."
Changes in public policies may be another reason for development differences in the fleets of
various countries.
Due to the absence of a suitable basis for international comparison it is difficult to find
a sufficiently good principle on which to evaluate the fate of Norwegian shipowners in an
international perspective. I have chosen two elements which can indicate the hardship of
Norwegian shipowners. The first is the development of lay up-rates. By comparing lay up-
rates, we may identify the extent to which the tonnage of shipowners in various countries was
left idle and unable to earn revenues. The second element is the development of domestically-
registered tonnage. Even though such an analysis is affected by the factors described in the
previous paragraph, it is nevertheless a relatively good indicator of the changing international
distribution oftonnage in the shipping industry.
5.2.1. A comparison of lay up-figures
The Norwegian lay-ups during the shipping crisis were higher than for any other major fleet.
This dubious record may be used as an indication of the differences in economic performance
between Norwegian shipowners and their foreign rivals. Shipowners in all countries were
faced with falling revenues as a result of the decreasing freight rates. Vessels which were laid
up, however, were unable to earn revenues at all, unless they were laid up on the charterer's
account. The result of the high lay up-rates was that Norwegian shipowners, to a larger extent
25 Due to the agreements utilised in the shipping industry, such as eg timecharters, a bankruptcy will be a
relaii ely unfavourable alternative for the main creditors, and they have incentives to fmd other solutions.
26 See the discussion in Chapter Ten.
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than foreign shipowning companies, were affected by the loss of revenue caused by the lack of
employment for their vessels.
Figure 5.6 Lay up-rate, as share of dead weight tonnage, per cent, 1974-7927
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Figure 5.6 is based on the estimates from the General Council of British Shipping, the
Norwegian Newspaper Norges Handels og Sjøfartstidende and Fearnley & Egers Chartering
Co. Ltd.28 The exact share of tonnage laid up is difficult to estimate, particularly in periods
where the changes are large. In August 1975, the General Council of British Shipping had
registered 29,6 million dwt of tanker and combination carrier tonnage laid up, whereas the
British shipbroker John I. Jacobs estimated that the figure was approximately 44 million
dwt." Moreover, the lay up-rate increases if figures are converted from grt to dwt, as a result
of the fact that the majority of the tonnage laid up was larger vessels. In this respect, a
conversion of the figures from dwt or grt to compensated gross register tons (cgrt), a measure
which take into account the sophistication of the tonnage, would reduce both the share of the
fleet laid up and the difference between Norwegian and internationallay up-rates." Although
the various figures deviate, the differences are generally fairly small, and there is no reason to
doubt the conclusion that the Norwegian lay up-rate from 1975 onwards was considerably
higher than the internationallay up-rate.
27 This chart refers to the beginning of each quarter and is based on figures from various sources - see the text.
28 These sources generally correspond fairly well. In the quarters where the figures deviate, an estimate based on
all three sources has been constructed.
29 Norges Rederforbund, Momenter til belysning av norsk og internasjonal skipsfart [Aspects illuminating
Norwegian and international shipping], Oslo, November 1975, p. 18.
30 The effect of a conversion to cgrt for the composition of the Norwegian fleet is presented in Chapter Nine.
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In late 1974 the TT Sir Charles Hambro and the TT Julian were the first mammoth
tankers officially declared laid Up.3!As the crisis evolved, this affliction affected a substantial
share of the Norwegian shipowning companies. Figure 5.6 illustrates the significant
differences between Norwegian and internationallay up-rates. The contrast is so large that the
effects on the economic performance of shipping companies in Norway must have been far
more severe than for foreign shipping companies. By the summer of 1975, a quarter of the
laid-up tankers and combination carriers was flying the Norwegian flag. Figures from the
British company E.A. Gibson Shipbrokers Ltd. indicate that whereas the lay up-rate of the
international tanker and combination carrier fleet was ten per cent, the corresponding
Norwegian figure was 25 per cent."
Table 5.2 shows that by December 1975, 46 Norwegian shipowners owned tankers
which had been laid up. The laid-up tanker tonnage amounted to more than ten million dwt,
representing more than 40 per cent of the tanker fleet. Of the 82 laid-up oil tankers, only eight
vessels, amounting to 1,3 million dwt, were laid up on the charterer's account. Moreover, only
four of the companies with vessels laid up on the charterer's account had not been forced to
lay up vessels on their own account as well.
The average size of the Norwegian tankers which had been laid up was approximately
130.000 dwt, reflecting the fact that 24 of the vessels were tankers of more than 200.000 dwt.
The tankers were a combination of older vessels, such as the relatively small 16 year old
tanker Bente Brøvig and modem mammoth tankers, such as the 311.400 dwt Belfri, delivered
from Germany in March 1975 and instantly laid up in Norway.
Of the 73 companies with oil tanker tonnage in 1976, more than 60 per cent had been
forced to lay up some or all of their vessels. This illustrates the breadth with which the
shipping crisis affected the Norwegian shipping industry. The shipowners affected were a
combination of small shipowners such as T.S. Bendixen AS, with all their tonnage laid up,
large shipowners such as Hilmar Reksten, with large parts of their fleet laid up, and large
shipowners such as Sig. Bergesen d.y. and Wilh. Wilhemsen, with small shares of their total
fleets laid up. Most of the companies affected were traditional shipping companies which had
played an important role in the postwar expansion of Norwegian shipping, rather than newly
established companies.
31 Drewry, The Trading Outlookfor Very Large Tankers, H.P. Drewry Shipping Consultants Ltd., 1975, p. 53.
32 Figures from Gibson quoted in Norges Handels og Sjøfartstidende, 1 July 1975. The figures refer to vessels
which have been laid up on the owner's account.
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Table 5.2. Norwegian tankers laid up, December 197533
Vessel Shipowner OWl Date Vessel Shipowner Dwt Date
MT Acina* CH Sørensen 130 05 TT Kong Haakon H Reksten 219 10
TT Aurelian H Reksten 219 02 MT Kristina Grieg & Co 62 02
MT Balla B, Brøvig 21 03 MT LinaC.* Fekete & Co 20 06
TT Beaumaris Biømstad 219 06 MT Long Phoenix Lange 51 02
TT Beaurivage Biømstad 285 05 MT Molda Mowinckel 144 10
MTBeauval Biømstad 88 07 TT Mosqueen Mosvold 71 07
TT Belfri Belships 311 03 TT Octavian H Reksten 220 Ol
MT Bente B. Brøvig 19 02 MT Orator OB Sørensen 135 04
MT Berge Pr. * Bergesen d.y. 280 04 MT Osco Spirit Schrøder 33 03
MT Bergevik Bergesen d.y. 100 03 MTPepita FoynBruun 20 02
MT Bjørkaas Mørland 18 02 MT Perikum Foyn Bruun 36 08
MT Britta Mathiesen 138 Ol MTPetunia FoynBruun 26 06
MTCemo JP Jensen 103 06 MT Polartank* Melsom 135 04
MT Cis Brøvig Brøvig 106 06 TT Radny Waage 286 Il
MTCondo Wangen 77 10 TT Raila Waage 219 02
TTCorona Wrangell 232 Il TT Ranja Waage 219 02
MT Credo Wangen 101 05 MT Ronaville Saanum 36 05
MT Curro JP Jensen 134 03 TT SUgeistad SUgeistad 34 03
TT Daghild JP Pedersen 256 03 MT Sea Breeze Bendixen 136 07
TT Elisabeth K. Knutsen 216 Ol TT Sir Charles H. H Reksten 286 12
TT Fabian H Reksten 286 Ol TT Sir Winston C. H Reksten 95 12
MT Fagerfjell* Olsen & U. 126 12 MTSkaugum Skaugen 77 05
TT Femcourt* F&E 245 08 TT Solfonn Sig. Bergesen 132 10
MT Femmanor F&E 78 03 MT Solviken WallemJ Ste. 21 03
TT Femmount* F&E 216 04 MT Sunares Hansen-Tangen 20 05
MTGC Brøvig Brøvig 17 03 MTSydhav Lodding 139 04
MT Gimle Evensen 59 03 TT Synia Waage 226 09
MT Granheim Bjørge 21 03 MT Tamarita 1M Ugland 75 05
MT GunvorB. Brøvig 19 03 MT Tank Rex Herlofson 52 03
MT Gylfe Evensen 20 Ol MT Templar W Wilhelmsen 83 12
MTHMWrang. Wrangell 87 11 MT Thorshov Thor Dahl 103 08
TT Hadrian H Reksten 220 10 MT Thorshøvdi Thor Dahl 103 05
TT Harry B. H Borthen 225 05 TT Torill Knudsen Knutsen 285 06
MT Havbør P Meyer 44 04 TT Troma Mowinckel 86 02
TT Hitra Mowinckel 38 08 TTVeni Smedvig 227 05
TT Jagranda Jahre 90 06 TT Vespasian H Reksten 285 02
TT Jorek Trader J Reksten 99 04 MTVinga Mowinckel 138 08
TT Julian H Reksten 286 Ol MTWangii Wangen 126 06
MT 11Lorentzen Stove Shipping 132 03 MTWangskog Wangen 126 10
MT Kollbris* Bjørge 136 09 MTWangstar Wangen 97 07
MT Kollskegg Bjørge 136 03 MT Wilstar A Wilhelmsen 133 03
In addition to the vessels above, three gas tankers, 13 combination carriers, four bulk carriers
and one passenger vessel had been mothballed by December 1975. The amount of tonnage
laid up continued to increase after this point. When the Norwegian lay-ups reached their peak
in the spring of 1976, 116 vessels, amounting to more than 14 million dwt and representing
almost a third of Norwegian tonnage, had been laid up due to lack of employment.
An international comparison of lay up-rates justifies the assertion that Norwegian
33 Based on figures from Norges Handels og Sjøfartstidende, 3 December 1975. Dwt refers to tonnage in 1000
dead weight tons according to list, whereas Date refers to the month in 1975 when the vessel was laid up, except
for figures in italics, which refer to 1974. An asterisk indicates a vessel laid up on the charterer's account.
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shipowners were harder hit by the shipping crisis than the shipowners of the other major
shipping nations more or less throughout the crisis." As share of the fleet, measured in dead
weight tons, the Swedish lay-ups were at times even higher than the Norwegian. However,
tonnage-wise, this amounted to only a third of the size of the Norwegian lay-ups, as the
Norwegian fleet was much larger than the Swedish fleet. Liberia was the only nation with lay-
ups, measured in dead weight tons, which were as large as Norway's, but the Liberian fleet
was bigger, so the actual Liberian lay up-rate was smaller than its Norwegian counterpart.
Table 5.3. Fleet size and lay up-rates, based on grt, 1974-7935
Fleet Fleet Lay- Lay- Lay- Lay- Lay- Lay- A\ erage
Country 1974 197R up up up up up up lay- up
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Denmark 4.505 5.530 0,0 0,8 11,2 8,1 10,0 3,0 5,5
France 8.835 12.197 0,0 0,9 1,9 0,8 2,1 1,2 1,2
Germany 7.980 9.737 0,0 0,0 4,1 4,6 6,8 3,0 3,1
Greece 21.759 33.956 1,0 1,2 5,9 7,4 9,3 2,6 4,6
Italy 9.322 11.492 0,7 0,6 9,6 7,2 4,6 1,8 4,1
Japan 38.708 39.182 0,0 0,0 0,9 0,1 1,5 7,0 1,6
Netherlands 5.501 5.180 0,0 0,4 8,1 9,0 0,0 0,0 2,9
Norway 24.853 26.128 0,0 1,0 24,3 17,1 21,4 6,1 11,7
Spain 4.949 8.056 0,4 0,4 0,3 0,1 0,7 0,6 0,4
Sweden 6.227 6.508 0,0 1,6 27,3 8,3 25,3 6,3 11,5
United Kingdom 31.566 30.897 0,0 0,1 8,4 4,8 4,9 3,2 3,6
Liberia 55.322 80.191 0,3 0,5 10,6 7,3 7,6 2,3 4,7
Panama 11.003 20.749 0,7 0,0 3,8 1,4 1,9 0,8 1,4
Lay up-figures indicate the large problems encountered by Norwegian shipowners when
attempting to secure profitable transport assignments. Table 5.3 shows that, with the exception
of the Swedish figures, the average share of the fleet laid up by Norwegian shipowners was
more than twice the lay up-share of the other important maritime nations. The reasons for the
relatively high Norwegian lay up-figures will be analysed in detail later. However, it is
important to note that domestic conditions affected the lay up-figures of some countries. The
principal example is Japan, where the laying up of vessels was impeded by local manning
regulations. The Japanese seafarer employment guarantees made lay-ups less beneficial
compared with continued operation, as there would be small cost savings on personnel." A
comparison of the lay up-rates of the Norwegian fleet and the fleets of other nations shows
34 In 1976, the most severely hit countries were the oil-producing nations. Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Libya had been
forced to lay up 26, 39 and 74 per cent respectively of their tanker fleets. However, their fleets were rather small
- in mid-1976 their combined tankers fleets amounted te>less than ten per cent of the Norwegian fleet; see
OECD, Maritime Transport 1975, p. 77 and OECD, Maritime Transport 1976, Table XIV, p. 123.
35 The figures in the table are based on calculations from OECD, Maritime Transport, various issues. All
countries which in 1975 had fleets of more than five million gross registered tons are included, except for the
United States, due to the problems of calculation with regard to the reserve fleet, and India, Singapore and the
USSR, for which lay up-data are not available. The fleet size at the beginning of each year is measured as the
average of the fleets in the middle of the reported year and the middle of the previous year, and given in 1000
gross registered tons. The deviation of the Norwegian lay up-figures between this table and Figure 5.6 is due to
the fact that the chart is based on dwt and the table on grt.
36 OECD, Maritime Transport 1975, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris, 1976, p.
101.
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that Norwegian shipowners were particularly affected by one aspect of the shipping crisis, viz
high lay up-rates.
5.2.2. The development of national fleets
An analysis of the development of the national fleets is another manner through which the
effects of the shipping crisis in various countries can be evaluated. We may expect a reduction
of the fleets which were severely hit by the crisis, as unprofitable tonnage was sold abroad and
the vessels of companies in economic distress were taken over by foreign creditors. Moreover,
we may expect that shipowners which were less severely affected by the difficulties
consolidated their position or increased their engagement. This would be reflected in a stable
or growing share of world tonnage.
If 1980 is used as the basis for comparison, the absolute and relative reduction of the
Norwegian fleet becomes apparent. However, an analysis ending in 1980 only illustrates the
short-term effects of the crisis on the development of domestic fleets. To fully be able to
analyse the long-term shift in the importance of national fleets we have to extend the scope of
the analysis, taking into account the development into the 1980s as well. It is important to
keep in mind that several factors, in addition to the effects of the crisis, can account for the
expansion or contraction of the fleets of the most important maritime nations
Figure 5.7. Development of the most important fleets, per cent of world fleet, 1970-8737
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Figure 5.7 shows the development of the fleets of the five most important maritime nations in
1970, excluding the United States. It illustrates both the differences in the development of the
various countries and the influence of specific circumstances. The strong reduction of the
Norwegian and British fleets reflects the problems of the countries' shipping companies,
37 The figure depicts the various countries' share of the world fleet It is based on dwt-figures from the tables of
the world fleet and the fleets of the OECD countries in OECD, Maritime Transport, the issues from 1970-1987.
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which resulted in large sales of tonnage and reduced attractiveness of the domestic flag. The
growth of the Greek fleet up until the beginning of the 1980s is partly a reflection of the
transfer of Greek-owned vessels from foreign registries. From 1974 to 1981 the development
of the Greek-owned fleet under Greek and other flags went in opposite directions." Similarly,
the reduced importance of the Liberian fleet, particularly from 1984 onwards, was a result of
political uncertainty, and was more than made up for by the increase of other Flags of
Convenience.
The development of the Norwegian and British fleets stands out when compared with
the other main maritime nations. In 1970, the United Kingdom and Norway had the world's
third and fourth largest fleets respectively. The Greeks caught up with the Norwegians in
1976, and passed the British in the following year. By 1981Norway and the United Kingdom
had been relegated to the fifth and sixth place due to the growth of the Panama fleet. In 1987
the United Kingdom ranked as the 14th largest maritime power, with Norway eighteenth. The
British had been overtaken by the fleets of the United States and the USSR, emerging Asian
nations such as China, The Philippines, Hong Kong and Singapore, the Flags of Convenience-
countries Cyprus and Bahamas, and even Italy. Norway had been forced to bow to South
Korea, Brazil and India as well. The changes in the hegemony of international shipping will
be analysed in more detail in Chapter Ten.
Measured in tonnage, the flight from the Norwegian and British flags was higher than
for any other domestic flags. Both fleets peaked in late 1976, and by the middle of 1987 the
Norwegian and British fleets had been reduced by approximately 40 million dwt compared
with the peak year." Due to differences in the size of the fleets of various countries, absolute
figures do not necessarily give a meaningful comparison of the development of the various
fleets. However, the large reductions of the Norwegian and British fleets are distinct when
relative figures are used as well.
38 See Harlaftis, Gelina, A history of Greek-owned shipping: the making of an international tramp fleet, 1830 to
the present day, Routledge, London, 1996, p. 266,
39 Fearnley & Eger use a more narrow definition of the size of the fleets, and the Norwegian fleet peaked in the
beginning of 1977 when this definition is followed.
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Table 5.4. The development of the largest DECD-fleets, 1973-8740
1973 19iW 1987 Change Change Change
1000 dwt 1000 dwt 1000 dwt 1973-1980 1980-19R7 1973-1987
Denmark 6.512 8.703 6.961 33,6 -20,0 6,9
France 13.286 20.861 8.407 57,0 -59,7 -36,7
Germany 12.148 13.332 5.659 9,7 -57,6 -53,4
Greece 31.438 67.048 42.776 113,3 -36,2 36,1
Italy 13.185 17.951 12.178 36,2 -32,2 -7,6
Japan 58.585 67.321 54.669 14,9 -18,8 -6,7
The Netherlands 7.264 8.999 5.123 23,9 -43,1 -29,5
Norway 40.087 38.885 9.657 -3,0 -75,2 -75,9
Sweden 8.802 13.522 2.403 53,6 -82,2 -72,7
United Kingdom 47.155 43.814 11.677 -7,1 -73,3 -75,2
Table 5.4 illustrates the reduction of the OECD-fleets and the severity of the fleet contraction
in Norway and the United Kingdom. One noteworthy aspect of the figures in Table 5.4 is that
the Norwegian and British fleets were lower than the 1973-level as early as 1980. The fleets of
the other main OECD maritime nations increased, and in several countries considerably so, in
the period from 1973 to 1980. There might be two reasons for the disparate development in
Norway and the United Kingdom. One explanation may be that shipowners in these countries
were particularly hard hit by the freight market breakdown, and that liquidity problems and
bankruptcies occurred earlier, expediting the sale of domestic tonnage to foreign shipowners.
Alternatively, the phenomenon may be explained by the fact that the shipowners in Norway
and the United Kingdom at an earlier stage than their competitors realised the severity of the
shipping crisis and reacted by disposing of tonnage which would be unable to create profits
flying the domestic flag.
A closer examination of the Norwegian sales indicates that with regard to the
Norwegian shipping industry the former explanation is the more relevant." In the British case,
approximately two thirds of the tanker tonnage was owned by oil companies. This is partly
reflected in the relatively low British lay up-rate. The reduction of the British fleet was
enhanced by the transfer of oil company tonnage from the British flag to Flags of
Convenience. Moreover, a considerable share of the fleet flying the Red Ensign in the early
1970s was owned by foreigners who wanted to benefit from the United Kingdom's liberal
investment grants. When the conditions for these grants had been fulfilled after five years, the
owners chose to transfer the vessels to foreign flags."
In a long-term perspective, the relative reduction of the British, Norwegian and
Swedish fleets stands out. In all three countries, the liberalisation of flag policies augmented
the reduction of the domestically registered fleet, indicating that the decline in the nationally
controlled fleet was lower than the figures in Table 5.4 imply. Both relative and absolute
40 The table is based on the dead weight tonnage of the ten largest OECD fleets in 1970, representing all vessels
greater than 100 grt. The figures have been taken from the tables of the world and OECD fleets in the appendix
of OECD, Maritime Transport, various issues. The fleet of the United States has been excluded.
41 See Chapter Nine for a more detailed analysis.
42 Hope, Ronald, A New History of British Shipping, John Murray, London, 1990, p. 450.
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figures show that the reduction of the domestic fleet was more severe in Norway than in most
other maritime nations. This may indicate that the Norwegian shipping sector was adversely
affected by the crisis."
Low freight rates and difficulties securing employment led to economic difficulties for
several Norwegian shipowners. In the first period after the oil price increase these companies
survived due to the capital reserves which had been accumulated in the period with high
freight rates prior to the market breakdown. As the crisis escalated, the shipowners were
unable to service their debts and meet their daily expenses. In several instances the shipowners
were forced, often by banks or other financial institutions, to sell their assets. According to a
Norwegian publication, more than 40 Norwegian companies had chosen, or been forced, to
dispose of all their tonnage by 1980.44
Summary
Although sufficiently good yardsticks are hard to come by, the development of lay up-rates
and fleet volumes gives support to the claim that Norwegian shipowners were harder hit by
the shipping crisis than their international competitors. The financial problems encountered by
the Norwegian shipping companies - and the amount of forced sales - make the supposition
that the reduction of the Norwegian fleet was the result of a conscious and strategic
withdrawal from the shipping sector relatively unlikely.
43 Confer the analysis in Chapter Ten for a presentation of alternative factors which may have contributed to the
contraction of the Norwegian fleet.
44 Økonomisk Rapport, No.5, 1981, p. 11. Confer the analysis in Chapter Nine for a more detailed presentation.
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CHAPTERSIX
THE STRATEGY OF NORWEGIAN SHIPOWNERS
The analysis in the previous chapter indicated that Norwegian shipowners were severely
affected by the shipping crisis, and more so than their international competitors. The aim of
this chapter is to analyse the possible reasons for the disparate Norwegian experience. The
initial hypothesis is that the chartering policies of Norwegian shipowners, the Norwegian fleet
structure and the heavy investments in the early 1970s can explain why the international
shipping crisis made a particularly heavy impact on Norwegian shipowners.
Due to the diverse nature of Norwegian shipowners, there is bound to be a
considerable amount of generalisation in this chapter. The use of aggregate figures as the basis
for the analysis of Norwegian shipowners and the shipping crisis conceals the fact that some
shipowners only to a small extent fell victim to the adverse conditions. However, as one
industry insider posits, "there is no shipowning company of any importance which has not
been influenced, and in most cases negatively so, by the five year long crisis in shipping. " l
Even though Norwegian shipowners traditionally had offered a relatively large share of
their fleet in the spot market, there were shipowners who operated all their vessels on long-
term charters. A similar example of deviating behaviour concerns shipowners who sold their
ships and building contracts when "everyone else was buying", that is, during the contracting
boom in the period prior to the freight market breakdown.' The heterogeneity of Norwegian
shipping thus makes it difficult to give a balanced presentation of the sector and the
development during the 1970s. However, some distinct aspects separate the Norwegian
experience from that of shipowners in other countries.
The strategy of the Norwegian shipowners - focus on large tankers and bulk carriers,
spot market chartering and aggressive contracting - made them the winners in a market
characterised by rapid demand increase, but made them correspondingly vulnerable when the
demand side situation changed. It is thus possible to present a general outline of Norwegian
shipowners and their experiences in the period surrounding the shipping crisis, illustrating the
implications of the fundamental structural changes in the markets for shipping and energy.
6.1. Strategic Elements
The high Norwegian lay-ups and the strong reduction of the Norwegian fleet in the wake of
the freight market breakdown indicate that Norwegian shipowners were severely affected by
the crisis in the shipping sector. The analysis of the reasons for the grievous development is
based on the hypothesis that the misfortune of the Norwegian shipowners can be explained by
l Løddesøl, Leif Terje, "Hvorfor gjør noen rederier det godt og andre det dårlig?" [Why are some Shipping
Companies successful, and some not?], Internasjonal Politikk, No. lB, 1979, p. 167.
2 Erling Dekke Næss was honorary chairman for a company which sold their vessels, totalling three million dead
weight tons, in August 1973; see Norwegian Shipping News, No. 8B, 1975, p. 34. Fred. Olsen sold his tankers in
1972, but continued to build tankers for other shipowners at his Aker yards. See Chapter Eight for details on Sig.
Bergesen d.y.
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their business strategies in the period leading up to the crisis.
The term business strategy embodies a plethora of short- and long-term decisions
made by the agents operating in a given market. In 'shipping, the decision to order a vessel is
an obvious example of a strategic judgement. However, even though it is often made more
unconsciously, the decision not to dispose of existing tonnage is another example of a
judgement affecting the strategy of the company. The variety and amount of evaluations and
decisions underlying and making up the strategy of the shipping company make it difficult to
present a uniform and all-encompassing measure of shipping strategy.
The following analysis focuses on three particular elements of the shipping strategy of
Norwegian shipowners. These aspects largely embody the most important strategic decisions
in shipping companies, and can contribute to an explanation of the large impact of the crisis
on the Norwegian shipping sector. The strategic elements which are analysed are fleet
structure, chartering policy and contracting.
The aim of the analysis is twofold. The first object is to identify the factors which
characterised the three elements presented above, ie find out what distinguished the
Norwegian fleet structure, chartering policy and contracting. This analysis is undertaken by
means of international comparison. The second object is to analyse the factors and forces
which shaped the strategic decisions of Norwegian shipowners, ie identify the underlying
factors which can account for the Norwegian fleet structure, chartering policy and contracting
strategy.
Fleet structure is related to the composition of the fleet with reference to vessel type,
age and size. The type of ships which the shipowner chooses to operate is one important
aspect of the strategy of the shipping company. A shipowner looking for a stable revenue from
a secure market will typically invest in vessels for the liner trade, whereas someone interested
in high, short-term revenues will invest in large tankers intended for operation in the spot
market. The vessel type is not the only aspect of the fleet which is indicative of the
shipowner's strategy and attitude towards risk. Size is also of importance. A strategy
involving investments in large vessels is generally more risky than the choice of a fleet
consisting of several smaller vessels, or vessels of different sizes.
The second aspect which is chosen to represent the strategy of Norwegian shipowners
is their chartering policy. In this connection the most important decision for shipowners is
whether to tie their vessels to long-term charters or operate them in the spot market.'
Shipowners who operate mainly in the spot market have commonly been regarded as more
risk prone than those of their colleagues who choose to tie their ships to longer charters. In this
respect the chartering policy may be seen as an expression of the shipowners' attitude towards
risk. The situation is more complex, however, and it is necessary to take into account the
3 The length and type of charter contracts is of course of relevant as well. In connection with the oil price
increase it was evident that some types of contracts were unprofitable to the shipowners despite the fact that
they, at the time of signing, seemed advantageous. The reason for this was the unexpected development of
exchange rates and bunkers prices.
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shipowner's assessments of the future market development when evaluating chartering
policies.
The shipowners' strategies are also expressed in connection with acquisition and
disposal of tonnage. For the majority of Norwegian shipowners operating in the international
market, acquisition of tonnage implied contracting, rather than purchase of second-hand
vessels. The most important element in this context is the type and timing of newbuilding
contracts, but the choice of shipyard and country of production is also a result of strategic
decisions. The contracting activity is given particular relevance as it can be regarded as
important for the structural development of the fleet, which again indicates the long-term
strategy of the company. The structure of the fleet will be altered by both acquisitions and
disposal of tonnage. Whereas the current composition of the fleet to some extent has been
determined by past strategies, contracting and sales reveal which kind of vessels the
shipowner intends to operate in the future. The assessment of prospective market conditions
again plays a crucial role.
The first part of the analysis of the business strategy of Norwegian shipowners deals
with the factors which can explain the high Norwegian lay-ups. Effects which were not
necessarily reflected in high lay up-rates, but which may have affected the economic
performance of Norwegian shipping companies, are discussed in a concluding analysis.
6.2. The Norwegian Fleet Structure
One reason for the high Norwegian lay-ups was that Norwegian shipowners had invested a
disproportionate share of their resources in the types and size classes of vessels which were
adversely affected by the shipping market imbalance. The largest imbalance between supply
and demand was found in the tanker market and the malaise was initially referred to as "the
tanker crisis". Norwegian shipowners owned a disproportionate share of the world' s tanker
tonnage. The effects of the freight market breakdown were least visible in the liner trade, and
the share of liner vessels in the Norwegian fleet was smaller than the Norwegian share of the
world fleet.
What characterised the Norwegian fleet?
The following analysis emphasises four aspects of the Norwegian fleet - vessel types, average
size, propulsion and average age. In the Norwegian fleet there was a disproportionate share of
bulk vessels, and particularly tankers and combination carriers." Compared with their share of
the world fleet, the Norwegian shipowners owned a large share of the world's tankers,
combination carriers and bulk carriers.
4 A disproportionate share implies that the Norwegian share of these vessels was larger than the Norwegian share
of the total world fleet would indicate, Another way to present this is by saying that the Norwegian fleet
"lacked" non-bulk ships.
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Figure 6.1. Fleet composition, Norwegian and international fleets, based on dwt, 1965-805
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Figure 6.1 shows the distribution of the Norwegian and international fleets across vessel
types. The high Norwegian investments in the bulk sector are evident, and the distinctive
Norwegian fleet structure was apparent as early as the middle of the 1960s. However, the
figures conceallarge international variations.
Table 6.1. Fleet composition, seven largest fleets, 19766
Dry bulk! Fleet 1976
Flag Oil tankers combination Sum bulk Miscellaneous (1000 grt)
Liberia 64 29 93 7 73.447
Japan 46 31 77 23 41.663
The United Kingdom 49 25 74 26 32.923
Norway 53 34 87 13 27.944
Greece 36 33 69 31 25.035
The USSR 20 4 24 76 20.668
Panama 38 21 59 41 15.631
Table 6.1 shows the considerable differences in the structural composition of the various
national fleets. Liberia was the only major maritime nation which had a larger share of
tankers, combination carriers and dry bulk vessels than Norway.
Another feature of the Norwegian fleet, which is partlya result of the focus on bulk
vessels, is the proportion of large vessels. The Norwegian shipowners had invested heavily in
the size classes of ships which operated in the hardest hit market segment, ie the market for
large vessels. Mammoth tankers, combination carriers and bulk carriers made up a higher
share of the Norwegian fleet than the international fleet - Figure 6.2 reveals the difference in
the average size of the tankers and Table 6.2 shows the difference for the fleet.'
5 The chart is based on figures from Tables 3 and 20 from various issues of Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co.
Ltd., Review.
6 The shares are based on grt-figures from Table XIV in OECD, Maritime Transport 1976, p. 124.
7 If statistics including smaller vessels are used, the average size of the ships in the Norwegian fleet was more
than twice as large as the average size of the vessels in the Rest of the World- fleet.
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Figure 6.2. Average size of tankers, 1000 dwt, 1965-808
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Figure 6.2 is based on tankers of more than 10.000 dwt and shows the large and increasing
difference between the average size of Norwegian tankers and the average for the rest of the
international tanker fleet. Whereas the average Norwegian tanker was 22 per cent larger than
the average non-Norwegian tanker in 1970, the corresponding figures for 1973 and 1980 were
38 and more than 80 per cent respectively. Furthermore, the differences between the average
size of the Norwegian and non-Norwegian tankers in Figure 6.2 are smaller than the average
of the aggregate fleets, partly due to the larger share of tankers in the Norwegian merchant
marine.
Table 6.2. Size distribution, Norwegian and world fleets, 1975 and 19799
Norwegian fleet Norwegian fleet
Size class -- grt World fleet 1975 1975 World Fleet 1979 1979
100-500 2 2 2 2
500-2.000 3 l 3 l
2.000-6.000 8 2 8 2
6.000-10.000 12 4 10 2
10.000-20.000 19 13 19 9
20.000-40.000 17 15 15 12
40.000-50.000 5 8 5 4
50.000-100.000 14 24 15 25
100.000 and over 20 31 23 43
Average size 10.210 22.550 11.020 24.710
Table 6.2 shows that the vessels above 50.000 grt made up approximately 55 per cent of the
Norwegian fleet in 1975, compared with roughly a third for the world fleet. Four years later
8 The chart is based on figures from Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review, 1972 and 1980, Table 3 and
Table 20. The figures for the Rest of the World-fleet have been found by subtracting the Norwegian tonnage
from the figures for the world fleet. IfNorwegian tonnage was included, the figures for the world fleet would be
higher after 1967, but not significantly so.
9 Based on data from Lloyd's Register of Shipping, reprinted in Norges Rederforbund, Momenter til belysning
av norsk og internasjonal skipsfart [Aspects illuminating Norwegian and international shipping], Norges
Rederforbund, Oslo, 1976, p. 14 and 1979, p. 14.
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more than two thirds of the Norwegian fleet consisted of vessels larger than 50.000 grt,
compared with 38 per cent for the world fleet. The average size of the vessels in the
Norwegian fleet was more than twice the average size of the vessels in the world fleet in both
instances.
Investments in large ships are generally more risky than investments in smaller
vessels, but the increased risk has usually been rewarded through higher profits for larger
vessels. Two factors can account for the higher risk; the lack of alternative types of operation
for larger vessels and different demand patterns for ships in different size classes or market
segments. The risk of operating a vessel of 100.000 dead weight tons is higher than the risk of
operating four 25.000 tonners. Lorange and Norman even claim that "... it is somewhat
surprising that individual shipowners have chosen to invest heavily in supertankers. "10
The type and size of the vessels clearly show the structural differences between the
Norwegian fleet and the fleets of other countries. The third element which distinguished
Norwegian fleet from the international fleet was propulsion. As a result of the increase in the
price of bunkers, turbine-driven vessels became less competitive than vessels powered by
diesel-motors. l l Turbine tankers were unfavourably affected by the changes in relative costs in
connection with the oil price increase as they were constructed for a market with a totally
different set of relative prices of inputs than the one prevailing after 1973.12
A turbine-driven tanker of 50.000 dwt used approximately 85 tons of "Bunker C"
daily, whereas a similarly sized motor tanker used about 55 tons of low-grade diesel fuel."
Before the oil price increase the costs of operation for the two types of propulsion were at
approximately the same level. The implication of the nine dollar per barrel oil price increase
from October 1973 to January 1974 was that the cost of operating turbine tankers increased
relative to the cost of operating motor tankers. For the previously mentioned vessels. there
would be a daily difference of$1.S00, as a result of an increase in the price ofbunkers of$SO
per ton and the additional 30 tons of bunkers needed to operate the turbine tanker. Some
shipowning companies even chose to convert their ships from turbine to diesel engines."
Vessels are generally laid up when the rate level is insufficient to cover operating
expenses less lay up-costs. The "reservation price" of vessels varies with their efficiency;
relatively efficient ships will accept lower rate levels than relatively inefficient vessels.
Consequently, turbine tankers, which were adversely affected by the increase in the price of
10 Lorange, Peter and Norman, Victor D., "Risk preference in Scandinavian Shipping", Applied Economics,
1973, Vol. 5, p. 49.
II According to Johan Seland of The Norwegian Shipowners' Association, the rate level in the middle of the
1970s would cover the bunkers costs for a motor tanker, but not a turbine tanker, on the distance Europe-The
Persian Gulf; see Kapital, No.3, 1975, p. 8.
12 In 1972, the cost composition for a new 100.000 dead weight ton diesel vessel, ie a relatively fuel-efficient
ship, was as follows: fuel ten per cent, other operating costs 35 per cent and fmancial costs 55 percent. Seven
years later the composition of costs was 43, 19 and 38 per cent respectively; see Stortingsmelding nr. 52 (1980-
81), Om skipsfartsnæringen [On the shipping industry], p. 3.
13 The figures in the example are taken from Nersesian, Roy, Ships and Shipping - A Comprehensive Guide,
PennWell Books, Tulsa, Oklahoma, 1981, p. 29.
14 Stortingsmelding nr. 52 (1980-81), op.cit., p. 26.
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bunkers, were among the first ships to be laid up. The ships which had been among the most
profitable in a situation with high and increasing demand thus turned out to be particularly ill-
suited to the changes in the price of inputs following the oil price increase. After the second
oil price increase in the late 1970s, the economic disadvantage of a turbine-driven vessel had
increased to $1,5 million annually." However, this was to some extent offset by a further fall
in average vessel speed. The average recorded speed of ULCCs was 9,5 knots in 1982,
compared with 14 knots in 1973.16
In the first period after the freight market breakdown, the proportion of turbine-driven
vessels in the Norwegian fleet was lower than the international average. Accordingly,
Norwegian shipowners seemed to be in a better position with regard to fuel economics than
their foreign competitors. However, the large number of mammoth, turbine-driven tankers
ordered by Norwegian shipowners is not fully reflected in the 1975 fleet composition. The
share of turbine vessels in the Norwegian fleet increased considerably, from 30,7 per cent in
1975 to 38,2 per cent three years later. Over the same period, the share of turbine-driven
vessels in the world fleet fell from 35,5 per cent to 33,3 per cent."
The last element distinguishing the Norwegian fleet from the world fleet was the
average age of the vessels. The shipping market consists of both new, capital-intensive ships,
and older, relatively labour-intensive vessels. The recently built ships typically have a small
crew, and consequently marginal crew costs, whereas the older ships have low financial costs.
The Norwegian share of the tonnage on order in the period 1950-1979 has been systematically
higher than the Norwegian share of the world fleet."
The average age of the Norwegian fleet was six and a half years in 1968, whereas the
average age of the world fleet was eleven years." In 1977, at a time when the average age of
the Norwegian tanker tonnage was five years, the corresponding figure for the world tanker
fleet was nine years. A year earlier, 83 per cent of the Norwegian fleet was less than ten years
old, corresponding to 65 per cent for the world fleet and 44 and five per cent for the Greek and
Cypriot fleets respectively."
Some countries had tanker fleets with an age composition similar to the Norwegian
fleet, and in 1974 Denmark, Sweden and Spain had a higher share of modem ships than
Norway. However, the size of these fleets was considerably smaller than the Norwegian fleet;
they were in 1974 all in the region oftwo million grt, compared to twelve million in Norway's
15 Nersesian, op.cit., 1981, p. 29.
16 Figures for 1982 from Drewry, The Drewry Tanker Market Review, H.P. Drewry Shipping Consultants Ltd.,
London, 1982, Table 12, p. 30 and for 1973 from Drewry, The Trading Outlookfor Very Large Tankers, H.P.
Drewry Shipping Consultants Ltd., 1975, p. 16.
17 Based on gross register ton-figures from Statistisk Sentralbyrå, Sjøtransport 1983 [Maritime Statistics 1983],
Central Bureau ofStatistics, Oslo, 1984, pp. 45 and 102.
18 Norges Rederforbund, Momenter til belysning av norsk og internasjonal skipsfart [Aspects illuminating
Norwegian and international shipping], Norges Rederforbund, Oslo, 1979, p. 13. The only exception was the
year 1968, when the Norwegian share of the world fleet was larger than the Norwegian share of contracts.
19 Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review 1968, p. 12.
20 OECD, Maritime Transport 1976, p. 128.
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case. The Japanese fleet was also more modem than the Norwegian fleet, but a considerable
share of the Japanese tonnage was owned by companies with their main interests outside the
shipping sector, and this is one reason for the surprisingly low Japanese lay up-rates.
The structure of the Norwegian fleet was distinct in an international perspective.
Typewise, there was a disproportionate share of tankers and bulk carriers, and the Norwegian
fleet consisted of considerably larger units than the international fleet. The Norwegian fleet
was also relatively modem, and after 1976 there was a higher share of turbine-driven vessels
in the Norwegian fleet than in the international fleet.
What can explain the structure of the Norwegian fleet?
Even though the demand side in the shipping market is international, and several of the most
important factors of production are generally purchased in the international market,
shipowners in different countries can not evaluate investments in ships and the operation of
the vessels in the same manner. Although an international market for sea labour exists,
domestic legislation has impeded the use of foreign seamen in the fleets of most traditional
shipping countries. This implies that the domestic wage level affects the costs of operation.
Moreover, whereas debt financing is largely acquired in the international market, equity
generally comes from domestic sources. The alternative value of domestic capital is therefore
important in determining the level of investments. These factors are of great relevance for the
development of domestic fleets.
In a lecture in 1972, Professor Arnljot Strømme Svendsen presented three "survival
mechanisms" for shipowners in "high-variable cost countries" such as Norway. The first
strategy is risk-proneness, which Strømme Svendsen claims is necessary given the cost
advantage of low-wage countries. The second strategy is "the continual ordering of new,
modern vessels with technological superiority and operating advantages." This strategy
should be combined with advantageous contracting and sales in an asset play-like manner.
The third survival mechanism is the development of new shipping markets, where the
shipowner may enjoy a protected product market for a period of time."
Although the use of the term survival mechanism may seem ironic when the decline of
the Norwegian fleet is taken into consideration, all three strategies were evident in the
Norwegian shipping sector. As the focus of this thesis is the crisis rather than the development
of new and profitable market segments, the first two elements, which had clearly negative
implications after the freight market breakdown, will be analysed here. However, it should be
noted that several Norwegian companies succeeded in establishing an important position in
profitable niches, in stark contrast to the general economic performance of Norwegian and
international shipping companies. In the beginning of the 1980s, Norwegian shipowners
owned the world's largest fleet of cruise vessels and were also prominent in the markets for
chemical tankers and supply vessels.
21 Svendsen
Shipbuildin
rnljot Strømme, "Prospective Market Trends in the Shipping Trade", reprint from Scandinavian
.i72, Pamphlet No. 30, Institute for Shipping Research, Bergen, 1973, p. 13.
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The fact that the Norwegians owned a disproportionate share of the largest and most
modem vessels in the world fleet may be explained by the relative price of capital and labour
in Norway. Due to the relatively high wage level in Norway and the relative abundance of
capital available for shipping investments, Norwegian shipowners found it difficult to
compete in the operation of labour-intensive vessels, but had a comparative advantage in the
operation of large, technologically advanced vessels. The Norwegian fleet structure may thus
partly be seen as a result of cost differences and comparative advantage, rather than purelyas
an indication of a higher willingness to take risk among Norwegian shipowners.
By the beginning of the 1970s Norway had developed into a high cost country,
indicating that the wage level, at prevailing exchange rates, was higher than in other
industrialised countries. Moreover, the average wage level in the shipping sector was
considerably higher than the average wage level in the manufacturing sector. As a result of the
relatively high cost of Norwegian seamen, it would be difficult for Norwegian shipowners to
compete successfully in the segments of the shipping sector where labour-intensive vessels
were employed, as labour costs make up a relatively large share of total costs in these market
segments.
Domestic regulations made the use of lower cost foreign labour difficult, so vessels
which could only be operated profitably by means of low-cost labour could generally not be
operated at a profit if the vessels were flying the Norwegian flag. Accordingly, the labour-
intensive segment of the shipping sector was not an alternative for Norwegian shipowners,
who had to choose between exiting the shipping sector or operating in the capital-intensive
part of the shipping market. There were some examples of Norwegian shipping companies
operating in the labour-intensive segment, particularly in the regional Asian trades. In these
trades the manning requirements were waived, facilitating the operation of smaller and older
vessels. Nevertheless, the share of the Norwegian shipping capacity utilised in these trades
was negligible.
Whereas the high Norwegian wages made labour-intensive shipping unprofitable, the
relatively low price of Norwegian capital made investments in the more capital-intensive
segment of the shipping sector a worthy alternative. Norwegian investments in modem
tonnage were facilitated by the relatively low alternative value of Norwegian capital. It is
important to keep in mind that there was a considerably lower degree of international capital
mobility in the 1960s and 1970s than today. Consequently, shipowners in different countries
were not faced with identical investment opportunities - the alternatives to shipping
investments would generally be confined to the home country and the opportunities presented
there.
Comparisons of the return on capital are difficult and fraught with uncertainties.
Analyses of the return on capital invested in the shipping industry are particularly difficult due
to the fluctuations in the freight market, the heterogeneity of the industry and the problems
encountered when estimating depreciation. However, the capital-intensive nature of the
shipping industry makes the investment decision particularly relevant.
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Investments in the Norwegian shipping industry were motivated by the fact that the
return on these investments compared favourably with the return on alternative investments.
Eriksen and Norman have analysed the return from labour and capital invested in the shipping
industry during a "typical business cycle" in the period 1963-1972. Their conclusion is that
the shipping industry, at least marginally, had given a return which was at least as high as
alternative investments." A similar analysis, presented in a Norwegian White Paper, compares
the gross return on the capital invested in the shipping industry with the return on investments
in some of the most important capital-intensive manufacturing enterprises." The comparison
indicates that in five out of six years in the period 1968-1973, return from the shipping
industry was higher, though not dramatically so. However, this comparison of gross return is
to some extent misleading due to the higher depreciation in the shipping industry.
The fact that shipping investments rated favourably compared with other Norwegian
investments can explain why a considerable share of Norwegian resources was pooled into
this sector. Moreover, low alternative return on the capital, represented by the return on the
domestic investments alternatives, can explain both why Norwegian shipowners concentrated
on the capital-intensive segment of the shipping industry and why the Norwegian shipping
sector was large in an international perspective.
International comparisons of the return on capital are subject to many of the same
uncertainties as domestic comparisons between sectors. However, the differences between the
various countries in the most comprehensive study of the return on capital in the 1970s are so
large that statistical differences are unlikely to account for the total discrepancies. The study
was funded by the OECD, and reveals large variations in the return on capital in an
international perspective.
Table 6.3. Return on manufacturing investments, per cent, 1970-79
Norway Canada The US france Gell11any The UK
1970 10 14 20 22 21 10
1971 8 14 21 21 18 10
1972 10 16 24 21 16 10
1973 11 18 24 20 16 10
1974 13 19 17 23 16 6
1975 11 14 18 12 14 5
1976 9 13 22 11 16 5
1977 6 12 24 13 17 7
1978 5 13 23 13 17 7
1979 11 17 20 ... ... 5
Average 1970-1973 9,75 15,5 22,25 21 17,75 10
Average 1970-1979 9,4 15 21,3 17,33 16,78 7,5
22 Eriksen, lb Erik and Norman, Victor D., "Skipsfarten i norsk samfunnsøkonomi" [Shipping in the Norwegian
economy], Statsøkonomisk Tidsskrift, No.3, Volume 87, H. Aschehoug & Co., Oslo, 1973, p. 141.
23 Stortingsmelding nr. 23 (1975-76), Om sjøfolkenes forhold og skipsfartens plass i samfunnet [On the
conditions for seamen and shipping's role in the society], p. 63.
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As Table 6.3 shows, the return on manufacturing investments was considerably lower in
Norway than in other OECD-countries, except for the United Kingdom." Accordingly,
investments in shipping were relatively favourable for Norwegian investors, as the alternative
return on the capital would be low.
The high wage level and low alternative value of capital are important in explaining
why Norwegian shipowners had invested in modem, large bulk vessels. As shown during the
presentation of the structure of the Norwegian fleet, the high investments in bulk vessels
resulted in an internationally low share of liner tonnage. This might seem strange, given that
the liner segment is another relatively capital-intensive part of the shipping industry.
Two factors can account for the relatively low Norwegian engagement in the liner
sector. First, Norwegian shipowning companies have traditionally been small, utilising the
fact that the economies of scale in most segments of the shipping industry are related to the
size of the ship, rather than the size of the company. The economies of scale in the liner sector
are to a larger degree connected to the size of the company and the magnitude and frequency
of services offered. Moreover, these aspects became more important in connection with the
onset of containerisation, which accelerated from the late 1960s. Second, the links to the
foreign trade of the home country are stronger for the liner than for the bulk sector. Of the ten
largest liner companies in the beginning of the 1980s, the Danish Maersk Line was the only
company without a strong home market base. The low share of liner tonnage thus to some
extent reflects the relatively low Norwegian share of international trade and the protectionist
measures which made it increasingly difficult for cross-traders to operate in the liner sector.
An analysis undertaken by the Norwegian Shipowners' Association showed that the
introduction of the UNCTAD Liner Code ofConduct would reduce the volume of Norwegian
liner transport by more than 50 per cent."
Although a relatively large share of the Norwegian fleet consisted of large, capital-
intensive vessels, and crew costs thus constituted a relatively small share of total Norwegian
costs, it has been claimed that the relatively high Norwegian manning costs might have
contributed to the high Norwegian lay up-rates. In the boom period in the late 1960s and early
1970s Norwegian shipowners were able to earn substantial profits even though their operating
costs were relatively high in an international perspective. The freight market breakdown
resulted in a stronger focus on costs, and high manning costs may have made Norwegian
shipowners unable to compete at the prevailing low freight rate-level.
Thanopoulou claims that the high Norwegian lay up-rates may "seem as a self-
explanatory situation due to the [. ..} high Norwegian costs in the 1910s. ,,26 Two elements
24 The figures in Table 6.3 have been taken from Norges Offentlige Utredninger (1983:7), Skipsfartens
konkurranseevne [The competitiveness of shipping], p. 66. They refer to the study OECD, Profits and Rates of
Return, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris, 1979. However, Norway was not
included in this study, which only presents figure for the period until 1976. It is thus likely that the figures
presented here are estimates made by the Ministry of Trade and Industry.
25 Stortingsmelding nr. 23 (1975-76), op.cit., p. 31.
26 Thanopoulou, Helen A, "What price the flag? The terms of competitiveness in shipping", Marine Policy,
Volume 22, No. 4-5, 1995,pp. 361-362.
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make this assertion relatively unlikely. First, as Thanopoulou herself points out later in the
article, there is no correlation between the manning costs and lay up-rates of other countries.
Second, the majority of the Norwegian lay-ups consisted of mammoth tankers. For these
vessels, manning costs are relatively unimportant or maybe even negligible. If the relatively
labour-intensive Norwegian tonnage had been laid up, high Norwegian manning costs may
have provided an explanation. For the vessels actually laid up, however, manning costs were
more or less insignificant, and the explanations of the high Norwegian lay-ups must be sought
elsewhere.
The analysis above, emphasising Norwegian factor prices, is the "positive" explanation
of the reasons for the Norwegian emphasis on large, modern bulk vessels. By focusing on the
high domestic wages and the inferiority of the Norwegian investment alternatives, shipowners
are partly "acquitted" of their own misfortune. An alternative explanation may be that
although Norwegian shipowners were unable to invest in the most labour-intensive segments
of the shipping industry, their attitude towards risk made them contract more and larger
tonnage than the structure of factor prices could justify.
This claim implies that the first of Strømme Svendsen's survival mechanisms was
followed, ie that the strategies of Norwegian shipowners were more risky than those of their
competitors. The question of risk is complex, and an evaluation of the relative importance of
the attitude towards risk in the development of the Norwegian fleet structure is an impossible
task. However, Norwegian shipowners showed their willingness to take risks in connection
with chartering, where the risk proneness of Norwegian shipowners clearly shines through.
6.3. The Norwegian Chartering Policy
In connection with the shipping crisis, there were initially large differences in the economic
performance of those companies which had secured their income through long-term contracts
and those which had to offer their ships in a spot market characterised by a large supply
surplus. There was no uniform behaviour among Norwegian tanker owners when it came to
chartering policy - some shipowners had all their ships tied to long-term charters, others
offered all their ships in the spot market and some chose a combination of the two
alternatives. Despite the fact that some Norwegian shipowners operated their ships in a risk-
averse manner, it is correct to say, in general terms, that Norwegian shipowners were more
exposed to the fluctuations of the tanker market than most of their foreign competitors.
However, the widespread portrayal of Norwegian shipowners as risk-seeking gamblers should
be modified somewhat.
A commonly cited paragraph from an article in the American business publication
Fortune can illustrate this. According to the article, "Norwegians own less than 15per cent of
the world tanker fleet, but account for nearly 50 per cent of the tonnage in the spot market. .at
Not only are the figures incorrect, the assessment fails to take into account an important
27 Taken from the article "Betting $20 billion on the tanker game", Fortune, August 1974, p. 124.
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reason for the Norwegian spot market focus, viz the lack of oil company-owned tonnage.
What characterised the Norwegian chartering policy?
The uneven flag distribution of oil company-owned tonnage has generally been neglected in
analyses of the problems of the Norwegian shipping sector. The fact that the oil companies
reserved cargoes for their own vessels implies that approximately a third of the tonnage in the
tanker market was largely secured employment. In 1978 the laid-up vessels owned by oil
companies or their subsidiaries amounted to approximately one million dead weight tons,
representing less than one per cent oftheir fleets." The lay up-rates for the independent tanker
fleet were therefore considerably higher than the figures for the aggregate fleet, as a
substantial share of the oil company-owned tonnage was insulated from the problems of
securing employment. The extent of oil company-owned tonnage in the Norwegian fleet was
negligible.
Figure 6.3. Share of company-owned tanker tonnage in various fleets, 1967-8029
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If we adjust for the existence of oil company-owned tonnage, the difference between the
Norwegian and the internationallay-ups becomes less dramatic than Figure 5.6 indicates. By
excluding the oil company-owned tonnage from the world tanker fleet, international lay up-
rates would increase by approximately 50 per cent. A similar exercise for the Norwegian
shipping sector would only have a minor effect, as most of the oil company-owned tankers in
the Norwegian fleet were oil barges or really small tankers providing bunkers. However,
28 Figures from Dabrowski, K., "Comments on the mechanisms of the world shipping market", Maritime Policy
and Management, Volume 8, No.2, 1981, p. 92.
29 From calculations based on dead weight tons from Tables I1-9 to 11-22 in Jenkins, Gilbert, Stopford, Martin
and Tyler, Cliff, The Clarkson Oil Tanker Databook, Clarkson Research Studies, London, 1993, pp. 82-95. The
totals on which the calculations are based deviate from those in the original source due to the subtraction of
combination carriers, which were included in the total but not in the fleet by employment. Moreover,
government and domestic tonnage has been excluded. In Table I1-12 in the original source the figures for the
Norwegian and British fleets have been switched, but the chart has been corrected for this.
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Texaco Norway owned a fleet which in 1974 amounted to 372.000 dead weight tons,
comprising several medium-sized and one large tanker. Adjusting for the oil company-owned
tonnage would lead to a 1,6 per cent reduction of the Norwegian fleet, whereas a
corresponding correction of the international fleet in the same year would reduce the size of
the fleet by almost 34 per cent."
Measured as share of the independent fleet, the international lay up-rate for tankers
was more than 22 per cent in 1976, as opposed to 14 per cent as share of the total fleet.31 The
first figure is more relevant in a comparison with Norwegian lay up-rates, as it eliminates the
effects of the portion of the fleet which was relatively unaffected by the difficulties securing
employment. The difference between the lay up-rates of the total and the independent fleet
increased as the oil companies increased their proportion of the world tanker fleet in the
course of the decade. The absence of oil companies in Norwegian shipping can only explain
parts of the problem of the Norwegian shipping industry, however. Even though it can
contribute to an understanding of the high Norwegian lay up-rates, it offered little consolation
for shipowners who were unable to earn revenues on their vessels.
Another important reason for the high Norwegian lay-ups is the manner in which
Norwegian shipowners chose to operate their ships. Porter has analysed the international
market for tanker shipping in the 1970s, and he portrays the chartering policies of the
Scandinavian shipowners in the following manner: "The Scandinavians were considered
gamblers among the gamblers of the shipping industry. They had placed more early orders for
VLCCs and ULCCs than other nationalities and ran large portions of their fleet on the spot
market. The Norwegians, for example, owned only 15 percent of the world tankers, but
accountedfor nearly 50 percent of the tonnage on the spot market. "32
The latter assertion - which originates with the previously mentioned Fortune-article
and has been repeated several places - should be modified." According to figures from the
British shipping analysts Clarkson, the Norwegian share of the world spot market reached its
peak at the beginning of 1967when more than a quarter of the tonnage in the spot market was
Norwegian. In the period 1974-1980, on average approximately 18 per cent of the spot market
tonnage was Norwegian vessels. This figure is almost exactly twice as high as the average
30 In 1976, the only oil company-owned tankers ofany size outside the Texaco-fleet were the 32.000 dwt motor-
tanker Fjordshell, owned by AS Shellbåtene and the 18.500 dwt Esso Slagen, owned by Norske Esso AS.
31 This calculation is based on tonnage and lay-ups in dead weight tons. The size of the independent and
company owned fleets originate with OECD, Maritime Transport, whereas the figures for lay up-rates are taken
from Review.
32 Porter, Michael, "The Oil Tanker Shipping Industry", in Porter, Michael (ed.), Cases in Competitive Strategy,
Free Press, New York, 1983, p. 57. The claim is quoted in Tenold, Stig, Skipsfartskrisen og norske redere - en
økonomisk-historisk studie 1973-1980 [The shipping crisis and Norwegian shipowners - an economic-historical
study 1973-1980], SNF-Report No. 60/95, The Foundation for Research in Economics and Business
Administration, Bergen, 1995,p. 114.
33 The same claim - about Norwegian vessels comprising 50 per cent of the spot market tonnage - is also put
forward by Nerheim, Gunnar and Utne, Bjørn S., Under samme stjerne - Rederiet Peder Smedvig 1915-1990
[Under the star - The shipowning company Peder Smedvig 1915-1990], Peder Smedvig AlS, Stavanger, 1990,
p. 237, where the authors refer to the article in Fortune, August, 1974.
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Norwegian share of the tanker fleet in the same period."
In an analysis of Norwegian chartering policies, two elements are of particular interest.
The first is the historical development of Norwegian chartering policies in the period around
the crisis. Was there a marked change in the distribution of Norwegian tankers between the
spot and the charter markets in the years preceding the crisis? The second is an international
comparison of chartering policies. Were there large differences between the chartering
policies of Norwegian shipowners and the shipowners of other countries?
In a historical context it is obvious that there had been a transformation of Norwegian
chartering policies, though not necessarily one which is apparent from the distribution of the
fleet between the various markets. The share of the Norwegian fleet which was given long
charters decreased from the end of the 1960s onwards. Norman claims that "[i]n general, the
paradox is that with the advent of supertankers, Norwegian shipowners have largely shifted
from long-term timecharters to TCs of 1-3 years duration. ,,35 However, when considering the
share of Norwegian tonnage offered in the spot market, there appears to be no clear trend.
Table 6.4. Share of the Norwegian fleet on charters, per cent, 1963-7936
Time Tankers Tramp/ bulk
October 1957 86 64
October 1960 71 49
July 1963 59 33
July 1966 60 48
July 1969 67 51
July 1970 65 60
July 1971 87 77
July 1972 82 75
July 1973 81 71
July 1974 74 78
July 1975 60 61
July 1977 49 45
July 1979 36 53
The reduced willingness to sign charters is not evident from the figures in Table 6.4. The
share of Norwegian tonnage on charters actually increased by more than 30 per cent between
1966 and 1973. Two factors can account for this apparent deviation. First, the share of the
fleet operating on charters tends to increase when the freight rate increases. The two freight
rate peaks in the tanker market in 1967 and 1970 can account for the historically high share of
34 From calculations based on dead weight tons from Tables 11-9 to II 22 in Jenkins, Stopford & Tyler, op.cit.,
1993, pp. 82-95. The formerly presented restrictions apply. The figures group spot market tonnage with tonnage
in lay-up, tonnage used for storage and tankers used in the transport of grain. The high Norwegian share thus to
some extent reflects the high Norwegian lay-ups, but this poses no big problem, as the tonnage would have had
to be offered in the spot market if rates had been sufficiently high.
35 Norman, Victor D., Norwegian Shipping in the National Economy, Institute for Shipping Research, Norges
Handelshøyskole, Bergen, 1971, p. 64.
36 Figures from Norges Rederforbund, quoted in Stortingsmelding nr. 23 (1975-76), op.cit., p. 39, augmented by
figures from Table 3.1 in Norges Rederforbund, Momenter til belysning av norsk og internasjonal skipsfart
[Aspects illuminating Norwegian and international shipping] Oslo, May 1978 and December 1979.
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Norwegian vessels on charters in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Charters entered into during
the peak in 1967 may explain the high proportion of charters until 1970, whereas the peak in
1970 may explain the even higher share in the following years. Second, the figures do not
reveal the length of the charters on which the Norwegian vessels were operating, and from the
late 1960s Norwegian shipowners tended to reject long-term charters in favour of short- and
medium-term charters of 1-5 years.
The figures showing the development of the various market segments can not directly
substantiate the claim that Norwegians to a higher degree than previously rejected long
charters. However, the high volume of Norwegian charters which terminated in the first years
after the freight market breakdown indicates that there was a high degree of 1-5 year charters
in the Norwegian fleet. Of the tonnage which had been given charters by July 1974, more than
half operated on timecharters which would be terminated by 1977. Approximately two million
dwt had been secured charters into the first years of the 1980s. This represented less than five
per cent of the existing Norwegian tonnage and contracts.
Figure 6.4. Norwegian charters per l July 1974, development 1975-8337
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The steep reduction in Figure 6.4 illustrates the considerable amount of Norwegian
timecharters which terminated in the period 1975-1979. This indicates that a large share of the
Norwegian tonnage in the charter market was operating on short- and medium-tenn charters
of 1-5 years, rather than long-term charters. Of the vessels on charter in July 1974, less than a
quarter had been secured employment until the beginning of 1979. Accordingly, the ratio of
short- and medium-tenn charters to long-term charters was approximately 3:l.
In an analysis of the plight of Norwegian shipowners, an international comparison of
tonnage in the spot and charter markets will be a more fruitful approach than an analysis of the
historical development within the Norwegian shipping industry. Again, there are difficulties in
connection with the assessment of the length of the charters, as international statistics do not
37 Based on figures from the manuscript "Various information on the economy of Norwegian shipowning
companies", dated 30 June 1975, The Archives of the Norwegian Shipowners' Association, folder marked 6 B K
75 - Krisen 1975 I, 010175-300675.
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reveal charter length. However, the specific chartering policy of Norwegian shipowners
becomes relatively clear from analyses of the distribution of vessels between the spot and the
charter markets.
Figure 6.5. Spot market share, Norwegian and RoW tanker fleets, 1967-8038
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The line in Figure 6.5 shows the relatively large extent to which the supply side in the spot
market was made up by Norwegian shipowners, and it is evident that the Norwegians'
dominance of the spot market supply side decreased in the period from 1967 to 1974. The line
shows that the 50 per cent Norwegian presence in the spot market, as claimed by Fortune, is
way off the mark.
Two elements in Figure 6.5 require closer explanation. The first is the proximity
between the Norwegian and international spot market shares in the middle of 1974. This can
be explained by two factors. One is the aforementioned correlation of freight rates and
chartering - the low share of the Norwegian fleet offered in the spot market in 1974 reflects
the high freight rate level in the latter part of 1973. A similar reduction was evident after the
peak in 1970. Second, the figures portray the share of the existing fleets offered in the spot
market. Consequently, the high Norwegian newbuilding contracts which had been entered into
without employment being secured is not reflected in the figure.
The second point which requires explanation is connected to the first. Why did the
Norwegian spot share increase much faster than the share of the Rest of the World-fleet from
1975 onwards? The answers have already been given. One explanation is the fact that a high
share of the charters on which Norwegian vessels were operating were short- and medium-
term. Thus, the increase in the Norwegian spot market share can be explained by the fact that
38 From calculations based on dead weight tons from Tables 11-9 to II 22 in Jenkins, Stopford & Tyler, op.cit.,
1993, pp. 82-95. The term "spot share" refers to all vessels which are not oil company-owned and which have
not been assigned charters of more than three months, including vessels used for storage, in grain trading and
laid-up vessels.
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a large portion of these charters terminated relatively shortly after the freight market
breakdown. Second, the Norwegian share of spot market and laid-up tonnage increased when
unfixed newbuildings were delivered. Employment had not been secured for 80 per cent of the
Norwegian newbuilding contracts, a proportion of unfixed newbuildings which was
considerably higher than the international average.
The share of Norwegian tanker tonnage which was inactive or operating in the spot
market was more than twice as high as the figures for the Rest of the World-fleet every year
from 1975 onwards. The development traits depicted in Figure 6.5 also become apparent in a
comparison of the employment of the tanker fleets of the most important maritime nations.
Figure 6.6 is a comparison of the employment pattern of the four largest tanker fleets in the
period 1967-1980, depicting the share of the fleets which were secured engagement, either as
a result of oil company-ownership or as a result of chartering agreements.
Figure 6.6 shows that Norwegian shipowners by July 1974 had a smaller share oftheir
fleet engaged in the spot market than shipowners with vessels registered in Liberia. It also
shows that the share of Norwegian tonnage on charters was considerably higher than it had
been in the period 1967-1973, having increased by approximately a third. Thus, the
Norwegian shipowners' situation seemed favourable compared eg to shipowners with vessels
registered in Liberia. Again, the two elements presented above cloak the actual situation, as
differences in the length of charters and the entry of unfixed newbuildings played an
important role.
Figure 6.6. Company-owned and chartered tonnage, 1967-8039
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Even though the situation in 1974 indicates that Norwegian shipowners appear to have had a
more fortunate starting point than their Liberian competitors, with 12 versus 15 per cent of the
39 From calculations based on dead weight tons from Tables 11-9 to II 22 in Jenkins, Stopford & Tyler, op.cit.,
1993, pp. 82-95. The lines refer to all tonnage which is oil company-owned or which have been assigned
charters of more than three months. The Norwegian development is less dramatic than Figure 6.4 indicates, as
Figure 6.6 takes into account charters signed after 1 July 1974.
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fleet in the spot market, the development in the period 1974-1980 shows that appearances may
be deceptive. Whereas the share of the Liberian fleet on charters and owned by oil companies
was relatively stable, falling less than ten per cent between 1974 and 1980, the Norwegian
share fell dramatically. By 1977 the amount of Norwegian tonnage which had been secured
employment outside the spot market had been halved.
The figures above refer to charters of more than three months' duration. If figures for
charters ofmore than twelve months' duration are used, the share of the chartered Norwegian
fleet in 1974 falls from almost 88 per cent to 70 per cent, indicating that more than a fifth of
the Norwegian charters may have had a duration between three and twelve months."
The analysis above shows two factors which are important in an understanding of the
effects of the shipping crisis for Norwegian shipowners. First, the share oftonnage which was
operating in the spot market or on relatively short charters was high in an international
perspective. Second, this situation was augmented by the introduction of unfixed
newbuildings, which had a clearly negative impact despite large-scale Norwegian
cancellations. The influence of the unfixed newbuildings will be analysed in more detail in
connection with Norwegian contracting.
What can explain the Norwegian chartering policy?
The previous analysis has shown that the Norwegian shipowners to a larger extent than their
international competitors relied on the spot market and short- and medium-term charters.
Several factors have been offered as an explanation of this. In a government White Paper, the
strongly increasing Norwegian costs and the uncertain 'exchange rate situation were used to
explain the change in Norwegian chartering policies." Changes in exchange rates and cost
development may explain why Norwegian shipowners to a larger extent than previously
preferred shorter timecharters. However, these factors influenced shipowners of all nations
and were not a uniquely Norwegian phenomenon. The following analysis will only briefly
deal with the historical development of Norwegian chartering policies, focusing instead on the
factors which are important in an international perspective. The explanation of the Norwegian
chartering policy will primarily be based upon the Norwegian shipowners' evaluation of the
future market conditions and their attitude towards risk.
Great expectations?
To be able to evaluate the chartering policies of Norwegian shipowners, we need to know both
their aims and their assessment of the market in which they operate. As for aims, we may
assume that these were the same for shipowners of all nations, ie to maximise profits.
Although some shipowners may have had accompanying goals - such as preserving the
40 Figure for charters of more than one year in July 1974 from Stortingsmelding nr. 52 (1980-81), op.cit., p. 17.
The fact that some charters may have had a duration of more than one year, but were terminated in the period
January-July should be taken into account.
41 Stortingsmelding nr. 23 (1975-76), op.cit., p. 39.
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reputation and tradition of the company, continuing the development of traditional business
areas or even becoming the world's largest tanker owner - the notion of profit maximising
individuals should give a fair representation of the motive. When it comes to the assessment
of the market in which they operated, there is reason to expect a higher degree of variance
between different shipowners.
There are two possible explanations of the fact that Norwegian shipowners operated a
large share of their fleet in the spot market compared to their international competitors. On the
one hand, Norwegian shipowners' assessment of the future market development may have
been more positive than the assessments of their foreign competitors and the oil companies.
The importance of this aspect is impossible to ascertain without any knowledge of the market
expectations of the most important agents in a number of countries. On the other hand,
Norwegian shipowners' chartering policy may be explained by differences in the willingness
to take risks or differences in the evaluation of the risk associated with the various chartering
alternatives.
In the context of market assessment, Norwegian shipowners' expectations regarding
the development of the shipping market may have differed from those of their competitors. If
the Norwegian shipowners had a more positive view of the future market development than
foreign agents, they would operate a large share of their fleets in the spot market as they
expected the demand and supply in the shipping market to develop in a manner which
justified the spot market focus from an economic point ofview. It is reasonable to assume that
a shipowner anticipating a demand surplus will expect this demand surplus to be reflected in
high spot market rates. The chartering policy of Norwegian shipowners could then be
considered rational, given their expectations.
The growth of the world tanker fleet in 1974 equalled the average annual demand
growth in the period 1966-73. Based on the judgement that this demand growth could be
maintained, it would not be particularly risky to operate vessels in the spot market or on short
charters. Expectations about a potential demand surplus which was not reflected in the level of
long-term charter rates may then be one factor which can explain the fact that a large share of
Norwegian vessels operated without long-term contracts.
There is little doubt about the fact that Norwegian shipowners had an extremely
optimistic view of the development in world tanker demand. This may be due to the fact that
the Norwegian shipowners to a larger extent than their competitors had an adaptive formation
of expectations, ie they expected that the future market growth would be similar to the
historical growth." The strong growth in the demand for tanker transport in the 1960s was
undoubtedly one of the main causes of the positive market assessment. Norwegian
shipowners, and to a smaller extent their international competitors, may thus have been
bedazzled by the combination of strong historical growth, high freight rates, large availability
of financing and positive demand projections from the oil companies. Until the freight market
42 Confer the discussion in Chapter Three.
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broke down, the Norwegian shipowners had been highly rewarded for their expansive and
optimistic attitude.
Early in 1973, the Norwegian business publication Kapital claimed that the high value
of the shares in one of the Norwegian shipping companies "can be explained by the good
prospects in the tanker sector. " The company had just ordered a 280.000 dwt turbine tanker at
a Japanese yard, and this was done without the security of any long-term charters." In the
final months before the oil price increase the publication claimed that Norwegian shipping
shares were undervalued, despite the fact that several of these companies had experienced an
increase in their share prices of between 300 and 1000 per cent during the last year." It was
concluded that "[i}n the long-term, tanker shipping shares have a large growth potential.
This applies to for instance Waage I and II, Ruth [and} Hadrian." Three of these four
companies operated mainly in the spot market, and they had all contracted mammoth tankers
without the security of long-term contracts.
A leading Norwegian shipping economist asserted in 1972 that "[ijnternational
seaborne trade will probably continue to grow, by some eight per cent a year or more. ,>45 A
year earlier, the managing director of the Norwegian Shipowners' Association presented an
expected annual growth rate of 6,5-8 per cent." The actual figure for the period 1973-1979
was less than 1,5 per cent, and at the trough in 1982, world seaborne trade was smaller than it
had been ten years earlier. Gloating is not the motivation for the inclusion of these figures.
They have been included as they illustrate two important points. First, that expectations about
the development of seaborne trade were high in Norway. Second, that the unforeseen events in
the Middle East and the actual development of the transport demand played havoc with these
expectations.
However, the positiveness was not prevalent everywhere in the Norwegian shipping
community. The shipbrokers Fearnley & Eger, in their review of the 1972 shipping scene,
emphasised that the increase in trading distances was approaching a ceiling, and that future
demand increases would have to rely on increased consumption." Moreover, the shipowner
Odd Gogstad in December 1972 warned of a potential tanker oversupply." Judging by the
subsequent Norwegian contracting, their pessimism was not shared by the tanker owners.
The great expectations of Norwegian shipowners can be contrasted with scepticism on
the part of other agents. OECD, in their annual review of maritime transport, claimed in early
1973 that "unless f...} the demand for tonnage substantially exceeds the estimates made [by
the shipbuilding associations], it seems probable that there will be a significant oversupply of
shipping during the next few years, and that shipyard capacity will be sufficient to meet any
43 Kapital, No.5, 1973, p. 31.
44 Kapital, No. 19, 1973, p. 29. There is a considerable degree of correlation between the value of shipping
shares and the development of the rate level.
45 Svendsen, op.cit., 1973, p. 12.
46 Vikøren, David, "Den internasjonale situasjon for norsk skipsfart [The international situation for Norwegian
shipping], Statsøkonomisk Tidsskrift, Volume 85, No. l, 1971, p. 32.
47 Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review 1972, Oslo, 1973, p. 5.
48 Review of the 1972 shipping scene in Farmand, No. 51, 1972, p. 154.
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calls that may be made upon it up to the end of the decade. ,>49 Following these dire
prophecies, both Norwegian and international tanker contracting reached record heights.
If the Norwegian tanker owners had a more positive view of the future demand and
freight rate development than their competitors, their chartering policy can be considered
rational from an economic point of view." The fact that Norwegian shipowners historically
had achieved above-average revenues by operating in the spot market undoubtedly influenced
their assessment of the situation." Relatively optimistic expectations with regard to the future
market development can therefore not be ruled out as an explanation of why Norwegian
shipowners were relatively heavily engaged in the spot market. However, it is difficult to
prove that systematically erroneous expectations were more prevalent among Norwegian
shipowners than among their competitors without a detailed survey of the expectations of
shipowners in a variety of countries.
Risk attitude and evaluation
An alternative explanation of the Norwegian shipowners' chartering policy may be that their
attitude towards risk differed from that of their international competitors. Differences in the
attitude towards risks may have two explanations. One possibility is that they result from
differences in the willingness to take risks, ie that Norwegian shipowners were relatively risk
prone. Alternatively they may stem from differences in the perception of the risk associated
with operation in the various market segments.
Several authors claim that the chartering policy of Norwegian shipowners is evidence
of their willingness to take risks." However, the assumption that chartering policy is directly
associated with the willingness to take risk is not correct as long as the expectations about the
future market development are unknown.
The perceived risk propensity among Norwegian shipowners is not a postwar
phenomenon. Sturmey claims that the success of the Scandinavian shipowners in the interwar
period was the result of the fact that "they were not inhibited by traditional attitudes and were
more flexible and enterprising in seeking new trades and in adapting their shipping
enterprises to seek opportunities. "53 However the vessels which formed the basis for the
interwar expansion of Norwegian tanker shipping were generally given long-term charters.
The risk of these investments was associated with the low return and the fact that this market
was relatively new and unknown, rather than the manner in which the ships were operated.
49 OECD,Maritime Transport 1972, paragraph 98.
50 As previously mentioned, it is difficult to assess expectations ex post, but the level of contracting is a strong
indication that the Norwegian shipping environment had high expectations regarding the future development.
51 The fact that formal market analyses only were utilised to a limited degree in Norwegian shipping companies
is emphasised in Norman, Victor D., "Shipping Problems - has the market mechanism failed?", Norwegian
Shipping News, No.7, 1976, p. 26.
52 See Porter, op.cit., 1983, p. 57. The notion of the risk-loving Norwegians can also be found in Nerheim &
Utne, op.cit., 1990, p. 217 or Hole, Vidar, The Biggest Gamblers: structure and strategy in Norwegian oil tanker
shipping during the era ofgrowth 1925-1973, unpublished thesis, Norwegian School of Economics and Business
Administration, Bergen, 1993.
53 Sturmey, S. G., British Shipping and World Competition, The Athlone Press, London, 1962, p. 94.
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Norwegian shipowners have traditionally been regarded as entrepreneurs, and
Norwegian shipping organisations have typically been small and dynamic, exploiting the fact
that the economies of scale originate with the vessel rather than the shipping company.
Entrepreneurial organisations are often associated with a willingness to take risks, and
creativity and the ability to innovate have often been regarded as the most important aspects of
Norwegian shipping. 54
The description of the Norwegian chartering policy, particularly when viewed in
combination with the high Norwegian lay up-rates, may leave the impression that Norwegian
shipowners were either naive optimists or die-hard gamblers. Analyses show, however, that
the spot market focus could be a justifiable strategy, where the increased risk would be
rewarded through a substantial risk premium.
Table 6.5 is an analysis of the annual rate of return of various chartering policies. It
gives an indication of the extremely profitable conditions for shipowners choosing a spot
market strategy in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Average annual profits from the spot market
in the period 1967-73 were almost 40 per cent of the newbuilding price for shipowners
operating in this market, compared with 22 and 13 percent for medium- and long-term
charters respectively. Indeed, the average return from a vessel operating in the spot market
was almost twice as high as that of a vessel on 3-7 year charters. Spot market returns exceeded
the returns from long-term charters in all years but one, and was higher than the return from
medium-term charters every year except 1969 and 1972.
Table 6.5. Annual rate ofreturn, per cent of the newbuilding price, 1967-7655
Spot Charter, 1-3 years Charter, 3-7 years
1967 46,7 13 12,7
1968 35,5 15,2 9,6
1969 18,8 20,1 13,3
1970 48,8 14,4 8,8
1971 36,3 34,9 9,8
1972 11,3 40,7 17
1973 77,2 18,1 18,4
1974 7,5 40,2 7,8
1975 -14,2 22,2 20,7
1976 -1,6 -6 25,6
Average 26,6 21,3 14,4
Standard deviation 25,5 13 5
The higher expected return from spot market chartering reflects the fact that the oil companies
perceive the costs associated with lack of tonnage as high. As transport costs constitute a
relatively small share of the oil price at the point of consumption, the oil companies have a
54 Svendsen, Arnljot Strømme, "Er rederbegavelsenes tid forbi?" [Is the era of shipowner talents over],
Bedriftsøkonomen, No, 7, 1981, p. 352.
55 The figures refer to annual rate of return, measured as revenue less operating costs under Norwegian flag as
percentage ofnewbuilding price for an 80.000 dwt tanker built 1966-67, and are taken from Norman, Victor D.,
"Market strategies in bulk shipping", in Hope, Einar (ed.), Studies in Shipping Economics - in honour of
Professor Arnljot Strømme Svendsen, Bedriftsøkonomens Forlag, Oslo, 1981, p. 16.
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considerable willingness to pay for transport capacity in periods where they fear a tonnage
shortage. Their willingness to pay is reflected in the high spot rates in periods of high tonnage
demand, and ensuing high returns on vessels operating in the spot market.
The period analysed in Table 6.5 may give a somewhat misleading picture of the
superiority of the spot market alternative. First, the period analysed contained three boom
periods. This was more than usual for a ten year period, and increased both the average return
and the standard deviation of the spot market. Second, a combination of policies may be
preferable to a strategy were all vessels are operated in the same manner.
Several Norwegians have claimed that operating ships in the spot market was
associated with a smaller degree of risk than tying them to long-term charters." There were
two reasons for this assertion. The first reason was that the high profits which some
Norwegian shipowners had earned by operating their ships in the spot market represented a
sufficient compensation for the periods when the spot market was depressed. The second
justification was the uncertainty with regard to the exchange rate situation and the
development of costs, which added an element of risk to long-term charters. This aspect
became particularly important in periods with considerable uncertainty in the international
economy. Several shipowners who had committed vessels to long-term charters in the late
1960s were caught off guard by the fall in the value of important currencies and unanticipated
cost increases.
It is therefore possible that the question is about the perception of risk, rather than
about the willingness to take risk. In an internal memorandum presented by a committee in the
Norwegian Shipowners' Association it is claimed that "[fjor several of the vessels now laid
up it may apply that they would have given higher revenues to their owners by the
combination of eg a three year voyage-charter at a good rate followed by several years of lay-
up, than what they would have achieved by eg a 5-8 year timecharter which would have
secured stable, but lower revenues. ,,57
The disagreement between two of the biggest Norwegian shipowners may illustrate the
different views on the risk inherent in the various chartering strategies. The business policy of
the Norwegian shipowner Sigval Bergesen d.y. involved operating ships on long-term
charters, and Bergesen even went as far as to upbraid shipowners who chose to operate in the
spot market." Hilmar Reksten, on the other hand, claimed that shipowners operating in the
charter market were "cotters", and he asserted that the risk associated with this market was
56 See for instance Næss, Erling Dekke, Tankfartens problemer og utsikter [The problems and prospects of
tanker shipping], Kristofer Lehmkuhl Lecture 1965, Norwegian School of Economics and Business
Administration, 1965,p. 13 or Reksten, Hilmar, Opplevelser [Experiences], H. Aschehoug & Co., Oslo, 1979, p.
164.
57 "Assessment of the current shipping situation", memorandum dated 7 January 1976, The Archives of the
Norwegian Shipowners' Association, folder 6 B K 75 V - Krisen 1975 - 011275-310376.
58 In Kapital, No. 16, 1974, p. Il he calls Hilmar Reksten "hazardous", and declares that he does not regret
losing the peak rates in the spot market due to his insistence on long-term charters.
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higher than the spot market risk. 59 This debate is further presented in Chapter Eight.
A high propensity to take risks, different assessments of risk from their competitors or
more positive expectations are all elements which may contribute to an understanding of the
Norwegian chartering policy. Although the relative importance of the various factors is
difficult to ascertain, the analysis indicates that all of the elements were present.
The attitude towards risk among Norwegian shipowners can be illustrated by a study
from the early 1970s. Lorange and Norman interviewed 17 Scandinavian tanker owners in
mid 1970, and found that under assumptions of good liquidity, risk-proneness is widespread in
the Scandinavian shipping industry." The situation prior to the freight market breakdown
corresponds well with the type of situation in which Norwegian shipowners were willing to
take high risks. The propensity to take risks may thus be important in explaining the focus on
the spot market and medium- and short-term charters.
The previous presentation illustrated the positive expectations in parts of the
Norwegian shipping community, but lack of information on the expectations of foreign
shipowners makes international comparisons difficult. However, one manner in which
different expectations between Norwegian and foreign shipowners would have been
expressed, was by transfer of tonnage between the two groups of owners. If Norwegian
shipowners had more positive expectations about the demand development than their foreign
counterparts, purchases ofvessels from foreign shipowners by Norwegians could be expected.
According to reports from shipbrokers, Norwegian shipowners did not buy any vessels
above 100.000 dwt from foreign shipowners in 1972 or 1973. This might seem to undermine
the hypothesis that Norwegian shipowners had more positive expectations than their
international competitors. However, the purchase of second-hand ships was in many ways not
a viable strategy for Norwegian shipowners. It is therefore likely that more positive
expectations would be exhibited through a higher level of newbuilding contracts, rather than
through transactions in the second-hand market. The analysis in Chapter 6.4 shows that
Norwegian shipowners were more positive to the prospective market development than
foreign shipowners, as seen through the signing of newbuilding contracts.
6.4. Contracting
The Norwegian shipowner and economist Erling Dekke Næss has claimed that there were
three main reasons for the contracting boom prior to the international shipping crisis." The
first reason was that shipowners lacked information about the mechanisms in the international
shipping market, particularly the charter market. Accordingly, the contracting decisions of the
59 Reksten used the word "husmenn" which was used to characterise poor tenant farmers with life tenure - see
for instance Reksten, Hilmar, Noen ideer om konkurransevilje og risikomomentet under strukturendringene i
norsk tankskipsfart [Some ideas about willingness to compete and the risk aspect during the structural changes in
Norwegian tanker shipping], Kristofer Lehmkuhl Lecture 1971, Norwegian School of Economics and Business
Administration, 1971, p. 6 or Norwegian Shipping News, No. 19, 1973, p. 630.
60 Lorange & Norman, op.cit., 1973, p. 57.
61 Cited in Norwegian Shipping News, No. 12/13, 1975, p. 13-21.
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shipowners failed to fully take into account the probable future tanker demand.
The second reason for the over-contracting was that the behaviour of the tanker
owning companies may be described by a "follow my leader" or "flock of sheep" mentality as
some shipowners more or less blindly imitated the actions of their competitors. This led the
aggregate contracting to a level which could not be justified by realistic projections of the
demand development. One of the reasons for this herd mentality may be the signals from the
level of timecharter freight rates, as presented in Chapter Three - shipowners make similar
decisions because they interpret the signals from the market in the same manner. Another
reason may be that shipowners fear having to pay higher prices for newbuildings if theyenter
a contracting run at a late stage.
The third element in the analysis is of particular importance for Norwegian
shipowners. Næss claims that the depreciation rules in some countries, particularly in
Scandinavia, facilitated continuous reinvestment in ships for tax purposes. He claimed that
"with regard to the shipowners' contracting without taking the demand into account, the tax
policies of several countries have lent a helping hand to the shipyards..: [Ijt may be
worthwhile to take the risk of losses by speculating available capitalon new tonnage if the
alternative is to pay most of it as tax. ,,62 The article in which Næss is cited presents three
further factors which may have been of importance for the large level of contracting. The first
is the role of shipbrokers, who may have been more interested in their own short-term
commissions than the long-term needs of their clients. The other factors are the lack of caution
in the shipbuilding industry and the loan policies of the banks and investment syndicates.
What characterised the Norwegian contracting?
Norwegian shipowners' contracting in the period prior to the shipping crisis is influenced by
all the elements described by Næss. Three aspects of the Norwegian contracting differed from
world contracting in general. The first was the types of vessels ordered. The second was the
level of contracts relative to the size of the existing fleet. Both these elements reflect aspects
which were analysed in connection with the Norwegian fleet structure. The last characteristic
was the amount of tonnage which had been ordered without transport assignments having
been secured.
The contracting in 1973 partly reflects the Norwegian shipowners' preference for large
tankers and dry bulk vessels. However, in a comparison of Norwegian and international
figures the differences between Norway and other countries are less conspicuous with regard
to newbuilding contracts than with regard to the composition of the existing fleet.
The relative similarity with regard to contracting can partly be explained by the effect
of vessel sales on the structural composition of the fleet, but is also a result of the fact that
1973 was an extraordinary year. Due to the development of the various market segments, the
amount of tanker tonnage contracted at the international level was considerably higher than in
62 Næss, Erling Dekke, op.cit., 1965, p. Il.
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more "normal" years. At the internationallevel, tankers contracts constituted more than 80 per
cent of the total tonnage ordered, compared with an average of approximately 60 per cent in
the period 1968-1972.
Table 6.6. Norwegian and international contracting and order book, based on dwt, 197363
Share of Norwegian Share or mtern. Average size ~ Average sIze ~
contractmg 1973 contracting 1973 Norw, order book intern. order book
Tankers 84,0 80,5 174.974 171.365
Comb. carriers 1,4 2,9 121.462 137.753
Dry bulk carriers 14,3 11,2 72.348 44.438
Others 0,4 5,4 5.714 9.561
The distribution of newbuilding contracts illustrates the predominance of large bulk vessels in
the Norwegian fleet. However, compared with the existing fleets at the time, it is evident that
international newbuilding orders had acquired a "Norwegian" character. The high share of
tankers ordered and the relative absence of general cargo vessels imply that the international
contracting corresponds better with the structure of the Norwegian fleet than with the structure
of the international fleet at the time. Moreover, the considerable difference in the average size
of the tankers between the Norwegian and the international fleet is hardly reflected in the
contracting.
The apparent neutralisation of the difference in average size, as seen in Table 6.6, is
part1ya reflection of different statistical bases. The international figures refer to bulk vessels
above 10.000 dwt, whereas the Norwegian figures refer to vessels larger than 1000 dwt. When
this is adjusted for, the average size of the Norwegian tankers increases by 10.000 dwt,
whereas the other categories remain the same." Despite this correction, the difference in
average size between the Norwegian and the international order book - 185.000 dwt versus
171.000 dwt - is considerably smaller than in the case of the existing tanker fleets - 96.000
dwt versus 63.000 dwt.
Although the structural composition of the 1973 contracting was relatively similar
between Norwegian and international shipowners, the level of contracting, as share of the
existing fleet, differed. In 1973, Norwegian shipowners accounted for fourteen per cent of
world tanker contracting, whereas the share of the world tanker fleet owned by Norwegians
constituted approximately ten per cent. However, the fact that Norwegian shipowners
contracted more tonnage than their share of the world fleet should account for was by no
means conspicuous. The disproportionate contracting was the result of the Norwegian cost
structure and the fact that Norway consistently had a faster and larger replacement of ships
63 The table is based on figures for contracting and order book from Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd.,
Review. The contracting figures refer to newbuildings ordered in 1973, whereas the figures for the average size
of the vessels refer to the order book on l January 1974.
64 The figures can be adjusted by means of the size distribution of Norwegian orders in Table 25 in Fearnley &
Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review 1973.
Chapter Six - The Strategy of Norwegian Shipowners 185
Stig Tenold: The Shipping Crisis of the I970s: Causes, Effects and Implications for Norwegian Shipping
than other countries." The relative price of labour and capital in Norway may also explain
why Norwegian shipowners contracted the types of ships, and sizes, which were adversely
affected by the crisis.
It is possible to explain a large share of the variations in Norwegian tanker contracting
by means of the rate level in medium-term charters. Strandenes claims that Norwegian
shipowners were more influenced by variations in the current freight level than their foreign
colleagues." A given increase in the period rate led to an eight per cent increase in Norwegian
contracting, corresponding to a five per cent increase in international contracting. The high
level of Norwegian contracting in 1973, triggered by the strong freight rates, haunted
Norwegian shipowners for a considerable time after the freight market breakdown, and was
one of the reasons that Norwegian shipowners were particularly hard hit by the crisis.
Figure 6.7. Norwegian share of the tanker fleet and contracting, per cent, 1965-8067
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Figure 6.7 shows the violent fluctuations in the Norwegian shipowners' share of total tanker
contracting." There is little reason to claim that Norwegian owners in the beginning of the
1970s largely contracted new tankers when the freight rates and newbuilding prices were at
low levels. In 1970 and 1973, when freight rates were high, the Norwegian share of tanker
contracting was in the region of 14 per cent. The share was approximately the same in 1972,
65 Confer the discussion of the Norwegian fleet structure in Chapter 6.2 and Stortingsmelding nr. 52 (1980-81),
op.cit., p. 18.
66 Norwegian Shipping News, No. 13114, 1979, p. 26.
67 Calculation based upon figures from Table 3, 'Table 20 and Table 27 in Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd.,
Review, 1976 and 1981. The figures are to some extent affected by the fact that the statistical basis differs -
whereas the figures for the international tanker contracting only refer to vessels above 10.000 dwt, the
Norwegian contracting figures include vessels in the 1000-10.000 dwt-range. An adjustment of the figures
would not lead to significantly different results.
68 The giant leap in Norwegian contracting in 1977 is by and large the result of two ULCC-vessels which Sigval
Bergesen d.y. had contracted at the Japanese Mitsui-yard. These vessels accounted for more than two thirds of
Norwegian contracting this year, and the low level of international contracting at this time gives Norway a large
share of total contracting. See Norwegian Shipping News, No. 8B, 1977, pp. 34-35 where the company's reason
for contracting in a generally "dead" newbuilding market is explained.
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when the rate level was low. However, due to the swift changes in freight rates, annual figures
may be somewhat misleading, and the majority of the 1972 contracts had been signed in the
last part of the year, after the market had shown signs ofrecovery. The tonnage contracted by
Norwegian shipowners at foreign yards increased from 304.000 grt in the third quarter to
almost 3.2 million in the fourth quarter." The Norwegian share of the international tanker
contracting in the depressed market in 1971, when newbuilding prices were relatively low,
was only approximately five per cent.
The low figures in 1974 and 1975 show the relatively quick response to the changed
state of the tanker market. Indeed, if cancellations are deducted from contracting, the net
contracting becomes negative. In the third quarter of 1974 the tonnage cancelled was higher
than the new tonnage contracted, and this situation persisted, with one exception, until the
third quarter of 1976.?0
The tonnage which was contracted in 1974 and 1975 largely consisted of smaller
vessels. The average size of Norwegian tankers contracted in 1973 was 184.000 dwt,
reflecting the fact that 52 tankers of more than 100.000 dwt had been contracted. In 1974 no
vessels of more than 60.000 dwt were ordered on Norwegian account. The average size of the
tankers contracted feli to 30.000 dwt in 1974 and further to 4.000 dwt in 1975. The high
Norwegian share of international contracting in 1977 is mainly the result of contracts for two
large tankers and reflects the cessation of tanker contracting at the internationallevel. Whereas
the Norwegian contracting in 1977 made up more than a third of international contracting that
year, the contracting would have constituted less than one per cent of the international
contracting in 1973.
According to a Norwegian White Paper, Norwegian shipowners have been famous for
contracting ships when the contracting market has been favourable and the newbuilding prices
have been low." Perhaps a little surprisingly, an analysis from the Norwegian School of
Economics and Business Administration, printed as an appendix to the aforementioned White
Paper, emphasises the heterogeneity of Norwegian contracting; "Some Norwegian shipowning
companies entered into contracts in years with low prices, whereas other companies
concentrated their contracting activity in years with high freight rates and high newbuilding
prices. ,>72 Indeed, the claim that Norwegian shipowners took advantage of low newbuilding
prices is incompatible with the fact that the contracting of Norwegian shipowners largely was
a response to high freight rates.
The analysis of Norwegian contracting discloses two features which we would expect,
given the elements presented in the analysis of fleet structure above. Norwegian contracting
69 In the third quarter 290.000 grt of tanker tonnage was ordered, compared with 2.674.000 grt in the fourth
quarter. Figures from Table XIII 35 in Statistisk Sentralbyrå, Statistisk Månedshefie [Monthly Bulletin of
Statistics], Central Bureau of Statistics, Oslo, November 1972 and April 1973.
70 Figures from Table XIII 35 in Statistisk Sentralbyrå, Statistisk Månedshefie [Monthly Bulletin of Statistics],
Central Bureau of Statistics, Oslo, various issues.
71 Stortingsmelding nr. 23 (1975-76), op.cit., p. 39.
72 Ibid., p. 147.
Chapter Six - The Strategy of Norwegian Shipowners 187
Stig Tenold: The Shipping Crisis of/he 1970s: Causes. Effects and Implications/or Norwegian Shipping
was dominated by large bulk vessels, and the Norwegian share of international contracting
was high relative to the Norwegian share of the world fleet. The relatively small differences in
the structural composition of the Norwegian and international contracting were illustrated in
Table 6.6, but must be understood in terms of the market at the time. The similarities were a
result of the fact that the contracting of foreign shipowners had assumed a "Norwegian"
flavour, not vice versa. With regard to the amount of vessels on order, the tanker and
combination carrier orders of Norwegian shipowners corresponded to 106 per cent of their
current fleet, whereas the corresponding figure for international shipowners was 82 per cent.
The structural differences between Norwegian and international contracting in 1973
are too small to fully explain why Norwegian shipowners were more severely affected by the
shipping crisis than their international competitors. As for the level of contracting, Norwegian
shipowners were more eager in the newbuilding market than their international competitors, a
fact which to some extent can explain why they were harder hit by the freight market
breakdown. However, the single most important difference between Norwegian and foreign
shipowners was neither structure nor level, but rather the amount of newbuildings which had
been ordered without employment being secured.
The unfixed tanker newbuilding contracts were based on expectations about a
continuously growing demand for tanker transport. They were an important reason for the
hardship of several Norwegian shipowners following the international shipping crisis. After
the oil price increase, shipowners who had contracted unfixed vessels in the period with high
freight rates had to choose between receiving vessels which had to operate in a market
characterised by surplus capacity or paying large cancellation or conversion fees to the
shipyards.
Table 6.7 shows Norwegian tankers and combination carriers above 200.000 dwt on
order in the beginning of 1974.73 The vessels had been ordered by 25 different shipowners,
and 21 of these had contracted vessels for which charters had not been secured. The close
relationship between various Norwegian shipowners implies that several companies may have
participated in the investments without being included in the list.
73 The table is based on data from the list of "Norwegian newbuilding contracts as per l" January 1974",
Norwegian Shipping News N. 2A, 1974, pp. 41-64 and the publication "World Tanker Fleet of200.000 tons and
over including combination carriers and newbuildings" from the Norwegian shipbroker Johan G. Olsen. The
latter publication includes six vessels which have not been registered in Norwegian Shipping News. Three of
these are "Sanko-vessels" ordered by Mosvold. The other three were ordered by Onstad, Belstove and Hoegh,
but I have not been able to confirm from other sources whether these were actual contracts or options. The six
vessels have therefore been left out of the table.
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Table 6.7. Norwegian newbuilding contracts above 200.000 dwt per 1 January 1974
Shipo« ncr d\1 t Yard Country Deli. Cl)' Chartering
Anders Jahre 255 TT Nippon Kokan Japan March 1974 5 year 11979
Anders Jahre 255 TT Nippon Kokan Japan August 1974 5 year 11979
Anders Jahre 267 TT Nippon Kokan Japan May 1977 Unfixed
Anders Jahre 285 TT Nippon Kokan Japan March 1976 Unfixed
A. Jahre (Kosmos) 258 TT Nippon Kokan Japan December 1975 Unfixed
Arth. H. Mathiesen 230 TT Mitsui Shipbuilding Japan 1977 Unfixed
Biørn Biørnstad 320 TT Aker Group Norway 4 qtr 1974 Unfixed
Biørn Biørnstad 258 TT Aker Group Norway 3qtrl975 Unfixed
Biørn Biørnstad & Co 230 TT Aker Group Norway Iqtrl976 Unfixed
Biørn Biørnstad & Co 280 TT Aker Group Norway 2 qtr 1976 Unfixed
CH Sørensen & Sønner 410 TT Bremer Vulkan Germany Medio 1975 5 year 11980
Einar Rasmussen 410 TT Mitsui Shipbuilding Japan October 1974 4 year 11978
Einar Rasmussen 233 TT Uddevallavarvet Sweden 2 half 1976 Unfixed
Einar Rasmussen 472 TT Uddevallavarvet Sweden Mid 1977 Unfixed
Erling H Samuelsen 472 TT Kockums Mekaniska Sweden June 1976 Unfixed
Erling H Samuelsen 236 TT Kockums Mekaniska Sweden December 1977 Unfixed
H Staubol Jp Pedersen 472 TT Kockums Mekaniska Sweden August 1974 3 year 11977
Hagb. Waage 472 TT Howaldtswerke Germany 1978 Unfixed
Hagb. Waage 320 TT Howaldtswerke Germany 1978 Unfixed
Hagb. Waage 258 TT Aker Group Norway 2qtrl974 Unfixed
Hagb. Waage 380 TT Aker Group Norway December 1975 Unfixed
Hagb. Waage 380 TT Aker Group Norway Nov 1977 Unfixed
H Ditlev-Simonsen 276 TT Mitsui Shipbuilding Japan March 1978 Unfixed
H Ditlev-Simonsen 415 TT Kockums Mekaniska Sweden December 1976 Unfixed
H Ditlev-Simonsen 410 TT Kockums Mekaniska Sweden January 1978 Unfixed
Harry Borthen & Co 410 TT Verolme The Neth. April1975 Unfixed
HE Hansen-Tangen 267 TT Uddevallavarvet Sweden June'1975 5 year 11980
HE Hansen-Tangen 267 TT Uddevallavarvet Sweden 197511976 Unfixed
Hilmar Reksten 410 TT Aker Group Norway I qtr 1974 Unfixed
Hilmar Reksten 414 TT Aker Group Norway 2qtrl975 Unfixed
Hilmar Reksten 280 TT Aker Group Norway 1975 Unfixed
Hilmar Reksten 380 TT Aker Group Norway 1975 Unfixed
Hilmar Reksten 360 TT Aker Group Norway 4 qtr 1977 Unfixed
Hilmar Reksten 380 TT Aker Group Norway 1978 Unfixed
Hilmar Reksten 285 TT Aker Group Norway 1978 Unfixed
Hilmar Reksten 285 TT Aker Group Norway 1978 Unfixed
Jørgen Bang 352 TT Kockums Mekaniska Sweden May 1975 2 year 11976
Knut Knutsen OAS 370 TT -Kawasaki Heavy I Japan December 1974 Unfixed
Knut Knutsen OAS 286 TT Kawasaki Heavy I Japan December 1976 Unfixed
Mosvold Shipping AS 285 MT Sumitomo Japan April1975 Unfixed
Mosvold Shipping AS 370 TT Sumitomo Japan End 1976 Unfixed
Odd Godager & Co 285 TT Uddevallavarvet Sweden June 1974 5 year 11979
Odd Godager & Co 285 TT Uddevallavarvet Sweden I half 1976 Unfixed
Onstad Shipping AS 285 TT Uddevallavarvet Sweden May 1977 Unfixed
P Meyer 285 TT Howa1dtswerke Germany 1977 Unfixed
P Meyer 420 TT Howaldtswerke(OIO) Germany 3 qtr 1976 Unfixed
Peder Smedvig 420 TT Howaldtswerke Germany 1977 Unfixed
Sig. Bergesen dy & Co 420 MT Mitsui Shipbuilding Japan July 1974 6 year 11980
Sig. Bergesen dy & Co 420 TT Mitsui Shipbuilding Japan July 1975 7 year 11982
Sig. Bergesen dy & Co 233 TT Mitsui Shipbuilding Japan December 1975 7 year 11983
Sig. Bergesen dy & Co 230 TT Kawasaki Heavy I Japan September 1976 Unfixed
Sig. Bergesen dy & Co 355 MS Uljanik (010) Yugoslavia May 1975 8 year 11982
Skibs-AS Belships Ltd 355 TT Bremer Vulkan Germany April1975 Unfixed
Thor Dahl AS 355 TT Mitsui Shipbuilding Japan July 1976 Unfixed
Thor Dahl AS 355 MT Mitsui Shipbuilding Japan September 1976 Unfixed
Tschudi & Eitzen 230 TT Uddevallavarvet Sweden 1977 Unfixed
Wilh. Wilhelmsen 233 TT Aker Group Norway February 1974 5 year 11979
Wilh. Wilhelmsen 230 TT Nippon Kokan Japan December 1976 Unfixed
Wilh. Wilhelmsen 485 TT Nippon Kokan Japan April1975 Unfixed
Wilh. Wilhelmsen 228 TT Nippon Kokan Japan March 1976 Unfixed
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A considerable share of the vessels presented above were cancelled. Of the 60 newbuildings
on order, 13 had been fixed on timecharters, ranging in duration from two to eight years.
Figure 6.8 shows the amount of tonnage which was unfixed, as well as the amount which had
been secured assignment in the period from 1976 to 1983. The bars for the various years refer
to the amount oftonnage on charters at the beginning of the year.
Figure 6.8. Norwegian newbuildings on charters, 1000 dwt, 1976-8374
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The Norwegian contracting in the beginning of the 1970s is important in explaining the fact
that Norwegian shipowners were heavily affected by the international shipping crisis.
Compared with their foreign competitors, Norwegian shipowners did not contract more
tonnage than they had traditionally done. However, a large portion of the contracts had been
signed at a point in time where the price of newbuilds was high or increasing. Moreover, more
than 80 per cent of the largest tanker tonnage on order had not been secured timecharters. This
is where the Norwegian contracting really differed from that oftheir competitors.
Of the non-Norwegian tanker tonnage on order in January 1974, 37 per cent had been
given timecharters, 32 per cent were oil company contracts and 31 per cent were intended for
the spot market." The figures refer to those newbuilding contracts for which data on
employment are available, and are based on approximately 400 observations for the
international fleet and 60 observations for the Norwegian fleet. It is thus evident that whereas
the portion of the existing Norwegian fleet operating in the spot market corresponded to the
international share, the situation was different with regard to the "fleet" of newbuilding
contracts - in this respect the Norwegian owners differed substantially from their international
competitors.
74 Based on data from Table 6.7.
75 Calculations based on figures from the Norwegian shipbroker Johan G. Olsen.
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Goss claims that the "real risk" of contracting large tankers is only evident when the
first timecharter has expired, at which point most of the debt has been repaid." The
newbuildings of 21 Norwegian shipowners would not even reach this critical point, as they
had not been fixed on charters which could secure these first instalments.
The eager contracting in the early 1970s affected Norwegian shipowners in two ways.
Several shipowners had to receive newbuildings for which employment could not be found.
The laid up vessels constituted a drain on the companies' resources. Other shipowners avoided
this by paying massive cancellation and conversion fees. It has been estimated that the fees
paid by Norwegian shipowners in the period 1975-1977 were in the region of 1,5-2 billion
kroner." By following a more prudent contracting strategy, Norwegian shipowners could have
avoided paying a "penalty" of such proportions.
The heterogeneity of the Norwegian shipping community was emphasised earlier, and
the high amount of unfixed Norwegian contracts may have been the result of the influence of
a few expansive and risk-seeking shipowners. Ifwe adjust for the effects of the contracting of
the three Norwegian shipowners usually presented as risk-lovers - Biørnstad, Waage and
Reksten - and take into account the lack of oil company tonnage in the Norwegian fleet, the
picture is partly modified. However, significant differences between Norwegian shipowners
and owners in other countries still remain.
On the international scene, 45 per cent of the independent shipowners' newbuildings
were unfixed. This can be compared with 73 per cent for Norwegian shipowners, if we leave
out the 17 unfixed vessels ordered by Biørnstad, Reksten and Waage. The difference is still
substantial, and illustrates that the large amount of unfixed newbuildings was not the result of
the influence of a handful of risk-lovers, but had a more fundamental basis in the Norwegian
industry.
How can the high Norwegian contracting be explained?
The following analysis focuses on three elements which can explain the high Norwegian
contracting. Two of these are related to features discussed above and will thus only briefly be
analysed in this context. The first element is the Norwegian factor prices, and the fact that
Norwegian shipowners operated in the technologically advanced, capital-intensive segment of
the shipping sector. The second element is the assessment of the market conditions and the
attitude towards risk. Like in the case of chartering, a relatively positive attitude with regard to
the future market conditions or a higher propensity to take risks can explain the Norwegian
disparity. The third element is the institutional setting, particularly with regard to tax policies.
The Norwegian fleet structure may partly be accounted for by the relative price of
labour and capital in Norway. The fact that Norwegian seamen were expensive in an
76 Goss, Richard O., "A Comment on Risk Preference and Shipping Decisions", in Lorange, Peter, and Norman,
Victor (eds.), Shipping Management, Institute for Shipping Research, AS John Grieg, Bergen, 1973, p. 185.
77 Memorandum to the Norwegian Minister of Trade and Shipping, Hallvard Bakke, dated 10 October 1977, The
Archives of the Norwegian Shipowners' Association, Folder 6 B K 75 - Krisen 1975 VII, 011077-311277.
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international perspective implied that Norwegian shipowners were encouraged to invest in
modem vessels which utilised economies of scale and the best-available technology,
simultaneously minimising manning costs. As a result of the rapid technological development
in the shipping industry there were considerable improvements in the operation of vessels. By
ordering new, capital-intensive and technologically superior vessels, and disposing of these
when even more advanced alternatives became available, Norwegian shipowners were able to
utilise their comparative advantage with regard to capital costs and reduce the importance of
the comparative disadvantage in connection with manning. This strategy necessitated a high
level of contracting.
Norwegian shipowners' evaluation of the future transport demand and their attitude
towards risk may also have influenced the amount of newbuilding contracts on Norwegian
account. The mechanisms are the same as in connection with chartering strategies. If the
Norwegian shipowners were more optimistic with regard to their expectations about future
transport needs than their international competitors, this would be reflected in a larger share of
tonnage on order. If they intended to benefit from the peaks in transport demand, and were
willing to suffer the anguish of an oversupply, we should also expect high contracting levels.
Berg Andreassen has shown how the level of investment is influenced by the risk
preference of the shipowner." Shipowners who are willing to take risks will invest in a
manner which secures that the peak transport demand will be met. Risk-averse shipowners, on
the other hand, will typically use more conservative estimates of future transport demand as
the basis for their decisions. In periods where the freight rate level is low, both groups will act
in the same manner. The interesting point in this connection is that the contracting behaviour
of Norwegian shipowners in the period before 1974 corresponds closely to the strategy which
Berg Andreassen claims that "risk lovers" will follow in prosperous times.
It is evident that the factors which can explain the Norwegian fleet structure and
chartering strategy may be relevant in connection with the high contracting level as well.
Another important factor was briefly presented in the international context in Chapter Four,
viz taxation. The manner in which the tax system is designed may in itself influence the
strategic decisions of the shipping companies, implying that after-tax evaluations may differ
from pre-tax evaluations. As Fischer and Nordvik point out, "the principal method of
subsidising international shipping since the Second World War has been through
manipulations of domestic tax systems. ,,79
Due to the fact that shipping is a mobile sector, where a large share of the factors of
production are bought and sold internationally, it is necessary to take special precautions in
connection with the taxation of shipowning companies. As a result of this, the tax treatment of
Norwegian shipowners has traditionally been regarded as favourable compared with other
78 Andreassen, J. A. Berg, "Risk and investment decisions in non-liner shipping", Maritime Policy and
Management, Vol. 17,No.1, 1991,pp. 22-30.
79 Fischer, Lewis R. and Nordvik, Helge W., "Subsidy ands Protection in National Shipping Industries around
the North Sea Since World War II", paper presented to the North Sea History Conference, Stavanger, Norway,
1995,p. 7.
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sectors of the Norwegian economy."
The relatively dominant position of shipping in the Norwegian economy can partly be
explained by the fact that the tax system has been preferential for shipping investments, thus
constituting an indirect subsidy relative to other sectors. Wergeland has pointed out four areas
in which the tax system has been particularly preferential:"
o Liberal depreciation rules which have made large tax deductions possible.
o The fact that losses can be carried forward and be deducted from future profits.
o The "gross principle" with regard to taxation, which implies that the purchasing price is
the basis for depreciation when second-hand tonnage is bought.
o The writing down of profits from sales against new investments.
As a result of the favourable treatment of shipping investments, the manner in which
shipowners utilise their capital has been affected by the tax rules. The special tax treatment of
the shipping sector has been motivated by the fact that the assets in this sector are far more
costly than in other sectors of the Norwegian economy, and that a higher turnover of assets is
necessary." Accordingly, the tax practices with regard to the valuation of shipping assets have
been favourable in order to amend the fast deterioration of these assets relative to other
investments.
Although the special rules reflect actual features of the shipping industry, ie the
relatively short life-span of the assets and the limited geographical restrictions on the capital,
the arrangements have substantial consequences for the actions of the agents in the shipping
sector. The Norwegian authorities may for instance, through their depreciation allowances,
have influenced the contracting decisions of the shipowners." Indeed, the Norwegian
authorities recognised this and admitted that "{t}he special rules for shipping taxation will
lead to a considerable tax credit for companies with economic results which make the rules
effective. ,,84
The depreciation rate of Norwegian vessels varied from six to eight per cent annually
for tankers and most other vessels and five to seven per cent for dry cargo vessels. However,
two elements are of particular importance with respect to depreciation:
o The access to tilleggsavskrivninger [additional depreciation] when the vessel is delivered,
representing five per cent of the original cost annually and 15 per cent in total, but limited
80 Hansen, Terje, Aarbakke-utvalgets skisse til reform av bedrifts og kapitalbeskatningen og norsk
skipsfartsnæring [The Aarbakke-committee's sketch for reform of the company- and capital-taxation and
Norwegian shipping industry], Report No. 29/89, Centre for Applied Research, Bergen, 1989, p. 45. Despite the
favourable treatment, Norwegian shipowners called for relief in connection with the shipping crisis; see Norges
Rederforbund, Årsberetning 1978/1979 [Annual report], p. 5.
8! Wergeland, Tor, Et konkurransedyktig Norge - Norsk skipsfarts konkurranseevne [A competitive Norway -
the competitiveness of Norwegian shipping], SNF-report No. 50/1992, The Foundation for Research in
Economics and Business Administration, Bergen, 1992, p. 47.
82 Stortingsmelding nr. 52 (1980-81), op.cit., p. 23.
83 See for instance Næss, op.cit., 1965, p. Il, Porter, op.cit., 1983, p. 57 or Dobrowen, Kim et.al., Rederi og
kapitaltilførsel - Hovedproblemer i moderne rederifinansiering [Shipowner and capital supply - Main problems
in modem shipping financing], Nordic Institute of Maritime Law, University of Oslo, 1981, p. 241.
84 Stortingsmelding nr. 23 (1975-76), op.cit., p. 65.
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to 50 per cent of ordinary depreciation annually. Thus, if the shipowner chooses eight per
cent ordinary depreciation, additional depreciation may be 4+4+4+3 per cent, and would
stop after four years.
o Alternatively, shipowners had access to åpningsavskrivninger [accelerated depreciation]
of up to 25 per cent of the original cost. However, the accelerated depreciation may not
exceed 50 per cent of the taxable income of the shipowner. The most important feature of
this access to accelerated depreciation, is that it may begin as soon as the first instalment
on the building contract has been paid."
The access to additional depreciation or accelerated depreciation shortened the period of
ordinary depreciation, and have contributed to the liberal Norwegian depreciation rules for
shipping investments. The fact that the depreciation rules are liberal has important
ramifications:
o Companies will prefer investments in capital assets to financial investments.
o If the period of depreciation differs from the life of the asset, companies have an incentive
to invest in the assets for which the depreciation allowances are favourable, in particular if
additional or accelerated depreciation is possible.
o Companies operating in relatively capital-intensive sectors have an advantage compared
with companies in less capital-intensive sectors, and companies will substitute capital for
labour.
o Expanding companies are favoured as the tax credit which the depreciation represents
makes it easier to finance increased capital needs.
The favourable Norwegian depreciation allowances may have induced shipowners to contract
new ships without sufficient analysis of the market conditions at times when the profits were
large. The existence of anticipated depreciation on shipbuilding contracts meant that
shipowners with large profits could reduce their tax burden considerably by contracting new
vessels. This factor may contribute to an explanation of the strong correlation between the
freight rate level and Norwegian contracting and the apparent "herd behaviour".
Another element of the Norwegian tax policy was the benefits of reinvestment in
connection with revenues from the sale of assets. If a vessel was sold at a profit, the owner
would be given a suspended tax relief on the capital gains from the sale. The tax on the profits
of the sale could be deducted from the book value of a new investment within the following
eight years. The writing down of sale profits when new investments were undertaken did not
reduce the basis for depreciation, and would come on top of ordinary and additional or
accelerated depreciation.
The maximum depreciation, including accelerated depreciation, on a tanker implies
that the vessel is fully depreciated after ten years. The life-span of the vessel will generally be
considerably longer, and the value of the vessel thus represents a "hidden reserve" for the
85 The Norwegian tax regime made provisions for accelerated depreciation in other sectors as well, although the
deductible amount was smaller and depreciation could begin only when the building of the asset had begun, not
when the first instalment was paid.
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shipping company." A fully depreciated vessel implies that the shipowner's taxes will
increase unless the vessel is sold and the profits reinvested. By continuous reinvestment, the
temporary tax relief inherent in the depreciation rules and suspended tax on profits from sales
acquire a permanent nature.
Johan Seland of The Norwegian Shipowners' Association strongly refuted the
assertion that the tax system could explain the timing of Norwegian contracting. In an
interview he claimed that "[vjery few Norwegian newbuilding contracts could not have been
postponed for a considerable time if the purpose was to gain preferential depreciation. As the
contracting has happened at an earlier time, and been larger than necessary to secure the
depreciation, it is obvious that other factors have been more important for the decisions. ,,87
His assertion is partly correct. The fact that capital gains from sales could be suspended from
taxation for eight years gave shipowners limited incentives to invest in new tonnage
immediately after vessels had been sold. However, the question of capital gains is not the
most important here, and although capital gains could be suspended, freight income could not.
The liberal depreciation rules only become important when the operation of the
company leads to profits, and in particular when the profits are so high that maximum
depreciation becomes possible. The fact that the tax burden would be high in years with high
freight rates motivated shipowners to order new tonnage. If new contracts were entered into
and accelerated depreciation of contracts was activated, their tax liability could be
considerably reduced. The fact that high freight rates coincided with large order books implies
that depreciation could commence several years before the yards had even begun the building
of the vessels.
The analysis above takes into account the two most important aspects of the
Norwegian tax system, and shows that the design of the tax system, and in particular the
depreciation rules, may have contributed to the high Norwegian contracting. Other aspects of
the Norwegian tax system, eg the access to carry forward losses and the provision for
classification, devaluation and self-insurance funds, have not been included in the analysis,
but distinguishes the tax treatment of shipping from that of other domestic industries
Moreover, the taxation practices were changed in the wake of the crisis. For instance,
Norwegian shipowners were granted a reduction of income of 25 per cent of the price of
vessels contracted at Norwegian yards in the period 15 February - 31 December 1977. This
rule was motivated by the predicament of the Norwegian shipbuilding industry, and not
Norwegian shipowners."
Summary
The Norwegian hardship in the period after the shipping crisis was reflected both in high lay
up-rates and a strong reduction of the Norwegian fleet. The three features analysed above -
86 Dobrowen, Kim et.al., op.cit., 1981, p. 238.
87 Kapital, No.3, 1975, pp. 8-10
88 Dobrowen, Kim et.al., op.cit., 1981, p. 244.
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fleet structure, chartering strategy and contracting - can explain the fact that Norwegian
shipowners were harder hit by the crisis than their international competitors. The analysis of
the Norwegian fleet structure showed that Norwegian shipowners had invested a
disproportionate share of their resources in the vessel types and size classes which were
adversely affected by the crisis. Norwegian shipowners were thus more vulnerable to the
changed conditions in the shipping market than foreign shipowners.
The analysis of the chartering policy shows that Norwegian and international
shipowners had a similar proportion of their tonnage in the spot market by the outbreak of the
oil crisis. However, this apparent similarity conceals two aspects which made Norwegian
shipowners particularly exposed. First, there was a relatively large share of short- and
medium-term charters in the Norwegian fleet, as shown by the large share of charters which
terminated in the period 1974-1977. Second, although the share of the existing fleet"which had
been given charters was equal to the international average, Norwegian shipowners had a
considerably higher share of unfixed newbuildings than their international competitors. In
particular this applied to large tankers, where 80 per cent of the tonnage ordered on
Norwegian account had not been given charters, compared with 31 per cent for other
shipowners.
It was these unfixed newbuilding contracts, rather than Norwegian contracting per se,
which differentiated Norwegian shipowners from their foreign competitors, and which had
important bearings for the development of the Norwegian shipping industry in the wake of the
crisis. Given the existing structure of the Norwegian fleet, the effects of the Norwegian tax
system and the influence of Norwegian factor prices, a relatively large share of newbuildings
on Norwegian account should be expected. However, whereas the relatively fast replacement
oftonnage provided Norwegian with a competitive advantage in the 1960s and early 1970s, a
large "fleet" of newbuildings became a liability in a market characterised by tonnage surplus.
6.5. Other Factors
The factors presented above are paramount to an explanation of the high Norwegian lay up-
rates and the economic difficulties of the Norwegian shipowners. However, some factors may
have affected the Norwegian shipping sector negatively, without necessarily being visible
through higher lay up-rates. The following analysis briefly looks at two such elements - the
development of exchange rates and the development of costs.
6.5.1. The importance of exchange rate fluctuations
The large exchange rates fluctuations after the breakdown of the international monetary
system increased the shipowners' risks with regard to contracting and chartering. Whereas the
risks previously largely had been connected to freight market fluctuations, the demise of the
fixed exchange rate-system implied that shipowners were faced with risks related to exchange
rate fluctuations as well.
The currency instability may have had more severe implications for Norwegian
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shipowners than for their foreign competitors. Two factors can account for this. First, the
Norwegian fleet was relatively modem, implying that a relatively small share of the debt had
been repaid. Accordingly, Norwegian shipowners had relatively high financial costs. Second,
the Norwegian exchange rate-balance - the relationship between income-currencies and cost-
currencies - may have made Norwegian shipowners relatively vulnerable.
Shipping income is usually received in dollar, whereas costs are accrued in a variety of
currencies." Bunkers costs were usually stipulated in dollar, like the freight income, and
consequently did not involve any kind of exchange rate risk. In connection with interest and
instalments, however, exchange rate developments may have been of some consequence.
These costs were not necessarily in the same currency as the income, and exchange rate
fluctuations would thus influence the costs in connection with investments.
In October 1977 the foreign debt of Norwegian shipowners totalled NoK 27,2 billion.
It was distributed in the following manner (all figures denote NoK); 16,7 billion as US dollar
(61 per cent), 2,5 billion as German mark (nine per cent), 2,5 billion as Swedish kroner (nine
per cent), 1,7 billion as Japanese yen (six per cent), 1,3 billion as Swiss franc (five per cent)
and 1,2 billion as French franc (four per cent). It is likely that the share of dollar in shipping
debts increased during the 1970s as a result of the development of better mechanisms which
could secure against exchange rate losses. Moreover, the Guarantee Institute actively tried to
convert the debt of Norwegian shipowners to Eurodollars. 90
Figure 6.9. Index of the value of the US dollar (4 January 1971=100), 1971-80
110 - -
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Japanese yen
40 ---------- o --
171 571 1071372 872 173 673 1173474 874 175 675 1175476 876 177 677 1177 478 978 279 6791179
-- German mark -- Japanese yen --Norwegian kroner -- Swedish kroner
89 The two instances in the 1970s where the dollar was devalued led to a reduction in the income of shipowners.
According to Lund, Ole, "Dollardevaluering og bristende forutsetninger" [Dollar devaluation and mistaken
premises], Nordisk Skibsrederforenings Medlemsblad, No. 499, 1974, p. 4422, several shipowners were in a
position where they wanted to annul charter contracts entered into at pre-devaluation exchange rates.
90 Figures from Norges Bank, reprinted in Norwegian Shipping News, No.4, 1978. See also Stortingsmelding nr.
8 (1979-80), Om virksomheten iNorsk Garantiinstituttfor skip og borefartøyer AlS i 1978 [On the activities of
The Norwegian Guarantee Institute for Ships and Drilling Vessels Ltd. in 1978], Vedlegg l (Appendix l), p. 9.
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Figure 6.9 shows the large appreciation and fluctuations relative to the dollar of four of the
most important currencies for Norwegian shipowners." As a result of the large share of
newbuilds on Norwegian account and the low average age of the Norwegian fleet, Norwegian
shipowners were relatively vulnerable to fluctuations in the exchange rates. Financial costs
accounted for a larger share of total costs for Norwegian shipowners than for the majority of
their foreign colleagues."
In late 1976 the Norwegian debt on existing vessels and contracts amounted to almost
36 billion kroner, or 7 billion dollar, of which four fifths were related to foreign creditors. Six
months earlier the debt on the world fleet and contracts was estimated at 34,7 billion dollar."
Accordingly, Norwegian shipowners were responsible for approximately 20 per cent of the
international shipping debt, whereas their share of the world fleet and order book was slightly
more than eight per cent. The high degree of Norwegian shipping debt, ofwhich less than half
was denoted in American dollar, contributed to the hardship of Norwegian shipowners.
The Norwegian situation was thus influenced by a relatively high degree of debt
compared with foreign shipowners, and a large share of this debt was denominated in the
currencies of the most important suppliers of vessels. Foreign shipowners may have had a
better exchange rate-balance between income and costs, thus augmenting the Norwegian
disadvantage. It would be relatively easy for shipowners largely operating cheap second-hand
tonnage, financed by the company's available resources or by loans given by banks or other
financial institutions, to have their loans denoted in the same currency as the company's
revenue.
A change in the Japanese attitude to financing made the problems particularly serious
for shipowners who had contracted a large share of their newbuildings there. In the 1960s the
Japanese authorities, eager to promote the country's shipbuilding industry, offered credit in
dollar, thus making it relatively easy for shipowners to secure balance between income and
revenue. From the beginning of the 1970s, however, the Eximbank, the major financial
institution financing foreign orders at Japanese yards, was unwilling to quote in dollar.
Accordingly, shipowners who contracted tonnage in Japan during the boom in the beginning
of the decade were unfavourably affected by the exchange rate development. The situation
was much the same for newbuildings ordered in Germany."
In the two years following the freight market breakdown, the development of exchange
91 Figure 6.9 is based on daily figures from the Federal Reserve Board of the United States. The exchange rate on
4 January 1971 equals 100, and a level of 80 indicates a 20 per cent appreciation relative to the US dollar. In
order to improve the clarity of the presentation, the figures have been converted to averages on a 20-day basis,
and the x-axis crosses the y-axis at 40. A less precise survey of the development of the Norwegian currency can
be found in Statistisk Sentralbyrå, Historisk Statistikk 1994 [Historical Statistics 1994], Central Bureau of
Statistics, Oslo, Table 24.28, p. 161.
92 This may have contributed to the hardship of Norwegian shipowners by making them more exposed to
exchange rate losses.
93 Norwegian figures from Norges Offentlige Utredninger (1978: 13) Skipsfartsnæringen [The shipping sector],
p. 29. Debt relating to the oil rig sector has been excluded. For the international fleet, confer Table 3.2.
94 Stokes, Peter, Ship Finance - Credit Expansion and the Boom-Bust Cycle, Lloyd's of London Press Ltd.,
London, 1992,p. 120.
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rates had negative impact on shipowners with a large share of their costs in Swedish and
Norwegian kroner, such as Norwegian owners. After 1976, this situation changed, and the
exchange rate development turned out to be relatively favourable to Norwegian owners,
particularly compared with companies with a large share of their debt denoted in German
mark or Japanese yen. Even though the share of Norwegian contracts in Japan had increased
to more than 30 per cent of total Norwegian newbuilding contracts, this was a considerably
smaller share than the international average; in 1974 Japan delivered almost 60 per cent of all
new-built tonnage." The strong appreciation of the Japanese currency - from 295 yen/dollar
in December 1976 to 177 yen/dollar in October 1978 - put several shipowners in a difficult
position, and shipowners who had a relatively large share of their debt denoted in yen
sustained heavy currency losses after the middle of the decade."
Compared with some oftheir international competitors, several Norwegian shipowners
were adversely affected by the exchange rate fluctuations. The exchange rate development in
the 1970s favoured the different shipbuilding nations in turn; only the German mark
experienced a negative development throughout the decade. Norwegian shipowners were
unfavourably affected by the fact that they were responsible for a relatively large share of the
international shipping debt. However, it is difficult to ascertain the magnitude and significance
of this effect, as detailed information about the proportion of the debt of shipowners in various
countries is unavailable.
6.5.2. The development of costs
The hardship of Norwegian shipowners may also have. been affected by the development of
costs. The cost development has been used to explain the fact that the Norwegian shipowners
operated a larger share of their ships in the spot market than they had traditionally done.
According to one prominent Norwegian shipowner "ordering newbuildings without the
backing of freight contracts was much less of a gamble than ordering on the basis of long-
term charter parties which give no security against rising costs and inflation. .vn
Due to the strong inflation in the beginning of the 1970s, there was a considerable
increase in the cost of building and operation of vessels, but this generally influenced all
shipowning companies in a like manner. However, there might be some support for the
argument that the Norwegian shipowners were harder hit by the unfavourable development of
costs than shipping companies abroad.
One reason for this is that the costs which increased the most may have weighed
heavily in the "cost bundle" of Norwegian shipowners. If building costs increased faster than
95 Chida, Tomohei and Davies, Peter N., The Japanese Shipping and Shipbuilding Industries - A History of Their
Modern Growth, Athlone Press, London, 1990, Table 6.9, p. 161.
96 Some Norwegian shipowners with Japanese-built tonnage or contracts in Japan were negatively affected.
However, due to the experience from the beginning of the decade, it had become more common to secure the
debt burden against adverse exchange rate developments through a variety of mechanisms.
97 See Reksten, Hilmar, op.cit., 1971, p. 18. The quote is taken from an interview with Reksten in Norwegian
Shipping News, No. 19, 1973, p. 630.
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crew costs, Norwegian shipowners would be more severely affected than shipowners for
whom the share of wages was high relative to construction costs, eg owners who operated old,
relatively labour-intensive ships. The cost advantage of shipowners operating second-hand
tonnage would, however, partly be neutralised by the fact that increases in the price of
newbuilds manifest themselves in higher second-hand prices. Nevertheless, it is evident that
the financial position of Norwegian shipowners was impaired by the fact that their aggressive
contracting strategy forced them to pay large cancellation fees or accept newbuildings which
at the time of delivery were far less worth than the price the Norwegian owners had agreed to
pay.
Norwegian shipowners may also have been adversely hit due to differences in the
development of the price of the factors of production available to the various shipowners."
This is to some extent counteracted by the international character of the shipping market; most
factors of production were bought in the international market at a set of prices generally equal
to all buyers. Consequently, the domestic cost level is of much less importance to shipping
than to land-based industries. Some factors of production, eg bunkers, other provisions and
debt capital, will generally only in be bought in local markets if the prices here are
competitive." The only area in which national operating costs were of any particular
significance was in connection with the manning of ships.
The total manning costs for Norwegian shipowners more than doubled between 1971
and 1977, and in a Norwegian White Paper it is claimed that the strong domestic growth of
prices in the period 1974-77 resulted in a weakening of Norwegian shipowners'
competitiveness and a deterioration of their economic standing.'?" Two factors reduce the
importance of this element in a longer perspective. First, manning costs were of limited
importance with regard to the majority of the Norwegian tonnage. Second, the development in
the last part of the decade made up for the previous Norwegian cost disadvantage. A 1983
survey of the competitiveness of Norwegian shipping concluded that "the wage development
a/Norwegian seamen has been moderate in the 1970s. ,,101
Although it is difficult to estimate the extent to which the cost development of
Norwegian shipowners was unfavourable, some general features can be described:
D From 1977 onwards Norwegian shipowners owned a disproportionate 'share of turbine-
driven vessels. As a result of this the Norwegian fleet was relatively hard hit by the strong
fuel price increase.
D The fact that Norwegian manning costs were high in an international perspective was
98 This implies that the price of one of the factors of production may develop differently for different
shipowners. The development of the operating costs of Norwegian ships illustrates to some extent that the
development offactor prices varied between countries; see Stortingsmelding nr. 23 (1975-76), op.cit., p. 98.
99 Some countries, notably Saudi Arabia, subsidised the price of bunkers for domestic vessels; see Norges
Offentlige Utredninger (1983:7), op.cit., p. 67. This is one of the relatively few examples ofnon-crew operating
costs which varied with the nationality of the shipowner.
100 Stortingsmelding nr. 52 (1980-81), op.cit., p. 18. See the index of costs for Norwegian ships in Norges
Rederforbund, op.cit., 1979, Table 8.1., p. 28.
101 Norges Offentlige Utredninger (1983:7), op.cit., p. 56.
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partly neutralised by the Norwegian focus on capital-intensive vessels. The development
of Norwegian crew costs did not significantly diverge from the international trend,
although there was a deterioration of the Norwegian competitiveness in the first part of the
1970s.
o The effects of the Norwegian contracting strategy were more important than the
development of operating costs. Cancellation fees and superfluous newbuildings had a
more negative influence on the economic performance of Norwegian shipping companies
than the Norwegian cost development.
6.6. Summary
Three factors have been emphasised to explain why Norwegian shipowners were relatively
hard hit by the international shipping crisis, compared with their international colleagues. The
first explanation is that the Norwegian fleet was largely made up of the types and sizes of
ships which were particularly hard hit by the crisis. The basis for this fleet structure can be
found in the relative prices of the factors of production in Norway, which gave Norwegian
shipowners a competitive advantage in the operation of relatively capital-intensive ships.
The second cause of the Norwegian hardship is that Norwegian shipowners to a larger
degree than their competitors operated in the spot market or on short- and medium-term
charters. Moreover, the share of oil company-owned tonnage in the Norwegian fleet was low
in an international perspective. As a result of this, only a small share of the Norwegian fleet
was secured employment in the years following the freight market breakdown.
The final reason for the unfavourable development of the Norwegian shipping sector is
connected to the contracting undertaken in the period before the oil price increase. Norwegian
shipowners had a larger share of the newbuilding contracts than their corresponding share of
the world fleet. The difficulties with regard to the amount of tonnage on order were
aggravated by the fact that several Norwegian shipowners had not secured employment.
The analysis shows that the commonly presented image of Norwegian shipowners as
gamblers should be modified. Given their working conditions, including tax policies and
factor prices, as well as expectations about continuing strong transport demand growth, their
investments should be considered rational. Indeed, judged by the expectations prevalent in
1973, the Norwegian strategy - with regard to fleet structure, chartering and contracting - can
to a large extent be considered sensible from an economic point of view. However, the oil
price increases and the freight market breakdown transformed the shipping sector to such an
extent that the actual development differed significantly from the expectations. Norwegian
shipowners were more severely affected by this shift than shipowners in other countries .
.,
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE GUARANTEE INSTITUTE
As the previous analysis has shown, the beginning of the 1970s represented a watershed in the
development of the international market for shipping services. l The shipping crisis,
characterised by depressed freight rate levels and high lay up-rates, had large consequences
for Norway. On the one hand, the Norwegian shipping sector was more important for the
domestic economy than the shipping sectors of any other industrialised nations.' On the other
hand, Norwegian shipowners were adversely affected by the crisis.
The shipping malaise prompted a shift in the Norwegian shipping policy. Helge
Nordvik has appropriately characterised the change as a development from "benign neglect to
active intervention ".3 First, the Norwegian authorities had to react to the fact that a
considerable portion of Norwegian shipowners would be having liquidity difficulties as a
result of lacking revenues and high costs. Second, the Norwegian authorities had to introduce
measures which could secure the viability of the Norwegian shipping sector in the long-term.
The response to the former challenge will be analysed in this chapter, whereas the long-term
changes in the Norwegian shipping policy will be analysed in Chapter Ten.
7.1. The Initial Response of the Authorities
The Norwegian authorities responded to the crisis by establishing Norsk Garantiinstitutt for
skip og borefartøyer AS [The Norwegian Guarantee Institute for Ships and Drilling Vessels
Ltd.] to alleviate the financial difficulties of the Norwegian shipping industry and to preserve
valuable tonnage on Norwegian hands. The Guarantee Institute played an important role after
its formation in 1975, and several shipowners avoided bankruptcy due to loans secured
through guarantees provided by the institute. However, the shipowners were not the only
group benefiting from the institution. Its establishment was important to the existence of the
Norwegian shipbuilding industry, as well as to Norwegian borrowers' creditworthiness and
the stability of domestic financial markets.
Parallel with the plunging freight rates, the market for second-hand tonnage broke
down. The result of the fall in the value of the vessels was that much of the equity which the
tonnage represented was lost to Norwegian shipowners. The reduction of the value of the
vessels was particularly troublesome due to the minimum value-clause, which was a common
feature of international mortgage contracts. This clause gave the financial institutions the right
I This chapter is based on a paper presented at the Ninth International Conference of the Association of the
History of the Northern Seas, Comer Brook, Newfoundland, August 1999. I am grateful for fmancial support
from the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. A version of the paper is forthcoming
in the International Journal of Maritime History.
2 The only developed country where the importance of the shipping sector in the domestic economy was of the
same magnitude as in Norway was Greece.
3 Nordvik, Helge W, "From Benign Neglect to Active Intervention: Norwegian Government Shipping Policies
from the 1970s Shipping Crisis to the Present", paper presented to the lAME-Conference held at City
University, Department of Trade, Shipping and Finance, London, September 20-22, 1997.
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to demand extra collateral or instalments if there was a reduction in the value of the
investment object, ie the ship. If the shipowners were unable to meet these terms, the creditors
could demand possession of the ship. Several Norwegian shipowners, who originally had
economic problems due to the reduction in freight rates and the disappearance of revenues due
to lay-ups, were unable to pay extra instalments or supply additional collateral.
The dramatic deterioration of the collateral put Norwegian shipowners in an awkward
position relative to their creditors. If the creditors wanted to exercise the rights stipulated in
the minimum value-clause, they could either keep the ship, awaiting an increase in the value,
or they could sell the vessel to agents with more financial resources. The reason for the limited
use of the latter opportunity in the period after the breakdown of the freight rates was probably
the sorry state of the market for second-hand tonnage.
Norwegian shipowners had also entered the growing market for drilling vessels.
Parallel to the situation in the shipping sector, the market for drilling vessel services was
characterised by increasing supply and stagnating demand from the middle of the 1970s.
However, the difficulties in the rig sector were expected to be of a more temporary nature than
those in the tanker sector. Two connecting links made it convenient to consider the difficulties
of the rigowners together with those of the shipowners. First, the groups were to some extent
overlapping, as the bulk of the rigs orders on Norwegian account had been placed by
shipowners seeking new profit opportunities or wishing to diversify their operations. Second,
the construction of drilling vessels had become an important activity for several Norwegian
yards.
The importance of shipping in the Norwegian economy appeared to be the major
motivation for the actions of the Norwegian authorities following the freight market
breakdown. Traditionally, the shipping sector had been relatively free from government
intervention. Despite giving shipowners favourable tax treatment, mainly as a result of the
international character of the shipping industry, the Norwegian authorities had generally left
the development of the fleet to the agents in the shipping industry. However, as the crisis
threatened the viability of this sector, measures were introduced to reduce the anticipated
flight of Norwegian tonnage following the adverse demand conditions.
Despite the obvious need for action to maintain the significant position of Norwegians
in the international shipping industry, the government may have had other motives for their
sudden involvement in the shipping sector. As a result of the close relationship between some
of the hardest hit Norwegian shipowners and the country's leading shipbuilders, what were
originally shipping sector difficulties could easily extend to the shipbuilding industry. This
would affect one of Norway's most important labour-intensive industries, responsible for
considerable rural employment. Moreover, it could put the state-controlled bond market at risk
due to government-guaranteed loans extended to shipbuilders - the activation of these
guarantees would have important ramifications. Additionally, loss of confidence following
from a series of loan defaults and subsequent bankruptcies in the shipping sector could have
affected Norwegian borrowers' position in the international financial market negatively. This
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element was particularly important due to the considerable amount of cooperation between
Norwegian shipowners.
Several large Norwegian shipowners had liquidity problems from late 1974 onwards.
Their vessels were laid up and revenues were decreasing. However, financial costs, and in
particular interest and instalments resulting from the high contracting in the beginning of the
decade, remained high. The depressed freight rate level made profitable employment difficult,
and the breakdown of the second-hand market implied that raising liquidity through vessel
sales was difficult.
7.1.1. The establishment of the Guarantee Institute
In late June 1975, the Ministry of Trade and Shipping appointed a committee to advice on
government involvement that could solve the immediate financing difficulties of the shipping
sector. The motive was "to avoid that a considerable amount of tonnage is sold abroad at
prices which are lower than those which can be justified from a socio-economic point of
view. ,>4 Hermod Skånland, then deputy director of Norges Bank [the Central Bank of
Norway], chaired the committee. He was simultaneously heading another government-
appointed committee, analysing the problems of the shipbuilding sector.
The advisory committee worked fast, and delivered its recommendation three days
after it had been constituted. In practice, the committee had been working for a fortnight, and
the recommendation had been finalised before the committee was officially appointed. Two
solutions were considered. One came from Haakon Nygaard, who had a central position
within Norwegian shipping financing and had taken the initiative to the meeting with the
Minister of Finance which led to the establishment of the advisory committee. He suggested
the establishment of a state-owned guarantee institute as well as a shipowning company. This
company, owned by shipping companies and financial institutions, should take over
Norwegian-owned or Norwegian-built tonnage.'
The alternative solution was presented by the committee's chairman, and suggested the
establishment of a guarantee institute, but not an institution owning ships. The final report,
which received the support of the Ministry of Trade and Shipping, largely reflected his views.
The crucial element of the advisory committee's report was thus the establishment of a
temporary guarantee institute for ships and drilling vessels. The term temporary is of
importance; the committee's advice was based on the assumption that freight markets within
five years would have improved sufficiently for the vessels to be operated profitably. The
guarantees should in principle be linked to the vessels, not the owners, thus reflecting that the
aim was to protect Norwegian ships, not Norwegian shipowners.
4 Stortingsproposisjon nr. 17 (1975-76) Om etablering aven midlertidig garantiordning for norske skip og
borerigger [Parliamentary proposition on the establishment of a temporary guarantee scheme for Norwegian
ships and drilling vessels], p. 3.
5 Letter from Haakon Nygaard to Skipsjinansieringsutvalget [The committee investigating ship fmancing] dated
17 June 1975, The Archives of the Norwegian Shipowners' Association, folder marked 6 B K 75 - Krisen 1975
1,010175-300675.
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In its proposition to Stortinget [the Norwegian Parliament], the Labour government
largely supported the recommendation from the advisory committee. However, the inter-party
Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs was divided in its view on the scheme.
The representatives from Sosialistisk Venstreparti [the Socialist Left Party] and the liberal
Anders Langes Party chose not to support the government's proposal.
The dissenting members of the committee had opposing views on the establishment of
the institute. The member representing the non-interventionist Anders Langes Party claimed
that the arrangements largely would function as a helping hand to foreign financial institutions
and suggested that the shipping industry, together with the financial institutions, should
establish a private institution." The members of the Socialist Left Party, on the other hand,
pointed out that the shipowners themselves were to blame for their difficulties and advocated
a scheme of contracting control, combined with the establishment of a state-owned
shipowning company. They supported the establishment of a guarantee institute, but feared
that the institute, if organised in the manner proposed by the advisory committee, would
function as a "welfare office for shipowners".
Despite these remarks, the majority of the Standing Committee on Finance and
Economic Affairs supported the establishment of a temporary guarantee institute. The
institution could grant guarantees for the following purposes:
o Loans covering interest payment on previous loans.
o New loans financing previously signed newbuilding contracts for ships and drilling
vessels, as well as the transfer ofvessels or contracts between Norwegian shipowners.
o Loans covering cancellation fees, lay up-costs etc.·
It was pointed out that the authorities' aggregate liability should not exceed NoK 2 billion,
which at the time amounted to approximately $ 350 million. However, a survey which had
been sent out to Norwegian ship- and rigowners prior to the establishment of the institute
indicated a need for guarantees in the region of NoK 5,4 billion.' As the need for guarantees
was higher than expected, the committee realised that the proposed NoK 2 billion limit would
be insufficient, and provisions were made for an extension of the authorities' liabilities
relatively quickly. 8
The recommendation from the Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs
was dealt with in the Storting on 24 November, 1975, and the ensuing debate very much
followed traditional party lines. The Socialist Left Party's proposal to introduce state control
of contracting and establish a state-run shipowning company was rejected against the 14 votes
6 Innst. S. nr. 58 (1975-76) Innstilling fra finanskomiteen om etablering aven midlertidig garantiordning for
norske skip og borerigger [Recommendation from the Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs on
the establishment of a temporary guarantee scheme for Norwegian ships and drilling vessels], pp. 4-5.
7 Letters from The Norwegian Shipowners' Association [Norges Rederforbund} and Norwegian Association of
Drilling Contractors [Norsk Boreriggeierforening], both dated 4 November, 1975, Archives of the Norwegian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs No. 164.58, Norsk Garantiinstituttfor skip og borefartøyer, box l, folder 2: 1110-75-
30111-75. This archive is hereafter referred to as the GI-archive.
8 Memo regarding the meeting of the Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs dated 12
November, 1975, The Gl-archive, box l, folder 2: 1/10-75-30111-75.
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of the party's own representatives. The debate centred on the morals and viability of the
Norwegian shipping community, and the shipowners were alternately presented as victims and
villains." Except for a comment that the establishment of the Guarantee Institute in reality
"was a support to foreign financial institutions", the effects of the Guarantee Institute on
agents outside the shipping sector were not mentioned.
The parliamentary debate about the establishment of the Guarantee Institute focused on
the problems of shipowners and how these could be solved. The Norwegian shipowner Hilmar
Reksten plays an important role in connection with the Guarantee Institute." Reksten, who
operated all his vessels in the spot market and had a massive newbuilding programme with the
Norwegian Aker-group, was particularly severely hit by the shipping crisis and had serious
liquidity problems shortly after the freight market breakdown.
Through a secret proposition to the Starting, the Ministry of Trade and Shipping
suggested that the Norwegian authorities buy Reksten's portfolio of shares in Norwegian
companies. On 11 June, the Starting, behind closed doors, decided to grant NoK 200 million
for the purchase of Reksten's portfolio. The reason was not to help Reksten per se, but rather
to "prevent that [Reksten 'sl liquidity problems should spread to the Aker-group, putting the
company's 11.400 employees at stake. ,,11 The close ties between certain shipowners and the
Norwegian shipbuilding industry, which had been at the forefront ofthis debate in June, were
ignored in the debate about the establishment of the Guarantee Institute in November. Barely
half a year later, in June 1976, when the increase of the guarantee limit was discussed, the
debate was as much about Reksten as the Guarantee Institute."
7.1.2. The organisation of the Guarantee Institute
The Guarantee Institute was organised as a limited liability company. Sixty per cent of the
10.000 shares were held by the Norwegian authorities. Members of the Norwegian financial
community held 2.000 shares, and two holding companies owned by Norwegian shipowners
and drilling vessel owners held 1.000 shares each. Of the board's nine members, five were
appointed by the government, one by Norges Rederforbund [the Norwegian Shipowners'
Association], one by Norsk Boreriggeerforening [the Norwegian Association of Drilling
Contractors], one by Norsk Banliforening [the Norwegian Bankers' Association] and one by
Norsk Sjømannsforbund [the Norwegian Seamen's Association].
Section One of the company's directives clearly states the aims of the Guarantee
9 Stortingsforhandlingene, 24. november 1975 [Official report of the proceedings of the Starting, 24 November,
1975].
10 In a lawsuit in the early 1990s, the Guarantee Institute's lawyer claimed that Reksten's difficulties were the
reason for the establishment of the Guarantee Institute. See Chapter Eight for details.
II Quote from the secret proposition to the Storting regarding the authorities' purchase of Reksten's shares
Stortingsproposisjon nr. 187 (1974-75) Om fullmakt til kjep av aksjer i norske selskaper [Parliamentary
proposition on the authority to purchase shares in Norwegian companies], p. 1.
12 Stortingsforhandlingene, 10. juni 1976 [Official report of the proceedings of the Starting, 10 June, 1975].
Again the importance of the Guarantee Institute for the shipbuilding industry was absent from the debate, except
for a brief comment that "the indirect effects can be exemplified by the words the shipbuilding industry H.
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Institute, which were to grant guarantees for the provision ofloans to:
a. avoid that lack ofliquidity forces Norwegian ships and drilling vessels to be sold abroad at
lower prices than those which can be justified socio-economically
b. maintain a competitive Norwegian shipping sector, including maintaining the built-up
professional competence."
The second element is fairly straightforward. A deterioration of the Norwegian shipping sector
and reduction of shipping activities would not only affect the shipowning companies, but also
a range of auxiliary services such as shipbroking, classification, maritime insurance and
financing.
The first argument, however, may require a closer explanation. The Guarantee Institute
was founded on the assumption that the breakdown of the shipping market was a temporary
phenomenon, and that sale of tonnage at the prevailing prices would be socio-economically
inefficient. Thus, some kind of market failure existed which made the price of vessels lower
than their long-term income potential. Consequently, it would be profitable for the authorities
to help Norwegian shipowners keep their tonnage while awaiting an improvement in market
conditions. When market conditions had improved, the tonnage could either be sold in the
international market at prices covering remaining debts or, preferably, be operated profitably
by Norwegian shipowners. In this respect, the Guarantee Institute was founded upon the basis
that the dire state of the shipping market was a temporary phenomenon.
An extremely important question was thus when the shipping crisis would come to an
end and "normal market conditions" would occur. Indeed, the large degree of uncertainty
regarding the length of the shipping crisis was the most speculative element of the guarantee
scheme.
The view on when normal market conditions would be restored varied depending on the
source and the time of analysis:
o The Norwegian Shipowners' Association had an optimistic view of the future
development, and claimed that 'further growth in international trade can be expected
relatively soon. " They also claimed that an expected increase in newbuilding prices
would "put the vessels currently sailing or laid up in a very favourable competitive
position. ,,14
o The advisory committee assumed that normal market conditions would be achieved
within a five year period, but pointed out that there was a considerable risk that the
development could be less favourable.
o International sources had an even more pessimistic view. The Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development claimed in early 1975 that high quantities of
tonnage in lay-up were likely to continue well beyond 1980, particularly for the VLCC
13 Stortingsmelding nr. 93 (1977-78) Om virksomheten iNorsk garantiinstitutt for skip og borefartøyer AS i 1977
[Report to the Storting on the activities of The Norwegian Guarantee Institute for Ships and Drilling Vessels AS
in 1977], Appendix 2, p. 17.
14 Comment from Norges Rederforbund, dated 16 July, 1975, printed as Appendix 3 of Stortingsproposisjon nr.
17 (1975-76), op.cit., p. 19.
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element. 15 The British company H.P. Drewry estimated that between 37 and 59 per cent
of the tanker fleet would be surplus to requirements in 1980.16
The risk inherent in the establishment of the Guarantee Institute was closely connected to the
question of normal market conditions. The advisory committee emphasised that "there is a
considerable risk of losses if the breakdown is long-term. ,,17 A detailed formula was
constructed to estimate the profitability of preserving tonnage, but this was based on
subjective assumptions about the length of time before the market improved, the reduction of
the value of the vessel during lay-up, the level of interest rates etc. IS
The Ministry of Finance based their estimates on far stricter assumptions than The
Norwegian Shipowners' Association, implying that a larger share of the Norwegian fleet
should be sold abroad at the prevailing prices." In the proposition to the Storting a wide range
of estimates were presented; for a 250.000 dwt VLCC the "lower price of a vessel worth
keeping" varied between NoK 45,9 million and NoK 167,8 million depending on the size of
the variables."
The advisory committee emphasised that the business risk already undertaken by
investors and shipowners should not be transferred to the Guarantee Institute. State
intervention should only occur "as part of a reorganisation, where losses are incurred by the
parties carrying the commercial risk. ..21 When guarantees were granted for loans covering
payment of interest on older loans, it was a general condition that the creditors postponed the
demand for instalments.
The companies participating in the Guarantee Institute were initially divided into two
risk groups, shipowners and rigowners, where the members of each group were responsible
only for the guarantees granted to the benefit of the other members of the same group. The
reason for this separation was the difference in the perceived risk of the ship- and the rig-
guarantees. The participants were required to submit an unconditional guarantee to the
Guarantee Institute, a so-called institutional guarantee, for their own and the other
participants' liabilities. The institute would then grant guarantees to the benefit of the
participants in proportion to their submitted institutional guarantees. Depending on the type of
loan for which a guarantee was needed, the Guarantee Institute would. grant a guarantee up to
15 OECD, Maritime Transport 1974, Paris, 1975, p. 28.
16 Drewry, The Trading Outlook/or Very Large Tankers, R.P. Drewry Shipping Consultants Ltd., London, 1975.
17 "Recommendation from The Advisory Committee regarding the fmancial difficulties of the shipping sector",
printed as Appendix 1 of Stortingsproposisjon nr. 17 (1975-76), op.cit., p. 3.
18 The formula, and some of the estimates, can be found in Stortingsproposisjon nr. 17 (1975-76), op.cit.,
Appendix 4, pp. 23-25.
19 Letter to the Minister of Trade and Shipping, dated 30 September, 1975, The GI-archive, box l, folder l: 115-
75-30/9-75.
20 Hambros Bank, a major creditor with several shipowning companies, used the estimates given in the appendix
to Stortingsproposisjon nr. 17 (1975-76) to determine their defrnition of "market values". According to a letter
from managing director of the Guarantee Institute, Haakon Nygaard, to Hambros Bank, dated 21 January, 1976.
The GI-archive, box 1, folder 3: 1112-75-3113-76, the difference between Hambros and the Guarantee Institute's
estimates was more than $ 30 million. The "current value" of the vessels was important to the question of
priority with regard to the ranking of security.
21 Stortingsproposisjon nr. 17 (1975-76), op.cit., p. 4.
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an amount equal to five to ten times the institutional guarantee.
The guarantees were secured by mortgages on vessels, real estate or other types of real
security. The Articles of Association stated that the Guarantee Institute could accept collateral
security up to amounts which exceeded the current market value of the mortgaged property.
This was based on the idea that an increase in freight rates would lead to a sufficient increase
in the value of the mortgaged property, and this practice thus reflects the theoretical basis of
the institute.
As the value of the mortgaged property to a large extent corresponded to the second-
hand value of vessels, the amount of guarantees which were uncovered fluctuated with the
conditions in the freight market. If the market improved sufficiently, the granted guarantees
would be covered by the value of the mortgaged property. If the market remained depressed,
the value of the mortgaged property would not cover the granted guarantees, and the mortgage
would have to be redeemed at a loss.
Table 7.1. Guaranteed amount secured within market value, per cent, 1976-81 22
1976 1977 197R 1979 19i10 19i11
Ships 55 17 24 58 36 60
- tankers 49 13 21 50 NA NA
-other ships 74 30 37 91 NA NA
Drilling vessels 87 93 77 100 100 -
Total 68 47 41 71 47 60
In 1979 the market for drilling vessels had improved sufficiently for the full guaranteed
amount to be covered by the market value of the mortgaged property. The stable value of the
mortgaged property prior to this meant that the engagement in drilling vessels carried
relatively little risk for the Guarantee Institute.
The security of the shipping engagements was more volatile, and in 1977 only 13 per
cent of the granted guarantees in the tanker sector were secured by the market value of the
collateral. The temporary improvement of the shipping market in 1979 reduced the institute's
risk, but due to the subsequent deterioration of market conditions the value of the mortgaged
property decreased and the Guarantee Institute chose to wind up its tanker engagements.
When a claim for payment was made under a guarantee, the institutional guarantee
given by the shipowner in question was initially debited. Due to the rules through which
guarantees were given in proportion to the institutional guarantee, this could maximum
represent 20 per cent of the claim. The rest of the claim would constitute a loss, half of which
would be covered by the authorities. The other half of the loss would be distributed among the
other participants of the participant's risk group, proportionately to their own utilisation of
guarantees. When the guarantees given by participants were fully utilised, the authorities were
liable for further losses.
The anticipated losses in connection with the already granted guarantees prevented
22 Estimates based on the annual reports from the Guarantee Institute to the Storting. The table refers to granted
guarantees for the period 1976-1979 and issued guarantees for 1980 and 1981.
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shipowners from approaching the institute. Consequently, the operation of the Guarantee
Institute was extended in 1979. A new risk group, in which the participants were not liable for
engagements entered into prior to 5 July, 1979, was established. As early as 1977, the
Guarantee Institute stated that Ha new institutional guarantee will be considered lost the
moment it is executed due to the risk of losses with regard to previous engagements. ,m In
addition to the establishment of the new risk group, NoK 300 million of the NoK 4 billion
guarantee limit were earmarked for Norwegian shipowners' purchase of second-hand vessels.
The purpose of this arrangement was to reduce the demands on the owners' equity. The
utilisation ofthese new arrangements was limited."
7.2. The Effects of the Guarantee Institute
The rationale behind the Guarantee Institute can only be understood when the positions of
several agents connected to the shipping industry are considered. The plight of shipowners
was the focus when the establishment of the Guarantee Institute was presented to and
discussed in the Starting. Nevertheless, the institution had important consequences for the
Norwegian shipbuilding industry and Norwegian and international financial institutions.
7.2.1. Importance for the Norwegian shipping sector
The Norwegian shipping community reacted positively when the Guarantee Institute was
established, and 101 companies, three quarters of them shipowning companies, joined the
institute during the first six months. By the end of 1976 the Guarantee Institute had granted 26
guarantees to 23 companies." The purpose of the majority of the guarantees granted to the
shipping sector was liquidity loans, whereas 80 per cent of the value of the guarantees granted
to rig-owners related to for long-term financing.
Measured by the value of the guarantees, more than 85 per cent of the Guarantee
Institute's engagements were in the tanker and drilling vessel segments. The Guarantee
Institute was involved in the financing of 13 drilling vessels, which constituted around a third
of all Norwegian-owned drilling vessels. The institute granted guarantees in connection with
22 large tankers, and at the turn of the decade a quarter of the Norwegian tanker fleet was
owned by Guarantee Institute participants. The participation of shipowners outside the tanker
segment was limited, as approximately eighty per cent of the guarantees to shipowners were
granted to tanker owners.
23 Stortingsmelding nr. 93 (1977-78) Om virksomheten iNorsk garantiinstitutt for skip og borefartøyer AS i 1977
[Report to the Storting on the activities of The Norwegian Guarantee Institute for Ships and Drilling Vessels AS
in 1977], Appendix l, p. 7.
24 The value of the guarantees granted under the new arrangements peaked at NoK 240 million in 1982.
However, the losses from these guarantees were relatively high.
25 Three requests had been turned down, and four of the original participants, two shipowning companies and
two rig owners, had withdrawn from the arrangement. Of the 26 guarantees granted, 14 guarantees went to the
shipping sector, and 12 were given for loans to rig owners.
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Figure 7.1. Guarantee undertakings, million kroner, end of the year, 1976-8226
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The amount of loans made possible by guarantees granted by the authorities was considerable,
but this financial assistance was not spread evenly throughout the shipping sector. As
previously mentioned, the impact of the crisis was different for shipowners following different
strategies. A considerable share of the guarantees, particularly in the tanker sector, was
provided to a relatively small number of shipowners with very large fleets. The average size
of the guarantees granted to tanker owners was more than NoK 150 million in 1976,
representing almost three times the average size of the guarantees granted to owners of other
types of ships. The selective distribution of the guarantees may be exemplified by Hilmar
Reksten's case. By 1977 almost half of the guarantees granted to shipowners, measured in
kroner, had been given to Hilmar Reksten's companies RA Hadrian and RA Trajan."
The participation of large shipowners such as Reksten in the Guarantee Institute
implies that the share of Guarantee Institute-involvement in the Norwegian fleet becomes
considerable. At the end of 1978, the 16 shipowners who had received guarantees from the
Guarantee Institute owned more than ten million dwt of tonnage, representing more than a
quarter of the Norwegian fleet. Three years later, almost twenty per cent of the Norwegian
fleet consisted of vessels for which guarantees had been provided.
26 Figures taken from the annual reports to the to the Storting on the activities of the Guarantee Institute.
27 Estimates based on the quarterly report of the Guarantee Institute to the Ministry of Trade and Shipping, dated
February 23, 1977, The GI-archive, box 2, folder 3: 111-77-31/7-77.
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Figure 7.2. Amount of tonn age owned by shipowners receiving guarantees, 1976-8128
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Due to the lag between contracting and delivery of vessels, the Norwegian fleet continued to
grow after the freight market breakdown, from 40 million dwt in 1974 to 48 million in 1977.
With one exception the Norwegian fleet had increased every year in the postwar period, but
from 1978 onwards the size of the fleet was considerably reduced. The exodus was
particularly large after the Guarantee Institute chose to wind up its engagements in large
tankers in the beginning of the 1980s.
It is important to keep in mind that the aim of the authorities when establishing the
Guarantee Institute was not to preserve the Norwegian fleet as such, but rather to avoid that
modem tonnage was sold overseas. In spite of the large sales of Norwegian vessels to foreign
shipowners in the latter part of the 1970s and early 1980s, the guarantees granted by the
Guarantee Institute enabled shipowners to retain tonnage that they would otherwise have been
forced to sell. Due to the large financial problems in the Norwegian shipping sector, a large
share of this tonnage may have been sold abroad. Consequently, the reduction of the fleet
would have been even more dramatic without government intervention.
The Guarantee Institute facilitated the restructuring of viable Norwegian shipping
companies. Some of the companies which were assisted by the Guarantee Institute, being
given a chance to recover and increase their equity, have continued to play an important role
in Norwegian and international shipping. In addition to this, the Guarantee Institute stabilised
the second-hand market by establishing a floor levelon the value of vessels. A "fire sale" of
Norwegian tonnage would have resulted in further reductions in vessel values. This could
have contributed to a contagion of the financial problems, as more shipowners would have
28 The term participants refers to shipowners who had been granted guarantees. Figures for Guarantee Institute
participants come from the reports to the Storting on the activities of the Guarantee Institute. Figures for the size
of the fleet originate with Review, various issues.
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seen the value of their mortgaged property fall below the outstanding debt. Thus the
establishment of the Guarantee Institute indirectly assisted shipowners who were not
participants.
The institute's engagement in the rig sector was an unconditional success. No losses
were incurred, and the Guarantee Institute estimated that the increase in the value of the
affected drilling vessels was 5-6 billion kroner." Consequently, in the case of the drilling
vessels, the Guarantee Institute managed to reach its aim of preserving valuable tonnage on
Norwegian hands. However, in other cases the tonnage, particularly the tankers, became less
valuable from 1975 onwards. Accordingly, the desirability of keeping it was reduced as
market conditions failed to improve.
The establishment of the Guarantee Institute may have delayed a necessary and
beneficial structural transformation of the Norwegian shipping sector. Thanopoulou claims
that the shipping crisis "coincided with major changes in the distribution of world tonnage
among the various fleets. ,,30 Due to the fact that government intervention affected the
composition of the Norwegian fleet, reducing the amount of tanker and bulk tonnage sold to
foreign shipowners, this transformation appeared relatively slowly in Norway. After the
guarantees for the tankers were terminated, however, this development accelerated."
One of the aims of the Guarantee Institute was to contribute to a greater balance
between tonnage demand and supply at the international level." Due to the high level of
tonnage on order for Norwegian shipowners and the fact that several of the newbuildings
would be unprofitable, the Guarantee Institute provided guarantees for loans to cover
cancellation fees. The importance ofthis provision was limited; in 1976 such guarantees were
given in connection with two drilling vessels, but these cancellations were later arranged
without the assistance of the institute. In 1977 the Guarantee Institute granted a guarantee of
NoK 13 million in connection with the cancellation of one ship. The limited utilisation of
guarantees for cancellation purposes was partlya result of the fact that the amount of tonnage
cancelled before the establishment of the Guarantee Institute was relatively high.
Nordvik claims that large sales of Norwegian tonnage in 1975-76 probably would have
benefited the restructuring of the international tanker market." He claims that the anticipated
positive effects of the Guarantee Institute on the balance in the international market for
29 Stortingsmelding nr. 41 (1982-83) Om virksomheten iNorsk garantiinstituttfor skip og borefartøyer AS i 1981
[Report to the Storting on the activities of The Norwegian Guarantee Institute for Ships and Drilling Vessels AS
in 1981], Appendix l, p. 12. Some of these gains were realised through sales of vessels at the high values.
However, looking at the development at one particular point in time may lead to misleading conclusions. The
value of the drilling vessels fell shortly after the Guarantee Institute had presented their positive estimates.
30 Thanopoulou, Helen A, "The growth of fleets registered in the newly-emerging maritime countries and
maritime crises", Maritime Policy and Management, Volume 22, No. l, 1995, p. 51.
31 There were additional reasons for this, eg the increased possibility for Norwegian owners to register their
vessels in Flag of Convenience countries. The Guarantee Institute delayed the flight to Flag-of-Convenience
registries, as the participants' vessels were required to fly the Norwegian flag. See Chapters Nine and Ten for a
more detailed discussion.
32 Stortingsproposisjon nr. 17 (1975-76), op.cit., p. 5.
33 Nordvik, op.cit., 1997, p. Il.
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shipping services were grossly overrated.
In hindsight, large sales of Norwegian tanker tonnage in the period after the freight
market breakdown would have been beneficial. Even the Guarantee Institute acknowledged
this, and stated in a letter to the Ministry of Trade and Shipping in 1981 that "it was probably
a mistake not to sell the large tankers for what they would have provided in 1975. ,,34
By the autumn of 1977 the authorities had realised that what they initially thought was
a business cycle problem, in fact was a structural crisis. They reacted by requesting that the
Guarantee Institute should anticipate a tanker tonnage surplus until 1985 when considering
new applications. One result of this change in the expected market conditions was that several
of the previously granted guarantees were renegotiated." In 1981 the Guarantee Institute
suggested that the losses stemming from its engagement in large tankers should be realised.
They suggested a controlled winding-up of the tanker owning companies by disposing of their
tonnage within a period of one to two years.
Figure 7.3. Accumulated Guarantee Institute losses, million kroner, 1977-8536
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34 Letter from the Guarantee Institute to the Ministry of Trade and Shipping, quoted in Norges Offentlige
Utredninger (1983:13) Reksten-saken [Report to the Norwegian government from the investigative committee
established by royal resolution 26 June, 1981 to go through the Reksten-case], p. 212.
35 During the renegotiations, some of the creditors were more optimistic than the Guarantee Institute with regard
to future market conditions. By assuming some responsibility for possible losses they managed to postpone the
winding up of the Guarantee Institute's tanker engagements.
36 The figures presented in this chart, and in the rest of the chapter, are those which were available when all the
guarantees granted by the Guarantee Institute had been terminated in the middle of the 1980s. The Norwegian
authorities have later received dividend from some of the engagements. In the early 1990s, some NoK 200
million were received after the trustees in bankruptcy of the estate of Hilmar Reksten had unearthed the
shipowners' secret foreign funds. In 1995 the Guarantee Institute received NoK 300 million from Hambros Bank
in the largest Norwegian settlement ever, following a damages claim for NoK 1,6 billion. It is yet impossible to
determine the final losses of the Guarantee Institute, as some disputes still linger in the Norwegian judiciary
more than 15 years after the institute wound up its tanker engagements.
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The Guarantee Institute turned out to be an expensive arrangement for the Norwegian
authorities, resulting in payments of more than NoK 1,7 billion or almost $ 300 million. The
losses were not evenly distributed among the institute's engagements - more than 80 per cent
originated with the guarantees that had been granted to tanker owners.
However, the establishment of the Guarantee Institute was not only motivated by the
concern for the shipping industry and the losses seem more reasonable when the auxiliary
effects are taken into account. Although it was not said in public at the time, the Guarantee
Institute had important consequences for a series of agents outside shipowning. In a worst-
case-scenario, a series ofbankruptcies in the shipping sector could be the first domino, leading
to the fall of shipyards and financial institutions. The establishment of the Guarantee Institute
solved this problem by securing that the first domino did not topple.
7.2.2. Importance for the Norwegian shipbuilding industry
The importance of shipbuilding in the Norwegian economy increased in the first postwar
decades. The sector expanded considerably in the 1950s and 1960s, and in 1973 1.255 million
gross registered tons were built, compared to 550 million in 1968. Employment increased
from 20.000 in 1960 to 30.000 in 1972. In addition to this, some 10-15.000 employees worked
in companies delivering goods and services to the shipbuilding sector."
At the forefront of the Norwegian shipbuilding sector was the Aker-group, Norway's
largest industrial employer. The Aker-group owned several yards, including Stord Verft,
which after 1967 had specialised in the construction ofmammoth tankers. By the end of 1973,
tonnage on order at Norwegian yards amounted to almost seven million dwt. More than two
thirds of this was tonnage contracted at Aker Stord." The close relationship between the
Guarantee Institute and the Aker-group becomes evident when the total losses of the
Guarantee Institute are examined. A conspicuously large share of the losses resulted from the
three major customers at Aker Stord.
In the period 1967-1974, the Aker-group received newbuilding contracts for 31
tankers. 270fthese vessels were ordered by three shipowners; Hilmar Reksten had ordered 16
ships, Hagb. Waage had ordered six ships and Biørn Biørnstad & Co had ordered five ships.
Reksten, Waage and Biørnstad had several things in common. First, their contracted vessels
were intended for operation in the relatively risky spot market. Second, they had expansive
newbuilding programmes, exceeding the size of their existing fleets. Third, they contracted
all, or the majority, of their tonnage at Aker. Moreover, due to their chartering and contracting
policies, they earned large amounts of money when conditions were good, but were extremely
37 Norges Offentlige Utredninger (1974:51) Perspektivanalyse for skipsbygningsindustrien [Report to the
Norwegian government on the perspectives of the Norwegian shipbuilding industry], p. 365.
38 According to figures from Norwegian Shipping News' survey of Norwegian newbuilding contracts per I
January, 1974, the following Norwegian newbuilding orders were recorded at Aker Stord: Wilh. Wilhelmsen - I
vessel of 285.000 dwt, Hagb. Waage - 3 vessels totalling 940.000 dwt, Biørn Biørnstad & Co - 4 vessels
totalling almost 1,3 million dwt and Hilmar Reksten - 8 vessels totalling more than 2,8 million dwt. The yard
also had an order for a 285.000 dwt tanker from a foreign company.
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vulnerable to changes in the market development.
It is possible to say that Aker's balance sheet reflected the high-risk strategy of their
most important customers." When the shipping market was characterised by increasing
demand, profits were high. After the freight market breakdown, Aker's most important
customers were among the first to be hit. Reksten was insolvent as early as 5 April, 1974,
when he failed to pay instalments on vessels contracted at Aker Stord. The fact that the most
important customers were unable to fulfil their contractual obligations was a major problem
for Aker. Of the 17 mammoth tankers on order in the beginning of 1974, only seven vessels
were built; tonnage amounting to more than three million dwt was cancelled, either by the
shipowner, due to the market conditions, or by the yard, due to lacking payment. Within a six-
month period, Aker lost contracts worth more than four billion kroner.
As a result of the increased competition in the shipbuilding sector in the postwar
period, yard financing had become more and more important to secure newbuilding contracts.
In Norway, AS Låneinstituttet for Skipsbyggeriene [the Mortgage Institute for Shipbuilders]
had been established in 1959 to provide second mortgage loans to shipbuilders on favourable
terms. As the capital raised by the Mortgage Institute for Shipbuilders carried a government
guarantee, the terms were better than those the yards themselves would have faced. Mjelva
claims Aker could not compete with the Japanese yards price-wise, but became competitive
by taking high risks and offering favourable loans facilitated by the Norwegian state."
The Norwegian shipyards were able to offer advantageous loans to attract newbuilding
orders. The result was a three-sided relationship, where the yard provided credit to the
shipowners, facilitated by long-term loans from the Mortgage Institute for Shipbuilders. The
yard was the formal debtor for the loan from the Mortgage Institute, but for practical purposes
the shipowner paid interest and instalments directly to the financial institution providing the
loan.
The provision of financing to shipowners put the Aker-group at risk, and in the middle
of 1975 they had lent more than NoK 500 million to various shipowners. At the same time,
Aker's debt to the Mortgage Institute for Shipbuilders amounted to NoK 216 million, more
than half of which was for Reksten's tankers. Aker were formally liable for the loans granted
to shipowners through the Mortgage Institute for Shipbuilders, and had ordered large amounts
of materials which became obsolete due to cancellations.
If Aker's main debtors, Biømstad, Reksten and Waage had been declared bankrupt,
their fleets would have been disposed of at prices which could not fully cover the second
39 The Aker-group owned several shipyards, and the following presentation relates to the company's yard at
Stord. The group was also involved in the rig sector, and in 1975 had ten orders for oil rigs. Four of the owners
which had contracted rigs had signalled that they would have trouble financing the newbuildings. For some of
them, the Guarantee Institute came to the rescue.
40 Mjelva, Hans K., "Stord Verft 1945-1975", Sjefartshistorisk Årbok 1995 [Norwegian Yearbook of Maritime
History 1995], Bergen Maritime Museum, Bergen, 1996, p. 254. The assertion is partly confirmed by Hilmar
Reksten in Skipsfartsøkonomisk Institutt, Rapport fra ekskursjon til Reksten-rederiene 21. november 1974
[Report from an excursion to the Reksten-companies 21 November 1974], Institute for Shipping Research,
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Bergen, 1975, p. 7.
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mortgage. This would have exacerbated the serious financial difficulties of the Aker-group,
and maybe even led to bankruptcy.
By establishing the Guarantee Institute, the authorities managed to "buy time" for the
Aker-group. Despite the positive influence, it is important to keep in mind that the effects of
the Guarantee Institute for the Norwegian shipbuilding industry was not officially an issue
when the arrangement was established. Nevertheless, the distribution of the Guarantee
Institute's losses is striking, with more than two thirds of the total payments connected to the
high-risk Aker-customers. In the beginning of 1974, Aker held only about 15 per cent of
Norwegian shipowners' newbuilding contracts.
Table 7.2. Distribution of Guarantee Institute losses 41
Losses (NoK) Per cent of total
Biørnstad- rederiene 220,4 million 12,4
Nortank I & Il (Waage) 140,1 million 7,9
RA Hadrian (Reksten) 245,7 million 13,9
RA Trajan (Reksten) 585,2 million 33
Sum - Aker-related 1.191,4 miIlion 67,2
Knut Knutsen OAS 233,5 million 13,2
AS Havdrott 96,7 million 5,5
Seven smaller losses 250,6 million 14,1
Sum - not Aker-related 580,8 million 32,8
In 1982, Inger Prebensen, who was managing director of the Guarantee Institute at the time,
claimed that "with regard to the shipyards one may conclude that the Guarantee Institute has
contributed positively." She also presented the main reasons for the establishment of the
Guarantee Institute as "1. The yards - 2. The banks and financial institutions - 3. The
shipowners. ,>42 The difference between this list of priorities and the one presented in
connection with the establishment of the Guarantee Institute is conspicuous.
It is a paradox that the authorities on the one hand supported the shipbuilding sector,
and thus contributed to the continuing oversupply of tonnage, but on the other hand granted
assistance to the shipowners who were victim ofthis oversupply. In no country was the close
relationship between arrangements for the shipping sector and arrangements for the
shipbuilding industry more evident than in Sweden.
Sweden was the only nation with lay up-rates at the same level as Norway." However,
shipbuilding was relatively more important than shipping in Sweden, and the Swedish state
organised a national shipowning company, comprising shipowners and yards which had built
vessels "on speculation" following the freight market breakdown.
41 Based on figures from Stortingsmelding 24 (1986-87) Om virksomheten i Norsk garantiinstitutt for skip og
borefartøyer AS i J 985 [Report to the Storting on the activities of The Norwegian Guarantee Institute for Ships
and Drilling Vessels AS in 1985], p. 2. The losses connected to the two Reksten-controlled companies were later
reduced due to the discovery of secret foreign funds owned by Reksten. Even when this is taken into
consideration, more than half of the losses can be related to Aker's major customers.
42 Statement from Inger Prebensen, quoted in Norges Offentlige Utredninger (1983: 13), op.cit., pp. 280-281.
43 Confer the discussion in Chapter Five.
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The Swedish solution proved far more costly than the Guarantee Institute had been.
This was partly due to the fact that the basis for intervention was different, with emphasis on
shipbuilders rather than Swedish shipowners, but also because the authorities waited longer
before terminating their shipping engagements." It may seem ironic that the majority of the
vessels in which the state-owned Swedish holding-company were engaged had been
contracted at Swedish yards by Norwegian shipowners. Thus, several Norwegian shipowners
benefited from the Swedish solution.
The conditions of the shipbuilding industry were central to the handling of the
shipping crisis in both Norway and Sweden, even though this was not explicitly expressed in
the Norwegian case. Another hidden motive for the Norwegian authorities' intervention was
the possible effects of the shipping crisis on the financial market.
7.2.3. Importance for the financial market
Major bankruptcies in the shipping industry would put the financial sector at risk through two
mechanisms. At the national level, it would influence the so-called Paragraph IS-market, a
bond market largely controlled by the authorities. At the international level, massive defaults
on loans to Norwegian shipowners could reduce the creditworthiness of Norwegian companies
in general, and particularly those involved in the shipping sector.
In the selective, low interest rate loan regime operated by the Norwegian authorities in
much of the postwar period, the Paragraph IS-market played a key role. Through this market,
the authorities allocated capital to sectors and projects deemed worthy of the limited financial
resources available in Norway. The amount of capital raised was partly at the discretion of the
government, as they could demand that a certain proportion of the banks' and financial
institutions' reserves be placed in this market.
The Paragraph IS-market was a significant tool for economic and industrial policies
and an important source of capital for the institutions financing shipbuilding. These comprised
the previously presented Mortgage Institute for Shipbuilders, as well as the four institutions
granting first priority mortgages." Before the Guarantee Institute was established, it was
suggested that the authorities should increase the amount of capital available to these
institutions and utilise the existing institutions when solving the financial difficulties of the
shipowners." However, this would imply increased priority of shipbuilding financing and a
corresponding reduction of the amount of investment capital available for other purposes. By
establishing the Guarantee Institute, the authorities managed to insulate the domestic bond
44 For a comparison of the Norwegian and Swedish solutions to the problem, see Lund, Ole, "Shippingkrise og
stat" [Shipping crisis and state], Bergen Bank Kvartalsskrift [Bergen Bank Quarterly Journal], No.2, 1985, pp.
56..64.
45 For an introduction to the financing of shipbuilding in the Norwegian market, with emphasis on AS
Låneinstituttet for Skipsbyggeriene, see Platou, Fanny and Stokke, Berit, Skip, verksted og finansiering [Ship,
yard and financing], Sjørettsfondet, Oslo, 1980.
46 See the letter to the Minister of Finance and the Minster of Trade and Shipping from H.l Darre Hirsch,
managing director of the Norwegian Shipowners' Association, dated 14 May 1975, in The Archives of the
Norwegian Shipowners' Association, folder marked 6 B K 75 - Krisen 1975 I, 010 175-300675.
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market from the problems of the shipping sector, simultaneously avoiding a reduction of the
financial resources available for other purposes.
If some key Norwegian shipping companies had gone bankrupt, notably Biørnstad,
Reksten and Waage, the Mortgage Institute for Shipbuilders would be at risk as the
institution's financial base was insufficient to deal with the anticipated losses. The Mortgage
Institute for Shipbuilders estimated in early 1975 that their possible losses on Aker alone
would amount to approximately NoK 200 million, whereas the institute's total equity was
NoK 150 million." The authorities, as underwriters of the debt of the Mortgage Institute,
would have been forced to fulfil their obligations. This could either be done by paying the
creditors or by increasing the Mortgage Institute's liquidity through other mechanisms. In any
case it would involve a redistribution of investment capital or an immediate pay-out on the
authorities' hands.
The Norwegian institutions granting first priority mortgages would not necessarily
have been affected by bankruptcies in the Norwegian shipping sector, as a larger share of the
loans they had given were secured within the value of the mortgaged property. However, a
"fire sale" of a substantial share of the Norwegian tanker fleet would have depressed vessel
values further, and this could have put the first priority institutions at stake.
If the authorities had been unable to solve the financial problems of the shipping
sector, the Mortgage Institute for Shipbuilders and possibly some of the first priority
institutions would have been severely affected by the crisis. The result could have been the
collapse of several Norwegian ship financing institutions, utilisation of government
guarantees and a redistribution of investment capital to shipbuilding from other sectors. To
make matters worse, the financial problems of the Norwegian shipping sector had
international ramifications as well.
More than 80 per cent of Norwegian shipping investments were financed by means of
foreign sources. In the beginning of the 1970s, it was relatively easy for shipowners to obtain
loans - partlyas a result of the good record of the shipping industry, partlyas a result of the
fact that a series of new agents entered the ship financing market for the first time in the late
1960s.
The depressed conditions in the shipping market after the freight market breakdown
made the banking fraternity less willing to extend loans to shipowners, and provisions were
made to increase the security of the transactions already entered into. Some Norwegian
shipowners had contracted vessels without securing financing in advance, and were unlikely
to obtain credit without guarantees exceeding the value of the vessels. Other Norwegian
shipowners fell victim to the minimum value clause, which stipulated that extra instalments be
paid or additional collateral made available if the value of the collateral fell below the
outstanding debt. Government guarantees were vital in both situations.
47 Norges Offentlige Utredninger (1983:13), op.cit., p. 30.
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The establishment of the Guarantee Institute secured financing for the shipping sector
which in the absence of government guarantees would have been unavailable. The fact that the
collapse of several domestic ship financing institutions was avoided also contributed
positively to Norway's position in the international financial market. This was important, as
Norway at this time developed a considerable offshore oil industry, which necessitated large-
scale borrowing from foreign sources. Consequently, it was necessary to maintain the
confidence of foreign creditors.
It is difficult to assess to which extent the arrangement led to an improvement in
Norwegian creditworthiness and better terms for Norwegian debtors outside the shipping
sector. The large Norwegian borrowing was the basis for the most important transformation of
the Norwegian economy in the postwar period, with petroleum products replacing shipping
services as the major foreign exchange earner." It is doubtful that bad experiences from the
shipping industry would make foreign lenders more cautious when providing capital to the
booming Norwegian oil industry.
7.3. Conclusion
The relative success of the Guarantee Institute can be measured by several factors.
D All drilling vessel engagements were terminated without loss for the authorities, but
with profit for the rig owners. The experience regarding the drilling vessels reveals the
potential of the arrangement.
D The bulk of the authorities' losses of more than NoK 1,7 billion came from tanker
engagements, and the bleak side of the arrangement is evident with regard to the ship
engagements.
D The Guarantee Institute was important for the continuing existence of some major
agents in the Norwegian shipbuilding industry, particularly the Aker-group, However,
due to the continuing high level of subsidisation in the shipbuilding industry,
restructuring or capacity reduction might have been beneficial in the long term."
D Through the establishment of the Guarantee Institute, the authorities succeeded in
avoiding the failure of domestic ship financing institutions, which would have implied
the activation of government guarantees.
The benefits of the arrangement were contingent on an improvement of the markets for ships
and drilling vessels within a five-year period. In the market for drilling vessels, this
improvement was evident at the tum of the decade. In the market for ships, and for large
tankers in particular, what was initially viewed as a temporary downturn turned out to be a
structural crisis. Consequently, freight rates and tonnage values never recovered sufficiently to
avoid large losses for the Guarantee Institute. Jf the conditions in the tanker sector had
improved in the manner assumed when the Guarantee Institute was established, the scheme
48 See Chapter Ten for a presentation of the transformation.
49 This is a statement based on economic theory, and is of relatively little importance when regional and political
factors are considered.
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could have been regarded as an unconditional success.
It is interesting to note that the preservation of tonnage on Norwegian hands, which
was the principal reason presented to the Storting and the public when the Guarantee Institute
was established, to a large degree contributes negatively in an assessment of the institute. It is
the indirect effects, with regard to the shipbuilding industry and the financial market, which
tip the balance in favour of the arrangement."
50 Lucy Smith, a long-term member of the board of the Guarantee Institute, acknowledged the contrast between
revealed and actual reasons; see Smith, Lucy, "Statlige støtteordninger til rederifinansiering i Norge"
[Government support for the fmancing of shipowning companies in Norway], the 9th Nordic Seminar on
Maritime Law, Finland, September 1980, found in The Archives of the Norwegian Shipowners' Association,
folder marked 6 B K 75 - Krisen 1975 XIV, 010779-290980.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
THE FATE OF FOUR NORWEGIAN TANKER OWNERS
The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the various manners in which the shipping crisis
affected Norwegian shipowners, as well as the different responses triggered by the crisis. The
analysis focuses on the development of the companies in the 1970s, ie the period prior to the
tanker market breakdown and the first years after the crisis had begun to take its toll. The far-
reaching short-term effects of strategic decisions are illustrated through the fates of Knut
Knutsen OAS, Hilmar Rekstens Rederi, Rederiet Peder Smedvig and Sig. Bergesen d.y.
It is evident that the companies' actions in the period leading up to the crisis are
paramount to an understanding of their subsequent fate. The four companies analysed show
how the strategy during the heyday of high contracting and freight rates determined the
companies' ability to adapt to the changes in the tanker sector, facilitating, complicating or
preventing a sustainable adaptation to the new conditions.
There is no uniform measure on which an analysis of the strategy of shipowners can be
based. I have chosen to focus on the business policy parameters presented in Chapter Six.
Moreover, I will briefly look at the manner in which the shipowners chose to finance their
business. Consequently, fleet structure, chartering policy, contracting and financing are used
to represent the strategies of the companies. I have chosen to focus on shipowners who, to
different extents, had invested in the tanker sector. The companies represent a variety of
strategies with regard to fleet structure and chartering policies. However, they all had
mammoth tanker tonnage on order prior to the freight market breakdown.
Fleet structure denotes the distribution of the fleet with regard to the types of vessels
owned, as well as their age and size structure. However, the fleet structure is not necessarily a
result of the shipowners' strategy at the moment analysed, but should rather be seen as the
result of a combination of current and previous policies. The shipowner's recent judgements
are reflected in the shipowner's newbuilding contracts, or the ships which he buys or sells in
the second-hand market. Changes in the fleet structure or in the composition of newbuilding
contracts are therefore to some degree a better representation of the shipowner's current
strategy than the actual structure of the fleet.
The data on the various shipowners' fleets have been taken from the Veritas-register.
This poses problems in connection with ships controlled through nominee companies or ships
flying foreign flags, for instance those of Flag of Convenience-countries. These ships will not
be included in the analysis due to the large degree of uncertainty regarding the ownership of
such vessels. The question of ownership or management was central to the legal case against
Hilmar Reksten, and it is evident that the use of Flags of Convenience and nominee
companies makes it almost impossible to prove the correct ownership of some vessels.'
In some instances, ships that were sold during the last part of the previous year have
erroneously been entered in the Veritas-register as owned by the same company the following
) According to the British Rochdale-report (Committee of Inquiry into Shipping Report), Her Majesty's
Stationery Office, London, 1970, p. i, "The complexity of ownership has international ramifications which make
it impossible to present a single definiton of the UK industry which serves all purposes. "
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year as well. I have, as far as possible, tried to correct these mistakes by means of the surveys
of second-hand ship sales printed in Fearnley & Eger's Review and the Norwegian Shipping
News. The information from these sources has been used to supplement the data from the
Veritas-register. Vessels chartered by the shipowner - from other shipowners - have also been
omitted from the calculation of the shipowners' fleet size. However, the existence of such
charter agreements will, where applicable, be analysed in the text.
Chartering strategy is the second parameter used to characterise the strategies of the
companies. The choice between long- or medium-term charters or operation in the spot market
was of great importance for the economic performance of the various shipowners in the period
surrounding the crisis. The analysis in this chapter shows the great extent to which the
chartering strategies influenced the fate of the companies.
Contracting is the third element used to denote the strategy of the shipowners. The
contracting strategy comprises the timing of newbuilding contracts, the choice of yard or
country of production and, most importantly, the size and type of newbuilding orders.
Information on contracting has been taken from Norwegian Shipping News, which several
times annually published a list of tonnage on order for Norwegian owners. A comparison
between this list and other sources indicates that the survey from Norwegian Shipping News is
fairly accurate. The information on the fleets and contracts has been organised in four
databases, named after the respective companies.
Financing is the final element used to describe the policy of the four tanker owners.
The degree of equity financing and the choice and use of external sources may be of interest in
this connection. However, information on financing is hard to come by. The presentation of
financing focuses on how the shipowners coped with the dire economic conditions in the latter
part of the decade, eg whether or not they sought relief through the Guarantee Institute.
Chapter 8.1. Knut Knutsen OAS
The shipowning-company owned and managed by the Knutsen-family had long traditions in
the liner sector. In the beginning of the 1970s the company operated two liner services. The
older of these, the Knutsen Line, Orient Service, a circular route in the Pacific Ocean calling
on America, Asia and Australia, had been established in the middle of the 1950s. As a
supplement to this line, the company started the Knutsen Line, West Australia-West Pacific-
line in 1972. The liner operations of the company willlargely be omitted from the analysis. It
was due to the engagements in the tanker sector, in terms of tanker ownership and contracting,
that Knutsen was particularly hard hit by the shipping crisis.
8.1.1. Historical introduction
Prior to the Second World War Knut Knutsen OAS was the third largest shipowning company
in Norway, and the company's founder, Knut Knutsen, was a distinguished person who was
held in high regard in his hometown Haugesund.' The company was divided as part of an
inheritance settlement after Knut Knutsen's death in 1946, and one part of the company was
2 Knut Knutsen was the son of shipowner Ole Andreas Knutsen, and the three letters in the name, OAS,
represent this - Knut Knutsen, Ole Andreas Sønn (son of Ole Andreas).
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merged into Chr. Haaland & Søn. After the split, Knut Knutsen's son, Ole Andreas Knutsen,
continued to administer the remaining part of the company under the name Knut Knutsen
OAS. However, the history of the company dates back to 1896.
The first Knutsen-ship, acquired in the late 19th century, was engaged in the
Norwegian export of herring. The Knutsen-company is therefore a good example of the
manner in which the Norwegian shipping industry evolved from servicing the Norwegian
exports of goods to becoming an important supplier of transport services in tertiary markets.
In a domestic perspective, Knutsen's shift from goods exports to transport services occurred
relatively late, but the timing corresponds well with that of other merchants in the Haugesund-
area. The company later diversified, concentrating on tramp shipping in the period before
World War L From the middle of the 1920s Knutsen invested in whaling ships and a whaling
factory. The company withdrew from the whaling sector shortly after the Second World War,
but the whaling company, Hvalfangst-AS Suderøy, was listed as the formal owner of five
vessels in the beginning ofthe 1970s,3
In 1925, two 13.000 dwt tankers were delivered to Knut Knutsen OAS, and the
company continued to expand in the tanker sector in the period up to the Second World War.
On the eve of the war, the company's tanker fleet consisted of eight large tankers, and the
company owned 18 other vessels. After the war, the company continued the expansion of its
tanker fleet, and it has been claimed that the tankers have been responsible for most of the
company's revenue in the post-war period."
The company's first liner service was the Knutsen Line, Scandinavian-South Pacific
Service, established in 1928,which existed until it was challenged by preferential treatment of
domestic shipping by some of the countries in Latin-America. It has been claimed that
Knutsen, due to "sentimental reasons" refrained from closing down this line.' Consequently, it
may seem that some of the liner services were kept even after economic considerations
indicated that the services should be discontinued. Nevertheless, two of the liner services
established in the interwar period were abandoned after the company had lost important
market shares due to the interruption of operations during the Second World War.
In the period after the Second World War, the company had two main areas of
business; the liner and the tanker sector. The company's activities in the liner sector peaked at
the end of the 1960s, when the liner fleet constituted 16 vessels." In addition, the company
continued its operation in the tanker sector, and in the latter part of the 1960s the company
3 In addition to the ownership of five small vessels, the company was until 1979 co-owner of the 216.000 dwt
TT Elisabeth Knutsen, and owned 35 per cent of the TT Hilda Knutsen and 24 percent of the TT Torill Knutsen.
4 Borgen, Svein Ole and Spanne, Martin, Investeringsatferd i norske rederier - en casestudie av rederiet Knut
Knutsen o.A.S [Investment behaviour in Norwegian shipowning companies - a case study of Knut Knutsen
OAS], unpublished thesis, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Bergen, 1982,p. 4.
S In Bang, Henning, Haukedal, Willy, Reve, Torger and Tronsmo, Per, Omstilling og organisasjonskultur i
norske rederier [Transformation and organisational culture in Norwegian shipowning companies], Report No.
311986, Centre for Applied Research, Bergen, 1986, p. 87, an employee of Knutsen claims that "{w}e were
fortunate when we were forced to abolish the South-America line." This analysis of the company is also
published as Tronsmo, Per, Omstilling og organisasjonskultur: lederskap og overlevelsesevne i tre norske
rederier [Transformation and organisational culture: management and the ability to survive in three Norwegian
shipowning companies], Bedriftsøkonomens Forlag, Oslo, 1987.
6 Two of these ships, the Bakke Cooler and the Bakke Reefer, were employed in the transport of fruit, and were
sold in the middle of the 1970s.
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owned a tanker fleet of 250.000 dwt.' From the beginning of the 1970s, the company's
expansion in the tanker sector accelerated. In October 1970, Knutsen launched the 216.000
ton TT Elisabeth Knutsen, which resulted in the tanker fleet being almost doubled.
B.1.2. Fleet structure
Knut Knutsen OAS were engaged in both liner and tanker operations in the period prior to the
international shipping crisis. As a result of this, a casual glance at the fleet structure may give
the impression of a company attempting to reduce risk through diversification.' However, the
case of Knutsen is a good example of the fact that the current structure of the fleet may
diverge from the company's strategy and focus.
Figure 8.1. Fleet and contracts, liner vessels and tankers, 1000 dwt, 1970-809
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The changes in the fleet structure during the 1970s, when the emphasis was on expansion of
the tanker fleet, are evident from Figure 8.1. In 1970 and 1971 five of the company's liners
were lengthened and rebuilt to be better suited for the transport of containers. This was the
only major investment in the liner operations in the period. The company retained the liners,
but channelled their resources into the tanker sector, where they undertook large investments.
The liner fleet was subsequently neither renewed nor modernised, despite the fact that the
international market for liner services at this time was characterised by large structural and
technological changes. In 1978, the average age of the company's liner vessels was almost
twenty years, whereas the average age of the tankers was five years.
7 In the 1950s and 1960s, the tanker fleet grew slowly. In 1959 the company owned ten tankers, constituting
235.000 dwt. Ten years later, the number of tankers had been reduced to six, but due to the increase in average
size, amounted to 252.1 00 dwt. The increase in the average size of the tankers is not necessarily a result of an
increase in risk propensity. The technological development and the increasing economies of scale were the
impetus behind the growing average size of the vessels.
S The company also had a brief interlude in the offshore sector in the middle of the 1970s; see Bang, Haukedal,
Reve & Tronsmo, op.cit., 1986, p. 153.
9 The chart is based upon the Knutsen-database.
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The activities of Knut Knutsen OAS became increasingly directed towards the tanker
sector from the beginning of the 1970s. Thor Pande, the company's "heir apparent", claimed
that he wanted to concentrate on the tanker sector, rather than the liner services." The
company had launched two supertankers, the TT Elisabeth Knutsen and the TT Torill
Knutsen, before the breakdown of the tanker market. As a result of this, the tanker fleet in
1973 was almost three times the size that it had been only a few years previously. Moreover,
Knutsen had contracted two 410.000 dwt tankers. Neither financing nor charters had been
secured for these vessels.
8.1.3. Chartering strategy
On the one hand, the fleet structure of Knut Knutsen OAS indicates a company wishing to
reduce risk through diversification. On the other hand, the tanker chartering indicates a
considerable willingness to take risk. The company usually operated their tankers in the spot
market, even though medium-term charter agreements were only occasionally entered into."
One example of such an agreement is the four-year charter signed with Esso in connection
with the investment in the TT Elisabeth Knutsen. The revenue from this charter enabled the
investments in even larger tanker tonnage. As the company mainly operated in the spot
market, the risk posed by fluctuations in the freight rate level has been large.
The risks undertaken by Knut Knutsen OAS were not confined to those represented by
the spot market operation of their own vessels. In 1972, the company chartered an 85.000 ton
motor tanker from the Japanese shipowning company Sanko. This ship, the MT Europride,
was delivered in 1975. When they chartered the ship from the Japanese company, before the
shipping crisis, Knutsen had not secured employment for the vessel. Consequently, the
charter, like most of the Sanko-deals, "proved a considerable financial embarassment to
those owners who were not willing or able to cancel before the tanker market crash. "12
The Sanko-deals are an enticing chapter in the history of merchant shipping in the
1970s. When the Japanese authorities reorganised the Japanese shipping industry in the mid
1960s, six companies were given preferential treatment which facilitated their expansion in
the latter part of the decade. Sanko was not among these, but managed to expand by signing
large-scale, inexpensive newbuilding contracts which were secured through charters with
European shipowners. In 1972 more than 50 such contracts were negotiated, and Knut
Knutsen OAS were among the companies that ordered vessels through Sanko. The fact that
Knutsen had chartered a ship in this manner is proof that the company's willingness to take
risks was large in the period before the international shipping crisis. They "bought" risk, and
possible profits, in addition to that represented by the company's own fleet.
10 This strategy was approved by Ole Andreas Knutsen; see Borgen & Spanne, op.cit., 1982, p. 17. Pande left the
company in 1978, after they had encountered large difficulties due to the tanker sector focus.
Il According to Bang, Haukedal, Reve & Tronsmo, op.cit., 1986, p. 82, "The company had gambled enormously
on the tanker operations. It operated in the spot market, like it always had. "
12 Stokes, Peter, Ship Finance - Credit Expansion and the Boom-Bust Cycle, Lloyd's of London Press Ltd.,
London, 1992, p. 81.
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In 1975, all of Knutsen's tankers were laid Up.13According to Kapital, the lay-up of TT
Elisabeth Knutsen and TT Torill Knutsen led to annual expenses in the region of 30-40
million kroner, at a time when there was no revenue from these ships."
Table 8.1. Knut Knutsen OAS - employment of large tankers, 1970-8015
Tl ElIsabeth Knutsen n Torill Knutsen I T thida Knutsen Kawasaki 1215
216.000d\\t zss.ooo dwt 410.000 dwt 410.000 dwt
1970 Delivered
1971 TC Esso
Contracted -
1972 TC Esso 270.000 dwt
Converted to
1973 TC Esso Delivered 410.000 dwt Contracted
1974 TC Esso Laid up (some trips)
1975 Laid up Laid up Converted (2 liners)
1976 Laid up Laid up Delivered
1977 Laid up Laid up Laid up (some trips)
1978 Laid up Laid up until Aug. Laid up (some trips)
1979 Sold Spotmarket Spot market
1980 Laid up (some trips) Laid up (some trips)
The sale of a tanker such as TT Elisabeth Knutsen at the right time in 1979 would have been
beneficial, compared with a sale in 1978 or 1980. However, Knutsen sold the vessel in March
as a result of liquidity problems, and the timing was anything but good. Only a few months
later, the price in the second-hand market was considerably higher."
It has been estimated that Knut Knutsen OAS lost NoK 215 million from 1975 to
1979. This can be compared with a bottom line of55 million in 1973 and 60 million in 1974.17
The relatively risky strategy, with a considerable share of the tonnage engaged in the spot
market, is the main cause of the extremely large fluctuations in operating profits.
8.1.4. Contracting
In the years from 1970 to 1980, all of the newbuilding contracts which the companyentered
into were for tankers." Contracting is a better measure of the company' s present strategy than
fleet structure, so it is evident that the focus of Knut Knutsen OAS during the 1960s had been
transferred from liner services to the relatively risky tanker market.
The turbine-driven tanker Elisabeth Knutsen, delivered in 1970, had proven to be a
very profitable investment for Knut Knutsen OAS, and the company's second supertanker was
13At this point, the tanker fleet consisted of the two supertankers TT Elisabeth Knutsen and TT Torill Knutsen,
as well as the motortankers John Knutsen and Anna Knutsen. The latter ships were sold en bloc to owners
registered in the Cayman Islands in October 1975 at $11,5 million.
14 Kapital, No. 14, 1975.
15The table is based on figures from the Knutsen-database, as well as information from Borgen & Spanne,
op.cit., 1982, Appendix. 1 and Kapital, various issues.
16 The TT Elisabeth Knutsen, built 1970, was sold at $6.45 million to Korean interests. In August, a slightly
smaller vessel, the TT Jarmona, built in 1968 was also sold from Norway to Korean interests. However, the price
was $9 million.
17 Bang, Haukedal, Reve & Tronsmo, op.cit., 1986, pp. 109 and 82.
18 According to the lists published in the Norwegian Shipping News, Knut Knutsen OAS contracted a 14.000 dwt
vessel at the VEB Mathias- Thesen Werft. This is a mix.-up between Knut Knutsen OAS and the Oslo-based
shipowner Knut A. Knutsen.
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launched prior to the oil price increase. Due to the favourable conditions in the tanker market,
the increased investments in this sector resulted in high profits in the beginning of the 1970s,
and this encouraged the company to further contracting of large tankers.
In late 1972, Knut Knutsen OAS contracted as 270.000 dwt tanker at the Japanese
Kawasaki-yard. In the summer of 1973, this contract was converted to 410.000 dwt, and early
in the autumn this year, the companyordered another identical ship." The contract was signed
without secure financing or employment." Shortly after the signing of the contract the oil
price increased and the tanker market collapsed.
Figure 8.2. The freight rate level and contracting by Knut Knutsen OAS, 1970-74.
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In addition to the distinct expansion in the tanker sector, another feature of the company's
contracting is that newbuilding contracts have been entered into in periods where the
company's liquidity has been good or where the freight rate level has been high. Due to the
fact that the company operated most of its tankers in the spot market, these conditions have
usually occurred concurrently. It has been claimed that "analysis was banned in period were
the tanker market was good. "21 In the same manner, the sale of vessels has, at times, been
motivated by liquidity problems. As a result of this, the decisions to purchase and sell vessels
have not always been part of a conscious strategy, but rather been influenced by external
events such as the tanker market development and the liquidity of the company.
When the newbuildings contracted in 1972 and 1973 were delivered to Knut Knutsen
OAS, the bottom had fallen out of the market. The TT Hilda Knutsen, building number 1215
at the Kawasaki-yard in Kobe, was originally scheduled to be launched in late 19741 early
1975. The ship was delivered in April 1976, and had seven assignments until September 1978,
after which it managed to earn acceptable rates in connection with the temporary freight level
Increase.
19 This contract is registered in Norwegian Shipping News for the first time in January 1974, and is not included
in the survey ofnewbuilding contracts from September 1973.
20 This contract would haunt Knutsen until 1982, when the company had to come to terms with an agreement
with the Guarantee Institute and the Japanese yard; see Økonomisk Rapport, No. 16, 1987, p. 86.
21 Unnamed employee quoted in Bang, Haukedal, Reve & Tronsmo, op.cit., 1986, p. 88.
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Building number 1228 at Kawasaki, the sister-ship of TT Hilda Knutsen, was never
delivered to Knut Knutsen OAS. In 1975 the companyentered into negotiations with the yard
with a view to converting the contract to two liner vessels. This conversion implied that Knut
Knutsen OAS was spared from having to pay the cancellation fee or operating the ship in a
depressed tanker market. However, due to the conversion fee and the exchange rate
development, the two liners became twice as expensive as they would have been if they had
been contracted in the traditional manner."
The contracting of two large tankers, without employment secured, in the period prior
to the oil price increase, was of great importance to Knut Knutsen OAS. The company's
losses amounted to more than NoK 200 million between 1975 and 1979, and they encountered
large economic difficulties. The contracting of consistently larger tanker tonnage was an
important part of the company's expansion in the tanker sector. The heavy expansion started
when the companyordered the TT Elisabeth Knutsen in the late 1960s, and ended abruptly
when the tanker market collapsed.
8.1.5. Financing
In spite of the extent of shipyard financing available, shipowners had to have close
connections with bank's to secure additional financing and liquidity-loans. The British finance
institution Hambros Bank was originally Knutsen's most important financial partner. After the
freight market breakdown, Hambros Bank had fallen victim to great losses in connection with
the financing of the tanker fleets of two major Norwegian shipowners, Hilmar Reksten and
Hagbart Waage. Due to the large losses that the bank had been forced to accept in connection
with the financing of supertankers, Hambros would notgive Knut Knutsen OAS an acceptable
offer when the final part of the financing of TT Hilda Knutsen was to be arranged in 1975Y
Knut Knutsen OAS had to look for alternative bank connections, and the Guarantee
Institute entered the scene as guarantor for the loans. They granted guarantees for the loans in
connection with the TT Hilda Knudsen, and also assisted with regard to liquidity loans. A
guarantee for a liquidity loan granted in late 1981 was motivated by the fact that "the
discontinuation of the Guarantee Institute 's involvement in the tankers would lead to the
winding-up of the company's additional activities. f...]As the company was one of the few
remaining smal! Norwegian liner companies, the winding-up would be a further step in the
direction of reduction of Norwegian liner activities. "24 Accordingly, the neglected liner sector
to some extent came to the rescue. The Guarantee Institute and Knutsen's main creditors
became strongly involved in the operation of the company."
22 Borgen & Spanne, op.cit., 1982, p. 47.
23 According to Borgen & Spanne, ap. cit., 1982, p. 47 this was a result of the fact that Knut Knutsen OAS had
been unwilling to agree to a conversion fee six months earlier.
24 Stortingsproposisjon nr. 21 (1982-83) Om bevilgning til utbetaling under garantier stillet av Norsk
garantiinstitutt for skip og borefarttøyer AS for lån til rederiet Knut Knutsen OAS [On the appropriation of
payment with regard to guarantees granted by Norsk garantiinstitutt for skip og borefartøyer AS for loans to the
shipowning company Knut Knutsen OAS], pp. 1-2.
25 The Guarantee Institute, together with Manufacturers Hanover Trust and Bergen Bank, forced the company to
recruit a managing director who had no previous relation to the company in the end of the 1970s.
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8.1.6. Summary - Knut Knutsen OAS
Knut Knutsen OAS was originally involved in both the tanker and the liner sectors. Motivated
by expectations of large profits, Knutsen expanded in the tanker sector, at the same time
neglecting the need for modernisation and renewal of the liner fleet. The end result was that
when the tanker market collapsed, the company had pooled its resources into a market
characterised by overcapacity and depressed freight rates. Ironically, the large tanker
investments implied that Knutsen had lost competitiveness in the relatively secure liner sector
due to lack of investment.26
The development of Knut Knutsen OAS can illustrate how the tanker market focus of
some Norwegian shipowners had disastrous consequences. The expansion in the tanker
market enabled the company to reap large profits in the first part of the 1970s. The contracting
of two ULCCs without financing or employment secured in advance proved to be extremely
unfortunate when the tanker market broke down. As a result of the contracting in 1973, the
company acquired a supertanker which alternately was laid-up and earning abysmal rates, as
well as two liners which had become very expensive. Moreover, the company was forced to
sell parts of the fleet due to acute liquidity problems.
The fate of Knut Knutsen OAS illustrates the changes in Norwegian shipping
companies brought about by the shipping crisis. By the mid 1980s, after almost 90 years at the
helm, the Knutsen family left the company." The company's new owners implemented a new
strategy, based on long-term charters. Knutsen OAS Shipping today operates a fleet of some
20 vessels, mainly shuttle tankers, product carriers and chemical tankers.
Chapter 8.2. Hilmar Rekstens Rederi
Hilmar Reksten had built his shipowning company from scratch. Reksten was in the
beginning of the 1970s one of the most famous characters on the international shipping scene.
The reputation was primarily due to his risky strategy, as a result ofwhich he had earned large
profits on a series of speculative deals. "The mysterious Norwegian Hilmar Reksten" is called
a "gambler" and an "archetypal entrepreneur", Other observers have called him "risk-
loving " and "the shipowner who was willing to break law and justice to accomplish his goal;
becoming the largest tanker owner in the world. "28
There are several problems connected to an assessment of Hilmar Reksten's
importance in the international shipping market, as Reksten had considerable assets abroad,
which were kept out of reach of the Norwegian authorities. It is, among other things, alleged
that Hilmar Reksten, together with P&O, controlled the company Associated Bulk Carriers,
26 At the same time, it is important to remember that the increasing preferential treatment of domestic lines
altered the conditions in the liner market from the middle of the 1970s. One possibility is therefore that larger
investments in the liner sector would but have delayed the economic difficulties of the company.
27 The basis for the withdrawal can be found in Bergen Bank's proposal to avoid bankruptcy, referred to in
Stortingsproposisjon nr. 21 (1982-83), op.cit., pp. 2-3.
28 Quotes from The Sunday Times, 12 March, 1978, p. 63, Espeli, Harald, Industripolitikk på avveie -
Motkonjunkturpolitikken og Norges Industriforbunds rolle 1975-80 [Industrial policy gone astray - The counter-
cyclical policy and the role of Norges Industriforbund 1975-80], Ad Notam Gyldendal, Oslo, 1992, p. 55 and
Borgen, Erling, Hilmar Rekstens eventyr [The adventures of Hilmar Reksten], J.W. Cappelens Forlag, 1981, p.
7.
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which was one of the largest dry bulk companies in the world." Due to the large amount of
uncertainty surrounding Reksten's assets abroad, only the ships listed as owned by Reksten in
the Veritas-regi stry are regarded as part ofhis fleet.
Even though an assessment of Reksten's fleet may be fraught with uncertainties, his
strategy is easy to discern. Although he was known as a relatively shy person who seldom
gave interviews, he explained and defended his choice of strategy and his business philosophy
on several occasions. These sources will be used to underline certain elements in the analysis
ofReksten's market behaviour and contracting."
8.2.1. Historical introduction
Hilmar Reksten embarked on a career as a shipowner in the interwar period, after studies in
Germany. Before he started his studies in Germany, Hilmar Reksten speculated in German
marks with borrowed money. He had obtained a 5.000 kroner loan from a shipowner in
Bergen to finance his studies. The development of the German currency left his investment as
good as worthless after four months. Reksten sometimes used this story to illustrate the
uncertainty of the currency market, and the incidence might explain Reksten's fear of
exchange rate losses in connection with long-term charters."
Hilmar Reksten started out by operating his own and chartered vessels on The Great
Lakes-trade. In 1938 he ordered his first tanker at the Swedish yard Kockums Verft." During
the Second World War, Hilmar Reksten worked for the Norwegiari organisation Nortraship,
which was responsible for the operation of the Norwegian fleet."
Reksten questioned the Norwegian authorities' licensing-policy in the period after the
Second World War, and he saw the policy as a direct discrimination against shipowners
wishing to invest in large tankers." Reksten was convinced that the largest potential for profit
existed in the tanker market, and particularly in the spot market.
Despite feeling obstructed and opposed by the Norwegian authorities, Hilmar Reksten
continued to expand in the tanker sector after the Second World War. Early in the 1960s he
29 See Næss, Erling Dekke, Autobiography of a Shipping Man, Seatrade, London, 1977, p. 233, Norwegian
Shipping News, No. 12, 1973, p. 402 and Norwegian Shipping News No. 15, 1973, p. 487. Reksten claimed that
he was only involved in the management of the vessels on behalf of the real owners, who wanted to remain
anonymous.
30 The advantage of this kind of sources is that they make it possible to analyse the evaluations of the shipowner
before certain actions were undertaken, for instance the signing of a contract. The problem with the use of these
evaluations in connection with Hilmar Reksten is that he, even after being proved wrong, claimed that he acted
in the rational and most profitable manner. He also tended to blame circumstances of which he had no control
for his failures.
31 Norwegian Shipping News, No. 7B, 1971, p. 49.
32 In Norwegian Shipping News, No. 1,1976, p. 20, Reksten claims that he originally wanted to contract this ship
at a Norwegian yard, but that he was surprised to learn that Norwegian yards were unable to build the kind of
vessel that he wanted.
33 For an introduction to Reksten's position in the Nortraship-organisation, confer the chapter "Hilmar Reksten -
et stormsentrum" [Hilmar Reksten - eye of the hurricane] in Thowsen, Atle, NORTRASHIP - Profitt og
patriotisme [NORTRASHIP - Profit and Patriotism], Grøndahl og Dreyers Forlag AlS, Oslo, 1992, pp. 217-251.
34 Norwegian Shipping News, No. 7B, 1971, p. 53 and Reksten, Hilmar, Noen ideer om konkurransevilje og
risikomomentet under strukturendringene inorsk tankskipsfart [Some ideas about willingness to compete and the
risk aspect during the structural changes in Norwegian tanker shipping], Kristofer Lehmkuhl Lecture 1971,
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, 1971, pp. 7-16.
Chapter Eight - The Fate of Four Norwegian Tanker Owners 231
Stig Tenold: The Shipping Crisis of the 1970s: Causes, Effects and Implicationsfor Norwegian Shipping
contracted a series of seven turbine-driven tankers, delivered in the period 1965-1967.35 The
contracting of the TT Julian at Aker/Stord marked the beginning of a close association
between Reksten and the Aker-group. In the years 1964-1972, Reksten contracted 12VLCCs,
at a total value ofmore than two billion kroner, at the yard."
In addition to his own shipping company, Hilmar Reksten had economic interests in a
variety of Norwegian companies, both within the shipping industry and in other sectors.
Moreover, he owned several properties, and intended to build a yard on one of these," Hilmar
Reksten also owned a plethora of stocks and properties abroad." When Reksten encountered
liquidity problems in the middle of the 1970s, the Norwegian authorities decided to buy his
Norwegian shares, valued at 200 million kroner."
Hilmar Reksten's emergence as one of the world's leading tanker owners was the
result of a business philosophy resting on three principles. First, he focussed on the market for
oil transport. Second, he expanded his fleet through the ordering of the largest and most
efficient vessels available. Third, he operated in the spot market, ie the market for single
voyages, rather than on long-term contracts.
8.2.2. Fleet structure
Early in the 1970s, Hilmar Reksten claimed that he controlled the largest privately owned
independent tanker fleet in the world." The fleet mainly consisted of turbine-driven
supertankers." In 1970, Hilmar Reksten's tanker fleet amounted to more than one million dwt,
and he had a similarly sized "fleet" ofnewbuilding contracts at German and Norwegian yards.
In addition to his own vessels, he had chartered vessels from other shipowners, thereby
increasing his risk as well as his potential revenue.
Hilmar Reksten had invested heavily in the tanker market, and after 1970 his fleet
consisted almost exclusively of tankers. In 1975, Reksten received the gas-tanker GTT Lucian
from Moss-Rosenberg Verft, allegedly after signing the $40 million contract for the ship on a
35 The vessels were contracted in Germany, Great Britain, Sweden and, in the case of the TT Julian, Norway.
36 Rederiaksjeselskapet Hadrian, Driftsberetning og Resultat [annual report], 1972, p. 7.
37 See for instance Rederiaksjeselskapet Hadrian, Driftsberetning og Resultat [annual report], 1977, p. 12. The
yard should build tankers of record-breaking proportions, ie in the region of 800.000 dwt; see Norwegian
Shipping News, No. 15, 1973, p. 485.
38 Borgen, op.cit., 1981, p. 44, presents some of the New York Stock Exchange-listed shares allegedly owned by
Reksten.
39 Stortingsproposisjon nr. 187 (1974-75), Omfullmakt til kjep av aksjer inorske selskaper [On the authorisation
of the purchase of shares in Norwegian companies]. The fate of the shares after they were bought by the
authorities was the centre of considerable debate in the Norwegian parliament; see for instance lnnst. S. nr. 437
(1976-77), Innstilling fra finanskomiteen om disponering av aksjer som staten kjepte av Reksten-gruppen
[Recommendation from the Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs on the use of shares which the state
bought from the Reksten-group] and Stortingsforhandlingene, 4. juni 1977, Disponering av aksjer som staten
kjepte av Reksten-gruppen [On the use of shares which the state bought from the Reksten-group], pp. 4275-
4282.
40 Reksten, Hilmar, Opplevelser [Experiences], H. Aschehoug & Co., Oslo, 1979, p. 29. The assertion is correct
if only vessels without charters are deemed "independent".
41 In addition to the tankers, one of Reksten's companies owned four 16.000 dwt bulk carriers. These vessels are
not included in the survey of Reksten's fleet, as they were relatively unimportant. The M/Aux Statsraad
Lehmkuhl, a sailing vessel which was owned through the company Bergens Skoleskib, is also omitted from the
analysis. This majestic vessel was bought by Reksten in 1968 and operated as a training ship for four years. She
was taken over by a private foundation in 1978.
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napkin." Despite the inclusion ofthis vessel, more than 95 per cent of the fleet consisted of oil
tankers.
One conspicuous feature of Reksten's operations was the large amount of contracts,
relative to the size of the fleet. Norwegian shipowners held a disproportionate share of the
world's newbuilding contracts. However, Reksten's amount of tonnage on order, relative to
his existing fleet, was even larger than his Norwegian colleagues. One important reason for
this was that Reksten contracted ships of ever-increasing sizes, and the average size of the
vessels he contracted grew strongly in the beginning of the 1970s.
Figure 8.3. Reksten's fleet and contracts, million dwt, 1961-7943
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The fleet structure is of importance in an explanation of why Hilmar Reksten was extremely
hard hit by the international shipping crisis. First, the fleet consisted almost exclusively of
tankers. Second, the vessels were large, and it was the freight rates and the values of the
largest tankers which deteriorated the most in connection with the shipping crisis.
Table 8.2. Average size of Hilmar Reksten's tankers and tanker contracts, 1970-7444
Average size - existing fleet Average size - newbuilding contracts
1970 90.500 dwt 221.000 dwt
1971 100.000 dwt 265.000 dwt
1972 114.000 dwt 275.000 dwt
1973 196.500 dwt 285.000 dwt
1974 227.500 dwt 352.500 dwt
In addition to the operation of his own large fleet, Reksten increased his potential profits and
risks by chartering-in four vessels from other shipowners. When he encountered economic
42 Borgen, op.cit., 1981, p. 88.
43 Based on figures from the Reksten-database. The list does not include the vessels ordered in Hilmar Reksten's
name, but intended for the company of his son Audun Reksten, vessels owned by Reksten through foreign
companies or vessels chartered from other shipping companies. These vessels have also been omitted from the
rest of the paper.
44 Figures based on calculations from Reksten- database.
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difficulties, Reksten did not have the financial resources necessary to honour the agreements
he had signed, and the charters were annulled after the tanker market breakdown. As a result
of this annulment, the original owners of the ships demanded $300 million in compensation
from Reksten."
8.2.3. Chartering strategy
Hilmar Reksten had a clearly pronounced chartering strategy - only given particular
circumstances would he commit his vessels to charters. The chartering strategy was a result of
the fact that he judged the risk of operating in the spot market differently from his
competitors. On one occasion, he claimed that "the chartering policy [....} was based on
commercial reasoning and not on gambling. I could not afford to gamble. "46
Hilmar Reksten's ships were as a rule operated in the spot market, and in his
autobiography Opplevelser [Experiences] he characterises "the four times I hit the bull 's eye
in the spot market" as the main achievements in his shipowning career. In 1948, the MT
Julian was committed to a five-voyage charter, and the ship's profit during these nine months
far exceeded its initial price. Four years later, the MT Octavian was given a five year charter,
quite unusual in view of Reksten's general chartering policy. Reksten claims that this "is an
example that I committed vessels to charters when Ifelt that it was right. "47 The largest block-
closure included 12 of Reksten' s 15 vessels, which were chartered to British Petroleum. This
agreement, from 1970, involved 59 voyages around the Cape."
Reksten's spot market victories culminated in the closure of the VLCC TT Kong
Haakon VII at the rate Worldscale 400. Reksten claims that this was "a rate the world has
never seen, neither before nor after. "49 The net profit from this trip was 42 million kroner,
which implies that 40 per cent of the ship's building price had been earned on a voyage which
lasted 68 days.
On several occasions Reksten emphasised that he operated his vessels in the spot
market because he regarded this as the market segment with the lower risk. Fear that the
development of exchange rates or costs would reduce his profits made him see the charter
market as the relatively risky alternative. Reksten claimed that "the risk associated with this
assessment of the market conditions is, in periods of depression, not unreasonably large for
experienced shipowners with a practised organisation and competitive tonnage, which in
periods of increasing demand also can reap unreasonably large profits. "50 Shipowners
preferring long-term charters were referred to as "husmenn" [cotters].
One week before The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries began their
concerted effort to raise oil prices, Hilmar Reksten claimed in a public interview that "[ajgain
45 See Kapital, No. 18, 1978, p. 21. For an introduction to the saga surrounding the chartered-in vessels, see
Tenold, Stig, "The Harder They Come... Hilmar Reksten from Boom to Bankruptcy", paper presented at the
Third International Congress of Maritime History, Esbjerg, August 2000.
46 Reksten, op.cit., 1979, p. 169.
47 Ibid., p. 168.
48 It has been claimed that Reksten had considerably larger profits from these trips than those he declared to the
Norwegian authorities, and that this revenue enabled him to buy his share of the Zapata-Næss fleet.
49Reksten, op.cit., 1979, p. 169.
50Reksten, op.cit., 1971, p. 21.
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I am in the fantastic position that all my vessels are by the goal line, unchartered and free. "51
The fantastic position was reflected in the closure of the TT Kong Haakon VII at Worldscale
400, but also in the high share of Reksten's fleet laid up the following years.
Immediately after the TT Kong Haakon VII had finished her trip at the historic freight
rate Worldscale 400, the vessel was laid up and not employed for another four months. The
vessel then undertook one voyage, at rates which did not cover costs. After the oil price
increase, large parts of Reksten's fleet was constantly laid up, and the revenue from the few
trips which were undertaken in several instances did not cover the variable costs.
Table 8.3. RA Hadrian's tankers and their employment, 1973-7852
Table 8.3 is a survey of one of Reksten's companies, RA Hadrian, and the employment of
some of its tanker in the period after the tanker market collapse. Reksten' s policy of operating
his vessels in the spot market proved to have dramatic consequences, and at one point in 1975,
all of his tankers were laid up. A few weeks before the tanker market collapse, Reksten had
rejected an offer of long-term charters for several of his vessels, allegedly because of a
difference of ten cents per ton between the charterer's offer and Reksten's demand." The
result of this rejection was that he ended up with large parts of his fleet in lay-up, and
newbuilding contracts for even more unchartered vessels.
8.2.4. Contracting
Hilmar Reksten's willingness to take risks is reflected in the newbuilding contracts he signed
in the last part of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s. The numbers from one to three in
the subsequent figure denote the following development:
1. February 1970: Two tankers are converted from 220.000 to 283.000 dwt, and another
three ships of283.000 dwt are contracted.
2. December 1970: Reksten contracts two additional tankers of283.000 dwt.
3. July 1973: Reksten signed pro forma contracts about the building of two ships each
representing 420.000 dwt. The contracts were later re-negotiated with the view ofbuilding
four tankers, each 490.000 dwt.
51 Interview with Hilmar Reksten arranged on 9 October 1973, reprinted in Norges Industri, 22 October 1973, p.
12.
52 Information from Rederiaksjeselskapet Hadrian, Driftsberetning og Resultat [annual report].
53 Borgen, op.cit., 1981, p. 84.
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Figure 8.4. Freight level and tanker contracting, 1970-7454
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Hilmar Reksten usually contracted newbuildings in blocks, placing orders for a series of
vessels at the same time. Early in 1970, Reksten contracted three ships, totalling 850.000 dwt,
at the Aker-group/ Aker Stord-yard. 55 Less than a year later, he contracted two more vessels,
283.000-tonners, at the same yard. The final and biggest block of contracts was signed shortly
before the freight market breakdown, when Reksten contracted four 420.000 dead weight ton
tankers, totalling more than 1,6 million dwt, at Aker Stord,"
The large contracting of VLCCs and ULCCs, usually at fixed prices, meant that
Reksten's contracts often were favourable compared to those of his competitors who fell
victim to the strongly increasing newbuilding prices in the beginning of the 1970s.57 As a
result of the fact that all his tanker contracts after 1966 were with the Aker-group, a large
share of Reksten's debt was denoted in Norwegian kroner. 58 Until 1976, the exchange rate
development was unfavourable to Reksten. His income was denoted in dollar, the value of
which fell sharply, whereas his expenses were largely in appreciating kroner and mark.
The massive contracting of consistently larger tonnage was an important element in
Reksten's expansive tanker market strategy. The effect of the focus on large vessels is clearly
visible when we compare his fleet and newbuilding contracts with the Norwegian and
international averages.
54 Based on figures from the Reksten-database.
55 Reksten, op.cit. 1979, pp. 11-24 is a subjective introduction to the problems surrounding Reksten's contracts
with Aker from the beginning, of the 1970s. An alternative version of these events can be found in Onarheim,
Onar, Min tørn [My bout], Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1984, pp. 177-182. Figure 8.4 is based on the dates which
Reksten presents for his contracts, not the inclusions in the Norwegian Shipping News-list.
56 These contracts were not registered in Norwegian Shipping News' list of vessels contracted by Norwegian
owners, published in September 1973, Onarheim, Onar, Min tørn [My bout], Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1984, pp.
56-65 is an introduction to the negotiation-process which lasted from June 1973 and which ended in the
contracting of the four tankers.
57 Consequently, Kapital, No. 7-8, 1973, p, 41, claimed that there were large hidden reserves in the Reksten-
fleet.
58 Rederiaksjeselskapet Hadrian, Driftsberetning og Resultat [annual report], 1974, p. 4 includes a list of the
Reksten-owned company RA Hadrian's debts. More than half of this was denoted in Norwegian kroner,
approximately a third was in dollars and the rest was German marks.
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Figure 8.5. Average size offleets and vessels on order 1974, 1000 dwt"
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All of Reksten's contracts were entered into without the security oflong-tenn charters. Hilmar
Reksten experienced the dangers inherent in this contracting policy as early as 1972, when the
TT Hadrian went directly from the Aker/Stord-yard into lay-up. Two years later, as a result of
the spot market policy, the net profit of the same ship was more than 50 million kroner.
In 1974 Reksten's turbine tanker contracts at Aker/Stord amounted to approximately
three million dwt, and these ships were to be launched in a market with overcapacity and
bunkers prices which favoured motor tankers. At the same time, it was evident that the value
of the company's fleet was deteriorating, and this would create a difficult situation with regard
to the creditors. The solution was to cancel some of the contracts with Aker/Stord.
Reksten had difficulties paying the instalments on the four turbine tankers as early as
April 1974. He claimed that his lack of payment was a protest against the fact that his
previously paid instalments had been used for other purposes than his own ships. At the same
time, Reksten indicated that he intended to cancel several of the contracts at Aker/Stord
because the yard would be unable to deliver the vessels at the scheduled time or secure
financing in the manner which the contract stipulated."
In September 1974 the Aker-group decided that the contracts with Reksten about the
building of the four 420.000-tonners should be cancelled. The company chose to go to court to
secure compensation for the losses that they had been forced to take as a result of the fact that
59 The figures for Reksten are taken from the Reksten-database. The figures for the Norwegian and international
fleets and contracts are taken from Review 1975, which includes tankers and bulk carriers of more than 10.000
dwt and other vessels over 1000 grt. The point made in Chapter Six, that the size differences between the
Norwegian and international tanker fleets largely related to the existing fleets, rather than contracts, is obvious.
60 On this occasion, it is easy to see how Reksten tended to blame external circumstances for his problems. In a
letter to Fred. Olsen, chairman of the board in the Aker-group, he claims that "in July 1973 you even managed to
fool me into signing the contracts for buildings number 414-417. "; see Reksten, op.cit., 1979, p. 66. Onarheim,
Onar, Min tørn [My bout], Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1984, p. 150 takes the contrary position, claiming that
"Hilmar Reksten hadfrom the autumn of 1972 pushed Aker to give him more contracts, but the board decided
that Aker had enough Reksten-contracts already. [...} Reksten did not give in. He was both insulted by and angry
with Aker. roo} the end of the story was that Aker in June 1973 signed contractsfor four vessels with delivery in
1977-78. "
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the ships were never to be built. Three months later, Reksten himself cancelled the two
remaining contracts for the building oftwo 283.000-ton tankers, citing foul play from the yard
as the reason.
As a result of the annulment of the contracts due to lacking payment of instalments, an
arbitration court ordered Reksten to pay the Aker-group 320 million kroner." In addition to
this, he had to pay more than NoK 200 million in cancellation fees for the two 283.000-ton
vessels." Consequently, due to his eager contracting in 1972 and 1973, Reksten had to pay
NoK 520 million for vessels which he never received. Even for a company with a more
sustainable chartering strategy, it is doubtful whether expenses of this magnitude would be
manageable.
The liquidity difficulties occurred parallel with a strong reduction of the value of
Reksten's assets. Estimates from a Norwegian shipbroking company show that the value of a
standard 200.000 dwt tanker decreased by 80 per cent from 1973 to 1975.63 Reksten has
estimated that the value of his fleet fell by more than two billion kroner, or two thirds, from
January 1974 to September 1975.64 His net wealth fell from NoK 2,7 billion to red figures over
the same period.
8.2.5. Financing
Hilmar Reksten's contracting was undertaken in an unorthodox manner. When the vessels
were contracted, the only guarantee was Reksten's personal signature; neither charter
agreements nor bank guarantees were necessary." The reason for these unconventional deals
was Reksten's close relationship to the British Hambros Bank." Newbuilding contracts were
mainly financed by means of the yard credits, originating with state-run agencies, but the
additional financing was provided by Reksten personally or Hambros Bank." There are
several indications that Hambros Bank shared Reksten's opinion that operating the tankers in
the spot market was the best alternative."
Hambros Bank played a crucial role in connection with the financing of shipbuilding
for Norwegian account, and several of the shipowners who contracted large parts of their
tonnage from Norwegian shipyards had Hambros Bank as their main business associate in the
banking sector." After the tanker market collapse, the bank's losses on loans granted to
Norwegian shipowners, particularly Hilmar Reksten and Hagbart Waage, were enormous.
61 The already paid initial term, constituting NoK 86 million, was deducted.
62 107 million was deducted from the total sum, due to instalments previously paid by Reksten.
63 Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review 1976, Oslo, 1977, Table 19.
64 Reksten, op.cit., 1979, p. 175.
65 Ibid., p. 7. In an interview with Norwegian Shipping News, No. 7B, 1971, p. 59, Reksten asserts that .....if one
becomes too involved with finances one begins to be afraid and to be dependent upon the banks. I do not
recommend it. "
66 Borgen, op.cit., 1981, p. 107 claims that Hambros Bank "secured their own business by taking security in
Reksten 's foreign assets, but in Norway let the authorities compensate through guarantees granted by Norsk
Garantiinstitutt for Skip og Borefartøyer AS. "
67 In Kapital, No.6, 1974, p. 3 it is claimed that Hambros bank helped Reksten through a period of serious
economic difficulties before the freight rate increase in June 1967.
68 See for instance Rederiaksjeselskapet Hadrian, Driflsberetning og Resultat [annual report], 1975, p. 5.
69 See Hammer, Jan A. and Høy, Arvid, Norsk skipsfart og dets lånekilder [Norwegian shipping and its sources
of finance], Skipsfartsøkonomisk Institutt, Bergen, 1983, p. 36.
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According to Norwegian Shipping News, the bank had to write off £8,6 million in 197511976
as lost due to their involvement with Hilmar Reksten." According to the bank's annual
reports, the losses amounted to £4,6 million in 1976, an undisclosed amount transferred from
the bank's innerreserves in 1978 and more than $60 million in 1982.71
In the autumn of 1975, Reksten was threatened with bankruptcy. Transfer of money
from a mysterious foreign company and an agreement between the Norwegian authorities, the
Aker-group and Hambros Bank were necessary to secure the continuing operation of
Reksten's companies. Another element which helped to relieve the Reksten-companies'
liquidity problems in the period with deteriorating freight income and large lay-ups was the
Norwegian authorities purchase of Reksten's private portfolio ofstocks in the spring of 1975.
Hilmar Reksten was one of the first Norwegian shipowners to require the assistance of
the Guarantee Institute, and a large portion of the Guarantee institute's resources were
channelled to the Reksten-companies. Indeed, it has been claimed that the purpose of the
institution was a means to saving Hilmar Reksten from bankruptcy, induced by the close links
between Reksten and the Aker-group. This motive has been presented both by the Guarantee
Institute's barristers and by Haakon Nygaard, one of the instigators behind the institution and
later its managing director."
The entry of the Guarantee Institute signalled the exit of Hilmar Reksten. A new
company RA Trajan II, was established to take over vessels from the companies owned by
Hilmar Reksten and his family. Moreover, the family's 80 per cent share majority in RA
Hadrian was transferred to the Guarantee Institute without compensation. The vessels were to
be managed by Hilmar Reksten's adopted son, Johan Reksten. Although Hilmar Reksten was
allowed to remain on the board of RA Hadrian, he refused to sign the annual report and chose
not to participate on board meetings as "he questioned the legal basis of the agreements with
the Aker-group and the Guarantee Institute. "73
In order to secure the liquidity of the companies until the end of 1979, RA Trajan II
and RA Hadrian received guarantees from the Guarantee Institute of NoK 277 million and
NoK 463 million respectively." In the period 1976-1980 the annual losses of the companies
were in the region of NoK 270-300 million. Their negative balance increased from NoK 131
million in 1976 to NoK 1.275 million by the end of 1980.
In late 1981 the Guarantee Institute disbursed NoK 871 million in connection with the
guarantees granted to the benefit of Reksten's companies. On 10 May 1982 RA Hadrian was
70 Norwegian Shipping News, No. 13114, 1978, p. 13.
71 Hambros Bank, Report of the Directors and Accounts 1976, p. 3 and Hambros Bank, Report of the Directors
and Accounts 1978, p. 5. The bank reached two expensive settlements with the Norwegian authorities in 1982
and 1995; see Stokes, Peter, op.cit., 1992, pp. 41-42 and Tenold, op.cit., 2000.
72 The Guarantee Institute's barristers claimed this in a court case against Hambros Bank in 1992; see
Aftenposten, 29 October 1992, p. 7. Nygaard's claim can be found in Rapport til Stortinget fra den
granskningskommisjon i Reksten-saken som ble oppnevnt ved Stortingets vedtak 20. juni 1985 [Report to the
Storting from the investigative committee in the Reksten-case established by royal resolution 20 June 1985],
presented 9 February 1988, p. 199.
73 Director's report, RIA Hadrian, Driftsberetning og Resultat [annual report], 1976, p. 32.
74 Stortingsmelding nr. 103 (1980-81) Om virksomheten i Norsk garantiinstitutt for skip og borefartøyer AS i
1980 [Report to the Storting on the activities of The Norwegian Guarantee Institute for Ships and Drilling
Vessels AS in 1980], p. 4. The guarantees were renegotiated and increased in 1978.
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wound up after almost fifty years of operation. The company's NoK 17,4 million share capital
was lost, and the accumulated losses amounted to NoK 567 million. RA Trajan II continued
its activities with Johan Reksten and Hambros Bank as the main shareholders.
8.2.6. The aftermath
Due to the fact that Hilmar Reksten is often regarded as the personification of the shipping
crisis, he may deserve more attention than the other shipowners presented here." Moreover,
his demise was as controversial as his business policy, and included, among other things,
several lengthy court cases, the biggest civil action in Norwegian legal history and threats of
impeachment in the case of government members involved in the case.
In 1979 Hilmar Reksten was charged with eight counts of tax evasion and exchange-
control violations. He was acquitted on seven counts, but was fined one million kroner for
offences in connection with undisclosed profits from the sale of a tanker in 1973. Hilmar
Reksten condemned the criminal proceedings against him in a letter to the Norwegian Prime
Minister Odvar Nordli; "[ejven my iron constitution could not endure the strain. "76 He died in
Bergen in July 1980, aged 82;
Hilmar Reksten's estate was filed for bankruptcy by the Norwegian authorities in
November 1980 due to lacking tax payments. In January 1991, more than ten years after the
untangling of the Reksten-empire started, the Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten claimed that
"[t}he Reksten-case is definitely approaching an end. "77 However, legal cases in connection
with the estate are still contested in the Norwegian judiciary. According to the current
Norwegian national budget, "[djue to on-going lawsuits related to its only remaining activity,
the Reksten-complex, the Guarantee Institute can not be dissolved. "78
8.2.7. Summary - Hilmar Reksten
In Opplevelser, Hilmar Reksten presents a planned tanker-cooperation scheme between
several Norwegian shipowners." Two strategic elements were of crucial importance to this
collaboration. First, no long-term charters should be entered into due to the risk posed by
exchange rate changes and destructive inflation. Second, the investment should be in tankers
of a size and quality which was "top of the league" with regard to efficiency, viz turbine-
driven supertankers.
The collaboration never materialised, although Hilmar Reksten himself followed the
prescribed policy. Operation in the spot market proved to be very profitable in the period
where there was an increasing demand for tanker transport, but as a result of the freight
market collapse it became impossible to secure profitable employment for ships without
charters. The investment in large turbine tankers also proved to be extremely profitable in the
period where demand increased faster than supply. However, after the oil price increase, this
75 For a more detailed assessment of Hilmar Reksten's strategy and fate, see Tenold, Stig, op.cit., 2000.
76 Letter from Hilmar Reksten to Prime Minister Odvar Nordli, dated 26 March 1979, Archives of the Norwegian
Shipowners' Association, folder 6 B K 75 - Krisen 1975 XII: 011178-300679.
77Aftenposten, 24 January 1991, p. 22.
78 Stortingsproposisjon nr. l (1999-2000) Statsbudsjettet - Nærings- og Handelsdepartementet [The National
Budget - Proposition from the Ministry of Trade and Industry], p. 19.
79 Reksten, op.cit., 1979, pp. 163-167.
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segment experienced the largest fall, both in freight rates and the value of vessels.
Hilmar Reksten took advantage of the profit opportunities in the shipping sector. On 9
October 1973, he considered himself "in a fantastic position". No shipowners had more
tonnage available for assignments in the red-hot spot market than he had. A few years later
Hilmar Reksten set a new, more dubious record. No shipowners had more tonnage laid up
than he had. As Stokes puts it; "The highest flyer in 1973, Hilmar Reksten, was the first to
plunge earthwards. [ ...j Reksten, whose ambitions in 1973 appeared to know no bounds, was
a classic over-reacher, who sooner or later was bound to corne to grief "80
Chapter 8.3. Rederiet Peder Smedvig
Rederiet Peder Smedvig was a relatively diversified company involved in a series of
businesses. Originally, the Smedvig-family's companies were concentrated in two sectors -
shipping and canned goods. After the Second World War, the company continued to expand
in these sectors. The founder of the company, Peder Smedvig, died in 1959, and his son Torolf
took over the management of the company.
Torolf Smedvig has on several occasions been presented as a typical entrepreneur, and
he extended the commercial base of the company to include herring oil, property
development, tourism and in particular offshore oil activities." This short analysis of the
company focuses on the engagement in the shipping sector, with particular emphasis on the
tanker segment.
Rederiet Peder Smedvig partly differs from the other shipowning companies presented
here as a result of their considerable diversification outside the shipping sector. However, the
company's fate in the tanker sector is a very good illustration ofhow a few untimely decisions
prior to the international shipping crisis could have extremely large consequences in the
period after the freight market breakdown.
8.3.1. Historical introduction
When Peder Smedvig in 1915 decided to retire from his career as a captain, he had already for
some time owned stakes in several part -ownerships. 82 In the period 1915-1917 the company
received favourable returns from their investments in the shipping sector. However, after the
First World War the investments, financed by insurance settlements and profits from the sale
of ships, were channelled into the canning industry.
In 1926, Peder Smedvig re-entered the shipping scene. The company bought several
second-hand vessels in the period leading up to the Second World War, and in the 1930s the
company started to tie these vessels to long-term charters. As opposed to some of the other
80 Stokes, Peter, op.cit., 1992, p. 35 and p. 37.
81 Nerheim, Gunnar and Utne, Bjørn S., Under samme stjerne - Rederiet Peder Smedvig 1915-1990 [Under the
star - The shipowning company Peder Smedvig 1915-1990], Peder Smedvig AlS, Stavanger, 1990, p. 179. This
book is a very good introduction to the history of Smedvig's companies and an excellent example of the
potential of shipping company histories. The chapter is to a considerable extent based on information from the
book.
82 Nerheim & Utne, op.cit., 1990, p. 37, claims that Peder Smedvig in 1915 "joined the ranks of the
shipowners". This can be explained by the fact that this was the first time Peder Smedvig was more than a
passive investor. From 1915 onwards he acted as managing director and chairman of the board.
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Norwegian shipowning companies, Smedvig was no pioneer within the growing oil tanker
segment. The company's first tanker, the MT Glittre, was bought as late as 1935, the same
year in which Smedvigs Tankrederi AS was established. Originally, the ship was intended for
operation in the spot market, but in 1937 it was chartered to Standard Oil at very good rates."
During the Second World War, Smedvig lost four ofits five vessels.
Peder Smedvig's son, Torolf Smedvig, had started working for the shipowning
company in 1939. After 1959, the company's engagements and investments were diversified
under Torolf Smedvig's management. For instance, the company was among the pioneers in
the offshore oil industry. In 1971TorolfSmedvig was among the first Norwegian shipowners
to contract oil rigs. However, the company had already entered the offshore industry through
investments in supply ships and onshore supply bases.
Smedvig, which in the interwar period largely had bought second-hand bulk carriers,
invested mainly in newly built tankers after 1950. Intending to reap the benefits of the
increasing economies of scale within the tanker sector, Smedvig contracted large vessels. The
MT Vestalis was the largest vessel in Scandinavia when she was delivered in 1963, and the
TT Veni became Norway's largest ship when she was launched in 1969.
8.3.2. Fleet structure
In the beginning of the 1970s, Smedvig's tanker fleet, consisting of a turbine tanker, three
motor tankers and a combination carrier, amounted to 400.000 dwt. The turbine tanker, the
227.425 dwt TT Veni, represented more than half of the company's tonnage. This vessel had
been delivered in 1969, which means that there was a doubling of the company's tonnage
from 1969 to 1970. In addition to this, the company had contracted tonnage amounting to
40.000 dwt.
Figure 8.6. Smedvig's fleet and contracts, 1000 dwt, 1970-80
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The undelivered tonnage in 1970 consisted oftwo gas tankers ordered at the Moss-Rosenberg
yard. Due to the fact that Smedvig had ordered gas tankers, the figures in Figure 8.6 are
misleading compared with those of other shipowners." The reason for this is that gas tankers,
83 Nerheim & Utne, op.cit., 1990, p. 97.
84 Smedvig's newbuilding contracts, measured in dwt, made up only ten per cent of the total fleet of the
company in 1972, compared to a corresponding figure for Hilmar Reksten of almost 130 per cent. However, the
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despite the modest size when measured in dwt, are a relatively costly investment. This is
largely a result of the advanced technology necessary in connection with the building and
operation of gas tankers. In the beginning of the 197'()s, a 75.000 cubic metre LPG-vessel was
as expensive as a 200.000 dead weight ton oil tanker."
Due to the sale of the 18.775 dwt motor-tanker MT Venator, the size of Smedvig's
fleet was reduced between 1971 and 1972. Subsequently, the tonnage increased three years in
a row as a result of the delivery of supply ships and the previously mentioned gas tankers."
Smedvig was among the first Norwegian shipowners to invest in supply ships. Despite minor
difficulties for some of the vessels, the return on the investment was satisfactory."
There was no growth in Smedvig's tanker fleet during the 1970s. The company sold
the MT Venita to Greek interests in 1974, and the MT Vestalis was also sold to Greece the
following year. The combination carrier MS Vestan transported oil and iron ore until it was
sold to Bangladesh in 1977. In the end of the 1970s, the turbine tanker TT Veni was
consequently the only oil tanker left in Smedvig's fleet, and in 1980 this vessel was disposed
of as well.
There were large changes in the structure of Smedvig's fleet during the 1970s. In
1970, the company owned a fleet of more than 400.000 dwt, consisting solely of oil tankers
and combination carriers. During the decade the company gradually disposed of its tanker
tonnage, at the same time investing in gas tankers and supply ships.
The investments in gas tankers were no unconditional economic success." The LPG/C
Vestri, which was the first of the gas tankers delivered to Smedvig, found employment
throughout most of the 1970s.89 After the delivery in 1972, the vessel was operated in the spot
market until 1976, but was then given a one-year charter. As a result of the high rate level in
the gas tanker market in 1974, half of the ship's original price had been recovered within the
first three years of operation." Due to strong competition in the gas transport market, the
second gas tanker, the LNG/LPG/C Venator was laid up from September 1975 until May
amount of money invested in the gas tankers was much larger than an investment in similarly sized oil tankers or
bulk carriers would have been. Figures depicting contracts measured in dwt thus underestimate the fmancial
commitment involved.
85 See Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review 1977, Table 16, p. 22 for an introduction to the
development of the price of LNG- and LPG-vessels from 1972 onwards. The differences in the value of various
units oftonnage are more thoroughly analysed in Chapter 9.5.
86 The investment in the supply ships was originally a collaboration between Smedvig and Halfdan Grieg,
through the company IS Norway Supply Ships, where Smedvig owned two thirds; see Nerheim & Utne, op.cit.,
1990, p. 228.
87 Smedvig first invested in the supply ship sector in 1965. In cooperation with Fearnley & Eger, Hambros Bank
and Golden West they bought shares in two supply ship companies. In these companies, Smedvig was a
"sleeping partner", and not involved in the operation of the vessels; see Blom, Per Gustav; Fjellstad, Knut
Morten and Nessen, Frode, Investeringsatferd i norske rederier - en casestudie av rederiet Peder Smedvig AlS,
unpublished thesis, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, 1983, p. 14. For a more
thorough introduction to IS Norway Supply Ships, confer Nerheim & Utne, op.cit., 1990, p. 229-234. In
connection with the supply ships there are several errors in the Veritas-registry, These have been commented
upon in the Smedvig-database.
88 In addition to the two fully-owned vessel, Smedvig owned a quarter of the LPG/C Gas Lion.
89 Blom, Fjellstad, & Nessen, op.cit., p. 27.
90 Nerheim & Utne, op.cit., 1990, p. 224.
Chapter Eight - The Fate ofFour Norwegian Tanker Owners 243
Stig Tenold: The Shipping Crisis of the 1970s: Causes, Effects and Implicationsfor Norwegian Shipping
1979. This was, among other things, a result of Smedvig's decision to operate the vessel in the
spot market.
8.3.3. Chartering strategy
Smedvig's decision to operate the gas tankers in the spot market reflected an old strategic
policy. According to Blom, Fjellstad and Nessen, the company's business strategy in the
1950s and 1960s can be summed up in the following manner: "With long-term contracts on
existing assets as a stable and secure source of income, the company would invest in new and
risky projects, which, during a short period of time, could result in losses which would not
affect the company's liquidity and financial strength. "91 The gas tankers represented the risky
element; the oil tankers would give the secure revenue.
Smedvig usually operated the tankers on medium-term charters, which meant that all
of the company's vessels were secured employment when the tanker market collapsed. As a
result of the fact that the vessels were tied to charters, Smedvig's vessels were not affected by
the reduction in the tanker rates immediately after the freight market breakdown - most of the
vessels were secured employment at good rates well into 1974. However, another
consequence of this policy was that the company did not benefit from the extremely high rates
in the spot market before the oil price increase.
Table 8.4. The operation of some of Smedvig's vessels, 1973-78
Initially, it may seem as though Smedvig stuck to their old business policy; the existing tanker
fleet secured the revenue, whereas the gas tankers represented the risky element by operating
in a relatively new segment without long-term charters.
The case is not that simple, however. In addition to the gas tankers, Smedvig had
entered another risky project. In September 1973, immediately before the oil price increase,
the company contracted a 472.000 dead weight ton tanker in Germany. This vessel, which was
scheduled for delivery in 1977, was intended for operation in the spot market. Employment
had therefore not been secured when the conditions in the tanker market suddenly changed.
In this respect the fate of the company reflects one of the most important aspects of the
Norwegian shipowners' strategies. The potentially fatal effects of the tanker crisis were not a
result of spot chartering of the existing fleet, although the duration of the charters after the
tanker market collapse was relatively short. Rather, the crux of the problem was newbuilding
contracts for which employment had not been secured.
91Blom, Fjellstad & Nessen, op.cit., 1983, p. 3.
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8.3.4. Contracting
The contracting ofbuilding number 87 at the German Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft lay the
foundation for serious problems for Smedvig. The company had agreed to pay 230 million
German marks for the 472.000 dead weight ton tanker. In addition to this, the contract
contained an escalation clause which made Smedvig liable to pay an increased amount if the
German wages increased by more than ten per cent annually.
After the breakdown of the tanker market, Smedvig realised that the recently
contracted supertanker could become a terribly costly investment for the company." The
charter market for tankers of this size had almost disappeared, and the fact that the contracted
vessel was a turbine tanker meant that it would not be competitive after the increase in the
price of bunkers. Early in 1975, Torolf Smedvig decided that it was necessary to cancel the
newbuilding contract which had been signed with the Howaldtswerke."
Parallel with the problems in the shipping industry, the shipbuilding industry had
difficulties in securing assignments. Consequently, the German yard were unwilling to accept
a cancellation of the contract, and they wanted Smedvig to place neworders for other types of
tonnage. The company, on the other hand, was not interested in the building of any new
vessels, and asked the yard to present an estimate of how much a cancellation would cost.
Howaldtswerke demanded that Smedvig, if the company chose not to order substitute tonnage,
had to pay a cancellation fee amounting to 150 million German marks."
After negotiations with the German yard, Smedvig agreed to pay a cancellation fee of
approximately 100 million Norwegian kroner. The result of the arbitration court settlement
between Hilmar Reksten and the Aker-group became a guideline in connection with the
bargaining about the size of the fee. Nerheim and Utne claims that H!dl espite the size of the
amount, this loss can, in hindsight, be regarded as a good investment in the continuing
existence of the company. "95 If the ship had been delivered, the result might have been the
bankruptcy of Rederiet Peder Smedvig.
8.3.5. Financing
It has been claimed that Smedvig never wanted to have debts which exceeded the value of 50
per cent of the company's assets." The difficulty with this kind of policies is that they may
occasionally lead to liquidity problems. In connection with the shipping crisis in the 1970s,
this was exactly what happened.
Despite the fact that some of the tankers had been tied to profitable charters, Smedvig
had problems with the payment of instalments on their debt in the summer of 1975. The
reason for this was that the TT Veni and the LPG Vestri were unemployed, and the prospects
for revenue from the drilling rig West Venture were bleak due to over-contracting in the
market for drilling vessels. Moreover, the company had to pay parts of the cancellation fee to
92 According to Blom, Fjellstad & Nessen, op.cit., 1983, p. 12, the contract was expensive compared with other
contracts signed at the time.
93 Nerheim & Utne, op.cit., 1990, p. 247.
94 Ibid., p. 248.
95 Ibid., p. 250.
96 Blom, Fjellstad, & Nessen, op.cit., 1983, p. 31 claims that this saved the company during the 1970s' shipping
crisis. See also Nerheim & Utne, op.cit., 1990, p. 181.
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the Howaldtswerke-yard. Despite the sale of the MT Vestalis to Greece, the company's
liquidity was anything but good.
In contrast to other Norwegian shipowners in similar difficulties, Smedvig chose not to
participate in the Guarantee Institute. The decision was based on principles and ideological
premises. Torolf Smedvig thought that the authorities should not be burdened with problems
which the management of the company had caused themselves 97 The company preferred to
enter into negotiations with its creditors about a three year postponement of payments. All the
creditors, except the French Credit Lyonnais, accepted a one year moratorium, effective from
July 1976. However, as a result ofthis agreement with the creditors, the company did not have
the freedom of action which they wanted."
8.3.6. Summary - Rederiet Peder Smedvig
Smedvig is a good example of a shipowning company which based their policy on a
combination of secure and risky engagements. In connection with the international shipping
crisis, the company had large difficulties due to one ofthese risky investments; the contracting
of a 472.000 dead weight ton tanker from a German yard.
Smedvig did not have a large number of unchartered vessels which had to be laid up,
so the immediate effects of the freight rate fall were small. However, the company's problems
originated with a single unfortunate decision; the contracting of an unchartered ULCC in the
period prior to the freight market breakdown.
The fate of Rederiet Peder Smedvig illustrates several aspects of the development of
the Norwegian shipping sector in the 1970s and 1980s. The sale of the TT Veni in 1980
signalled a temporary exit from the tanker sector. In the mid 1980s the company' s gas tankers
were transferred to the Singapore registry, but taken back on five year timecharters. The basis
for the foreign registry was a reduction of operating costs.
Moreover, Rederiet Peder Smedvig has undertaken the shift from shipping to offshore
which was characteristic for several Norwegian shipping companies in the wake of the
shipping crisis. To.iay, the company is a leading offshore drilling contractor, with a strategy
based on mediurr.- and long-term contracts. The company's fleet includes four mobile rigs
operating in the North Sea, as well as ten tender rigs operating in international waters.
Smedvig's involvement in the offshore sector, where the company was among the pioneers, is
presented in more detail in Chapter 10.3.
97 Ibid., p. 253.
98 Due to the agreement with the creditors, the company could not buy an Aker H-3 drilling rig from the
Guarantee Institute, despite the fact that the company's management saw this as a profitable investment.
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Chapter 8.4. Sig. Bergesen d.y.
When compared with the three companies previously presented, the fate of Sig. Bergesen d.y.,
Norway's largest shipowning company, illustrates the heterogeneity of the Norwegian
shipping sector. The analysis in Chapter Six showed that the history of Norwegian shipping
companies during the crisis could to a large extent be characterised by the tanker and bulk
market focus, over-eager contracting and unfortunate chartering strategies, particularly with
regard to large tankers on order. In most cases the end result was a drain on accumulated
financial resources, which often led to bankruptcy or necessitated government involvement.
The experience of Sig. Bergesen d.y. differs on several accounts from this stereotype. Through
advantageous sales of newbuilding contracts, focus on long-term charters and relatively
cautious fleet expansion, the company managed to consolidate its position during the crisis
years and in several respects emerged strengthened by the beginning of the 1980s.
The fortunate development of Sig. Bergesen d.y. was not obvious given the company's
position in early 1973. The company had pooled its resources in the market for large tankers,
apparently making them more vulnerable than eg Knut Knutsen OAS. Moreover, the company
was eager in the contracting market, and in early 1973 Sig. Bergesen d.y. had eleven
mammoth tankers and one 223.000 dwt ore/oil carrier on order. However, the company
differed from the other companies analysed on one important account - chartering strategy -
and Bergesen had also managed to reduce the volume of newbuilding orders when the tanker
market collapsed.
The experience of Sig. Bergesen d.y. illustrates the substantial differences in the
economic performance between shipowners who had secured revenues through long-term
charters and shipowners who fell victim to the depressed spot market. Moreover, it shows how
some strategic decisions - in this case the decision to sell four newbuilding contracts shortly
before the market collapsed - can fundamentallyalter the economic situation of the company.
Due to their strong financial standing, Bergesen could use accumulated resources to
consolidate their position during the shipping crisis, taking over potentially profitable
contracts and engagements from shipowners in financial distress.
8.4.1. Historical introduction
The roots ofthe company Sig. Bergesen d.y. can be traced back to the late 1880s, when Sigval
Bergesen established his position as one of the most important managing owners in Stavanger,
on the Western coast of Norway," By 1900 Sigval Bergesen had become the largest steamship
owner in Stavanger. His youngest son, Sig. Bergesen d.y. joined the company in 1916 and
became partner two years later."? In the subsequent years Sig. Bergesen d.y. assumed
responsibility for the daily management of the company, whereas his brother took care of the
chartering.
99 For an introduction to the early period, see Jonasen, Jonas Schanche, Sigval Bergesen 1863-1956, Firma
Sigval Bergesen, Stavanger, 1963 or Hanisch, Tore Jørgen and Ramskjær, Liv Jorunn, Firmaet Sigval Bergesen,
Stavanger: under vekslende vilkår 1887-1987, Dreyer bok, Stavanger, 1987, pp. 9-98.
100 Ole Bergesen, born three years before Sig. Bergesen d.y., also became partner in 1918. For a short biography
of Sig. Bergesen d.y., see Norsk Industri, No.4, 1975, p. 17.
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In 1935 Sig. Bergesen d.y. left his father's firm, spurred by conflicts of interest and
personal disagreements.'?' The split was triggered by the fact that Sig. Bergesen d.y. had
contracted tanker tonnage in Denmark without his father's consent. Sig. Bergesen d.y. then
spent four years in Denmark, working with the Danish shipowning giant A.P. Møller, among
other things as member of the board at Møller's yard, Odense Staalskibsværft. At the same
time he managed his own company, and in the period up until 1940 Sig. Bergesen d.y. had
amassed a fleet ofthree tankers, totalling 45.000 grt.
During the Second World War Sig. Bergesen d.y. acquired the yard Rosenberg Verft,
and from 1943 until 1970 this yard was an independent division of the Bergesen-corporation.
In the first postwar decade, Bergesen's fleet expanded rapidly. Following the delivery of
vessels from both Rosenberg and foreign yards, he had acquired a fleet of seven vessels,
amounting to almost 185.000 dwt by 1955.
Four fifths of the tonnage built at Rosenberg in the 1960s went to Sig. Bergesen d.y.102
Moreover, this tonnage was supplemented by a considerable amount of newbuildings from
other yards, in particular in Japan. By 1970 Sig. Bergesen d.y. owned 18 vessels, ten ofwhich
had been built in Japan. The fleet amounted to more than 2,2 billion dwt, making Sig.
Bergesen d.y. Norway's largest shipowner. In 1976, Sig. Bergesen d.y. withdrew from the
management of the company due to failing health. The other three partners, Sig. Bergesen
d.y. 's grandsons Petter Sundt and Morten Sigval Bergesen, and Jacob Erland Jacobsen
managed the company's affairs.'?'
B.4.2. Fleet Structure
Judging by the structure of the company's fleet, Sig. Bergesen d.y. would be extremely
vulnerable to changes in the tanker market. Like Hilmar Reksten, the company had pooled
most of their resources in the market for large tankers, ie the market segment in which the
freight rate collapse was the most pronounced. Bergesen also owned combination and bulk
carriers, and diversified their operations into gas transport towards the end of the decade.
Some of the company's vessels were flying foreign flags, as a result of cooperation with
international shipping and mineral consortia.
101 See Hanisch & Ramskjær, op.cit., 1987, p. 94.
102 Dahl, Ole Felix, "Med Bergesen som los og kaptein - AS Rosenberg Mekaniske Verksted 1945-70"
[Bergesen as pilot and captain - AS Rosenberg Mekaniske Verksted 1945-70], unpublished thesis, The
University of Bergen, 1995, p. 90.
103 Sig. Bergesen d.y. & Co., Report and Account/or 1976, p. 6.
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Figure 8.7. Bergesen's fleet and contracts, 1000 dwt, 1970-80104
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Bergesen's fleet expanded from 2,8 million dwt in 1973 to more than 4,2 million dwt in 1980,
after peaking at more than 4,7 million dwt in 1977. The expansion was accomplished through
a combination of newbuilding contracts and the purchase of second-hand vessels from
shipowners in economic distress. As the analysis in Chapter Nine shows, Bergesen's position
as the largest Norwegian shipowner was consolidated, as the company's share of the
Norwegian fleet increased during the turbulent period in the late 1970s and the early 1980s.
Nerheim has called Bergesen a "courageous Greek", as he recognised the advantages
of large tankers before other Norwegian shipowners.!" The company's focus on large vessels
was part of a conscious strategy; "we have focussed on large vessels which are far more
inexpensive to operate, and thus counteracted part of the cost development. "106 As a result of
this focus, the average size of the vessels in Bergesen's fleet was considerably higher than the
national average, a fact which is reflected in Figure 8.8.
104 The figure is based on the Bergesen-database. Two contracts listed in Norwegian Shipping News have been
excluded from the figures, as these relate to the ill-fated combination carriers Berge Istra and Berge Vanga,
which were not included in Bergesen's Norwegian fleet. Moreover, only vessels registered in Norway are
included.
lOS Quote from Nerheirn, Gunnar, Jøssang, Lars Gaute and Utne, Bjørn S., I vekst og forandring - Rosenberg
Verft 100 år 1896-1996 [Growth and change - Rosenberg Verft 100 years 1896-1996], Kværner Rosenberg AS,
Stavanger, 1995, p. 211. Greek shipowners and international oil companies took advantage of the economies of
scale before most Norwegian shipowners. As the analysis in Chapter Six showed, the Norwegians had
undoubtedly realised the benefits of large vessels by early 1970s.
106 Interview with Sig. Bergesen d.y., Norsk Industri, No.4, 1975, p. 16.
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Figure 8.8. Average size, Bergesen's fleet and contracts, 1000dwt, 1970-80107
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Although both the share of tanker tonnage and the average size of the vessels in the Bergesen-
fleet were considerably higher than in the case ofmost oftheir colleagues, Sig. Bergesen d.y.
were less affected by the crisis than most other Norwegian owners. The main reasons for this
were the company's chartering strategy - due to the reliance on long-term charters, the effects
of the freight market breakdown were considerably delayed - and the fortunate sale of
newbuilding contracts prior to the freight market breakdown.
B.4.3. Chartering strategy
The strategic aspect which most clearly distinguishes Sig. Bergesen d.y. from the other
companies presented here is the company's chartering policy. Like in the case of Hilmar
Reksten, Sig. Bergesen d.y. 's belief in the excellence of his chartering strategy bordered on
the religious. However, unlike Reksten, Bergesen was adamant that long-term charters were
preferable to operation in the spot market.
In 1971 Reksten sent Bergesen almost a kilo of documents, containing calculations
"proving" that his spot market strategy was superior to Bergesen's reliance on long-term
charters. The reply from the latter was sarcastic; "I have skimmed [your unconventional and
most unexpected Easter greeting}, but I am searching in vain for its head and tail, as J.
suppose the documentation should serve another purpose than showing that you are more
elever than I am. "108 This was not Reksten's first attempt at converting Bergesen to the
supremacy of the spot market, but Bergesen had previously "appeared to be disagreeable and
immune to approaches which could have hindered some of the harmful effects which the
company's chartering policies entailed. "109
107 The figures do not include vessels registered abroad or the gas tankers and gas tanker contracts, The figures
for the average size of the Norwegian vessels is taken from the database presented in Chapter 10, and the
average size of the Norwegian tankers is taken from Figure 6.2,
108 Borgen, Erling, Huset Bergesen [The House of Bergesen), Cappelen, Oslo, 1984, pp. 140-141.
109 Reksten, Hilmar, "Sig, Bergesen d.y. & Co. 1947-1970", manuscript sent to Sig. Bergesen d.y. and
Norwegian newspapers, 1971, p. 73.
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Reksten's criticism was to some extent justified, as the cost and exchange rate
development sometimes made Bergesen' s charters unprofitable. In 1976, the MT Bergehus
had six years left of a charter which was unprofitable to the company. The charter was
cancelled, with effect from April 1978, after Bergesen paid the charterer a $3.5 million
compensation."? Nevertheless such expenses were relatively small compared with the costs
incurred by Reksten as a result of the fact that most of his fleet remained unemployed due to
his spot market focus.
Bergesen forfeited the freight rate peaks, as his vessels were tied to long charters.
However, this policy implied that he had secured his income during the troughs in the spot
market. Two analyses from the British shipping analysts H.P. Drewry illustrate the differences
in the position of Reksten's and Bergesen's companies after the freight market had broken
down. Whereas Reksten had been forced to lay-up the majority of his tonnage, Bergesen's
fleet was secured revenues in 1976.
Table 8.5. Fleet employment, Reksten and Bergesen'!'
In mid 1976, approximately 80 per cent of Bergesen's fleet had been given charters which
expired in 1978 or later, and more than 55 per cent of his fleet had employment secured after
1981. In an international perspective, the share of the Bergesen fleet which had been secured
employment was high. Indeed, only two of the largest tanker owners in 1976 were in a more
secure position than Bergesen. The least exposed company was Sir Vue-Kong Pao's World
Wide-Group, by far the largest tanker owner with a fleet of more than 12 million dwt. A major
proponent of the shikumisen-agreements, Pao had tied more than 90 per cent of his fleet to
Japanese charterers. However, the economic problems of some of the charterers, notably the
Japan Line, could have spelt disaster.!" The other company with a large degree of charter
cover was D. K. Ludwig's National Bulk Carriers. NBC had secured employment after 1981
for 76 per cent of the fleet.'"
110 Sig. Bergesen d.y. & Co., Report and Accountfor 1976, p, 4,
III Figures taken from Drewry, The Role of Independent Tankers Owners, H.P. Drewry Shipping Consultants
Ltd., London, 1976, p. 40 and p. 43 and Drewry, Independent Tanker Owners, H.P. Drewry Shipping
Consultants Ltd., London, 1979, p. 38 and p, 42. The figures in parentheses refer to tonnage on order. The
difference between the estimates of the Bergesen fleet between Drewry and the Bergesen-database is a result of
the fact that the former figures include vessels registered outside Norway, but excludes the gas tankers.
112 See Stokes, Peter, op.cit., 1992, pp. 59-60. Sir Pao had secured the income from his charterers through bank
guarantees, and was thus less exposed than shipowners who had signed charter agreements with other companies
in financial distress.
113 The Japanese Yamashita-Shinnihon Steamship Co, and the New York-based Overseas Shipholding Group
Ltd. also had a higher share of the fleet on charters into the 1980s. However, these companies were smaller than
Bergesen, and the amount of tonnage on charters was thus lower.
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Figure 8.9. Exposure of the world's 20 largest independent tanker owners, mid 1976114
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Figure 8.9 indicates the extent to which the world's 20 largest independent tanker owners
were exposed to the shipping difficulties in the mid 1970s. The companies have been ranked
by the size of their fleets. The figure illustrates the share of the companies' tonnage on
charters which expired in the period 1976-1980, the share of the tonnage on charters after
1981 and the share of the tonnage laid up or operating in the spot market.
The difference between the two Norwegian participants is striking. Whereas Reksten
had been forced to lay up ten of his twelve vessels, Bergesen had no vessels laid up on his
own account, and at least eleven of his vessels were secured employment well into the 1980s.
However, due to the structural change in the chartering market it became increasingly difficult
for Bergesen to secure long-term employment when the current charters terminated.
Accordingly., approximately a fifth of the fleet traded in the spot market in 1979.
Bergesen was the world's fifth largest independent tanker owner in 1976. Three years
later, the company had been relegated to the eight place, but was still fifth if tonnage on order
was included.!" One reason for the relegation was that Bergesen, in contrast to 80 per cent of
the other large independents, had no backlog of newbuilding orders in mid 1976.116 Indeed,
although expansive in absolute figures, Bergesen's contracting in the period immediately prior
to the freight market breakdown can be considered cautious.
114 The bars show the manner in which the companies' vessels were employed. Vessels for which charter expiry
date or employment were unknown have been excluded, thus giving aggregate percentages of less than 100 for
several companies. The line shows the aggregate fleets of the companies, measured in million dwt. The figures
have been taken from Drewry, The Role of Independent Tankers Owners, H.P. Drewry Shipping Consultants
Ltd., London, 1976.
115 Drewry, op.cit., 1979, p. 4. Chartered-in vessels have not been included in any of the analyses.
116 The tonnage on order in 1976 in Figure 8.8 refers to the Berge Empress, which was delivered in April 1976.
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8.4.4. Contracting
Judging by the tonnage on order in early 1973, Bergesen's contracting policy seems anything
but cautious. The company had twelve vessels above 200.000 dwt on order, implying that the
volume of contracts was approximately a third higher than the company's existing fleet.
However, when the tanker market collapsed that autumn, four of the contracts had been
disposed of. As a result of delivery of vessels and the sale of contracts, Bergesen's
newbuildings on order in January 1974 corresponded to 40 per cent of the existing fleet, rather
than 133 per cent, as it had been one year earlier. The company's order book was thus low,
compared with 106 per cent of the existing fleet for Norwegian shipowners and 82 per cent for
international shipowners.!"
The contracting of Sig. Bergesen d.y. has at times been radically different from other
Norwegian shipowners. In the summer of 1973, shortly before the tanker market breakdown,
the company offloaded two 400.000 dwt contracts at the Japanese Kawasaki-yard to Italian
interests, making $40 million in the bargain. The sale of these contracts was prompted by fear
of overcapacity and the fact that employment had not been secured, contrary to the company's
policy. Previously the same year, Sig. Bergesen d.y. had sold two contracts in Denmark to the
Greek shipowner Livanos, at a profit of approximately $30 million.!"
In 1977 Sig. Bergesen d.y. "caused a small sensation - at home and abroad" when
the company, in the midst of the tanker gloom, contracted two 320.000 dwt tankers in Japan.'"
This newbuilding order, which allegedly cost in the region of NoK 500 million, was one of
several expansionary moves made by the company in the depressed tanker market. The idea of
newbuilding contracts in a market characterised by massive overcapacity may seem irrational.
However, the vessels had diesel engines, which made them advantageous compared with the
turbine-driven tankers of the same size available in the second-hand market. Moreover, the
vessels were equipped with segregated ballast tanks, in anticipation of changes in the
international maritime legislation.
The 1977 newbuilding contracts were controversial. Some of the agents in the shipping
industry saw them as an indication that the vessels which were supported by guarantees from
the Guarantee Institute may have become obsolete, rather than worth keeping. In an internal
memorandum from the Norwegian Shipowners' Association it was claimed that "[tjhe price
indicated is approximately NoK 500 millionfor the two vessels. However, we know from other
sources that the price was particularly favourable, due to factors which can not be
disclosed. "120 The memorandum speculates that the contracting may be connected to particular
aspects of the situation of the company, rather than to the state of the tanker sector in general.
One of the possible explanations suggested by the author of the memorandum is incentives
with regard to taxation.
117 The order book as share of the fleet refers to tankers and combination carriers, and have been calculated
based on Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review, Tables 3, 9, 20 and 26.
118 Borgen, Erling, op.cit., 1984, pp. 139-144.
119 Quote from Norwegian Shipping News, No. 8B, 1977, p. 34.
120 Quote from the manuscript "The tanker contracting of Sig. Bergesen d.y. & Co.", dated 2 May 1977, The
Archives of the Norwegian Shipowners' Association, folder marked 6 B K 75 - Krisen 1975 VII, 010177-
300977.
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Some of the newbuilding contracts held by Bergesen in the late 1970s were a direct
result of the shipping crisis and its effects on other Norwegian shipowners. Several of the gas
tankers on order at the Finnish Wårtsila-yard had originally been contracted by the Norwegian
shipowning company Fearnley & Eger. However, due to considerable economic difficulties
the company was unable to honour the contracts. Sig. Bergesen d.y. took over the contracts,
signing a financing agreement with the yard in the process. The company's entry into the gas
sector - which was to be the main focus in the 1980s and 1990s - was thus partly accidental.
The type of vessels contracted by Bergesen did not deviate significantly from other
Norwegian owners - they ordered the largest and technologically most advanced tankers and
combination carriers available. However, in some ways Bergesen can be seen as "first among
equals", as the company's focus on the most efficient tonnage was a means through which the
company sought to neutralise the potentially harmful effects of long-term charters. Moreover,
through the sale of four newbuilding contracts in 1973, the company managed to avoid an
increase in the fleet which would have proved unfortunate.
Hilmar Reksten's amount ofnewbuilding orders was so large as to make an adaptation
to the changed market conditions virtually impossible. If Bergesen had maintained the high
volume of tonnage on order, the situation would have been less precarious, as the long-term
charters secured the revenue from the company's existing fleet. Nevertheless, the
newbuildings, and the fact that they had not been secured charters, would have represented a
considerable drain on the company's resources. It is thus evident that whereas the chartering
strategy was paramount to the company's relative success in the 1970s, the sale of the
newbuilding orders was also important in explaining the positive development of the
company.
8.4.5. Financing
Bergesen's financial strength was reflected in the fact that the company had large bank
deposits throughout the crisis years. Shortly after the tanker market had broken down, the
company's liquid reserves amounted to some 700 million kroner.!" Two years later the
company's bank deposits had increased, and Sig. Bergesen d.y. reported the highest operating
surplus in the company's history - in a period where most other agents in the shipping sector
were concerned with the tanker crisis.!" The company's liquidity continued to improve during
the crisis, in stark contrast to the majority of Norwegian shipowners, for whom the crisis
implied a drain on the accumulated resources.!"
The advantageous financial situation was a result of the fact that the company's
vessels were earning revenues - rather than laid up at Bergesen' s account. In essence, the
profitability of the vessels was not affected by the state of the tanker market at any given time.
Rather, the important factor was the state of the market at the point when the charters were
121 Norsk Industri, No.4, 1975, p. 17.
122 In 1976 the result was NoK 362 million, compared with NoK 321 million in 1975; see Sig. Bergesen d.y. &
Co., Report and Account/or 1976.
123 By 1979 the liquidiy had increased to NoK 839 million; see Sig. Bergesen d.y. & Co., Half year report/or the
shareholders in companies managed by Sig. Bergesen d.y. & Co., 1979, p. 3.
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entered into.:" At the same time the company's debt servicing was relatively modest, partlyas
a result of the fact that the company had managed to offload some of the newbuilding
contracts.
Despite the focus on the most depressed part of the shipping market, the prudent
chartering strategy secured that there was no need for Sig. Bergesen d.y. to approach the
Guarantee Institute as participant. However, the company managed to take advantage of the
vessels which were sold by other shipowners who had been forced to seek assistance from the
Guarantee Institute.!"
In late 1981 Bergesen established a co-ownership, where they owned 51 per cent, and
the Biørnstad-group, which was controlled by the Guarantee Institute, owned 49 per cent. The
co-ownership took over three vessels previously owned by the ill-fated Biørnstad-companies,
and Bergesen became responsible for the management and chartering of the vessels.!" The
following year Bergesen again went into co-ownership with the Guarantee Institute in
connection with the previously Reksten-owned tankers TT Cyprian and TT Julian, and also
managed the ex-Reksten tanker TT Trajan, which was owned by the Guarantee Institute.!"
8.4.6. Summary - Sig. Bergesen d.y.
Contrary to the majority of Norwegian shipping companies, Sig. Bergesen d.y. emerged
strengthened from the shipping crisis. In the mid 1980s the Bergesen-family's private
ownership came to an end, as Bergesen d.y. ASA became a public company, listed in Oslo.
The company is still one of the world's leading owners of supertankers, with a fleet of
approximately five million dwt and several newbuilding orders. However, although the
company still operates a relatively large share of their tankers on long-term contracts, the
chartering strategy is not as distinct as it was prior to the shipping crisis.!"
Following the company's fortuitous entry into the gas tanker segment, Bergesen has
become one of the world's major owners of large gas carriers, and gas transportation today
constitutes the company's largest business area. In 1999, sixty years after the company's
founder returned from A.P. Møller in Denmark with valuable experience, the company
entered into a pool agreement with A.P. Møller in the market for small gas carriers. The
company's total fleet includes more than 80 vessels, and Bergesen also operates vessels for
other owners.
124 Of course, the breakdown implied that when the vessels were redelivered to Bergesen, they would be affected
by the depressed market. However, due to the focus on long-term charters the crisis could persevere for a
number of years before Bergesen would be influenced.
125 Jan Sundt, one of Sig. Bergesen d.y. 's grandsons, was director and "Second in command" of the Guarantee
Institute. He left the position in 1979, before the close cooperation between Bergesen and the Guarantee
Institute.
126 Stortingsproposisjon nr. 38 (1981-82) Om bevilgning til utbetaling under garanti stillet av Norsk
Garantiinstituttfor skip og borefarttøyer [On the appropriation of pay-out with regard to guarantees granted by
Norsk garantiinstitutt for skip og borefartøyer AS] .
127 Stortingsmelding nr. 53 (1981-82) Om avtale av 5. februar 1982 mellom Norsk garantiinstitutt for skip og
borefartøyer AS, Hambros Bank Limited, RIA Hadrian og RIA Trajan i forbindelse med avviklingen av
garantiengasjementene iReksten-jlåten [On the agreement dated 5 February 1982 between Norsk garantiinstitutt
for skip og borefartøyer AS, Hambros Bank Limited, RIA Hadrian and RIA Trajan on the winding-up of the
guarantee-engagements in the Reksten-fleet], p. 8.
128 This can partly be explained by the change in the structure of the tanker market.
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8.5. Summary
The presentation in this chapter has illustrated the differing degrees to which Norwegian
shipowners were affected by the shipping crisis, and the four cases analysed above illustrate
the heterogeneity of the Norwegian shipping sector. Four strategic elements have been
emphasised - fleet structure, chartering strategy, contracting and financing.
The differences in the fate of the companies can be explained by all the policy
parameters analysed, although chartering and contracting appears to have been particularly
important. Fortunate decisions in these areas implied that Sig. Bergesen d.y. could emerge
strengthened from the crisis in the shipping sector. Moreover, unfortunate decisions with
regard to contracting and chartering - and in particular the combination of the two, in terms of
unchartered newbuilding contracts - can explain the difficulties of Knutsen and Smedvig, as
well as the collapse of Hilmar Reksten's empire.
The fleet structure was of some importance in explaining the unfortunate fate of
Norwegian shipowners in general, compared with shipowners in other countries. However, the
analysis of individual companies suggests that fleet structure per se is no good indication of
the economic well-being of the companies. Rather, the existing fleet structure must be seen in
relation to strategic determinants such as chartering and contracting. Whereas, judging by fleet
structure alone, Knut Knutsen OAS seemed better equipped to cope with the crisis than eg
Sig. Bergesen d.y., the history of the companies shows that this was not the case.
The contracting strategy can contribute to an explanation of the misfortune of three of
the companies. For Knutsen and Smedvig, the contracting in the period prior to the freight
market breakdown represented a considerable drain on the companies' resources.
Newbuilding contracts signed before the tanker market collapsed had important ramifications
for the financial strength of the companies. However, if the newbuilding contracts had been
secured through profitable long-term charters, the situation would have been less precarious.
In many ways, the economic difficulties of Knutsen and Smedvig mirror those of several other
Norwegian shipowners - the basis for the problems was neither contracting nor chartering
strategy per se, but rather the combination of these elements, ie the ordering of newbuildings
for which charters had not been secured.
The fate of Hilmar Reksten illustrates the vulnerability of a shipowner who was
willing to gamble on most strategic aspects. Reksten had pooled the majority of his resources
into the market segment in which the crisis was most pronounced. Moreover, the sheer
volume ofnewbuilding contracts would be sufficient to topple the company, given the freight-
market breakdown. In addition to this, even in the absence of a large number of newbuilding
contracts, Reksten's chances of sufficiently profitable employment after the freight market
collapse were miniscule.
It is difficult to assess the extent to which the financial strength of the companies
determined their possibilities for survival. However, in the cases of Knutsen and Smedvig, it
is evident that the economic difficulties may be the result of divisibility problems - the sheer
size of individual engagements tied up too much of the companies' resources. This was partly
a result of the fact that it was difficult for companies with limited financial bases to diversify
their risk in a period with a large increase in the price of each unit of capital, ie each ship.
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Knutsen and Smedvig were both relatively small companies, for which the tonnage on
order represented a dramatic increase in the size of the fleets. The large amount of resources
committed through a single decision, such as the signing of a newbuilding contract, implied
that the companies' fate hinged on the development of certain key markets. The
competitiveness of Norwegian shipowners was closely related to the operation of
technologically advanced vessels which could utilise the economies of scale in connection
with vessel size. Due to the increase in the average size of vessels, individual strategic
decisions tied up a disproportionate share of the companies' resources.
The four companies surveyed illustrate some of the changes in the Norwegian shipping
sector following the shipping crisis. In the case of Knut Knutsen OAS, the company's fleet
became the foundation for a shipping enterprise managed by new owners. Hilmar Reksten's
Rederi became one of the most manifest victims of the shipping crisis, as RA Hadrian was
wound up after more than 50 years of operation. Rederiet Peder Smedvig made a successful
transition to an offshore company, whereas the fate of Sig. Bergesen d.y. illustrates that there
was a continued basis for Norwegian shipowners even after the crisis.
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CHAPTER NINE
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NORWEGIAN SHIPPING, 1970-1987
This chapter explores the salient structural trends in the Norwegian shipping sector in the
period from 1970 to 1987. Significant development traits such as the increased concentration
of Norwegian shipping, with regard to ports as well as companies, the reduction of the number
of companies and the size of the fleet, as well as the increasing transfer of tonnage to Flags of
Convenience are analysed. The analysis is based on a purpose-built data set.' This data set
represents a systematisation of information from a variety of sources, and provides time-series
and detailed information which have hitherto been unavailable in a form suitable for analysis.
It has been founded upon two main sources - the Veritas register, in the case of companies
and vessels, and Norwegian shipbrokers, in the case of sales and purchasing.
9.1. The Databases
In order to organise the vast amount of data on Norwegian ships and shipping in the 1970s
and 1980s, I have constructed three databases which contain annual information on the
Norwegian fleet and Norwegian shipowning companies in the period from 1970 to 1987.
Although largely based upon publicly available sources, the manner in which the databases
are organised provides detailed time-series. These time-series facilitate the analysis of the
transformation of the Norwegian shipping industry in a period containing both strong
expansion and severe contraction.
9.1.1. The three databases
The data set utilised in the analysis has been organised in three databases, all with annual
entries over the period 1970-1987. The main database includes all Norwegian shipowning
companies and their vessels, given certain restrictions, as well as some aggregate figures. The
company database traces the entry and exit of shipowning companies. The sales database
includes all Norwegian vessels changing owners.
The main database
The main database is a survey of all Norwegian ships of more than 5.000 gross register tons
(grt), as well as all companies owning tonnage of this size. It was made on the basis of
statistics from three lists originating with the Norwegian classification society Det Norske
Veritas. These lists were published in their annual Register of Norwegian, Swedish, Danish,
Finnish and Icelandic ships and of other ships classed with Det Norske Veritas, hereafter
referred to as the Veritas-register.'
IA digital copy of the database may be obtained from the author upon request.
2 From register No. 113, published 1985, onwards, the name was changed to Register of ships classed with Det
Norske Veritas and of other Norwegian, Swedish, Danish, Finnish and Icelandic ships.
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The main database was constructed in the following manner. First, a list of all
companies owning vessels of more than 5.000 grt was made by means of the "List of
Norwegian owners and their vessels". This list records ports of registry, and presents each
shipowning company, the name oftheir vessels and the tonnage in grt.
The data from the geographically arranged list were then supplemented by information
from the main register, where the vessels are listed individuallyand arranged on an
alphabetical basis. The main register is considerably more detailed than the geographically
arranged index, and the data derived from this list include year and country of production,
type of ship, deadweight (dwt) capacity as well as information on previous names,
conversions etc. The main database is presented in the following manner:
Table 9.1. The main database
Port Country Shipowner's Shipowner's
shipowner Gr! Dwt Type of ship Year ofbuild ofbuild fleet (grt) nec! (dwt)
Company
Oil tanker 1977
260385 505459
MT Vessel (additional information)
In the few instances where inconsistencies between the geographically arranged index and the
main Veritas-register occur, alternative sources have been consulted. These have been referred
to in the database. In some instances, deadweight capacity had Rot been supplied by the
owners, and was consequently omitted from the general Veritas-register. In these cases,
alternative sources have been referred to or an approximate figure has been calculated based
on the index labelled "Norwegian cargo vessels arranged according to deadweight capacity
as stated by owners". As a result of the large number of ships in this list, and the variety of
sizes, this approximation will give a very good indication of the deadweight capacity of the
vessels.' Alternatively, or in some cases as a supplement, the deadweight capacity of sister
vessels has been used. The share of the vessels for which information about deadweight
capacity was available increased over the period. Consequently, the missing data in early
editions of the register have in some instances been supplemented by more precise
information taken from later issues.
The tonnage applied to the various vessels may change from one year to the next as a
result of conversions or changes in the measurement due to reclassification. Moreover,
whereas most vessels were included in the list after delivery, some vessels were recorded in
the register before they were delivered and classified. These vessels have been included in the
list by owner, but omitted from the aggregate figures. Regarding vessels for which both closed
and open tonnage were listed in the register, the latter has been used, in order to achieve
congruity with the aggregate figures presented in the Veritas-register.
The aggregate figures representing the various shipowners' fleets include all the
vessels listed separately. In addition, the aggregate grt-figure includes vessels below 5.000 grt,
3 Only in a few cases may this method give figures which noticeably deviate from the actual capacity. When the
dwt-capacity originates with this list or with other sources, rather than the main register, the sources have been
indicated in the database in connection with the listing of the vessels in question. Moreover, figures originating
outside the main register have been written in italics.
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in order to give an indication of the full size of the shipowners' fleets. For some shipowners,
such small vessels made up a considerable share of the total fleet. Drilling vessels have also
been listed separately, in order to identify the shipowners who chose to enter this segment.
Drilling vessels have been included in each shipowner's aggregate grt-figures, but have been
left out of the aggregate dwt figures.
The annual entries have been accumulated in order to give a representation of the fleet
as a whole. The accumulated figures are presented in the following manner:
Table 9.2. Aggregate figures, example from 1975
Sum column B (grt) 24669224 Sum column G (aggregate grt) 24669224
Sum column C (dwt) 42279218 Sum column H (aggregate dwt) 42279218
Total adjustment 983969
Column B adjusted 23685255 B adjusted! Registered 0,9580
Registered 24722473 Column BI Registered 0,9978
Adj. - one vessel < 5000 grt 27539 B-drilling vesselslReg. 0,9935
Adj. - several vessels < 5000 grt. 334 171 Reg-I975 and drilling vessels 24 100214
Adj. - drilling vessels 106235 Reg-1975 and drilling vesselslReg 0,9748
Adj. - vessels built 1975 516024
The "Sum column B"-figures are accumulated figures for all tonnage owned by Norwegian
shipowners with vessels above 5.000 grt, based on the individual vessel entries and measured
in grt. The "Sum column G"-figures are accumulated figures based on the entries of individual
shipowning companies. These have been included to ensure correspondence between the
individual entries and the fleets assigned to the various companies. The "Sum column C"- and
"Sum column R"-figures are accumulated in the same manner, but refer to dwt. Vessels
smaller than 5.000 grt have been excluded from these figures.
The figure labelled ''total adjustment" represents the sum of vessels below 5.000 grt,
vessels delivered in the year surveyed and drilling vessels, as indicated in the figures labelled
"Adj.". By subtracting the "total adjustment"-figure from the aggregate figure "Sum column
B", we find the total tonnage represented by vessels above 5.000 grt. The "Registered"-figure
refers to all vessels registered in the Norwegian fleet, regardless of size and type, as presented
in the aggregate figures in the Veritas-register.
The figures in the last column denote the degree of correspondence between the
database and the figures representing the Norwegian fleet. Accordingly, in 1975, the vessels
above 5.000 grt made up almost 96 per cent of the fleet (B adjusted/ Registered). Moreover,
the figures show that shipowners with vessels above 5.000 grt owned almost 97,5 per cent of
the tonnage registered in the Norwegian fleet (Reg-1975 and drilling vessels/ Registered).'
4 Ifvessels delivered in 1975 are included, the figure would be 99,35 per cent. However, the aggregate figures in
the Veritas-register include some of the vessels delivered in the year on which the statistics are based, but
exclude others. Accordingly, the share of the fleet owned by shipowners with vessels larger than 5.000 grt is
likely to be somewhere between 97,5 per cent - which is the conservative estimate and excludes all vessels
delivered in 1975 - and 99,3 per cent - which includes all vessels included in the 1975-register. In the expansive
period in the mid 1970s, the latter figure sometimes exceeded 100 per cent, as the large amount ofundelivered
vessels was included in the registry list but not in the aggregate figures from Veritas. Similarly, when the
contraction of the Norwegian fleet was most pronounced in the mid 1980s, some tonnage had been subtracted
from the aggregate figures, but had not been deleted in the main register. Again, the sum of the tonnage on the
main register would exceed the aggregate figures.
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The entries in the database have been categorised with regard to port of registry. This
enables us to analyse the importance of the various ports, and the premises will be discussed
in detail later. The distribution on ports is included in each annual entry, with respect to grt as
well as dwt, and is presented in the following manner:
Table 9.3. Distribution of the fleet, example from 1975
Port Per cent (grt) Tonnage (grt) Per cent (dwt) Tonnage (dwt)
Arendal 4,3 1054083 4,6 1935657
Bergen 11,5 2847669 11,5 4874692
Drammen 0,2 44592 0,1 35 135
Egersund 0,2 58618 0,2 66165
Farsund 1,1 278 306 1,1 466905
Grimstad 2,5 618010 2,4 1027524
Haugesund 3,5 872 435 3,4 1424176
Kristiansand 8,1 2000989 8,3 3500859
Larvik 0,6 160065 0,7 276007
Mandal 0,7 165491 0,7 303 168
Moss 0,8 209572 0,9 395620
Oslo 38,9 9595606 37,8 16000457
Porsgrunn 0,4 90975 0,3 133675
Sandefjord 9,8 2412926 10,5 4458522
Skudeneshavn 0,2 53221 0,2 76599
Stavanger 10,4 2574412 11,4 4806214
Tromsø 0,1 17582 0,1 25696
Trondheim 0,2 58517 0,1 32060
Tønsberg 6,3 1 556 155 5,8 2440087
Sum 100,0 24669224 100,0 42279218
The distribution of the fleet across ports varies, depending on whether grt or dwt are utilised.
This reflects the fact that some ports had a relatively high share of large vessels, whereas
companies in other ports mainly focused on smaller vessels. The deviation is largest for ports
with a high share of either general cargo tonnage, such as Oslo, or huge tankers, such as
Sandefjord and Stavanger. For ports with a more diversified structure, for instance Bergen, the
deviation is negligible. The difference between the two measures is relatively small, however,
and in the subsequent analysis the data based upon grt will mainly be utilised.
The company database
The main database has formed the basis for the other two databases, focussing on companies
and sales. The company database shows the number, entry and exit of Norwegian shipowning
companies, and may as such provide information on the structural development of the
Norwegian shipping sector. The term "company" is used to designate the korresponderende
reder [managing owner].
In connection with changes from one year to the next, all new companies and all
companies disappearing from the main database were registered in the company database. The
changes were the result of companies starting up or dissolving operations, as well as
companies fulfilling the 5.000 grt limit through acquisition of new tonnage or companies
falling below this limit through disposal of vessels above 5.000 grt. Moreover, companies
merging and companies changing their names have been recorded. In the case of the company
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database, companies only operating drilling vessels have been indicated. The aggregate
figures in the company database detail the number of companies owning vessels larger than
5.000 grt, categorised by port.
The company database facilitates an analysis of the structure and dynamics of the
Norwegian shipping sector, with regard to features such as industry concentration, average
size of companies and the entry and exit of companies in various regions. For most of the
entries in the company database, the foundations or fate of the companies included have been
briefly indicated.
The sales database
The vessels which were no longer registered with their previous owners were included in a list
of sales. The data from the main database were supplemented by information from other
sources in an attempt at identifying the new owners and acquiring details about the sale. The
representative entry from the sales database has to be divided into two parts to fit on a normal
page:
Table 9.4. The sales database'
The sales database enables us to analyse the fate of the vessels leaving the Norwegian
merchant marine, as well as transactions between Norwegian companies. As the database
includes information on both the new flag of registry and the new managing owners, it sheds
light upon the changes in the international maritime hegemony which will be presented in
more detail in Chapter Ten.
The construction of the sales database revealed that there was sometimes a lag between
the time the brokers reported that a vessel was sold and the deletion of the vessels from the
main register. This implies that a lag between the recorded and the actual reduction of the
Norwegian fleet might exist. However, this effect only applied to a relatively small share of
the vessels, and the lags were not so large as to pose a problem in connection with the analysis
ofthe data.
9.1.2. Reliability and validity
The use of the Veritas-register as the main source benefits from the fact that the register
contains a large degree of detailed information and simultaneously is a very reliable reference.
As the register is compiled by an independent agency, whose raison d' etre is to provide
accurate and reliable information to outside agents, there is no reason to expect any bias in the
reporting. According to a study of Det Norske Veritas, the company publishing the register,
"[a]n important condition/or classification is impartiality and integrity. "6
5 The figure "681" implies that the vessels was sold in June 1981, according to reports from Norwegian brokers.
6 Valen, Erik, I en klasse for seg - en studie av skipklassifikasjonsbransjen og Det Norske Veritas Classification
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The fact that the register is compiled by an independent agent without incentives to
alter the figures, does not imply that the register is faultless. The aforementioned lags in
connection with some vessels illustrate the problems encountered. However, these
inaccuracies are a result of problems with regard to information gathering and updating, rather
than a result of attempts at distorting the actual information. The relatively small number of
such inaccuracies, and their limited importance for the analysis, imply that the Veritas-register
can be regarded as the most reliable published representation of Norwegian shipowning
companies and their fleets.
In 1987 Det Norske Veritas changed their manner of reporting. The geographically
separated list by owner was replaced by an alphabetical list of shipowners of all nations,
encompassing vessels registered in different ports. This has two important consequences. On
the one hand, the information on vessels registered in Norway had to be compiled in a
different manner from the previous years. The vessel entries in the alphabetical list were
utilised, and the vessels were designated to their respective ports. The end result was the same
as in the previous years.
On the other hand, the register for the first time makes it practicable to gather
information on vessels owned by Norwegian shipowners, but registered abroad. However,
although the list includes all vessels registered in Norway, in the case of foreign-registered
ships owned by Norwegian shipowners, only vessels classified by Det Norske Veritas are
included in the list. Due to the changes in the manner of reporting, the database entry for the
year 1987 includes two different lists - one of vessels registered in Norway, identical to the
main database entry in the previous years, and one of ships owned by Norwegian shipowners
and classified by Det Norske Veritas. 7
The validity of the information in the main database can be examined by a comparison
of the database with other sources. Such a comparison reveals that there is a high degree of
correspondence between the figures in the database and figures published elsewhere, and that
the discrepancy between the database, the aggregate figures from the Veritas-register and the
figures presented by other Norwegian sources is relatively small. A comparison of the tonnage
in the database and the international figures presented by Lloyd's Register of Shipping, and
reprinted in eg OECD's Maritime Transport, reveals larger differences. This is due to the fact
that the database is based on figures from 1 January, whereas Lloyd's/ OECD present figures
from the middle of the year.
When the tonnage in the database, adjusted for drilling vessels, tonnage delivered in
the current year and tonnage below 5.000 grt, is compared with the gross registered tonnage of
all vessels above 4.000 grt in the Veritas-statistics, the average annual deviation is
approximately one per cent. The Veritas-register does not include an aggregate list based on
dwt. However, a comparison of the dwt-figures can be accomplished by means of the
information from Table 20 in Review, published on an annual basis by the Norwegian
AS [In a class of their own - li study of the ship classification industry and Det Norske Veritas Classification
AS], unpublished thesis, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, 1992, p. 12.
7 The international list refers only to ships above 5.000 grt, and contains less information on each vessel than the
other annual entries.
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shipbroking company Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd. This comparison poses some
problems, however, as the database registers all vessels above 5.000 grt, whereas the figures
in Review refer to tankers, combination carriers and bulk vessels above 10.000 dwt and other
vessels above 1.000 dwt. However, although the figures are not directly comparable, the
annual average deviation is only slightly more than two per cent.
Figure 9.1. Deviation as per cent of database figures, 1970-878
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IIIDatabase vs Veritas (both adjusted) • Database vs Fearnley
Figure 9.1 shows that the figures in the database correspond fairly well with the aggregate
data from the Veritas-register. One reason for the deviation is the fact that vessels in the
5.000-6.000 grt bracket are not included in Veritas' aggregate figures - in fact, this can
account for the full discrepancy in the beginning of the period. If we adjust for half of the
tonnage in the Veritas-register's "4.000-6.000 grt"-category, the figure for 1971, which has
the largest deviation in the first half of the 1970s, should be increased by 295.000 grt. This
corresponds well with a deviation of285.000 between the database and the aggregate Veritas-
figures. In 1978, the year with the largest deviation altogether, this aspect can explain only
approximately 15 per cent of the discrepancy. The majority of the difference originates with
vessels delivered in 1978, which have been included in the aggregate Veritas-figures, but have
been deducted from the figures in the database. In general, however, the correspondence
between the figures is good - with an average annual deviation of 1,04 per cent.
The deviations from the Review-figures are more significant. The main reason for this
is the fact that the definition of the Norwegian fleet differs between the database and the
Review-figures. In the case of "other vessels", the Review-figures include all vessels above
1.000 grt, whereas the database only incorporates vessels above 5.000 grt. However, as the
figures in the database include all vessels above 5.000 grt, the underestimation of "other
8 The figures show the percentage deviation of the figures in the database when compared with the Veritas-
register and the figures from Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review, Table 20. Negative percentages
imply that the database figures are lower than the other sources. Aggregate data for 1987 are not available from
Veritas.
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vessels" is partly countered by the inclusion of some tankers, combination carriers and bulk
carriers below 10.000 dwt, which have been left out of the Review-figures.
A closer analysis of the figures for 1971, in which the discrepancy is most prominent,
shows that the deviation for tankers, combination carriers and bulk carriers is approximately
three per cent. For the group "other vessels", however, there is a deviation of 87 per cent, as a
result of the considerable differences in definition. Comparisons for other years confirm this
feature - the differences for tankers, combination carriers and bulk carriers are relatively
small, whereas there are considerable differences with regard to other vessels. Nevertheless,
given the chosen definition of the Norwegian fleet, the dwt-figures from the database give a
good representation of the development of the aggregate Norwegian tonnage.
The information from the database confirms the development of the Norwegian fleet
presented in Chapter Five. The strong growth in the early 1970s is evident, and the
contraction, in particular from 1983 onwards, also corresponds with other sources.
Figure 9.2. Norwegian fleet, various sources, million dwt and grt, 1970-879
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The higher figures from OECD in the first part of the period and the lower figures in the latter
part of the period can be attributed to the fact that the OECD-figures are based on the middle
of the year, whereas the database refers to the beginning of the year. The OECD-figures for a
given year are thus likely to be higher in periods of expansion and lower when the fleet is
contracting. However, the difference is likely to be larger in periods of growth, as the
discrepancy in periods where the size of the fleet is falling to some extent will be neutralised
by the fact that the OECD-definition of the Norwegian fleet incorporates more vessels than
9 The figures from the database refer to all Norwegian tonnage owned by shipowners with vessels larger than
5.000 grt. The definition previously presented applies to the figures labelled "Fearnley" and taken from Fearnley
& Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review. The figures labelled "OECD" are annual figures from Lloyd's Register of
Shipping, reprinted in OECD, Maritime Transport.
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the database-definition. The OECD-figures refer to all vessels above 100 grt.
The fact that the database corresponds well with other sources does not necessarily
imply that it reflects the development traits which are analysed. The aim is to analyse the
structural development of the Norwegian shipping industry. In this respect, two objections can
be raised - one with regard to the treatment of chartering and another with regard to
information on the company structure.
The first shortcoming is the fact that the database - and the register on which it is
based - fail to take into account vessels which Norwegian shipowning companies have
chartered-in from other sources. According to his biographers, John Fredriksen controlled a
tanker fleet totalling four million dwt in the autumn of 1979, most of them chartered-in on one
year charters." Consequently, he managed Norway's second largest fleet, trailing only Sig.
Bergesen d.y. However, as the vessels were chartered, rather than owned, Fredriksen's fleet is
not registered in the Veritas-register or the database. In this respect, whereas the database is a
good measure of Norwegian shipowning, it is not necessarily a good representation of the
fleets managed by Norwegian shipping companies. The fact that only vessels owned by the
companies are included must be taken into account in connection with the analysis and
conclusions.
The second potentially problematic feature relates to the term shipowning companies. I
have chosen to categorise the vessels in the Norwegian fleet according to their
korresponderende reder [managing owner] as listed in the Veritas-register. In 1975 the Oslo-
based shipowner Torvald Klaveness was listed as managing owner for a fleet totalling almost
350.000 dwt, and comprising 16 different vessels. Partly for legal reasons and partly for
practical purposes, these vessels were owned by 13 different companies. The focus on
managing owners reflects the size of the fleets controlled by various Norwegian shipowners,
but this does not necessarily imply that the managing owner has legal ownership of all vessels
assigned to his name.
Another problem originating with the use of managing owner to indicate ownership is
that this definition conceals the large degree of cooperation in the Norwegian shipping
community. Again, the case of Klaveness can be used as an example. Their share of the
ownership of the companies for which they managed vessels ranged from 25 to 58 per cent.
The remaining parts of the companies were owned by other participants, some of whom had
invested in only one company and some of whom participated in several of the companies."
The participants in the companies legally owning the vessels in the Norwegian fleet ranged
from shipbrokers and shipowners other than the managing owner, to ordinary investors and
financial institutions. Accordingly, by focussing on managing owners, the dispersed
ownership of the Norwegian fleet is to some extent disguised. On the other hand, an analysis
of vessels based on legal ownership rather than managing owners would be relatively futile,
as it would say nothing of the individual fleet size and the importance of the various agents in
10 Hauge, Odd Harald and Stavrum, Gunnar, John Fredriksen - uautorisert biografi [John Fredriksen -
unauthorised biography], Gyldendal Norsk Forlag AS, Oslo, 1991, p. 69.
II See the presentation in Franck-Nielsen, Ame, Skipsfartsnæringen - strukturelle trekk og arbeidsbetingelser
[The shipping industry - structural features and operating conditions], Working paper No. 29, The Study of the
Distribution of Power in Norway, Bergen, 1975,p. 111.
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the Norwegian shipping industry. The categorisation by managing owner can thus be justified
from both a practical and an analytical point ofview.
The aim ofthis chapter is to trace the trends in the Norwegian shipping industry in the
1970s and the majority of the 1980s. In this respect, the database is a good foundation upon
which to analyse vessel ownership, with emphasis on managing owners, and aggregate trends.
9.2. The Geographical Distribution of the Norwegian Fleet
A traditional feature of the Norwegian shipping industry has been the geographical dispersion
of the ownership of the fleet. Shipowning has been an important business activity in ports all
along Norway's extensive coastline, and the widespread pattern of shipowning can be
explained by the manner in which the industry evolved. Initially, the advantageous factors for
the location of shipping activities had been access to raw materials for shipbuilding and a
stable labour supply. During the 19th Century this changed to access to capital markets,
proximity to communication- and trade-centres. organisational competence and dependence
upon a qualified, national labour force." Despite this development, shipping companies were
situated in a large number of ports. The shipping crisis to some extent changed this feature, as
the importance of the largest ports increased, whereas the activity in several smaller ports was
discontinued.
The Veritas-register includes a list of Norwegian vessels by port of regi stry. However,
this list comprises almost 60 ports, many of which only have a limited amount of relatively
small vessels registered. Accordingly, the inclusion of small fishing and coastal vessels makes
this list relatively unsuitable for an evaluation of the Norwegian merchant marine. Due to the
restrictions on the tonnage included, the database gives a more reliable picture of the centres
from which companies partake in the international transport of goods, defined as ports where
vessels larger than 5.000 grt are registered.
The analysis reveals that there were considerable changes in the importance of the
various ports, and that the transformation occurring parallel with the shipping crisis
contributed to increased centralisation of the Norwegian fleet. Moreover, the figures from the
database show that some regions were harder hit by the crisis than other regions, and several
ports which had tonnage above 5.000 grt in the early 1970s disappeared during the period
analysed. The trend towards fewer ports was evident despite the dynamic element which
implies that the 5.000 grt limit was relatively more strict in 1970 than in the mid 1980s due to
the increase in the average size ofvessels.
9.2.1. The increased concentration
All vessels in the database have been assigned to their hjemsted [port of registry] according to
the main Veritas-register. However, in the case of shipping companies with vessels registered
in several ports, all vessels have been recorded in the port where the majority of the
company's fleet was based. Two major companies deserve special attention in this respect.
12 See Nordvik, Helge W., "The Shipping Industries of the Scandinavian Countries: 1850-1913", in Fischer,
Lewis R. and Panting, Gerald D. (eds.), Change and Adaptation in Maritime History. The North Atlantic Fleets
in the Nineteenth Century, Maritime History Group, St. John's, 1985, pp. 117-148.
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The company owned by Sig. Bergesen d.y. was based in Oslo, but the vessels are included in
the fleet of Stavanger, which was entered as the port of registry. Similarly, the vessels of
Wilh. Wilhelmsen were registered in Tønsberg, even though the company was based in Oslo.
When these vessels are included in their ports of registry, rather than in the city in which the
companies were based, the Oslo-registered fleet is underestimated, whereas the fleets of
Stavanger and Tønsberg are inflated.
Table 9.5. Distribution of the Norwegian fleet across ports, per cent of total fleet, 1970-8713
Two features in Table 9.5 require attention. One is the increasing concentration III the
Norwegian fleet, which will be presented shortly. The other is the deviation between the two
columns labelled "-87" and "-87 int.". The latter column includes ships registered abroad, and
is based on the address of the company rather than on the port of registry. This explains why
the tonnage registered in Fredrikstad and Tromsø in 1987 disappears when the fleet includes
foreign-registered vessels." The effect of a focus on address rather than port of registry for the
fleets of Stavanger and Tønsberg, as seen in the difference between "1987" and "1987 int.", is
13 The table is based on grt as registered in the database. An entry of "0,0" implies that vessels above 5.000 grt
have been registered in the port, but that the tonnage represents less than 0,05 per cent of the Norwegian fleet.
14 The MT Sletreal, registered in Fredrikstad, is included under Oslo in the latter column. The change in the
position of Tromsø was the result ofa drilling vessel which is not included in the international figures for 1987.
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also evident.
Figure 9.3. Number, entry and exit ofports with vessels above 5.000 grt, 1970-8715
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Figure 9.3 reveals that the number of ports in which vessels above 5.000 grt were registered
was almost halved from 1970 to 1987. In 1970, vessels larger than 5.000 grt were registered in
27 different ports. The corresponding figure for 1987 was 14, irrespective of whether or not
foreign-registered vessels were included. The number of ports was reduced from 27 to
approximately 20 in the first half of the 1970s, when ports such as Bodø, Kirkenes,
Fredrikstad and Stokmarknes fell below the assigned limit - the latter two albeit temporarily.
The second reduction came in the latter part of the decade, when eg Egersund, Mandal and
Tromsø disappeared. From the mid 1980s onwards, ports such as Drammen, Horten and
Lillesand fell below the 5.000 grt limit.
The ports disappearing during the 1970s were largely relatively insignificant ports, in
aggregate constituting less than two per cent of the fleet in 1970. The ports which were
deleted in the latter part of the 1980s were more important, in particular Arendal. This port
was among Norway's five largest in the 1970s, owned almost five per cent of the fleet in 1984
but had no tonnage above 5.000 grt left on the Norwegian registry by 1987. However, the
reduction in the number of ports with tonnage above the limit is only one aspect of the
increased concentration. Another distinct feature was the increasing importance of the largest
Norwegian ports.
15 The Figures 9.3 and 9.4 are based on grt as registered in the database and shown in Table 9.5. However, the
Figures 9.5 to 9.7 have been adjusted as presented in the text.
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Figure 9.4. Concentration in Norwegian shipping, ports, 1970-87
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Figure 9.4 shows that the share of the fleet registered in Oslo, the largest port, fluctuated
between 30 and 40 per cent, and actually decreased, over the period. The difference between
"1987" and "1987 int." is a result of the fact that the entry including foreign-registered vessels
is based on the address of the companies, with Bergesen and Wilhelmsen included in the
figures for Oslo, the largest port. Accordingly, the apparent increase in concentration in the
latter entry is a result of different statistical bases, rather than a reflection of the actual
development.
The importance of the two largest ports was relatively stable until the beginning of the
1980s. In 1982, however, Stavanger caught up with Bergen, solelyas a result of the growing
importance of the Sig. Bergesen d.y.-fleet. In the subsequent years, the fact that the Bergesen-
tonnage was relatively stable, whereas the aggregate Norwegian fleet was substantially
reduced, secured that the importance of the two most important ports increased, despite Oslo's
reduced share.
The increase in the share of the Norwegian fleet registered in the three largest and five
largest ports was limited until 1981, adding up to 4,4 and 5,7 percentage points respectively.
In the period from 1982 to 1987 the proportion of the fleet registered in the three largest ports
grew considerably, from less than two thirds to almost three quarters." This was largely a
result of the increasingly important role played by Stavanger, the second largest port.
The importance of the largest port in Figure 9.4 can be considered an underestimation,
due to the fact that the Bergesen- and Wilhelmsen-fleets were assigned to Stavanger and
Tønsberg respectively. It is necessary to adjust for this element in order to get a more realistic
depiction of the importance of the various maritime centres and the increasing concentration
of the shipping industry. This element has been compensated for in Figure 9.5, where the
16 The growth of the share registered in the five largest ports was smaller, from 83,8 to 89,1 per cent.
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Bergesen- and Wilhelmsen-fleets have been registered under Oslo." The data on which this
figure is based will be used in the rest of the analysis in Chapter 9.2.
Figure 9.5. Adjusted concentration in Norwegian shipping, ports, 1970-87
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Figure 9.4 and Figure 9.5 illustrate the increased concentration in Norwegian shipping with
regard to ports, a trend which partly reflects the significant and growing importance of the
largest shipping companies. Whereas the inclusion of the Bergesen- and Wilhelmsen-fleets in
the figures for Oslo would boost this city's tonnage by 28,5 per cent in 1970, the same
exercise would more than double the Oslo-fleet in 1987. Indeed, Bergesen's tonnage alone
would be Norway's second largest "port" in the latter year, two and half times larger than
Kristiansand in third place. This is a reflection of the increasing concentration among shipping
companies, which will be analysed in Chapter 9.3.
Figure 9.5 shows that the tonnage registered in ports outside the Top Five was almost
eliminated over the period. Moreover, the share of the fleet registered in Oslo increased by
more than 20 percentage points, from less than 49 per cent in 1970 to almost 70 per cent in
1987. The share of the fleet registered in the second and third largest ports was relatively
constant, albeit slightly reduced. However, the share of the fleet which was registered in ports
outside the three largest fell dramatically, declining from 29,3 per cent in 1970 to 11,6 per
cent in 1987.
9.2.2. Changes in the importance of regions
Figure 9.4 and 9.5 show the development according to size, and do not illustrate the changes
in the importance of individual ports. Whereas the figures indicate that the largest ports gained
17 The Bergesen-fleet includes all vessels registered in Stavanger and owned by Sig. Bergesen d.y. & Co. until
1986, or Bergesen d.y. Gruppen from 1986 onwards, as well as the tonnage owned by General Ore Corporation
in 1986. These vessels were managed by Bergesen and had previously been included in his fleet. The
Wilhelmsen-fleet includes the vessels registered under Wilh. Wilhelmsen until 1986 and Wilh. Wilhelmsen Ltd.
AS from 1986 onwards.
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importance, they do not reveal the regional changes which accompanied this development. In
order to analyse the geographic development traits, the figures from the database have been
aggregated on a regional basis. An analysis of the regional figures reveals considerable
changes in the weight of the various regions, and the trend towards increased concentration is
again observable.
Figure 9.6. Share of the fleet by region, per cent, 1970-8718
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The changes in the importance of the various regions are evident from Figure 9.6. At the
beginning of the period, approximately half of the fleet belonged to companies based in Oslo,
and the three regions Oslofjord, The South Coast and Western Norway each owned between
14 and 19 per cent of the tonnage. By 1980 the picture was very much the same, although the
share of the Oslo-fleet had increased by approximately four percentage points, with a similar
decrease for the Oslofjord region. The 1980s, however, was a period with more prominent
changes.
The importance of the fleet based in the Oslofjord region continued to dwindle, and
their share of the Norwegian fleet had fallen to approximately four per cent by 1987, both as
share the Norwegian-registered tonnage and as share of all Norwegian-controlled tonnage.
The decline was partly a result of the fact that the number of companies in the region with
vessels above 5.000 grt fell from 23 to eight. Moreover, the average tonnage owned by the
companies in the region fell from 111.500 grt in 1970 to less than 40.000 grt in 1987, after
peaking at 184.000 grt in 1978.19
18 The regions have been categorised in the following manner; Oslojjord: Drammen, Fredrikstad, Horten, Larvik,
Moss, Porsgrunn, Sandefjord, Skien and Tønsberg - The South Coast: Arendal, Farsund, Flekkefjord, Grimstad,
Kristiansand, Lillesand, Mandal and Tvedestrand - Western Norway: Bergen, Egersund, Haugesund,
Skudeneshavn and Stavanger - The North: Bodø, Kirkenes, Narvik, Stokmarknes, Tromsø, Trondheim and
Ålesund,
19 The figures for the number of companies and aggregate tonnage do not include Wilh. Wilhelmsen.
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The share of the tonnage owned by companies based in Western Norway was constant
until 1980, but then declined by some 18 per cent until 1984. However, the Western Norway-
fleet's share of the Norwegian fleet plunged from almost 16 to approximately 11 per cent from
1984 to 1985. This was caused by a reduction in the Bergen-fleet of more than 500.000 grt, or
28 per cent, and a similar decline in the Haugesund-fleet, which represented a reduction of
almost three quarters. In Haugesund's case, the decline was largely the result of the disposal
of severallarge tankers, whereas the reduction of the Bergen-fleet was a combination of large
tankers being scrapped or sold abroad and the transfer of tonnage to foreign flags.
A comparison of the Norwegian-based and Norwegian-owned fleets in 1987 reveals
some interesting features. First, the share of Oslo is reduced when foreign-registered vessels
are taken into account, whereas the share of tonnage owned on the South Coast and in
Western Norway increases. This is partlya result of the fact that shipowners in these regions
to a larger extent than shipowners in the Oslo-region had taken advantage of the possibilities
to register tonnage abroad. The share of the tonnage owned by shipowners in Grimstad is
more than doubled when we look at Norwegian-owned rather than Norwegian-registered
tonnage. Similarly, the share of the fleet based in Bergen increases from approximately eight
to nearly 14 per cent. Second, when tonnage registered abroad is included, there is no
significant reduction in the share of the Norwegian fleet based on the South Coast and in
Western Norway relative to the situation in 1970. Rather, there is a small increase, from 16,8
to 18,9 per cent, for the South Coast, and a corresponding decline, from 18,8 to 16,9 per cent,
in the case of Western Norway.
Figure 9.7. Tonnage in various regions, million grt, 1970-87
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The tonnage of Oslo, the Oslofjord-region and Western Norway peaked in 1977, like the
aggregate Norwegian fleet. The tonnage registered on the South Coast peaked the previous
year, and the North fleet peaked in 1978, albeit at a tonnage level which was only a third of
what it had been at the beginning of the 1970s. Figure 9.7 also shows that the temporary
Chapter Nine - The Development of Norwegian Shipping, 1970-1987 273
Stig Tenold: The Shipping Crisis of the 1970s: Causes. Effects and Implications for Norwegian Shipping
cessation of the decline of the Norwegian fleet in the early 1980s was largelya result of the
growth in the Oslo- and Oslofjord-fleets, and occurred amidst continuing reduction of the
tonnage registered on the South Coast and in Western Norway. The demise of the Oslofjord
shipowners is also conspicuous when we compare the amount of tonnage registered and
owned in 1987with previous periods.
Table 9.6. Tonnage in 1987 as share of 1970-fleet and peak fleet, regions, per cent
19R71l970 19R7/peak 19R7 int.. 1970 In7 int. peak
Oslo 56,1 35,6 (1977) 88,2 56,0 (1977)
Oslofjord 12,4 8,4 (1977) 21,9 14,9 (1977)
The South Coast 34,4 22,0 (1976) 80,8 51,8 (1976)
Western Norway 20,6 13,5 (1977) 64,8 42,6 (1977)
The North 24,6 73,7 (1978) 6,1 18,2 (1978)
Aggregate 39,1 25,7 (1977) 71,9 47,2 (1977)
The relative reduction of the fleets of the various groups reveals large regional differences.
The reduction of the fleet registered in the North occurred earlier and was more pronounced
than for the rest of the country, particularly when viewed in relation to Norwegian-owned
tonnage. Tonnage-wise, the highest entry for the North-fleet was registered in 1970, after
which the tonnage dwindled. By 1976 the tonnage had fallen by more than 90 per cent, but
this partly reflected the relatively small number of vessels registered in the various ports,
which implies that the disposal of only a few vessels may have large effects. The reduction
was influenced by the exit of ports such as Bodø, Kirkenes, Stokmarknes and Ålesund, as well
as a decrease in the tonnage registered in Tromsø. Trondheim was the only port in the North-
category where the amount oftonnage registered was relatively stable. However, Trondheim's
share of the Norwegian fleet fell as a result of the considerable expansion in other parts of the
country.
Apart from the relatively insignificant fleet in the North, the highest relative decrease
was recorded in the Oslofjord-region. In 1987 the tonnage in this region amounted to merely
12,4 per cent of the tonnage registered there in 1970, and only 8,4 per cent of the tonnage
registered during the peak ten years previously. The situation is almost as severe if we adjust
for tonnage registered abroad - relative to 1970 the tonnage had been reduced by almost 80
per cent, and it amounted to less than 15per cent of the tonnage registered in the peak year.
If we take into account vessels registered abroad, the status in 1987 was not as grave
for the main three regions of Norwegian shipping, Oslo, The South Coast and Western
Norway. None of the regions had fleets of the same size as in 1970, let alone the peak in the
mid 1970s. However, relative to 1970 the decrease was less than 20 per cent in Oslo and on
the South Coast, and approximately a third in the case of Western Norway.
Although the reduction was dramatic, in particular when compared with the peak year,
the situation was not as grave as the figures might indicate. Some degree of reduction could be
expected, as the world fleet contracted from 1982 onwards. However, the reduction of the
world fleet was smaller than for any of the Norwegian regions. Another mitigating element is
the fact that a ton of shipping tonnage in 1970was different from a ton of shipping tonnage in
1987.
The Norwegian fleet in the late 1980s consisted of far more specialised vessels than in
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1970. Specialised vessels are more costly to build, but have a correspondingly higher revenue
potential. This implies, on the one hand, that the value of the fleet - or rather that the value of
each unit oftonnage - was higher in the mid 1980s than it had been in the early 1970s. On the
other hand, several Norwegian shipowners had diversified their operations from the bulk
sector, concentrating instead on market segments which can be characterised as "industrial
shipping". Norwegian shipowners were dominant within market segments such as the markets
for supply vessels, large gas tankers and roll on-roll off carriers, as well as within chemical
shipping, cruise shipping and open hatch bulk shipping. An adjusted measure of the decline of
the Norwegian fleet, based on "compensated gross register tons" will be presented in Chapter
9.5.
9.2.3. Changes in the importance of ports
Chapter 9.2.2 showed the regional changes in the Norwegian fleet in the period from the early
1970s to the midi late 1980s. A similar analysis can be performed with relation to ports, and
the purpose of this subchapter is to illustrate the development of the most important
Norwegian maritime centres. This exercise shows that the regional categorisation disguises __
variations in the development of the ports within the same regions. Perhaps the best example
ofthis is the South Coast, where the reduced position of the Arendal-fleet was made up for by
an increase in the share ofthe Grimstad- and Kristiansand-fleets,
Annual figures reveal that seven different ports were at some point among the five
largest in the period from 1970 to 1987. As was evident from Figure 9.5, the importance of
these ports increased during the period. The largest growth took place in Oslo, whose share of
the Norwegian-registered fleet increased from 48,6 per cent in 1970 to almost 70 per cent in
1987. The relative growth was nearly of the same magnitude in the case of Kristiansand,
whereas Sandefjord suffered the largest decline, in per cent as well as in percentage points."
Table 9.7. The largest ports, per cent of Norwegian fleet, 1970-8721
Table 9.7 confirms the trend towards concentration in Oslo which was evident from the
regional studies. Moreover, the latter two columns of the table show the varying impact of the
inclusion of foreign-registered vessels in the 1987-figures. In the case of Bergen, the share of
the Norwegian fleet is almost doubled when vessels registered abroad are taken into account.
20 The situation for Arendal was even more grave when only Norwegian-registered tonnage is included. By
1987, no tonnage above 5.000 grt registered in Arendal remained. However, this was partlya reflection of the
fact that Arendal shipowners had taken advantage of the access to foreign registry - when foreign-registered
vessels are included, Arendal's share of the Norwegian fleet was approximately halved relative to 1970, whereas
Sandefjord's share had fallen by more than 70 per cent.
21 Based on grt, with the Bergesen- and Wilhelmsen-fleets included in the Oslo-figures.
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This can be contrasted with a decrease in Haugesund, Kristiansand and Sandefjord, and
suggests that shipowners in some cities were more eager to take advantage of the liberalisation
of the Norwegian flag policy. Accordingly, the reduction of the fleet in eg Bergen during the
first half of the 1980s, will be less dramatic if foreign-registered vessels are taken into
account.
The share of the Norwegian fleet assigned to the various ports can illustrate the drastic
transformation which occurs when the presumptions are changed. Table 9.8 mirrors Table 9.7,
except for two changes. First, the share of the Norwegian fleet is based on dwt rather than grt.
Second, the fleets of Sig. Bergesen d.y. and Wilh. Wilhelmsen have been assigned to
Stavanger and Tønsberg respectively. The figures show the dramatic increase in Stavanger's
share of the Norwegian fleet - from 1986 the city even surpassed Oslo, becoming the
country's largest port. Tønsberg would also be among the five largest ports in the latter part of
the period. However, if the Wilhelmsen-fleet were assigned to Oslo, Tønsberg would
disappear completely in 1987, and would represent less than 0,3 per cent of the fleet in the
previous year.
Table 9.8. The largest ports, per cent of the Norwegian fleet, unadjusted, 1970-8722
Table 9.8 reveals drastic changes in the importance of the various ports, particularly in the
latter part of the period. This can be attributed to the increased concentration in the shipping
industry, which will be analysed later. However, the manner of reporting in Table 9.7 gives a
more accurate impression of the development of the shipping industry, as it depicts the
maritime centres, not the ports in which the vessels are registered.
Table 9.9. The largest ports by rank, 1970-87
Table 9.9 shows that the relationship among the three largest ports was stable up until 1983,
when Kristiansand seized Sandefjord's position as Norway's third largest port, before
conquering Bergen two years later. Sandefjord's share of the Norwegian fleet fell dramatically
after 1982, and by 1987 the city's share of the Norwegian fleet had been reduced by more than
22 Based on dwt, with the Bergesen- and Wilhelmsen-fleets included in the Stavanger and Tønsberg respectively.
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two thirds. The position as the fifth largest fleet alternated between Haugesund and Arendal
until 1980, when the Arendal-shipowners consolidated their position. However, the fifth place
was taken over by Grimstad in 1986. The table also reveals that the rank of the various ports
depended upon whether or not foreign-registered vessels were included.
Figure 9.8. Tonnage in the most important ports, million grt, 1970-8723
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The development of the various ports confirms the trend seen both in the aggregate figures
and in connection with the regional development. Again, there are large differences between
the various ports with regard to the extent to which their fleets declined during the shipping
crisis. When foreign-registered tonnage is taken into account, the decline relative to 1970 was
less than 20 per cent for Oslo, Bergen and Kristiansand. The fact that their decline was lower
than the average for the aggregate Norwegian fleet reflects the increased concentration with
regard to the largest ports. Moreover, some ports, notably Grimstad, actually increased their
tonnage relative to the situation before the crisis.
Table 9.l0. Tonnage in 1987 as share of 1970-fleet and peak fleet, ports, per cent
1987/1970 1987/peak 1987 int.! 1970 1987 int.! peak
Oslo 56,1 35,6 (1977) 88,2 56,0 (1977)
Bergen 24,2 14,5 (1977) 81,6 49,0 (1977)
Sandefjord 13,5 8,0 (1977) 20,8 12,4 (1977)
Kristiansand 53,6 31,4 (1977) 85,0 49;8 (1977)
Haugesund 18,4 11,8 (1977) 24,1 15,6 (1977)
Arendal 39,3 19,2 (1976)
Grimstad 41,1 31,9 (1977) 163,3 126,8 (1977)
Norway 39,1 25,7 (1977) 71,9 47,2 (1977)
Table 9.10 reveals that the flight of tonnage was particularly large in the case of Sandefjord
and Haugesund. The reduction in the fleets of the various ports was accompanied by a strong
23 For an introduction to the development of the amount oftonnage registered in Oslo, confer Figure 9.7.
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reduction of the number of companies engaged in shipping from the various ports. This will
be more closely examined in connection with the analysis of the development of shipping
companies in the next chapter.
9.3. The Development of Norwegian Shipping Companies
As the entries in the database are categorised by managing owner, the database enables us to
analyse the changes in the company structure in the Norwegian shipping sector. This
subchapter commences with an examination of the decline in the number of shipping
companies, the increased concentration of the Norwegian fleet in the hands of a few large
companies and the heterogeneity of the companies in the shipping sector. Subsequently, the
changes in the organisation of Norwegian shipping companies are briefly presented. The last
part of the Chapter 9.3 is a presentation of the literature on Norwegian shipping companies
during the crisis years. This literature indicates the diversity of the companies operating in the
shipping sector and the different manners in which they adapted to the crisis.
9.3.1. Changes in the number and average size of companies
The reduction of the Norwegian fleet was accompanied by a strong decline in the number of
companies engaged in international shipping. In 1970 a total of 176 companies had owned
vessels larger than 5.000 grt. The figure declined only marginally until 1973, as the number of
new companies partly neutralised the effects of the companies abandoning their operations. In
the following years the average reduction was higher, and particularly strong in the years
1978-1981.
Figure 9.9 Annual changes in the number of companies, 1970-86
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After the liberalisation of the Norwegian flag policy in the mid 1980s, the decline accelerated,
leading to a net reduction of 26 companies from 1985 to 1986 and 24 companies the following
year. By 1987 the number of companies engaged in the international shipping sector, with
vessels registered in Norway, had fallen to 64 - a reduction of almost two thirds relative to
1970.24 Adjusting for companies with vessels registered abroad, the figure was almost halved,
from 176 to 91 companies. The reduction of the number of companies participating in the
shipping industry was one aspect of the increased concentration in Norwegian shipping.
Moreover, the winding-up of some of the companies signalled the termination of shipping
operation from several Norwegian cities.
Most of the figures used in this subchapter incorporate all companies owning vessels
with tonnage above 5.000 grt, companies owning oil rigs as well as ships, and companies
whose sole engagements were in the drilling sector." The latter category comprises eight of
the companies, so the reduction of companies owning ships was even more severe than the
figures indicate. If rigowners are excluded, which implies that a more conservative measure of
the Norwegian shipping sector is used, the number of companies with ships registered in
Norway declines from 176 in 1970 to only 56 in 1987, a reduction of more than two thirds.
However, such a definition fails to embrace the important transformation of several
Norwegian shipping companies, exhibited through their conscious embrace of the offshore
segment as well as the increasing amount of tonnage registered abroad. The basis for these
development traits will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Ten.
The data on which Figure 9.10 is based depict the number of managing owners listed
in the Veritas-register. However, they might exaggerate the degree of turbulence in the
Norwegian shipping sector. In aggregate, 266 companies abandoned their operation in the
period 1971-1987. Moreover, 154 companies are registered as entering the shipping sector.
These figures are likely to be considerably higher than the actual termination and
establishment of shipping companies.
Three aspects can explain the fact that the figures for new companies and deletions
may overestimate the actual changes. First, the inclusion of offshore companies inflates the
data, eg as a result of the fact that several shipowners chose to establish individual rig
companies, but later wound up these companies and included the rigs in their original
companies. Second, the data behind the figures reveal that 15 of the "new" companies were in
fact companies which had been previously registered, but which had exited the shipping sector
for a limited period of time. The inclusion of these companies increases the number of new
companies by more than ten per cent and the number of companies deleted by approximately
six per cent. Third, some of the new companies were established by creditors taking over
vessels or by shipowners reorganising their companies. In several instances, these companies
constituted "transitory companies", ie they were not intended to operate vessels in the regular
24 Again, it is important to emphasise that the term "the international shipping sector" relates to companies with
vessels above 5.000 grt. The figure is likely to be an underestimation, as companies with smaller vessels
participated in this market as well. However, with regard to the analysis, it is both a convenient and consistent
measure of the Norwegian merchant marine.
25 The figures representing the Norwegian-owned fleet in 1987, incorporating ships registered abroad, do not
take rigowners into account.
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manner, and were often disbanded after the vessels were sold. Accordingly, banks or financial
institutions may have had a short, involuntary interlude as "shipowners" due to problem loans,
before withdrawing from the shipping sector. There were approximately ten such ephemeras
over the period.
Table 9.11. Number of shipping companies, various ports, 1970-8726
Table 9.11 shows the considerable reduction in the number of shipping compames m
practically all Norwegian ports, as well as the large number of ports for which the crisis
signalled the termination oftheir participation in the international shipping industry. Grimstad
and Porsgrunn were the only ports which enjoyed an increase in the number of companies
from 1970 to 1987. Except for the ports which disappeared altogether, Tønsberg, Haugesund
and Kristiansand experienced the largest relative reduction. The data in Table 9.11 can be
categorised on a regional basis, in order to illustrate the regional development trends with
regard to the number of shipping companies.
26 The table is based on the port of registry of the company's vessels. The latter column, "-87 int." includes
companies with vessels registered abroad, and refers to the address of the company.
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Figure 9.10. Number of shipping companies by region, 1970-87
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By 1987, the number of shipping companies had declined by approximately 60 per cent in
Oslo, the Oslofjord-region and Western Norway. The South of Norway was most severely hit,
with the number of companies falling by almost 75 per cent." If we include companies
owning vessels registered abroad, the decline ranges from approximately 40 per cent, in the
case of Oslo, to 55 per cent, for the Oslofjord-region.
There were mainly four reasons for the reduction in the number of companies. First,
companies were deleted as a result of mergers or acquisitions. However, this aspect was
largely insignificant - less than five instances of mergers and acquisitions over the period
1970-1987 were reflected in the figures. Second, companies terminated their operations, often
as a consequence of the dire state of the shipping market and the reduced profit opportunities.
This accounts for the vast majority of the companies disappearing from the list, and was
particularly prominent in the case of smaller shipowning companies with old, labour-intensive
tonnage. Third, some companies transferred their vessels to foreign flags, leaving them with
no tonnage on the Norwegian register, and consequently excluding them from the list of
companies. For some of these companies, foreign registry only offered a temporary reprieve,
and the vessels were later disposed of altogether. For other companies, foreign registry
facilitated the continuation of their shipping activities. This can be demonstrated by the fact
that 56 Norwegian companies owned ships registered in Norway in 1987, compared with 91
when companies owning vessels abroad are included. The fourth reason for the reduction in
the number of companies was that some companies disposed of their larger vessels,
concentrating instead on other segments, such as eg supply vessels or barges, which were not
included in the list. Approximately 25 companies were deleted from the database due to the
fact that their fleets temporarily or permanently fell below the 5.000 grt limit. Several ofthese
27 The decline in the North only constitutes 57 per cent, but this region was relatively insignificant. In practice,
the decline from seven to three companies hides the fact that the region was virtually out of the international
shipping business altogether - the three companies registered in Tromsø and Trondheim in 1987 were all
offshore companies. One company based in Trondheim had registered tonnage abroad.
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companies later left the shipping sector altogether.
The reduction of the number of companies provides only one part of the explanation of
the decline of the Norwegian fleet. Another reason for the diminishing Norwegian fleet was a
reduction in the average size of the shipping companies. _)
Figure 9.11. Average size of companies and vessels, 1000 grt and dwt, 1970-8728
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The average size of the companies in the Norwegian shipping sector increased until 1978,
levelled out, and then peaked in 1982. The subsequent decline can to a large extent be
explained by the winding-up of the Guarantee Institute's engagements, which implied that
severallarge tankers were sold abroad as the authorities were no longer willing to pay in order
to keep them in the Norwegian fleet. Accordingly, several companies with a considerable
amount of tankers and bulk tonnage disappeared from the register. This can explain the fact
that the average size of the shipping companies declines considerably faster than the average
size of the vessels in the Norwegian fleet after 1982.
One conspicuous element of Figure 9.11 is the relationship between the average size of
the companies measured in dwt and grt. The amount of deadweight tonnage per grt is higher
for large vessels than for small vessels and higher for tankers and bulk carriers than for
conventional cargo vessels, passenger vessels and drilling rigs. The conversion factor, which
had been 161 per cent in 1970, increased to 176 per cent in 1979, as mammoth tankers, bulk
carriers and combination carriers constituted an increasing proportion of the Norwegian fleet.
By 1987 the conversion factor had declined to less than 150 per cent, reflecting the exodus of
the largest vessels and the increased sophistication of the Norwegian tonnage.
The heterogeneity of the Norwegian shipping sector becomes evident when the data on
the number of companies are seen in relation to the regional distribution of the tonnage.
Figure 9.12 reveals that there were considerable differences between the "average companies"
28 The lines refer to the average size of the companies, measured in 1000 grt and 1000 dwt, and the average size
of the vessels above 5.000 grt measured in 1000 grt. International dwt figures are not available for 1987.
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in the various geographical regions. The North was not only distinguished by a relatively low
number of companies - the companies were considerably smaller than the national average as
well.
Figure 9.12. Average size ofcompanies in the various regions, 1000 grt, 1970-8729
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The combination of the tonnage figures and the data on the number of companies sheds light
upon several of the development traits previously presented. First, the demise of the
Oslofjord-fleet can be understood in terms of the dramatic reduction in the average size of the
companies based in the region. The average size of the companies fell by more than 75 per
cent from 1981 to 1987. Accordingly, the reduction in the average size of the companies in the
region was more important than the effect of the decrease in the number of companies from 15
to eight.
Second, the overall effect of the large reduction of companies on the South Coast was
partly countered by the fact that the average size of the companies in the region actually
increased from 1970 to 1987. The fact that the average size of the companies increases when
foreign-registered vessels are taken into account can be explained by the exclusion companies
owning only drilling rigs and the fact that several companies had more tonnage registered
abroad than in Norway.
Third, the large difference in the average size between the companies in Oslo and the
companies in the North indicates that there were large structural differences even within the
Norwegian shipping industry. Moreover, the average size of the companies in the three major
shipping regions increased from 1970 to 1987 when foreign-registered vessels are taken into
account.
29 The Bergesen- and Wilhelmsen-fleets have been included in the figures for Oslo.
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9.3.2. Changes in company concentration
The degree of concentration in the shipping industry, measured by the share of the fleet owned
by the largest companies, varies considerably from nation to nation. In Norway, ownership
had generally been relatively dispersed, with no companies controlling substantial shares of
the fleet. Moreover, the Norwegian shipping industry has traditionally been characterised by
large differences in the size of the various agents, as small and giant firms have been existing
side by side.
Due to the fact that the service produced - ie the transport of goods - is sold
internationally, a high degree of concentration does not have the same effects on the
functioning of the market as in sectors where a limited amount of producers sell their goods in
a confined, domestic market. Accordingly, the concentration has little impact on the degree of
competition in the shipping market, but should rather be seen as an indication of the
dispersion of ownership and the diffusion of shipping activities.
According to an international study, the degree of concentration in the Norwegian
shipping industry was low in a comparative perspective. Seven European countries were
analysed in the mid 1970s, and all of the countries had more concentrated ownership
structures than Norway. Of the Scandinavian countries, Denmark stands out due to the
position of Rederiet A.P. Møller, which owned two thirds of the tonnage. In Finland, the ten
largest companies owned 85,3 per cent of the fleet in 1976, and the corresponding figure for
Sweden was 90,2 per cent. The survey also included France, Germany and Belgium, where
the ten largest companies' shares of the national fleet were 72,5, 56,5 and 94,6 per cent
respectively."
The authors behind the international survey estimate that the share of the Norwegian
fleet owned by the ten largest companies was 46,6 per cent in mid 1973. This figure, which is
based on grt, is approximately four percentage points higher than the one given by
calculations from the database. A comparison of the various figures presented in the study
indicate that the reason for the discrepancy may be that the study underestimates the size of
the Norwegian fleet."
Compared with the other countries included in the study, the ownership of the
Norwegian merchant marine was spread among a larger number of companies, based in most
parts of the country. However, the shipping crisis coincided with an increasing degree of
concentration. Although the degree of concentration in the late 1980s was lower than in other
countries, there was a distinct trend towards increased concentration of ownership.
The fact that the number of companies owning ships declined by more than two thirds
over the period 1970-1987 is in itself evidence of increased concentration. The effect of the
reduction in the number of companies was augmented by increased concentration among the
remaining companies, as the large companies increased their share of the Norwegian fleet.
30 Chrzanowski, Ignacy, Krzyzanowski, Maciel and Luks, Krzysztof, Shipping Economics and Policy - A
Socialist View,Fairplay Publications Ltd., London, 1979, pp. 81-96.
31 Ibid., pp. 90-91. A comparison of the figures from Table 3.10 of the study and figures from OECD, Maritime
Transport 1973, indicate that the size of the aggregate Norwegian fleet used in the study is too low, leading to an
overestimation of the degree of concentration.
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Figure 9.13. Concentration of the fleet, companies, based on dwt, 1970-87
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Figure 9.13 reveals several interesting development traits, in particular the increasingly
important position of the country's largest shipowner and the marginalisation of the smaller
companies. The proportion of the Norwegian fleet owned by the largest company, Sig.
Bergesen d.y., which had constituted 7,5 per cent in 1970, grew steadily until 1980, when it
accounted for 11,3 per cent. In the following years the growth accelerated, with the largest
company's share passing 20 per cent of the fleet in 1984. Thereafter, the largest company's
fleet declined, but not as sharplyas the Norwegian fleet in general, and the share of the total
Norwegian-registered fleet owned by the largest company increased to 23,5 per cent in 1986
and more than 34 per cent in 1987.32 The share of the second largest company was doubled
from 1970 to 1987, and the companies ranked from three to five increased their share of the
fleet by approximately 50 per cent. In aggregate, the share of the Norwegian fleet, measured in
dwt, owned by the five largest companies increased from approximately 24,3 per cent in 1970
to more than 62,4 per cent in 1987.
Whereas the larger companies became considerably more important, the position of
the minor agents in the Norwegian shipping sector deteriorated sharply. In 1970, almost half
of the Norwegian fleet was owned by companies which were not among the twenty largest.
Ten years later the share had fallen to less than 30 per cent. There were two main reasons for
this. First, the largest companies had taken delivery of substantial quantities of tonnage - the
fleets of the twenty largest companies amounted to 26,6 million dwt in 1980, compared with
approximately 15 million dwt in 1970. Second, the number of companies outside the twenty
largest had fallen from 156 to 108, and their average size had only increased by approximately
seven per cent, from 82.417 dwt to 98.999 dwt. This can be compared with an average
32 The figures do not take into account Norwegian-owned vessels registered abroad. One reason for the large
share of the Norwegian tonnage owned by the largest company was that this company to a lower extent than
other companies had chosen to transfer vessels abroad.
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increase of more than 77 per cent in the case of the twenty largest companies."
However, as Figure 9.13 is based on dwt, the trend towards concentration will be more
manifest than if grt were used. The importance or" the biggest companies, which generally
owned huge tankers and bulk carriers, will be larger as a result of the fact that the conversion
factor from grt to dwt tends to be higher for large vessels. Accordingly, the importance of the
minor companies, which largely operated smaller vessels, will be relatively low when dwt is
used as the basis for comparison. Nevertheless, the trend towards increased concentration is
manifest even when grt are used as the basis for analysis.
Figure 9.14. Concentration ofthe fleet, companies, based on grt, 1970-87
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Figure 9.14 confirms the development traits seen in Figure 9.13, but the trends are less
pronounced when grt rather than dwt is used as basis. Several of the trends in Figure 9.14
warrant an explanation. The two main features are the same as in Figure 9.13, viz the reduced
weight of the smaller companies and the increasing importance of the larger companies, and
particularly the largest company.
The reduced importance of companies which were outside the 20 and 50 largest had
two causes. The first reason was the previously mentioned reduction in the number of
companies from 176 to 64. This reduction implies that the share of the companies which were
among the 20 largest increased from 11 per cent of all companies in 1970 to 31 per cent in
1987. Similarly, the percentage of all companies included in the bracket "50 largest" increased
from 28 to 78 in the period 1970-1987. Second, the larger co.npanies were considerably more
active in the expansive period of Norwegian shipping in the first part of the 1970s, and some
of them managed to maintain considerable fleets in spite of the reduction of Norwegian
shipping in the period until 1987. The increased concentration was thus a result of structural
33 It should be emphasised that the term "the twenty largest companies" is used in a dynamic manner, which
implies that it refers to the twenty largest companies in any given year. Of the twenty largest companies in 1970,
12 were among the 20 largest in 1980 as well.
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changes which occurred during the expansionary phase in the early 1970s and during the
depression of the 1980s.
9.3.3. The rise and decline of the Norwegian fleet
Itmight be fruitful to divide the years from 1970 to 1987 into two periods when analysing the
structural changes in the Norwegian fleet. The changes which occurred during the strong
growth period prior to 1977 reveal the transformation of the structure of the Norwegian
shipping sector in a period of growth. The subsequent development traits can be used to
illustrate the changes in the Norwegian fleet and company structure after the shipping crisis
had left its mark on the international shipping sector.
Structural changes during expansion, 1970-1977
The development of companies and tonnage in the expansive period of Norwegian shipping,
from 1970 until the fleet peaked in 1977, shows that the growth of the Norwegian fleet was
unevenly distributed among the various companies. Not surprisingly, the highest tonnage
growth occurred in the largest shipowning companies, and the highest relative growth largely
took place among the smaller companies. Nine of the ten largest companies in 1970 increased
their fleets, and most considerably so. The exception was Fred. Olsen, who ranked ninth in
1970. He disposed of his tankers and large cargo vessels, concentrating instead on passenger
vessels and drilling rigs.
Figure 9.15. Tonnage and tonnage growth in million grt and dwt, 1970-77
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Figure 9.15 shows that the ten largest companies increased their tonnage to a larger extent
than the smaller and medium-sized shipowning companies. Maybe surprisingly, the
development is more pronounced when grt rather than dwt is used as the basis for comparison.
This can be explained by the fact that although the largest companies included shipowners
such as Bergesen and Reksten, who invested solely in mammoth tonnage, several of the larger
companies, including Leif Hoegh & Co. AS, Wilh. Wilhelmsen and Fearnley & Eger, had
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invested in general cargo tonnage, gas carriers, vehicle carriers and drilling vessels. These
vessels weigh relatively less when dwt is used as measuring rod. It was in particular the
companies in the "11-S0"-bracket which invested in larger ships. The grtIdwt-conversion
factor for the tonnage growth in this category was almost 219 per cent, compared with
approximately 200 per cent for the other two groups."
Table 9.12. Highest growth 1970-77, absolute and relative"
Rank Growth Per Rank Grow th Per
Company 1970 grt cent Company 1970 grt cent
Sig. Bergesen d.y. 1 1.240.886 105,4 Jan-Erik Dyvi 169 146.038 1536,6
Hilmar Reksten 4 931.939 143,6 K.G. Jebsen AS 170 82.512 900,2
Anders Jahre 2 783.618 91,1 O.B. Sørensen & Co. 135 97.770 471,4
Einar Rasmussen 10 586.540 163,9 Ame Teigen 173 19.760 332,7
Willi. Wilhelmsen 3 553.859 69,7 AS Gotaas-Larsen 146 45.703 293,6
Hagb. Waage 22 530.061 244,3 J.P. Pedersen & Søn 94 133.433 287,1
Fearnley & Eger 6 464.128 78,1 Hagb. Waage 22 530.061 244,3
Leif Hoegh & Co. 5 321.875 51,0 Skjelbreds Rederi AS 99 92.171 233,7
C.H. Sørensen 25 304.121 153,4 Simonsen & Astrup 133 50.034 233,1
Odd Godager & Co. 38 294.559 227,7 Olaf Tønnevold 129 50.927 230,9
Knut Knutsen O.A.S. 15 276.718 108,2 Odd Godager & Co. 38 294.559 227,7
Biørn Biørnstad & Co. 18 243.308 102,8 Mosvolds Rederier 81 126.884 219,1
Mosvold Shipping Co. 8 195.523 43,7 Arth. H. Mathiesen 59 189.383 211,1
Arth. H. Mathiesen 59 189.383 211,1 Olaf Pedersens Rederi 157 24.578 199,3
AS Thor Dahl 7 177.408 35,2 Stove Shipping 82 108.154 187,2
J.M. Ugland 25 162.954 79,9 H.M. Wrangell & Co. 66 146.396 180,8
H.E. Hansen-Tangen 36 153.619 114,0 Firma Haldor Virik 97 73.416 176,9
H.M. Wrangell & Co. 66 146.396 180,8 Ole Schrøder & Co. AS 103 62.935 175,1
Jan-Erik Dyvi 169 146.038 1536,6 Einar Rasmussen 10 586.540 163,9
Sigurd Herlofson 13 145.710 55,0 C.H. Sørensen 25 304.121 153,4
The development of the companies at various positions in the shipping hierarchy confirms the
strong growth element among the larger companies, and in particular among the ten largest
companies. Nine of the ten largest companies in 1970 were among the twenty companies with
the largest absolute growth in the period 1970-1977. For lower-ranked companies, the
aggregate growth rates were influenced both by companies abandoning operations altogether
and by small companies with very strong relative growth.
34 The tonnage conversion factors for the 1970-fleets were 170 per cent for the ten largest companies, 160 per
cent for the companies ranked 11-50 and 153 per cent for the smaller companies. By 1977 the conversion factors
had increased to 183, 176 and 159 per cent respectively.
35 The table is based on grt and does not include companies which were established in the period 1970-1977.
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Figure 9.16. Growth rates by rank, 1970-77
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The growth rates in Figure 9.16 have been measured in two ways. The compound growth
rates refer to the growth of the tonnage assigned to the companies in each rank-bracket.
Accordingly, the first column shows the relative growth of the aggregate tonnage of the ten
largest companies between 1970 and 1977. The average growth rates represent the
unweighted averages of the growth rates of the companies in each rank bracket. Strong growth
of some companies may elevate these figures, as seen in the case of the companies ranked
from 161 to 176.36 Whereas their total tonnage increased by 117 per cent over the period, the
average growth rates of the companies was 221 per cent. Although the two measures are
largely coherent, the most accurate measure of the development of the various rank brackets is
the compound growth rates, as these are less influenced by the growth of individual
companies."
The low and negative growth rates of the smaller companies is influenced by the fact
that the companies which ceased their operations were largely the smaller companies - the
largest company which disposed of their fleet in the period was Herness Shipping Company,
ranked 53rd in 1970, with five vessels amounting to approximately 96.000 grt. The majority of
the companies registered in 1970 but deleted by 1977 were small companies, with an average
tonnage in 1970 ofless than 20.000 grt."
36 In Figure 9.16 the deleted companies have been assigned a reduction of 100 per cent. When these are excluded
from the calculation of averages, the growth rates in the lower brackets increase, although the compound growth
rates remain constant
37 In the case of average growth rates, these could be positive despite a reduction in the aggregate tonnage owned
by the companies in a given group. Such a situation could occur if one of the companies experienced particularly
strong growth.
38 The average tonnage of all companies deleted was approximately 23.400 dwt, and the average fleet of the
companies in the "0-20.000 grt"-bracket, which contained the majority of the companies, was 12.000 grt.
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Figure 9.17. Companies from 1970 not registered in 1977
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The analysis shows that 52 companies which had been registered in 1970, were not included
in the 1977-figures. Their aggregate tonnage had been approximately 1,2 million grt in 1970.
Accordingly, they represented approximately 30 per cent of the companies registered in 1970,
but less than seven per cent of the tonnage.
The reduction in the number of companies was countered by the inclusion of several
new entrants. Of the 158 companies with tonnage in 1977, 33 companies had not been
registered in 1970.39 Some of these new companies had been able to build up considerable
fleets, and three of the new companies had fleets larger than 100.000 grt. The new companies
owned ships amounting to approximately one million grt, in addition to six offshore vessels.
Accordingly, the aggregate fleet of the new companies was slightly smaller than the fleet of
the deleted companies had been in 1970.
A closer examination of the newentrants reveals that five were offshore companies,
three were operating passenger vessels, three were linked to oil companies, and one was a
bank which had temporarily taken possession of a vessel. Five of the companies were
registered as shipowners in 1970, but did not own vessels larger than 5.000 grt at that point.
Moreover, six of the companies had strong ties to other companies existing in 1970.
The increased concentration in the Norwegian shipping sector in the period from 1970
to 1977 can be understood in terms of the differences in the rate of expansion of the
companies at various positions in the shipping hierarchy. Altogether, the fleets of the fifty
largest companies increased by approximately 60 per cent from 1970 to 1977, compared with
12 per cent in the case of the companies ranked from 51 to 176 in 1970. Nine of the ten largest
companies were particularly eager, acquiring on average more than 500.000 grt each. Indeed,
39 The number of companies registered in 1970 and 1977 were 176 and IS 8 respectively. The reason that the net
reduction of 19 (52-33) companies diverges from the 18 (176-158) companies found in the annual data is that
one managing owner had two separate companies entered in the annual figures for 1977. These have been added
in connection with the estimate of the growth from 1970 to 1977.
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more than 63 per cent of the expansion occurred within these nine companies.
Structural changes during contraction, 1977-1987
The development in the expansive period of the 1970s revealed that the importance of the
large companies increased as a result of their substantial acquisition of tonnage, whereas the
growth of the smallest companies was considerably more modest. In the period from 1977 to
1987 a discussion of growth is somewhat misplaced. Only 11 of the 158 companies registered
in 1977 had more tonnage on the Norwegian register in 1987 than in 1977. The majority of the
companies registered in 1977 - III out of 158 - had in fact disposed of their Norwegian-
registered fleets altogether. The share of the companies deleted thus increased from 30 per
cent in the period 1970-1977 to more than 70 per cent from 1977 to 1987.40
There were considerable changes in the Norwegian shipping industry from 1977 to
1987. Accordingly, a comparison of the state of the industry is more difficult than in
connection with the development from 1970 to 1977. The main reason for this is the
turbulence in the population of Norwegian shipowning companies, characterised by creditor
involvement, bankruptcies, liquidations and reorganisation.
One prominent question is how to treat companies which were severely affected by the
crisis. Several companies went out of business, but laid the foundations for new companies.
The following analysis focuses on the fleets, rather than the legal companies." For instance,
the vessels registered in 1987 under Havtor Management, have been compared with the 1977-
fleet of the shipowner P. Meyer. The reorganisation of his company, based on the goodwill of
the creditors and the Norwegian authorities, laid the foundation for the Havtor-fleet."
Another important aspect is the treatment of companies owning tonnage registered
abroad. The liberalisation of the Norwegian flag policy had important consequences for the
shipping sector. The results of an analysis of the structural changes in the Norwegian fleet
differ substantially depending on whether or not foreign-registered vessels are included.
Accordingly, the analysis presents the results relating to both Norwegian-owned and
Norwegian-registered tonnage, but with a focus on the former category.
The analysis of the structural changes during the shipping depression is strongly
influenced by the demise of shipping companies and the exodus of tonnage. In many ways,
the situation described in this part of the thesis may be seen as overtly negative, as it deals
with the virtual collapse of one ofNorway's most esteemed and prestigious sectors. However,
two elements should modify this impression. First, there was a large degree of diversification
40 The figures refer to comparisons of individual years. In aggregate, 45 companies were deleted in the period
1970-1977 and 109 companies were deleted during the years from 1977 to 1987. The number of companies
leaving the industry refers to companies with tonnage registered in Norway.
41 It was not uncommon that some of the companies legally owning vessels found themselves in economic
difficulties, whereas other companies related to the same shipowner remained relatively unscathed. The degree
to which the managing owner was answerable as a result of joint responsibility and reciprocity agreements
varied. In order to avoid confusion, the analysis of the structural changes focuses on the managing owner.
42 For an introduction to the phoenix-like rise of Havtor Management, see Norwegian Shipping News, No.6.
1981, pp. 35-38. A detailed report from one of the meetings of the creditors can be found in Archives of the
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs No. 164.58, Norsk Garantiinstituttfor skip og borefartøyer, box l, folder
2: 011075-301175.
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and increased sophistication of the Norwegian shipping sector. This will be analysed in more
detail in Chapter 9.5. Second, 1987 represents a trough with regard to both the Norwegian-
owned and Norwegian-registered fleet. The introduction of the Norwegian International Ship
Register and the improved conditions in the international shipping market paved the way for a
considerable increase in the Norwegian fleet after 1987.
Figure 9.18. Changes in tonnage, million grt, 1977-87
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Figure 9.18 shows how the strong reduction of the Norwegian fleet from 1977 to 1987 was
distributed among the companies in the Norwegian shipping sector. The development mirrors
the development in the period from 1970 to 1977, although the reason for the increasingly
important position of the largest companies was less severe contraction rather than heavier
expansion. The difference is particularly manifest in the case of Norwegian-registered
tonnage. The fleets of the ten largest companies were reduced by more than 7,7 million grt,
compared with more than 9, l million grt in the case of the companies ranked Il th to 50th in
1977 and approximately 4,3 million grt in the case of the smallest companies."
Table 9.13. Tonnage and tonnage decline, 1977-87
The share of the Norwegian fleet owned by the ten largest companies in 1977 increased from
approximately 43 per cent to almost 61 per cent in 1987 if only Norwegian-registered tonnage
is considered. When vessels registered abroad are included, the share of the ten largest
43 The figures are influenced by the fact that the vessels registered under Reksten Management have been
assigned to Hilmar Rekstens Rederi. In principle, these vessels could also have been assigned to Johan Rekstens
Rederi, which had managed some of the vessels. Johan Reksten and Hilmar Reksten were both filed for
bankruptcy.
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companies from 1977 becomes less than 50 per cent. 44
A closer examination of the 33 newentrants recorded in the 1977-figures reveals the
shifting fortunes of shipping industry engagements. More than two thirds of the companies
had disappeared by 1987. However, five of the companies went against the grain and
continued their expansion when other companies were scaling down their fleets. Of the new
entrants, two drilling companies and three shipowners operated larger fleets in 1987 than they
had done in 1977.45
Eleven companies increased their Norwegian-registered tonnage from 1977 to 1987.
One of the agents, Einar Rasmussen, was among Norway's ten largest shipowners in 1977,
but the increase of his fleet was relatively 10w.46 The expanding companies also included
Anders Wilhelmsen & Co. and Lauritz Kloster! Kloster Cruise AS, ranked 59th and 99th
respectively in 1977. They were both successful participants in the cruise industry. None of
the other companies which increased their Norwegian-registered fleets from 1977 to 1987
were among the 100 largest in 1977. The eleven companies' increase was modest, totalling
approximately 395.000 grt, and representing an aggregate growth of 23 per cent for the
companies." Two of the companies, both among the newcomers in 1977, only operated
drilling vessels. However, to get a more representative picture of the companies expanding
their fleets, foreign-registered vessels should be included.
Even when vessels registered abroad are included, the contrast between the periods
1970-1977 and 1977-1987 is striking. In the former period, 78 companies increased their
tonnage, 44 companies reduced their fleets and 52 companies were deleted from the register.
This represents 44, 25 and approximately 30 per cent of the companies respectively." From
1977 to 1987 only 19 companies increased their tonnage, whereas 43 companies scaled down
their fleets and 92 companies abandoned the shipping sector or focused on the operation of
ships smaller than 5.000 grt. Accordingly, only 12 per cent of the companies increased their
fleets, whereas 28 per cent reduced their tonnage and 60 per cent were deleted from the
registry.
For the companies increasing their tonnage, the growth was less pronounced than in
the previous period. From 1970 to 1977 the expanding companies increased their fleets by
almost 11 million grt. From 1977 to 1987 the aggregate growth of the companies which
increased their fleets was 1,6 million grt, which would only constitute approximately three
quarters of the growth of the two most expansive companies in the previous period. Only four
44 The figures deviate from the ones in Figure 9.14 due to the fact that they refer to the ten largest companies in
1977, whereas Figure 9.14 shows the share of the fleet owned by the ten largest companies in any given year.
45 The number of companies disappearing was 24. The drilling companies were Odfjell Drilling & Consulting
Co. and Viking Offshore. The three expanding shipping companies were AS Bill, Peter Y. Berg and Larvik-
Frederikshavnferjen, all included in Table 9.13. The three oil company-connected companies and the company
of Peter Thorvildsen were also registered in 1987, albeit with smaller fleets than in 1977.
46 The growth of 1,8 per cent refers to the combined tonnage of Einar Rasmussen and Rasmussen Management
in 1987. In connection with the international figures, which exclude drilling vessels, there was a slight reduction
of his fleet.
47 If the largest company, Einar Rasmussen! Rasmussen Management, is excluded, the average tonnage growth
increases to 113 per cent.
48 Two companies maintained the status quo from 1970 to 1977.
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of the companies increased their fleets to such an extent that they would have been included
among the 30 companies with highest absolute growth in the period 1970-1977.
From 1977 to 1987, companies expanding their fleet were the odd ones out, and the
growth was more modest and less widespread than in the previous period. Fittingly, a ferry
company's investment in a larger vessel warranted an inclusion among the fastest growers of
the Norwegian shipping industry from 1977 to 1987.
A comparison of the growth of Norwegian shipping companies in the periods 1970-
1977 and 1977-1987 reveals two interesting aspects. First, four of the companies expanding
their fleets from 1977 to 1987 were among the companies with the highest growth in the
previous period as well. Leif Høegh & Co. AS and J.M. Ugland were among the companies
with the largest absolute tonnage increase from 1970-1977, whereas Kristian Gerhard Jebsens
Skipsrederi AS and Ole Schrøder & Co. AS were among the companies with the highest
relative growth rates. Second, Fred. Olsen, who recorded the largest absolute fleet reduction in
the period 1970-1977, was among the fastest growers in the period 1977-1987. From 1970 to
1977 his fleet declined by approximately 270.000 grt as a result of his exit from the tanker
sector. His fleet increased by approximately 260.000 grt over the following decade, as he re-
entered the tanker sector with three Liberia-registered vessels.
Table 9.14.Companies with expanding fleets, 1977-8749
Rank Growth Rank Growth
Company 1977 grt Company 1977 per cent
K.G. Jebsens Skipsrederi AS 73 279.468 Lauritz Kloster 99 368,1
Fred. Olsen & Co. 75 261.116 K.G. Jebsens Skipsrederi AS 73 304,8
Ugland Management Co. AS 88 183.047 Fred. Olsen & Co. 75 300,7
Lauritz Kloster 99 168.629 Chr. J. Reim 124 296,3
ASBill 102 94.978 Ugland Management Co. AS 88 286,0
Anders Wilhelmsen & Co. 59 94.186 AS Bill 102 223,5
J.M. Ugland 17 83.582 Gerrards Rederi AS 120 218,2
Kristian Jebsens Rederi AS 66 76.491 Peter Y. Berg 154 215,2
Ole Schrøder & Co. AS 70 71.170 Larviks- Frederikshavnferjen 150 120,4
Leif'Hoegh & Co. 6 70.282 Ugland Shipping Co. AS 103 96,9
Chr. J. Reim 124 55.531 Anders Wilhelmsen & Co. 59 76,4
Torvald Klaveness 28 54.937 Iver Bugge 113 75,2
Gerrards Rederi AS 120 44.689 Ole Schrøder & Co. AS 70 72,0
Ugland Shipping Co. AS 103 39.843 Kristian Jebsens Rederi AS 66 70,4
Iver Bugge 113 21.096 William Hansen 129 29,6
Peter Y. Berg 154 10.915 Torvald Klaveness 28 22,9
Larviks- Frederikshavnferj en 150 8.189 J.M. Ugland 17 22,8
William Hansen 129 4.864 Leif Hoegh & Co. 6 7,4
Christian Haaland 54 2.502 Christian Haaland 54 1,9
49 Due to changes in the defmition of companies, some aspects of the figures should be explained. The fleet
assigned to J.M. Ugland in 1987 comprises the companies Uglands Rederi AS, AS Ugland Shuttle Tankers and
Ugland Construction Co. AS. Ugland Management Co. AS refers to this company as well as Andreas Ugland
Autoliners AS and Andreas Ugland Ventures AS. The fleet assigned to K.G. Jebsens Skipsrederi AS refers to the
fleets ofthis company and Gearbulk Ltd., whereas the fleet of Kristian Jebsens Rederi refers to AS Jebsens Ship
Management. Ole Schrøder & Co AS refers to the company named Osco Shipping and Lauritz Kloster to Kloster
Cruise AS. In connection with the determination of the 1977 rank, companies only operating drilling vessels
have been excluded, bringing the total number of companies to 154 rather than 158.
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In connection with the presentation of the expansionary period 1970-1977, the relative growth
of the companies was presented according to their rank, based on the size of their fleets. For
the period 1977-1987 a similar analysis will have to be based on the relative decline of the
companies' fleets. Table 9.13 indicates that such a presentation will be strongly influenced by
whether or not foreign-registered vessels are included in the figures for 1987. If vessels
registered abroad are included, the reduction will be considerably less marked for the
medium-size and smaller companies than if foreign-registered vessels are excluded.
Figure 9.19. Rate of decline by rank, Norwegian-registered fleet, 1977-8750
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The fact that some of the largest companies chose to maintain a considerable portion of their
vessels on the Norwegian registry can explain the relatively low decline of the tonnage of the
ten largest companies. Figure 9.19 shows that the companies ranked 11th to 90th should bear
the brunt of the blame for the decline of the Norwegian fleet. This group consisted of
companies which in 1977 operated fleets between 60.000 grt and 530.000 grt. Of the 80
companies in the group, 55 disposed of all their Norwegian-registered tonnage, including the
four largest companies, which in 1977 had operated an aggregate fleet of more than 1,9
million grt.
The four companies can be used to illustrate the plight of the medium-sized
companies." In the period 1970-1977 the four companies expanded rapidly, all increasing
their fleets by more than 100 per cent. Indeed, only two companies of similar size in 1970
increased more rapidly." From 1973 to 1976 the four companies had taken delivery of
approximately 2,3 million dwt of tanker tonnage. However, they were unable to cope with the
crisis in the tanker market and were forced to dispose of their fleets, despite the fact that two
50 For an introduction to the difference beteen the terms compound growth rates and average growth rates, see
Figure 9.16.
51 The four companies were Knut Knutsen OAS, C.H. Sørensen & Sønner, Biøm Biømstad & Co. and Odd
Godager & Co.
52 The two other fast growers in the 11th to 40th bracket were Hagb. Waage and Yngv. Hansen-Tangen! H.E.
Chapter Nine - The Development of Norwegian Shipping, 1970-1987 295
Stig Tenold: The Shipping Crisis of the I970s: Causes. Effects and Implicationsfor Norwegian Shipping
of the companies received assistance from the Guarantee Institute."
Figure 9.20. Rate of decline by rank, including vessels registered abroad, 1977-87
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Figure 9.20 illustrates the negative development of companies at all positions in the shipping
hierarchy. Again, the decline is least pronounced for the largest companies, as well as for
some of the smaller categories. The low decline of the companies ranked 71-80 was a result of
the expansion of two of the companies with the largest tonnage increase, Kristian Gerhard
Jebsens Skipsrederi AS and Fred. Olsen & Co., which partly neutralised the decline of the
other companies in the category. Similarly, the "121~130"-bracket includes two of the other
companies expanding their fleets.
The contrast between the expansive period 1970-1977 and the period of contraction
from 1977 to 1987 is striking. In the former period, the largest and medium-sized companies
were the fastest growers, with the smaller companies losing ground. From 1977 to 1987 it was
mainly the ten largest companies, and some of the smaller companies, which maintained their
relative position, whereas the fleets of the medium-sized companies experienced the most
severe contraction.
Table 9.15. Comparison of the growth of shipping companies"
Increase 1970-1977 Declme 1977-1987 Decline 1977-1987
Rank per cent (grt) Norwegian registry All ships
Ten largest companies 78,2 64,3 51,1
Companies ranked Il-50 40,2 89,7 71,1
Companies ranked below 50 12,1 77,1 45,2
The low aggregate growth rate of the companies ranked below 50 from 1970 to 1977 was
Hansen-Tangen, both out of the shipping business altogether by 1987.
53 None of the companies had tonnage registered in Norway in 1987, but CH. Sørensen & Sønner managed three
Panama-registered vessels.
54 The figure for the reduction of the foreign-registered fleet for the companies ranked below 50th place differs
from the one in Table 9.14 by 0,4 percentage points. The reason is that companies only operating drilling vessels
were included in the size of the l 977-fleet in Table 9.14, but excluded in Table 9.15.
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partly affected by the demise of a considerable share of the companies registered - all of the
52 companies deleted in the 1977-figures belonged to this category. From 1977 to 1987 the
other categories were also victim of companies disappearing.
Two of the ten largest companies in 1977, with a combined fleet of 1,4 million grt,
were out of the shipping business by 1987. Tonnage-wise, the bulk of the erosion occurred
among the companies ranked 11th to 50th• Of these 40 companies, 23 companies, with an
aggregate tonnage ofmore than 5,5 million grt in 1977, were deleted from the registry. Of the
104 companies ranked below 50th place, 67 companies, with an aggregate tonnage of less than
3,2 million grt in 1977, were deleted. When internationally-registered tonnage is taken into
account, the reduction of companies from 1977 to 1987 declines from 111 to 92.
The average size of the companies disappearing was considerably larger than in the
period from 1970 to 1977, when it amounted to 23.400 grt. If we include foreign-registered
tonnage, the average size of the deleted companies was approximately 110.000 grt. If we look
at the companies deleted from the Norwegian registry, the average size was 121.500 grt.
Moreover, companies of various sizes, not only companies below 100.000 grt as in the
previous period, chose to leave the shipping business or concentrate on vessels smaller than
5.000 grt.
Figure 9.21. Companies from 1977 not registered 198755
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The 92 companies that were deleted constituted approximately 60 per cent of all Norwegian
companies in 1977, but owned less than 37 per cent of all tonnage that year. 56 The companies
which had no tonnage left on the Norwegian register constituted more than 70 per cent of all
55 The companies are ranked by size in 1000 grt. Accordingly "200-500" indicates companies with a fleet
between 200.000 grt and 500.000 grt in 1977. The columns and line marked "Norwegian" refer to companies
with no tonnage on the Norwegian register, whereas "international" includes companies which did not have any
tonnage at all, neither in Norway nor in other countries.
56 Companies only owning drilling vessels have been excluded from the number of companies and from the total
tonnage in connection with the international figures.
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companies in 1977, and owned approximately 49 per cent of all Norwegian tonnage. A
comparison with the figures for the period 1970-1977, which were 30 per cent of the
companies and less than seven per cent of the tonnage, shows that a larger share of the
companies disappeared. Moreover, the companies owned a considerably larger portion of the
Norwegian fleet.
Despite the severe contraction of the Norwegian fleet, some new companies entered
the scene during the depression. In 1987, 13 companies which had not been registered in 1977
owned ships registered in Norway." Four of the companies were offshore companies, and the
aggregate tonnage of the 13 shipowning companies amounted to some 500.000 grt. If we
include companies managing vessels registered abroad, the figure increases to 17 companies,
with an aggregate tonnage of approximately 1,26 million grt."
Of the new entrants, Skibs-AS Karlander and O.H. Meling had been registered in the
early 1970s, but had temporarily fallen below the 5.000 grt limit. Moreover, two of the
companies had previously operated smaller vessels but acquired vessels above 5.000 grt, and
two of the new owners were Norwegian manufacturing companies. The remaining eleven new
entrants had close links to other shipping companies, such as eg J.O. Odfjell AS, which was
established in connection with the division of AS Rederiet Odfjell between two branches of
the Odfjell-family.
The period 1977-1987 was extremely turbulent, with a strong reduction in the amount
of Norwegian tonnage and the number of Norwegian shipowning companies. The Norwegian-
registered fleet, measured in dwt, declined by more than three quarters from 1977 to 1987.
Simultaneously, the number of companies with ships registered in Norway fell from 154 to
56. The decline was partly mitigated by the registry ofvessels abroad, but the Norwegian fleet
was nevertheless more than halved over the period.
9.3.4. Changes in the organisation of companies
The importance of the largest managing owners increased considerably from 1970 to 1987,
and a considerable number of the smaller companies operating vessels above 5.000 grt chose
or were forced to withdraw from the shipping sector. Another transformation which took place
- regarding the organisation of shipowning companies - is not evident from the data on
managing owners. This subchapter traces the changing relationship among the various types
of vessel ownership.
The most common type of enterprise in the shipping sector in the 19th Century was the
partsrederi [co-ownership], regulated by custom and practice, special agreements and
common business practices. This institution was similar to the 64th-ers which were widely
used in the British shipping industry, and facilitated the widespread pattern of ownership
characteristic of the Norwegian shipping industry at the time. Changes in the legal framework
in the early 20th Century, in particular the introduction of legislation which made it possible to
use ships as collateral security, facilitated the increased use of aksjeselskaper [limited liability
57 In aggregate, 94 new companies were registered in the period 1978-1987, but the vast majority of these had
disappeared by 1987.
58 The offshore companies have been excluded from these figures.
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companies].
This subchapter focuses on rederi [owner], as opposed to managmg owner. The
Veritas-registers include information on both owners and managing owners, whereas the main
database only includes the latter category. Rederi does not signify any given type of company,
and several criteria can be used to distinguish the various arrangements through which
ownership was organised. A common method is to focus upon the degree to which the owners
are liable for the liens of the company. This would range from limited liability companies,
where the participants' liability is limited to their investments in the company, to sole
proprietorship, where the owners are answerable for all of the company's debts.
The Norwegian companies owning vessels above 5.000 grt in the period analysed can
be put into four broad categories; aksjeselskap [limited liability companies], interessentskap
[general partnerships], kommandittselskap [limited partnerships] and andre rederier [other
shipowning companies]." However, neither the Norwegian nor the English terms are
consistently defined, and some of the vessels were owned by a hybrid or combination of the
various company-types.
Limited liability companies in the shipping sector have the same properties as limited
liability companies ia other sectors." The terms skipsaksjeselskap [limited ship companies]
and rederiaksjeselskap [shipowning companies limited] are also used, as well as some more
antiquated forms of organisation. In the following analysis, the various types of limited
liability companies have been gathered in one group. Limited liability companies owned the
majority of Norwegian tonnage in 1970. Almost three quarters of the fleet were owned by
limited liability companies, and more than half of the tonnage consisted of vessels owned by
one limited liability company only.
The participants in general partnerships, comprising the Norwegian terms
interessentskap [general partnerships] and sameie [co-ownership], are liable for all of the debt
of the company, but they are taxed on an individual basis. There is thus no limit to the
liabilities of the participants. Sameie has been a traditional form of organisation when
companies within the same group buy or contract vessels, but has to some extent also been
used by companies without legal linkages. In the early 1970s, approximately ten per cent of
the Norwegian fleet was owned by general partnerships, either through sameie or through
interessentskap. However, this manner of organising ownership became less attractive in the
wake of the shipping crisis, as the participants could be negatively affected by the economic
difficulties of the companies with which they cooperated.
Limited partnerships can be considered a hybrid of the two previous types. One of the
owners, called komplementar [general partner] has unlimited liability, whereas the passive
members, called kommandittister [limited partners], are liable for a given amount of the debt.
59 The English translations have been taken from the "Key to the register of ships and extract from Det Norske
Veritas' rules" in the Veritas-register.
60 The legal implications of the various types of companies are more thoroughly presented in Dobrowen, Kim,
et.al., Rederi og kapitaltilførsel- Hovedproblemer imoderne rederifinansiering [Shipowner and capital supply-
Main problems in modem shipping fmancing], Nordic Institute of Maritime Law, University of Oslo, 1981 and
Norges Offentlige Utredninger (1980:45), Uteregistrering av skip og skipsfartens egenkapital [Foreign registry
of ships and the equity of shipping], pp. 4-7.
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The number of passive members differs between various limited partnerships. Limited
partnerships are not liable to tax, but each participant is taxed relative to their share of the
company. Limited partnerships were more suitable for shipping and offshore investments than
for other types of investments, as the limited partnership could be assigned to a single factor
of production, eg a ship, supply vessel or a rig. The use of limited partnerships was moderate
in the early 1970s, but this way of organising shipowning companies assumed increasing
importance over the period analysed.
The category "other shipowning companies" includes the modem version of the
partsrederi [co-ownership VI The co-ownerships may either have proportional liability, or
they might have unlimited liability. In the former type, the participants are responsible for
their share of the company's debts, whereas in the latter type they assume full responsibility in
the same manner as in general partnerships. However, as opposed to the general partnerships,
co-ownerships with proportional liability are taxed at the company level. In the following
analysis, the category "co-ownership" includes other companies which have not been listed as
limited liability companies, eg sole proprietorships. 62
The presentation in the previous paragraphs shows that the various types of
companies to a considerable extent are overlapping. In addition to the similarities among the
various forms of organisation, the different types of companies could be combined. For
instance, limited liability companies would frequently assume the position of general partner
in limited partnerships. Moreover, whereas there is unlimited liability in some types of co-
ownership, the actual responsibility of the owners may be reduced if limited liability
companies own parter [shares]. Accordingly, the following presentation does not present a
definite picture of the development of ownership in the Norwegian shipping industry, in the
sense that the figures are indisputable and well-defined.
In order to analyse the organisation of vessel ownership, the relative importance of the
various company types in 1970, 1975, 1980 and 1985 has been investigated. The development
traits are relatively clear, even though the similarities between the various types of
organisation imply that a considerable degree of discretion has been necessary. The data set is
based on the main body of the Veritas-register. The information in the geographically
arranged index also facilitates the identification of the actual owner, but the manner in which
this index is organised may lead to misinterpretation. Accordingly, information on the owners
has been lifted from the individual entries. These entries provide a good starting point for an
analysis, in the sense that information on ownership is included for all of the vessels.
However, there may be flaws in the reporting as a result of inaccuracies, although a high
degree of internal congruity indicates that the extent of such inaccuracies is relatively limited.
61 The English translation of the word partrederi is the same as the translation of sameie, partlyas a result of the
proximity between the two types of organisation.
62 All Norwegian limited liability companies were required to include the abbreviation AS in their name,
indicating that the company in question was an aksjeselskap [limited liability company]. Companies for which
AS or similar terms indicating that the company was a limited liability company were absent, have been
included in the category "other companies".
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Table 9.16. Company organisation, per cent of grt, selected years, 1970-8563
1970 1975 19RO 19R5
Limited liability companies (AS) 73,4 56,8 43,8 35,3
Co-ownership/ companies (CO) 14,4 27,7 39,3 43,4
General partnerships (IS) 9,7 12,4 5,4 3,0
Limited partnerships (KS) 2,5 3,2 11,5 18,3
Table 9.16 shows the decrease in the share of the Norwegian fleet owned by limited liability
companies and general partnerships, and the corresponding increase in the share of the fleet
owned by other companies and limited partnerships. However, the figures are to some extent
misleading, as some of the vessels listed as owned by limited liability companies were owned
by two or more limited liability companies, which in effect indicates some kind of co-
ownership. Accordingly, I have chosen to base the analysis on the categorisation usually
utilised in analyses of ownership structure, where only vessels owned by a single limited
liability company have been assigned to this category.
The share of the fleet owned by two or more limited liability companies declined
sharply over the period. Accordingly, an analysis focussing on vessels owned by limited
liability companies will indicate a stronger reduction of this category than an analysis of
vessels owned by one limited liability company. When the figures are presented in the manner
usually applied to analyses of the ownership structure in Norwegian shipping, the
development traits from Table 9.16 are still apparent, but less pronounced.
Table 9.17. Company organisation, per cent of grt, selected years, 1970-8564
1970 1975 Ino 19)\5
One limited liability company (AS) 53,2 45,1 38,6 34,5
Co-ownership/ companies (CO) 34,6 39,4 44,6 44,2
- of which two or more limited liability companies 20,3 11,6 5,2 0,8
General partnerships (IS) 9,7 12,4 5,4 3,0
- of which sameie 2,8 3,4 3,1 2,0
Limited partnerships (KS) 2,5 3,2 11,5 18,3
The share of the fleet owned by one limited liability company declined continuously over the
period analysed, whereas the share of the fleet owned by limited partnerships showed the
highest increase. However, due to the growth of the Norwegian fleet, the amount of tonnage
assigned to each group increased from 1970 to 1975, as shown in Figure 9.22.
63 The term "limited liability companies" includes the Norwegian terms Aksjeselskap, Skipsaksjeselskap, Rederi-
AS, Dampskips-AS and Hvalfangst-AS. The category "Co-ownerships/ companies" includes all individual
companies which are not described as limited liability companies, as well as co-ownerhips of the partrederi-
type. The term "General partnerships" designates interessentskap and co-ownerships of the sameie-type. Due to
rounding-off, the sums of the columns deviate from 100.
64 The term "limited liability companies" includes the Norwegian terms Aksjeselskap, Skipsaksjeselskap, Rederi-
AS, Damskips-AS and Hvalfangst-AS, but the term is only used when these companies are listed as the sole
owner of the vessel. The category "Co-ownerships/ companies" contains all individual companies which are not
described as limited liability companies, as well as co-ownerhips of the partrederi-type and vessels owned by
two or more limited liability companies. "General partnerships" is used to describe interessentskap and co-
ownerships of the sameie-type. Due to rounding-off, a transfer of the share of vessels owned by two or more
limited liability companies to the "limited liability company" -category in Table 9.16 gives results which deviate
from those in Table 9.16. In the subsequent figures, the defmitions utilised in the table apply.
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Figure 9.22. Tonnage by company type, 1000 grt, selected years, 1970-85
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The amount of tonnage owned by limited liability companies and general partnerships
increased until 1975, but then declined considerably. The decline was least pronounced for
companies in the "co-ownership"-category, whereas the amount of tonnage owned by limited
partnerships increased over every five-year interval. There might be several reasons for this
transformation, eg changes in the organisation of the companies or differences in the disposal
and contracting of tonnage between the various groups. A closer analysis of the data upon
which Figure 9.22 is based shows that the latter explanation is the more prominent.
The dynamics behind the increasing importance of "co-ownership"-category of
companies and the reduced importance of limited liability companies, as pictured in Figure
9.22, can be found by examining the three periods independently. In the period from 1970 to
1975, the higher increase of the tonnage in the "co-ownership"-category was a result of the
fact that the companies included here were more eager in the contracting market. A lower
share of the AS-owned fleet was sold abroad, compared with the fleets of other companies,
but the limited liability companies were less eager when it came to replacing the tonnage."
In the period from 1975 to 1980 the reduced role of the limited liability companies can
be explained by the fact that they disposed of more tonnage than the companies in the "co-
ownership"-category, in absolute as well as relative figures. Moreover, the companies in the
"co-ownership" -category again acquired a higher volume of new and second-hand tonnage. In
the final period, from 1980 to 1985, limited liability companies disposed of a larger amount of
tonnage, whereas the tonnage acquired by the two groups of companies was of the same
magnitude. The reduction in the amount of tonnage was in particular a result of the fact that
severallarge tankers, which had been owned by one limited liability company, were disposed
of as the Norwegian authorities ceased to grant guarantees to keep them on the Norwegian
register. The tonnage comprised by vessels above 100.000 grt declined by almost 60 per cent
in the case of ships owned by one limited liability company, compared with less than 17 per
cent for vessels owned by companies in the "co-ownership"-category.
65 In absolute figures, the limited liability companies disposed of more tonnage. The main difference, however,
was with regard to acquisition.
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It is thus evident that for the period 1970-1985, the reduced importance of the limited
liability companies can be explained in terms of both larger sales of tonnage and less eager
acquisition of new and second-hand tonnage. In the case of tonnage sales, the reduction of the
fleets of the companies in the "co-ownership" -category was approximately 20 per cent lower
than for the limited liability companies. This effect, combined with a 12 per cent higher
acquisition of tonnage for the "co-ownership" -category of companies, is important in
explaining the structural changes in the organisation of Norwegian shipowning companies."
Another possible explanation of the reduced importance of the limited liability
companies is that the companies owning the individual vessels were reclassified. There is
some evidence of such reclassification, but the effect on the fleet structure is ambiguous. In
the period 1970-1975, the reduced share of the limited liability companies was affected by the
transformation of limited liability-companies to "co-ownership" -category companies. The net
change was nevertheless relatively unimportant, compared with the effect of the differences in
disposal and acquisition of tonnage. In the other two periods, the tonnage converted from "co-
ownership" -companies to ownership by one limited liability company exceeded the tonnage
for which ownership was reclassified the other way. Moreover, the net changes were higher
than in the first period. Accordingly, changes in the ownership of individual vessels did not
contribute to the increasing share of the Norwegian fleet owned by companies in the "co-
ownership"-group. Rather, these changes partly neutralised the differences in acquisition and
disposal of tonnage.
The explanation of the reduced importance of vessels listed as owned by general
partnerships mirrors the development presented above, although reclassification of ownership
appears to be more important. For instance, 16 of the 25 vessels listed as owned by sameie in
1975 had been deleted by 1980. Only three of the vessels remained sameie-owned, whereas
five had been transferred to partrederi and one had been transferred to a limited liability
company.
One of the reasons for the decline in the use of general partnerships was difficulties in
connection with the unlimited liability-clause. For some participants the experience became
costly, as other participants were unable to contribute as expected due to economic
difficulties. Accordingly, what had previously been a potential problem in connection with
sameie-ownership, became a reality when the shipping crisis reduced the economic strength of
some of the participating companies. The risk thus curbed the shipowners' willingness to enter
into new general partnerships, and encouraged shipowners to reorganise the ownership of
vessels owned by general partnerships. Only two of the 14 vessels owned by. general
partnerships in 1985 had been built after 1976.
The largest tonnage expansion, in absolute as well as relative terms, occurred within
the limited partnerships. The amount of tonnage registered as owned by limited partnerships
66 In aggregate, the limited liability companies disposed of some 16 million grt, whereas the companies in the
"co-ownership"-category disposed of 12,8 million grt. As for acquisition, the figures were approximately 11,3
million grt and 14,2 million grt respectively. These figures refer to tonnage increases and decreases as found by
an analysis of five-year intervals, and do not include vessels for which ownership was re-classified from the "co-
ownership"-category to the "limited liability companies"-category or vice versa.
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increased from 445.000 grt in 1970 to almost three million grt 15 years later. However, this
refers to the Norwegian fleet as defined in the databases, ie vessels larger than 5.000 grt. Some
of the vessels for which the use of limited partnerships was particularly widespread have been
excluded from these figures, a fact which implies that the actual usage and growth of limited
partnerships was higher than indicated here.
According to the figures from the database, 103 ships and drilling units were organised
as limited partnerships in 1985, corresponding to 26 per cent of the number of vessels and 17
per cent of the tonnage measured in dwt. A similar examination performed by Norges
Rederiforbund in the autumn of 1984 found that limited partnerships owned 38 per cent of the
number of vessels in the Norwegian fleet and 18 per cent of the dead weight tonnage." The
share was particularly high in the case of supply vessels, where almost 60 per cent of the
vessels were owned by limited partnerships. These vessels have been excluded from the
database due to the restrictions on size. Accordingly, the growth with regard to the number of
vessels would be even more conspicuous if the total Norwegian fleet was analysed. However,
the variations in dwt would not be of the same magnitude, due to the fact that the vessels left
out of the analysis were relatively small.
The attractiveness of limited partnerships can be understood both in terms of the
limitations on the liability of the limited partners and in terms of the manner in which these
companies were treated by the authorities in connection with taxation. The owners were taxed
independently, rather than at the company-level as in the case of limited liability companies.
Accordingly, the deficits which were common in the initial period after the investment had
been undertaken could be deducted from the tax burden of the individual investors. The
limited partnerships consequently combined the most advantageous feature of the limited
liability companies, ie the relatively low risk, with the most advantageous feature of the
general partnerships, ie the right to deduct deficits from the personal tax burden of the owners.
In a domestic perspective, the advantage of limited partnerships was their ability to channel
resources from external, non-shipping sources to the shipping sector.
In the late 1970s, approximately 20 per cent of the investments in limited partnerships
originated with groups outside the shipping sector. An official survey concluded that "the
majority of newenterprises and a large share of the contracting is organised through limited
partnerships. "68 This can be exemplified by the fact that in 1985 more than 40 per cent of the
vessels delivered in 1981 and later were owned by limited partnerships, compared with 36 per
cent in the case of limited liability companies and 24 per cent in the case of companies in the
"co-ownership" -category. 69
The number of vessels owned by limited liability companies fell dramatically, from
694 in 1970 to 138 in 1985. This represented an 80 per cent decline, and the relative reduction
was even more dramatic in the case of vessels owned by general partnerships, the number of
67 The figures have been reprinted in Stortingsmelding nr. 53 (1984-85) Om skipsfartsnæringen [On the shipping
industry], p. 12.
68Norges Offentlige Utredninger (1980:45), op.cit., p. 50.
69 However, the vessels delivered to the companies in the latter category were on average considerably larger
than the vessels delivered to the other two types of companies, a fact which can partly explain why the share of
tonnage owned by the companies in the "co-ownership't-category remained constant.
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which fell from 88 to 14. The number of vessels owned by companies! co-ownerships
declined less dramatically, from 281 to 140, whereas the number of vessels owned by limited
partnerships increased from 23 in 1970 to 103 fifteen years later.
Figure 9.23. Type of organisation, per cent of the number of vessels, selected years, 1970-85
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The changes in the organisation of the Norwegian fleet are more prominent when the number
of vessels are used as the unit of analysis. This reflects the fact that the average size of the
vessels assigned to the various types of ownership varies. The vessels assigned to the "co-
ownership" -category were larger than the other categories' vessels in all of the four years
examined. The fleets of the general partnerships and limited partnerships to a larger extent
consisted of relatively small vessels.
Figure 9.24. Average size ofvessels, 1000 dwt, selected years, 1970-85
100
90
80
70 -
60
50 .
40
30 -
20 -
10 -
O .:.
CO IS
111970 .1975 O 1980 01985
The changes in the importance of the various types of companies are so substantial that there
should be little doubt about the fact that the organisation of the Norwegian shipowning
companies changed during the period analysed. However, the actual extent and effects of
AS KS
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these changes are difficult to quantify, due to the similarities between the various types of
ownership and the fact that shipowners often utilised a combination of the different types of
ownership. The increasing importance of the limited partnerships partly reflects the success in
making non-shipping investors channel their resources to the shipping sector, spurred by
generous taxation policies. A White Paper published in 1981 emphasised that "it is important
for [the shipping sector 'sl ability to renew itself and expand that the main features of the
rules regarding limited partnerships and limited partners is maintained. "70 Nevertheless, it is
difficult to assess the extent to which this capital would have been invested in the shipping
sector regardless of the existence of the limited partnerships.
9.3.5. Presentation in company histories
The companies in the Norwegian shipping sector differ with regard to factors such as fleet
size, tradition, strategies and organisation. In the bibliography in Chapter One, some of the
books on Norwegian shipowners were presented, with a focus on the publications which can
be considered the most valuable contributions from a "business history" -point of view.
However, the majority of the shipping company histories were left out.
In a survey of Norwegian maritime history, Helge W. Nordvik claims that most of the
oks on individual shipping companies "contain little factual information on the companies
in question, and it goes without saying that there is no attempt to attribute sources and
evidence for the many sweeping generalisations presented by the authors. "Moreover, "[t}hey
are purely public relations exercises, but [' ..J singularly fail in enlightening the general
public. On the contrary, their chief function is to perpetuate popular myths and they thus
make a negative contribution to the history of maritime enterprise. "71 This scathing criticism
only to some extent applies to the contributions included below.
I have chosen to focus on books that can be regarded as useful additions to the
knowledge of Norwegian shipping companies, and ignored what Nordvik refers to as
"hagiographies". The contributions included here illustrate the diversity of the Norwegian
shipping sector and the strategic decisions undertaken in Norwegian shipping companies in
the period surveyed. Although the quality of the research and literature varies, all
contributions included throw light upon the manner in which Norwegian shipping companies
coped wi: the international crisis. The following presentation can thus be seen as the
"common knowledge" of the strategic decisions of Norwegian shipping companies, as
presented in isolated analyses.
Dag Bakka jr.'s book "Hav i storm og stille" gives an account of the large
transformations and financial adaptation necessary to rescue the Norwegian shipowning
company Helmer Staubo & Co." The recipe included conversion, and later cancellation, of a
vessel contracted in Japan, support from the Norwegian Guarantee Institute for Ships and
70 Stortingsmelding nr. 52 (1980-81) Om skipsfartsnæringen [On the shipping industry], p. 20.
71 Nordvik, Helge W., "Norwegian Maritime Historical Research during the past Twenty Years: A Critical
Survey", Sjøfartshistorisk Årbok 1990 [Norwegian Yearbook of Maritime History 1990], Bergen Maritime
Museum, Bergen, 1991, p. 248.
72 Bakka, Dag jr., Hav istorm og stille - AS HA V Helmer Staubo & Co 1915-1990 [The history of the shipowner
Helmer Staubo's company AS HAV], Krohn Johansen Forlag, Larvik, 1990, pp. 72-79.
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Drilling Vessels Ltd., protracted negotiations with the main creditors and sales of the vessels.
Although marred by an extremely limited use of footnotes and secondary literature, the book
provides insight into the operation and management of a shipping company, both during the
shipping crisis and in connection with the revival of the Norwegian shipping industry after
1987.
The history of the shipowning company Leif Hoegh & Co has been written by the
same author, and the title of the book, "Shipping through cycles", embodies one of the most
important aspects of the shipping industry. The book illustrates how a diversified company
managed to acquire a reasonable return on capital through long-term contracts for its fleet of
combination carriers and profitable investments in auto-carriers and liner services, despite
having a gas tanker fleet which largely remained unemployed." By 1980 Hoegh had become
one of the largest privately owned shipping groups in Norway. Ironically, the advantageous
financial position by the tum of the decade facilitated a massive newbuilding programme,
which had substantial negative effects in the second half of the shipping depression, from the
early 1980s onwards.
Johannes Seland's short book on the Kristiansand-based shipowning company of Einar
Rasmussen tells the story of a company that survived the crisis through a combination of
newbuilding conversions, long-term charters and involvement in the offshore oil sector. 74 The
book does not, however, throw light upon the judgements upon which this fortunate strategy
was based.
Gustav Sætra's history of the Arendal-based shipowning-company Arnt J. Mørland
illustrates the diversity of Norwegian shipowners' engagements, and the importance of this
diversification for survival." The company owned tankers, bulk carriers, several barges and a
share of a drilling vessel, and also controlled tankers chartered-in from foreign companies.
However, the company's experience in the 1970s shows many of the familiar signs of
Norwegian shipowners in dire straits; disposal of tonnage, cancellation of contracts for
newbuildings and chartered vessels, need for public support through the Guarantee Institute
and red figures in the books. In 1979, for the first time in the company's history, Mørland was
without ships. Due to profits from the offshore sector and the advantageous sale of a rig, the
company acquired the financial basis necessary for a new beginning.
The history ofl.M. Skaugen illustrates two features of Norwegian shipping." First, the
company's minority interests in a series of product tankers and drilling vessels show the high
degree of cooperation between Norwegian shipowning companies which is often ignored
when fleets are presented by managing owner. Second, the company's good economic
performance in the 1970s came about as a result of large profits from cruise shipping, bulk
shipping, car carriers and timber carriers. The proceeds from these segments overshadowed
73 Bakka, Dag jr., Hoegh - Shipping through cycles, LeifH6egh & Co ASA, Oslo, 1997, pp. 164-172.
74 Seland, Johs., Poly-flåten gjennom femti år 1936-1986 [Fifty years of the Poly-fleet 1936-1986], Einar
Rasmussens Rederi, Kristiansand, 1986, p. 68-71. The period 1973-1978 is analysed in a chapter aptly named
"Into the North Sea", pp. 66-82.
75 Sætra, Gustav, Himmel og Hav [Shipping and Beyond], Arnt J. Mørland, Arendal, 1991, pp. 278-291.
76 Kolltveit, Bård, Skaugen - 70 år i shipping - AS Eikland 1916-1986 [Skaugen - 70 years in shipping - The
company AS Eikland 1916-1986], published by the company, Oslo, 1986.
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the relatively mediocre results from the company's investments in oil rigs, supply ships and
liners."
Tore Jørgen Hanisch and Martin Bould have written a book on the Torvald Klaveness
group, pioneers of the postwar dry bulk trade." The company's experience in the 1970s
illustrates the large changes necessary for a company which experienced escalating costs.
Though not directly hit by the falling demand in the tanker market, major adjustments were
required to keep the company profitable. The response was rationalisation and the transfer of
vessels to lower-cost countries throughjoint-ventures.
AS Ivarans Rederi, though to a limited extent involved in the bulk sector, was
generally regarded as a liner company, with a South America line as the company's main
engagement." Accordingly, the challenges facing this company in the 1970s were different
from those facing most of the other companies presented here. One of them was
discrimination; third-country flags were increasingly excluded from liner markets by state-
owned or state-supported companies. Fortunately, the fact that other third-flag liner operators
abandoned their operations left more room for Ivarans. Another challenge was the
modernisation of the fleet to comply with the increased need for efficiency and the onset of
containerisation. The company solved this by disposing of their older ships, contracting two
new vessels and chartering-in capacity from other shipowners.
The offshore oil and gas sector represented another challenge for Ivarans Rederi. The
company established a partnership for this purpose, KS Ivaran Drilling AS & Co, but the
contracted rig was cancelled due to the deteriorating rig market from the mid 1970s, and the
total investment capital was lost. The company was more fortunate with their investments in
supply ships and gradually increased their engagements in this field. The company's first,
cautious offshore investment, 5/64-shares of a drilling platform, was financed by the revenue
from the sale of a bulk carrier, again showing how the oil sector provided an alluring
investment alternative for shipping companies in the early 1970s.
Other histories of shipowning companies, eg several of the contributions by Birger
Dannevig and Bård Kolltveit, do not attempt to analyse the shipping crisis or the forces
behind the companies' fate. Rather, they focus on the development of the fleets, without
trying to explain the strategy upon which the development was based, and the central decision
makers, without trying to explain their decisions and the basis for their judgements. 80
77 It may seem contradictory that the market segments which functioned as cash cows for some companies, led to
bad results for other companies. This is due to the heterogeneity of shipping market segments, where even a
relatively low level of aggregation may obscure considerable differences. The timing and the choice of
contracting, sales and chartering strategy are of utmost importance for the financial results.
78 Hanisch, Tore Jørgen and Bould, Martin, Megler og Reder - Torvald Klaveness gruppen 1946-1996
[Shipbroker and Shipowner - The Torvald Klaveness Group 1946-1996], Messel Forlag, Oslo, 1996.
79 Kolltveit, Bård, Bridge across the Seas - AS Ivarans Rederi 1920-1995, published by the company, Oslo,
1995.
80 See for instance Dannevig, Birger, Assurancejoreningen Gard 1907-1982, published by the company,
Arendal, 1982, Dannevig, Birger, AS Uglands Rederi 1930-1980, published by the company, Grimstad, 1980,
Dannevig, Birger, CH Sørensen & Sønner 1881-1981, published by the company, Arendal, 1981, Dannevig,
Birger, OlajTønnevold & Sønner 1878-1978, published by the company, Grimstad, 1977 or Dannevig, Birger,
Tønnevolds Rederi 1878-1978, published by the company, Grimstad, 1977. Large proportions of the latter two
books are in fact identical.
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As Thowsen and Marøy emphasise in their presentation of one company history, "one
might question the priority of the topics when the design of the chimney on one of Anders
Wilhelmsen 's cruise vessels is given a lot of attention" and the reasons that the company
abstained from the tanker contracting in the early 1970s are more or less neglected."
The neglect has partly been remedied in an updated version of the book, where it is
claimed that "[sjuspicious of an over-heated tanker market, and resisting pressure from some
people in his own company, Arne Wilhelmsen decided that the future lay in other sectors of
the industry, such as bulk carriers, supply ships, diving support vessels and tanker shuttles to
service platforms in the North Sea. This decision would help Wilhelmsen survive the ensuing
oil crisis and position it to take advantage of new markets in a rapidly changing industry. "82
However, it is characteristic that an interview with the shipowner in an international shipping
publication gives information on the company's absence from the shipping sector which is
more revealing and illuminating than the official history of the company; "The Oslo-based
Anders Wilhelmsen Group could have broken its neck over potentially fatal tanker investments
in the early 70s. [ ...] Shipowner Arne Wilhelmsen says he decided to listen to shipping
economist Even Engelstad instead of some people in his own company who 30 years ago
argued the future was in the crude oil tanker market. "83
The example above illustrates one of the main problems of shipping company
histories. Official histories tend to emphasise the visions and sentiments of the owner.
However, in this case the basis for the decision was cautious analysis by an academic, who to
my knowledge is not even mentioned in the official publication despite his far-reaching
importance for the financial well-being of the company.
9.4. The Tonnage Leaving the Fleet
The previous analyses have been based on the mam database and the database on the
development of shipping companies. The third database details all vessels changing
ownership. It enables the analysis of both the vessels which changed ownership within
Norway and the vessels which left the Norwegian registry. The database includes information
on the new ownership, the new country of registry and the sales transaction itself. However,
the amount of information on each transaction varies. In particular, there are relatively large
gaps in the details on the transactions from the beginning of the 1980s. These are a result of
the fact that the broker reports started to include "representative sales" rather than "all
Norwegian sales".
Another potential problem is that there is a certain degree of inconsistency with regard
to information on the new country of registry and the new ownership. Five main sources were
81 Hansen, Arild Marøy and Thowsen, Atle, "Sjøfartshistorie som etterkrigshistorisk forskningsfelt" [Postwar
maritime history as topic for research], LOS-senter Working paper 91/6, Norwegian Research Center in
Organization and Management, Bergen, 1991, p. 15, referring to Kolltveit, Bård, Fra Verdens Ende mot de syv
hav-Anders Wilhelmsen & Co. 1939-1979, [From Verdens Ende towards the Seven Seas - Anders Wilhelmsen
& Co. 1939-1979], published by the company, Oslo, 1989, pp. 137 and 149.
82 Kolltveit, Bård, Vadseth, Knut and Butenschøn, Hans B., Six Decades on the Seven Seas - A Saga of Value
Creation, Andresen & Butenschøn, 2000, p. 94.
83 TradeWinds, Il August 2000, p. 10.
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consulted when the database was compiled, viz the Veritas-register, secondary literature, eg
the histories of individual shipping companies, the database of the Norwegian fleet at the
Bergen Maritime Museum, Lloyd's Register and reports from brokers. In the cases where
information varied between the different sources, the sources have been ranked in the order
presented above. Alternative information has been indicated in the database.
Figure 9.25. Validity of the sales database, per cent of all transactions, 1970-8684
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The considerable amount of sources utilised has made it possible to determine the fate of the
majority of the vessels which were sold in the Norwegian market, either to other Norwegian
shipowners or to foreign agents. On average, information on the new owners is available for
more than 90 per cent of the tonnage which changed owners, as shown in Figure 9.25.
Measured by the number oftransactions, information on the new owners is available for 1.600
of approximately 1.780 transactions. Information on the new country of registry, but not the
new owner, is available in 167 instances, and only 13 vessels have been deleted from the main
database without information on the new country of registry or the new owners."
Accordingly, the sales database is a useful tool for an analysis of the fate of the vessels which
were sold in the Norwegian second-hand market for ships in the period 1970-1986.
The vessels which left the Norwegian fleet in the latter part of the period were both
larger and more recently built than the vessels which were sold in the beginning of the period.
The average size of the vessels sold from Norway increased from approximately 13.000 grt in
1970 to more than 50.000 grt in 1985.86 Indeed, from 1983 until 1985 the vessels which were
sold in the Norwegian market and registered abroad were larger than the average vessels in the
Norwegian fleet. This can be explained by the fact that a large amount of the tonnage ordered
during the tanker market heyday, ie mammoth tankers and combination carriers, were
84 The figures are based on the share of tonnage registered in grt, and do not include drilling vessels and vessels
smaller than 5.000 grt.
85 The 1.600 entries also include vessels which were scrapped.
86 The average size in 1986 was lower, due to the fact that relatively few large tankers were sold.
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disposed of. Almost 50 tankers and combination carriers above 100.000 grt were sold from
1983 to 1985.
Figure 9.26. Average age and size ofvessels sold from Norway, 1970-86
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The average age of the vessels sold abroad decreased from approximately 13 years in the early
1970s to approximately ten years in the latter part of the period. However, the vessels which
were sold abroad were older than the average of the Norwegian fleet throughout the period.
9.4.1. Where did they go?
The amount of tonnage which changed owners varied considerably from one year to the next.
The majority of the tonnage was either transferred from one Norwegian owner to another or
registered in Flags ofConvenience-countries (FoC-countries) or Asian countries. In aggregate,
40 per cent of the tonnage changing owner was registered in an FoC-country, 13 per cent was
registered in Asia and 22,5 per cent was transferred within the Norwegian market.
Figure 9.27. Tonnage changing owners, 1000 grt, three year moving average, 1971-85
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The data upon which Figure 9.27 is based show that the share of the tonnage which was
transferred between Norwegian owners fluctuated around a quarter of all tonnage until 1982,
but thereafter fell dramatically, averaging 16 per cent from 1983 to 1986.87 However, the claim
that Norwegian shipowners were paralytic after the freight market breakdown, and thus were
financially unable to purchase the vessels which their compatriots in distress were forced to
sell, is not supported by the analysis. This assertion would be substantiated if there was a
strong increase in the share of the Norwegian tonnage sold abroad, but this share was
relatively constant in the first years after the freight market had broken down. However, it
should be kept in mind that the existence of the Guarantee Institute affected these figures - it
is likely that a higher share of the Norwegian fleet would have been sold abroad in the absence
of this institution."
The aim of this subchapter is to examine the fate of the vessels which left the
Norwegian register. Vessels which were scrapped or lost have not been included in the
analysis. This amounts to 52 vessels, totalling 1,25 million grt in the period 1970-1979, and
22 vessels, totalling 2,1 million grt in the period 1980-1986.89 In an international perspective,
the amount of tonnage which changed hands within Norway is relatively unimportant. The
following analysis is based upon the vessels which were deleted from the Norwegian registry
and transferred to foreign shipowners.
The vessels which were deleted from the Norwegian registry have been categorised in
five groups. The majority of the tonnage, in excess of 52 per cent, went on to be registered in
FoC-countries.9o The second largest group consists of the emerging maritime nations in Asia,
in particular China and Singapore. The growth of the merchant marines of the emerging
maritime nations in Asia is analysed in more detail in Chapter Ten. Approximately 17 per cent
of the Norwegian tonnage sold abroad was registered in this region."
A considerable portion of the Norwegian fleet was taken over by Greek shipowners,
either for operation under the Greek flag or FoCs. In the 1970s more than 19 per cent of the
Norwegian tonnage sold abroad was transferred to the Greek flag, but this share fell to less
than eight per cent in the period 1980-1986. In aggregate 14 per cent of the tonnage deleted
from the Norwegian registry in the period 1970-1986 was subsequently registered in Greece.
87 The chart shows the total amount of tonnage for which the new country of registry is known, as well as the
amount of tonnage which went to each of the three most important recipients - new Norwegian owners, Flag of
Convenience-countries and Asian countries. In order to improve the readability of the presentation, the figures
have been converted to three year moving averages.
88 When these vessels were sold as the engagements of the Guarantee Institute were discontinued in the early
1980s, a considerable share was taken over by other Norwegian shipowners.
89 Moreover, the thirteen vessels for which ownership and country of registry were unknown have been left out.
This refers to three vessels, totalling approximately 30.000 grt, in the period 1970-1979, and ten vessels,
amounting to approximately 300.000 grt, from 1980 to 1986.
90 The countries included in the Flag of Convenience-category are Bahamas, Bermuda, Cayman Islands,
Curacao, Cyprus, Gibraltar, Liberia, Malta, Panama, Somalia and the Lebanon.
91 The category "Asia" comprises Bangladesh, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Singapore, South
Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, the Philippines and Vietnam.
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Less than ten per cent of the tonnage sold from Norway went on to be registered in
other OECD-countries.92 Approximately eight per cent of the tonnage, comprising less than
three million grt, was sold to other countries, including oil-producing countries, communist
countries and developing countries." When the Norwegian ownership was terminated, the
vessels were registered in more than sixty different countries, a prime example of the fact that
the market for second-hand ships is truly international.
Table 9.18. Tonnage leaving Norway by new country of registry"
In aggregate, tonnage amounting to more than 37,7 million grt was sold from Norway for
registry abroad in the period 1970-1986.95 The sales database includes information on the
subsequent country of registry for almost 37,4 million grt of this tonnage. Table 9.18 shows
how this tonnage was distributed among the various new registries.
In the last two columns of Table 9.18, the recipients' shares of the tonnage sold from
Norway have been compared with their shares of the world fleet. The share of the tonnage
which was registered in OECD-countries was relatively low, even when we adjust for the
inclusion of the Norwegian and Greek fleets. There are two main reasons for this. First, the
OECD-countries' share of the world fleet was declining over the period. Second, a large
portion of the tonnage which left the Norwegian registry was unsuitable for operation from
high cost, industrialised countries. Rather, the shipowners purchasing the vessels could only
operate them profitably in low labour cost countries, which typically were countries outside
the OECD.
The share of the tonnage sold to FoC-countries, Greece and Asia was relatively high.
The explanations are the opposite of those which could account for the relatively low share of
tonnage sold to OECD-countries. On the one hand, these registries were expanding heavily in
the period, a development trait which is further analysed in Chapter Ten. Accordingly, one
should expect that the acquisition oftonnage is relatively high, compared with the size oftheir
current fleets. Second, by utilising low cost labour, shipowners in these countries could
operate old vessels profitably even after they were unsuitable for operation with the
92 The OECD-countries receiving tonnage were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, Portugal, Sweden, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States. Greece has been excluded
from these figures.
93 The countries which received tonnage from Norway, and have been included in the "other"-category are
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, DDR, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Mexico,
North Korea, Nigeria, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, the USSR, Tanzania and
Venezuela.
94 The figures in the last column indicate the groups' average share of the world fleet in the period 1970-1986.
The figure for the OECD-fleet includes both Norway and Greece.
95 Only ships above 5.000 grt are included in the figures.
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Norwegian flag. In this respect, Greece differed from the other OECD-countries, as it was a
relatively low labour cost flag.
Figure 9.28. New registry, per cent of grt on an annual basis, 1970-8696
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
ID
o
or-,
o-
r-,
o.
Nr-o-
<r)
r-,
o-
r- oo o- o ;;or- r- r- oos:: s:: s:: s:: s::
oOther oGreece
N
00o.
.FoC IlAsia oOECD
Figure 9.28 shows where the vessels which were sold by Norwegian shipowners were
subsequently registered. The columns refer to per cent of the annual sales, and do not take into
account the fact that the volume of tonnage sold varied immensely between the various years.
Greek shipowners operating their vessels under the Greek flag were particularly eager
to purchase Norwegian second-hand tonnage in the beginning of the period. In 1970 alone, 27
vessels were sold for registry in Greece. Slightly more than half of this tonnage was purchased
by Greek-based shipowners, whereas exiled Greek shipowners in Great Britain bought more
than 40 per cent. The rest was purchased by Greek shipowners who had companies in the
United States but preferred to fly the Greek flag. Moreover, Greek shipowners, both Greek-
and foreign-based, bought a considerable share of the vessels which were registered in FoC-
countries."
Shipowners utilising Flags of Convenience increased their share of the purchases of
Norwegian vessels in the early 1970s, and the share was stabilised at approximately 50 per
cent in the period 1973-1984. However, in 1985 and 1986 more than two thirds of the tonnage
leaving the Norwegian fleet were registered in FoC-countries. As the subsequent analysis will
show, the high share in the 1980s was largely the result of traditional flagging-out of
Norwegian vessels.
The third group buying a considerable share of the Norwegian tonnage was Asian
shipowners. The most important countries in the "Asia" -category were China, Hong Kong,
Singapore and the Philippines. In both Singapore and the Philippines, some of the vessels
were purchased by agents with strong links to the Norwegian shipping sector. These agents
96 The chart shows the distribution of the vessels leaving the Norwegian fleet, based on grt.
97 In the analysis in Chapter 9.4.2, all shipowners have been defined by their country of operation. Accordingly,
a considerable share of the vessels which were managed by British and American companies were in fact owned
by Greek nationals.
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were either Norwegian nationals who had started their careers abroad or companies
established by Norwegian shipowners. As Figure 9.28 indicates, GECD-countries, with the
exception of Greece, and the countries in the "other"-category were relatively unimportant.
9.4.2. Where did they really go?
As country of registry often differs from the nationality of the actual owner, the results of the
analysis in Chapter 9.4.1 do not necessarily correspond with the nationality of the shipowners
who purchased the Norwegian vessels. However, the sales database includes information on
the majority of the new managing owners as well, and this enables us to analyse the new
ownership of the vessels which left the Norwegian fleet.
The subsequent analysis is a return to the focus on managing owners, rather than legal
companies, as in Chapter 9.3.4, or country of registry, as in Chapter 9.4.1. It should be
emphasised that the growth of the ship management industry implies that some of the
companies registered as managing owners, in particular in the latter part of the period, were in
fact only managing the vessels for owners based in other countries. However, the extent of
this practice was not so large as to affect the conclusions to any considerable extent. The
development of the ship management industry is analysed in more detail in Chapter 10.4.3.
Data on the new managing owners are available for approximately 90 per cent of all
the observations, regardless of whether the number of transactions or the volume of the
tonnage sold is used." However, approximately 22 per cent of the tonnage was sold in the
Norwegian market, where information on the new ownership was available for all of the
vessels. This implies that the observations of newforeign ownership is lower than 90 per cent.
The new foreign owners have been identified in the case of approximately 86 per cent of the
almost 1400 observations." Measured in grt, the transactions in which the location of the new
owners is identified cover slightly less than 84 per cent of the tonnage sold from Norway.
Although precise information is lacking for approximately 14 per cent of the vessels,
representing 16 per cent of the tonnage, the data can be considered relatively reliable with
regard to the real ownership of the vessels which left the Norwegian fleet.
The analysis reveals two striking, but not surprising, features. First, there is little
correspondence between the registration and the actual ownership of the vessels which left the
Norwegian registry. This can be accounted for by the large share of the fleet transferred to
FoC-countries. Second, the effects of the liberalisation of the Norwegian flag policy are
evident, and flagging-out can explain quite a lot of the changes in ownership and registration
from 1984onwards.
The analysis in Chapter 9.4.1 showed that the GECD-countries were suspiciously
absent in connection with the new registration of the tonnage which left the Norwegian fleet.
Excluding Norway, the GECD-countries' average share of the world fleet was approximately
98 The percentages are practically identical as a result of the fact that the vessels for which data are missing did
not deviate substantially in terms of size from the vessels for which information is available.
99 In a handful of instances the database contains information on the name of the new company, but not where
the company is based. The number of companies for which the location of the owners is not identified is 196,
rather than the previously mentioned 179, which is the number of vessels for which the owners have not been
identified. The term foreign owners includes Norwegian companies with vessels registered abroad.
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45 per cent in the period 1970-1986. However, the OEeD-countries purchased only 23, l per
cent of the Norwegian tonnage, and the majority of this tonnage was bought by Greek
shipowners. An analysis of actual ownership neutralises this effect. Whereas less than a
quarter of the tonnage sold abroad was registered in OEeD-countries, companies based in
these countries were the actual buyers of more than 70 per cent of the tonnage sold from
Norway.?"
Analysis of vessels sold from Norway
The buyers of the tonnage which was sold from Norway have been divided into five main
categories. The most important group consists of companies in the OEeD-countries, which
bought the majority of the tonnage which was sold abroad by Norwegian shipowners, largely
for registration in FoCccountries.!" The second most important group was Norwegian
shipowners, who "bought" more than 21 per cent of the tonnage which left the Norwegian
fleet and was registered elsewhere. However, the Norwegian share increased considerably,
from less than seven per cent in the 1970s to almost 39 per cent in the period 1980-1986.
Shipowners in Asian countries bought 18,5 per cent of the tonnage sold from Norway.
This figure is higher than the 16,8 per cent of the tonnage which was registered in Asia. The
reason for this is that some Asian owners, in particular in Hong Kong and Singapore, chose to
register their vessels in FeCvcountries.!" However, this effect was to some extent neutralised
by the fact that some of the companies that registered their fleets in Asian countries were
based outside the region.
Companies based in countries grouped in the "other"-category bought less than six per
cent of the tonnage."? The "other" -category consists of a motley crew of owners based in
countries which were relatively insignificant in an international maritime perspective.?' The
vast majority of the vessels sold to these countries were registered in the country of the owner,
ilthough there are some instances of separation of registry and ownership in the case of these
.nmtries as well.
Just like the registry of the vessels gives little indication of the actual nationality of the
owners, the addresses of some shipping companies do not reveal where the owners are based.
These companies have been included in the last category, called tax havens, which consists of
companies for which the given address refers to countries with little limitation on foreign
ownership. The countries included in this category are largely the same as those included in
the Foe-category in the previous example. In addition, Monaco has been defined as a tax
100 The figure includes Greece and vessels which were registered outside Norway, but managed by Norwegian-
based companies.
il.! The OECD-based companies which bought Norwegian tonnage were located in Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the
United States.
102 The Asian companies which bought vessels from Norway were located in Bangladesh, China, Hong Kong,
India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, the Philippines and Vietnam.
103 The companies were based in Albania, Algeria, Argentina, British West Indies, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia,
DDR, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Poland, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Tanzania,
Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, the USSR and Venezuela.
104 Although the USSR controlled a considerable fleet, Soviet companies were not particularly important in the
international shipping market; see Chrzanowski, Krzyzanowski & Luks, op.cit., 1979, pp. 165-243.
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haven. The inclusion of Switzerland in this category could be justified due to the discretion of
the country's banking system, but I have chosen to include the Swiss shipowning companies
in the OECD-category.!05
Figure 9.29. Tonnage sold from Norway by actual ownership, 1970-86
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The important position of the OECD-countries with regard to the ownership of the vessels
sold from Norway is evident from Figure 9.29.!O6 The largest recipients were Norwegian
companies registering their vessels outside Norway. They purchased slightly more than 30 per
cent of the tonnage bought by OECD-companies, followed by British companies, with 19 per
cent, and Greek-based shipowners, with 17 per cent of the tonnage. US owners acquired
approximately 10 per cent of the tonnage, whereas companies in other OECD-countries, in
particular Finland, Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands, bought 23 per cent of the tonnage
which was bought by OECD-based companies.
The tonnage which was taken over by Asian owners can broadly be put into three
categories. First, Asian companies acquired a considerable amount of relativelyold vessels, in
particular in the beginning of the period. These vessels were largely intended for transport in
regional waters, but do not weigh heavily when tonnage is used as the basis for analysis.
Second, relatively modem bulk tonnage was sold to shipowners in Hong Kong and Singapore
after the freight market breakdown, often for registry in FoC-countries. Third, several agents
with close links to the Norwegian shipping industry operated from Asian countries, in
particular Singapore. Moreover, some Norwegian shipowning companies were responsible for
the establishment of new companies in this region, and in several instances tonnage was
105 Some of the companies registered as based in Switzerland were "trusts", one of the favourite institutions
utilised by shipowners wishing to avoid a revelation of their actual ownership. The countries included in the "tax
havens"-category are Bermuda, Cyprus, Gibraltar, Liberia, Malta, Monaco, Panama and the Lebanon.
!O6The average of the annual shares of the tonnage sold to OECD-countries was approximately two thirds.
However, 70,7 per cent of the tonnage sold abroad went to OECD-countries. The discrepancy is a result of the
fact that the other groups, in particular Asian countries, had high annual shares around the turn of the decade,
when the amount of tonnage sold was relatively low.
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transferred from the Norwegian register to these new companies.
Analysis of the tonnage transferred to Flags of Convenience
The considerable difference between the country of registry and the nationality of the actual
owners is largely the result of the use of Flags of Convenience. This aspect of the international
shipping sector is analysed in more detail in Chapter Ten. However, the sales database can be
used to elucidate the actual ownership of the FoC-fleets in a manner which is usually not
possible in connection with aggregate data on the world fleet.'?'
Vessels amounting to almost 17 million grt were transferred from Norway to Flags of
Convenience in the period 1970-1986. The database contains information on the actual
ownership for 87 per cent of the tonnage which was later registered in FoC-countries. This
relates to approximately 89 per cent of the 656 observation of vessels leaving the Norwegian
fleet for inclusion in such registries. The results of the analysis varies greatly depending on the
period of observations.
Table 9.19. Previously Norwegian-registered tonnage in Flags of Convenience - actual owner
In the 1970s, the majority of the vessels which left the Norwegian fleet and were registered in
Flags of Convenience were purchased by OECD-based owners, and this share increased in the
period 1980-1986.108 Companies registered in tax havens received a significant amount of the
tonnage in the 1970s, but were nigh on absent in the 1980s. Asian owners were responsible for
a significant share of the FoC-tonnage. Most of these vessels were owned by shipowning
companies based in Hong Kong and Singapore."?
The amount of tonnage owned by shipowners outside tax havens, the OECD and Asia
was negligible. Whereas shipowners in the "other"-category bought approximately seven per
cent of the tonnage sold from Norway, they owned only 1,4 per cent of the tonnage which was
later registered in FoC-countries. This is a result of the fact that the majority of the tonnage
owned by shipowning companies in these countries was flying the domestic flag. Whereas
107 The countries included in the FoC-category are Bahamas, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Curacao, Cyprus,
Gibraltar, Liberia, Malta, Panama, Somalia and the Lebanon. Bermuda, Cyprus, Gibraltar, Liberia, Monaco,
Panama and the Lebanon are also included in the "tax haven't-category,
108 In addition to owners in the countries specified above, owners in Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the Netherlands bought tonnage from Norway, and registered these
vessels in FoC-countries.
109 The Asian owners which had vessels registered in FoC-countries were based in Hong Kong, Indonesia,
Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines,
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shipowners in 23 countries in the "other"-category bought vessels from Norway, only
shipowners in three ofthese countries registered their vessels in FoC-countries.110
Figure 9.30. Flag ofConvenience-registered vessels by owner nationality, 1970-86111
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If the ownership of the vessels which were transferred to Flags of Convenience is broken
down on an annual basis, the considerable changes in the importance of the various countries
becomes evident. The most striking development is the increasing importance of Norwegian
shipowners, a direct result of the changes in the Norwegian flag policy.
Figure 9.31. Real ownership ofvessels transferred to FoC-countries, 1000 grt, 1970-86
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Norwegian shipowners in fact purchased almost two thirds of the tonnage which was later
registered in FoC-countries in the years 1984 to 1986. This was closely related to the
110 These owners were based in Argentina, Israel and Saudi Arabia,
III The figure refers to ships over 5,000 grt deleted from the Norwegian registry and registered in Flag of
Convenience-countries. The columns depict the shares of the annual figures, and do not take into account
differences in the amount of tonnage registered between various years.
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liberalisation of the Norwegian flag policy, and may to some extent be the result of a pent-up
pressure which had existed for a number of years.
9.5. A More Positive Assessment of the Fleet Development
Chapter 9.2 and Chapter 9.3 detailed the considerable transformation of the Norwegian
shipping industry over a period spanning almost two decades. The first part of the period was
characterised by market euphoria and strong expansion of the Norwegian fleet. The second
part of the period saw a strong reduction in the number of companies and the tonnage on the
Norwegian register. From 1970 to 1987 the number of companies with ships registered in
Norway fell by more than two thirds, whilst the mass departure of Norwegian-registered
vessels cut down the size of the fleet by more than three quarters relative to the peak year.
The focus on the number of companies and aggregate tonnage registered in Norway
from 1970 to 1987 may give an overtly negative picture of the development of the Norwegian
shipping industry. On the one hand, the development after 1987 proved the viability of the
companies in the Norwegian shipping sector, but this aspect will not be discussed here.
Nevertheless, the growth of the Norwegian fleet after the introduction of the Norwegian
International Ship Register should be a major topic in any analysis of the recent development
of the Norwegian shipping community. On the other hand, the Norwegian shipping industry
had to some extent undergone a positive transformation from 1970 to 1987. Large tankers and
bulk carriers, for which the market had been disastrously bad for most of the 1970s and 1980s,
played a less important role. Rather, Norwegian shipowners had chosen to focus on some of
the more advanced segments of the shipping industry. This transformation is the topic of the
following analysis.
9.5.1. The price and value of shipping tonnage
The previous analysis has used grt, and to a lesser extent dwt, to illustrate the changes in the
Norwegian fleet and the Norwegian shipping industry. However, the use of tonnage as
measuring rod to some extent cloaks the sophistication - or lack of such - of the tonnage in
question. In the shipping sector, as in most other major industries, there is a strong correlation
between the sophistication and quality of the factors ofproduction and their price and value.
The large units which have dominated the tanker and bulk carrier industry - both with
regard to tonnage and with regard to attention - are relatively cheap per grt and dwt compared
with other types of tonnage. Accordingly, in 1970 the purchase of a 30.000 dwt product tanker
was as expensive as the purchase of a bulk carrier twice the size, due to the more sophisticated
technology utilised in connection with the construction of the former vessel. Whereas the cost
per dwt for the product tanker would be approximately $370, the cost per dwt for the bulk
carrier would be approximately $175, and the cost per dwt of eg a large tanker would be even
lower.!" The relative newbuilding price of the various types of vessels fluctuated due to
changes in the conditions in various market segments. 113 Nevertheless, although a random year
might give a faulty impression of the newbuilding price, the pattern was clear - the cost per
112 Figures from Table 16 in Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review 1972, p. 16.
ll3 Demand factors play some role as well, as the potential supply of the various types of vessels is limited.
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grt or dwt varied considerably depending on the type ofvessel ordered.
The pattern behind the price differences can be presented in a relatively simple
manner. First, smaller vessels were more expensive than larger vessels, measured in cost per
grt or dwt. Second, specialised tonnage was more expensive than standardised tonnage. The
difference was particularly large for vessels for which relatively advanced technology was
necessary, either in the construction of the vessel or in connection with the vessel's own
equipment and attributes.'!' Figure 9.32 shows the cost of a dwt of shipping tonnage of various
types.
Figure 9.32. Differences in the price of newbuildings, $ per dwt, 1972-85115
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Figure 9.32 reveals both the large variations in the cost of one dwt of shipping capacity
between various vessel types and size classes, and the considerable fluctuations in these
prices. The same development pattern is evident with regard to the value of second-hand
vessels, although this picture is not as clear. On the one hand, the second-hand market is more
responsive to changes in the conditions in the freight market, as explained in Chapter Two. On
the other hand, the inclusion of age, and in particular the condition of the vessels, as
parameters, gives larger variations between vessels of otherwise identical types and sizes.
The price and value of second-hand tonnage can also be presented on a dwt-basis.
However, consistent time series are more difficult to come by. The pattern is nevertheless
much the same as in the case of newbuildings - smaller vessels are more expensive than larger
vessels, and tonnage intended for specialised transport assignments, eg tonnage with purpose-
made equipment, is more expensive than more generalised tonnage.
114 Wijnolst, Niko and Wergeland, Tor, Shipping, Delft University Press, Delft, 1996, pp. 67-141, give a good
introduction to the various types of ships utilised. Packard, W.V., Sea Trading: The Ships, Volume I, Fairplay
Publications, London, 1984, lists some 250 different types of merchant ships.
115 Based on the price of newbuildings as listed in the table "Contracting prices for newbuildings" in various
editions ofFeamley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review. The price of a 5.000 dwt ro-ro vessel is only available
from 1974 onwards. The basis for the estimates are listed in Review.
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Figure 9.33. Average values, second-hand vessels, $ per dwt, 1977-85116
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The considerable variations between vessels of different types are evident in the development
of the second-hand prices as well. The effect of the age of the ships can be seen with regard to
the 65.000 dwt and the 60.000 dwt bulk vessels, where one of the lines shows the
development of the price per dwt of a five year old vessel, and the other shows the
development of the price of a vessel built in 1972.
The differences in the price and the value of the various types of shipping tonnage
indicate that aggregate measures based on grt or dwt may give a distorted picture of the actual
development of the fleet. When the structure of the fleet is taken into consideration, the
underlying figures give a better indication of both the type of shipping undertaken and the
value of the vessels.
9.5.2. The structure of the Norwegian fleet - a compensated presentation
With regard to fleet structure, the Norwegian merchant marine went through two important
transformations in the period analysed. The first transformation had been a feature of the
development of the Norwegian fleet for most of the postwar period, but was brought to an end
in the middle of the 1970s. Large tankers, combination carriers and bulk vessels comprised an
increasing share of the Norwegian fleet, and this trend continued until the final vessels ordered
during the boom in 1973 were delivered around 1977/1978. The second transformation
occurred when the importance of these vessels was reduced from the beginning of the 1980s.
As the Norwegian fleet declined, the majority of the tonnage which was disposed of was the
large tankers, combination carriers and bulk vessels which had been acquired from the late
1960s onwards. At the same time, Norwegian shipowners channelled much of their
investments into more specialised types of tonnage, including gas tankers, chemical tankers
and passenger vessels.
116 Based on the price of second-hand vessels as listed in the tables "Second-hand dry cargo. Average values"
and "Second-hand tankers. Average values" in various editions of Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd.,
Review. The basis for the estimates are listed in Review.
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Figure 9.34. Tonnage in the Norwegian fleet, million grt, selected years, 1970-87117
14 _ ..
1970 1975 1980 1985 1987 int
_ Tankers c:::J Bulk c:::J Gas Chemical ~ Combination ---.- Other vessels
Figure 9.34 shows the structural composition of the Norwegian fleet, based on grt. The
tonnage comprised by tankers and combination carriers increased until 1975, but thereafter
declined considerably. The amount of tanker tonnage on the Norwegian register in 1987 was
more than three quarters lower than it had been in 1975. The figures are even more
conspicuous if the peak in 1977 is used as the basis for comparison. The most pronounced
growth occurred in the case of chemical tankers, gas tankers and passenger vessels.
Figure 9.35. Composition of the Norwegian fleet, shares of grt, selected years, 1970-87
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The changes are also conspicuous when we look at the relative composition of the Norwegian
fleet, rather than absolute tonnage figures. Figure 9.35 shows that in the early 1970s, tankers,
combination carriers, bulk carriers and general cargo vessels made up more than 98 per cent of
117 Based on the main database. The figures for 1987 refer to the Norwegian-owned fleet. The reduction of the
tanker tonnage mentioned in the text refers to the Norwegian-registered fleet. The figures for "other vessels"
include passenger vessels, general cargo vessels and vessels which do not fit into the other categories. Drilling
rigs are excluded from the analysis in this subchapter.
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the Norwegian fleet. Seventeen years later the figure had fallen to approximately 80 per cent,
largelyas a result of the growing proportion of the Norwegian fleet constituted by gas carriers,
chemical tankers and passenger vessels.
The two figures presented above indicate that there was a structural transformation of
the composition of the Norwegian fleet which is not evident from the aggregate tonnage
figures. When the figures are considered in relation to the development of prices and values as
shown in the previous subchapter, it is evident that the fall in the value of the Norwegian fleet,
measured per grt, must be smaller than the aggregate figures indicate. This can be inferred by
the increasing importance after 1975 of vessels which are relatively expensive per unit of
tonnage.
There is no universal measure of the value of shipping tonnage of various types.
However, in connection with the building of vessels, there have been attempts at adjusting for
the differences in construction costs. An OECD working party developed a measure in order
to establish comparable figures for the level of activity in the shipbuilding industry. This
measure, called compensated gross tonnage is based on the gross registered tonnage of the
vessels, but includes a coefficient which adjusts for the need for labour relative to a given
"standard vessel".
The term cgrt (compensated gross register tonnage) takes into account some of the
features which affect the price differences shown in Figure 9.32, and the system of conversion
coefficients is relatively detailed, depending on both the type and the size of the vessel.
Although the method is intended to show structural traits in the shipbuilding industry, it may
be applied to the shipping sector as well.
The following analysis is based upon the assumption that the compensated gross
tonnage can be used to evaluate the changes in the Norwegian merchant marine. Although this
measure is relatively crude, it gives a better presentation of the most important structural
development traits than analyses based only on grt or dwt. A conversion of the data on the
Norwegian fleet from grt to cgrt has two important implications. First, the importance of the
large tankers, bulk carriers and combination vessels decreases, as the coefficients utilised for
these vessels are relatively low. Second, the decline of the Norwegian fleet becomes
considerably less conspicuous, as a result of the fact that vessels with a low conversion factor
were largely replaced by vessels with a high conversion factor.
Table 9.20 shows the value of the conversion factors for the various types of vessels
and sizes. The large effects of a conversion may be illustrated by the extreme examples in the
case of a one million grt fleet. If this fleet consisted solely of mammoth tankers, its
compensated tonnage would be 300.000 cgrt. On the other hand, ifthe fleet consisted solely of
specialised vessels, eg tugs, offshore supply vessels and drilling ships, its compensated
tonnage would be five million cgrt. Indeed, the compensated size of the fleet would be
doubled if it consisted of product carriers in the 30-50.000 dwt range rather than crude carriers
above 250.000 dwt.
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Table 9.20. Conversion factors from OECD, late 1970S118
A conversion of the tonnage in the Norwegian fleet for selected years in the period 1970-1987
yields dramatically different results from a straightforward addition of the grt or dwt of the
various vessel groups. Figure 9.36 is based on the same data as Figure 9.34. However, the
vessels have been assigned to their various size classes, measured by dwt, and the
compensated gross tonnage has been calculated by means of the relevant grt figures.
Figure 9.36. Tonnage in the Norwegian fleet, million cgrt, selected years, 1970-87
5 _
1970 1975 1980 1985 1987 int.
_ Tankers c:::::::J Bulk c:::::::J Chemical --f:r- Gas ~ Combination Others
The most conspicuous element in Figure 9.36, relative to Figure 9.34, is the high importance
of the "other vessels"-category, which consists of general cargo vessels, passenger ships and
ferries, as well as specialised tonnage. By 1985, the compensated gross tonnage of this group
exceeded the tankers, despite the fact that the tankers were more than three times as large
when grt was utilised. The development of the other types will be discussed later.
The most important change when cgrt, rather than conventional tonnage measures, is
used, is the overall development of the fleet. The Norwegian-registered fleet, measured in grt,
fell by 62,2 per cent from 1970 to 1987 and more than 72 per cent from 1975 to 1987.
118 The term "CF" refers to the conversion factors, which have been taken from Norges Offentlige Utredninger
(1978:13) Skipsfartsnæringen [The shipping sector], pp. 17-18.
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Measured in cgrt, the decline is reduced to 55 and 62,5 respectively. Accordingly, the
conventional figures may be seen as overstating the reduction of the Norwegian fleet, due to
the fact that structural changes are not taken into account.
The utilisation of compensated measures indicates that the downfall of the Norwegian
shipping sector was less pronounced than indicated by ordinary analyses. The trend is also
evident in connection with the Norwegian-owned fleet. Measured in grt, the decline was 25,6
per cent from 1970 to 1987 and 45 per cent from 1975 to 1987. Measured in cgrt, the fleet was
reduced by 27,6 per cent relative to 1975, but only 13,4 per cent from 1970 to 1987.
Moreover, the cgrt-adjustment may overstate the actual situation in 1970, a fact which will be
explored later. If this is the case, the apparent decline in the Norwegian shipping sector from
1970 to 1987 can be disregarded when the structural changes in the fleet are taken into
account.
Figure 9.37. Composition of the Norwegian fleet, shares of cgrt, selected years, 1970-87
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Based on cgrt, the four most important groups - tankers, combination carriers, bulk carriers
and general cargo vessels - comprised 96 per cent of the fleet in 1970, rather than more than
98 per cent, as in Figure 9.35. The largest changes, however, occur in the latter part of the
period. Measured in grt, the four tonnage groups mentioned above made up 80 per cent of the
fleet in 1987. When the figures are converted to cgrt, the share is less than 60 per cent for
Norwegian-registered vessels, and slightly above 60 per cent for all Norwegian-owned
vessels.
Whereas ferries and passenger vessels made up six cent of the Norwegian-registered
fleet in 1987 when grt is used as the basis, these vessels in fact made up almost a quarter of
the fleet when cgrt is used as the basis for comparison.'" This can be explained by the fact that
the conversion factor for passenger vessels is relatively high. Similarly, the largest reduction
occurs in the case of tanker and combination carriers, with a relatively low conversion factor.
119 However, due to the fact that the majority of the ferries and passenger vessels were registered in Norway, the
share decreases when foreign-registered vessels are taken into account.
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By a conversion from grt to cgrt, the share of these vessels falls from 70 to 50 per cent in 1980
and from 62 to 40 per cent of the fleet in 1985.
The increased sophistication of the Norwegian fleet can be shown by means of the
development of the average conversion factor across time. Maybe surprisingly, the average
conversion factor fell between 1970 and 1975. Two factors can account for this. On the one
hand, there was a large inflow of mammoth tankers and combination carriers, ie vessels for
which the conversion factor is relatively low. On the other hand, the Norwegian fleet in 1970
consisted of a considerable amount of older, relatively small cargo vessels. In 1970, more than
130 general cargo vessels were registered, and average age of these vessels was more than 14
years. By 1975 the majority of these vessels had been disposed of. As the conversion factor
does not take into account age, the fact that this tonnage was relativelyold is not reflected in
the figures. This implies that the use of cgrt as an indication of value and replacement cost
may actually overestimate the situation in 1970.
Table 9.21. Tonnage and conversion factors, selected years, 1970-87
1970 1975 1980 1985 1987 1987 into
Sum group cgrt 10.042.041 12.026.157 10.624.825 8.854.319 4.509.886 8.699.692
Sum group grt 17.476.185 23.656.915 20.786.556 15.227.378 6.662.724 13.098.975
Conversion factor 0,575 0,508 0,511 0,581 0,677 0,664
The difference between the conversion factors of the Norwegian-registered and Norwegian-
owned fleet in 1987 can partly be explained by the fact that large tankers were an attractive
object with regard to flagging-out. Moreover, for some of the domestically registered vessels,
operating in certain niches, the advantage of operation under the relatively prestigious
Norwegian flag may have been a reason for not flagging out. This can explain why the owners
of the passenger vessels, which were largely engaged in the cruise industry, chose to maintain
the Norwegian registry.
Table 9.21 shows that the sophistication of the Norwegian fleet, measured in terms of
the conversion factor from grt to cgrt, increased over the period analysed. Accordingly, an
evaluation of the Norwegian fleet measured in cgrt will give less negative results than an
analysis based on grt or dwt. Measured in grt, the Norwegian-registered fleet declined by
more than 70 per cent from 1975 to 1987. This gives an extremely gloomy depiction of the
development of the Norwegian fleet. For a more positive assessment, we might compare the
tonnage in 1975 with the Norwegian-owned fleet in 1987, and base the comparison on cgrt
rather than grt. In that case, the reduction in the Norwegian fleet is 27,7 per cent, rather than
71,8 per cent.
The analysis presented above does not take into account the age of the vessels in the
Norwegian fleet. By 1987 the average age of the vessels in the Norwegian fleet was
approximately eight and a half years, corresponding to the situation in 1970.120 The average
age peaked at approximately nine years in 1973, but fell to slightly more than seven years in
1981. However, after 1981 the average age of the vessels increased due to the limited
120 Based on an average of the age of all vessels. The fact that older vessels generally were smaller implies that
an average taking into account the size of the vessels would yield different results.
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contracting activity of Norwegian shipowners.
The differences in the development of the Norwegian fleet based on grt and cgrt reflect
the structural changes in the Norwegian shipping Industry. The state of the shipping industry
in 1987 was not as bad, compared with previous years, as comparisons based on grt or dwt
might indicate. When the Norwegian fleet peaked in 1977, the majority of the fleet consisted
of large tankers, bulk carriers and combination carriers, which operated in the most
competitive and volatile parts of the shipping industry. Indeed, these vessels were engaged in
the segments of the shipping sector which was most severely affected by the crisis, and the
value per unit of tonn age was relatively low.
Ten years later the mammoth tankers, combination carriers and bulk vessels were still
important, although a large number of these vessels had been disposed of. However, the
Norwegian-owned fleet by this time also consisted of a relatively large portion of
technologically advanced vessels which operated in niches of the shipping market where the
potential for profit was better than in the bulk sector. Moreover, the value of these vessels, per
unit of tonnage, was considerably higher than for the vessels which had previously dominated
the Norwegian fleet.
The structural transformation implied that the Norwegian fleet became increasingly
sophisticated. Parallel with the increased sophistication, there was an increase in the
diversification of the Norwegian fleet. Whereas the Norwegian fleet in 1970 largely consisted
of general cargo vessels and ships transporting dry and liquid bulk cargoes, the situation in
1987 was characterised by a higher degree of activity in several specialised segments.
Norwegian shipowners owned considerable fleets of passenger vessels, chemical and gas
tankers and specialised vessels. Moreover, Norwegian shipowners had diversified into the
offshore industry, owning considerable shares of the world's supply vessels and drilling rigs, a
fact which has not been accounted for in the previous analysis.
The increased diversification of the Norwegian shipping industry implies that the
agents to a smaller extent than previously would be affected by dramatic changes in one of the
market segments. The breakdown of the tanker market after 1973 had disastrous consequences
for the Norwegian shipping sector due to Norwegian shipowners' reliance upon this segment.
The advantage of the increased diversification was that despite the collapse of one market
segment, Norwegian shipowners operating in other parts of the shipping sector would remain
relatively unaffected. The Norwegian shipping industry as a whole would thus be less
vulnerable. Moreover, several shipowners operated in niches where the price of the transport
service was not necessarily the dominant determinant of their competitive abilities, and where
the freight rates were more stable.
9.6. Summary
The database provides a good starting point for an analysis of several of the development
traits in Norwegian shipping which are not evident from aggregate data. The analysis in this
chapter has shown that there were large structural changes in the Norwegian shipping sector,
with regard to regional distribution, the importance of various ports and the concentration
among and organisation of shipping companies.
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The geographical distribution of the Norwegian fleet changed dramatically from 1970
to 1987. The fleets of several small ports disappeared, and the number of Norwegian ports
with vessels larger than 5.000 grt was almost halved. The period saw the virtual elimination of
some of the historically most important Norwegian ports, including Tønsberg and Arendal.
Oslo consolidated its position as the main centre of Norwegian maritime activity, whereas the
Oslofjord-ports' share of the fleet plunged from 14 to four per cent. The shipowners in
Western Norway and on the South Coast maintained their share of the Norwegian-owned fleet
from 1970 to 1987. However, even within the regions there were large variations. Whereas the
Arendal-fleet had virtually disappeared by 1987, the shipowners in neighbouring Grimstad
had managed to increase their tonnage from 1970 to 1987.
The period was also characterised by a strong reduction in the number of Norwegian
shipping companies and an increase in the concentration of the Norwegian fleet. The number
of companies with ships registered in Norway was reduced by more than two thirds, from 176
in 1970 to 56 in 1987. In the period from 1970-1977 the companies abandoning their
operations were largely smaller companies, and the changes were not larger than those which
could be expected in a dynamic' industry. In the latter part of the period, however, the
development was considerably more grave. Several companies which had controlled
considerable fleets in the 1970s chose or were forced to dispose of all their tonnage and wind
up their shipping engagements. More than two thirds of the companies registered in 1977 had
no tonnage left on the Norwegian register ten years later.
Parallel with the reduction in the number of shipping companies, there was a change in
the organisation of vessel ownership. The share of the Norwegian fleet owned by limited
liability companies and general partnerships declined, whereas the share of the fleet owned by
co-ownerships and limited partnerships increased.
One of the elements investigated in this chapter is the fate of the vessels which left the
Norwegian fleet. Over the period analysed, the average age of these vessels sold abroad
declined, whereas the average size increased considerably. The analysis shows that the
majority of the vessels went on to be registered in Flag of Convenience-countries. However,
the actual owners of these vessels were largely companies in the OECD-countries. From 1982
onwards a large portion of the tonnage sold abroad remained under Norwegian management.
In analyses of national fleets and international market shares, grt and dwt are the most
common units of analysis. In Chapter 9.5 an alternative view of the structure and development
of the Norwegian fleet was presented. This analysis, based on compensated gross registered
tonnage, takes the sophistication of the tonnage into account. Although originally intended for
calculations of shipbuilding capacity, cgrt may be used to analyse the structural composition
of existing fleets.
The analysis based on cgrt shows that after 1975 the vessels in the Norwegian fleet
became increasingly sophisticated. The importance of large tankers and bulk vessels was
reduced, whereas passenger vessels, gas tankers, chemical tankers and other types of
specialised vessels became more important. When cgrt is used as the basis of analysis, the
decline of the Norwegian fleet becomes considerably less dramatic, as the strong reduction in
the amount of tonnage is partly countered by an increase in the quality of the fleet.
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Accordingly, whereas the decline of the Norwegian-owned fleet from 1975 to 1987 is almost
45 per cent based on grt, the reduction in cgrt is slightly less than 28 per cent.
The use of cgrt as measuring rod neutralises some the most dramatic features of the
development of the Norwegian fleet. However, it does not hide the fact that the shipping crisis
had large consequences for the Norwegian shipping industry. The Norwegian-registered and
Norwegian-owned fleets dwindled, Norway's importance in the international shipping market
was drastically reduced and the shipping sector lost its hegemonic position in the Norwegian
economy. These aspects are analysed in more detail in Chapters Six and Ten.
It is difficult to evaluate the extent to which the development traits presented in this
chapter would have occurred in the absence of the shipping crisis. Some of the features, eg the
increasing concentration at the port and company levels, reflect long-term trends. However,
the shipping crisis undoubtedly amplified this development - a large share of the companies
which abandoned their operations can be seen as direct casualties of the crisis. The demise of
these companies reinforced the trend towards greater concentration, and also led to the
deletion of several previously important ports.
The strong reduction of the Norwegian fleet can be seen as an effect of the crisis.
Moreover, the changes in the structure of the fleet, characterised by increased diversification
and concentration, were also influenced by the freight market breakdown. The low freight
rates in the markets for tanker and bulk transport made it difficult for Norwegian shipowners
to compete, and forced several owners to dispose of their vessels. Moreover, Norwegian
shipowners were encouraged to find new and more profitable niches. In many ways the
shipping crisis led to the fall of a large share of the giants, both in terms of vessels and
companies. Simultaneously, some of the shipping companies embraced new market
opportunities, within eg industrial shipping, the cruise industry and the offshore sector. These
market segments provided a good basis for Norway's continuing importance as one of the
world's leading maritime nations.
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CHAPTERTEN
THREE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATIONS
The development of the early 1970s heralded a new epoch in the postwar development of
international shipping. The demand for shipping services, which had grown substantially in
the 1950s and the 1960s, stagnated and after 1979 actually decreased. The demand
development resulted in a massive reduction of freight rates and vessel values. Unprecedented
levels of new tonnage entering the depressed market initially amplified the imbalance and led
to slow steaming and high lay up-rates. In the early 1980s even a reduction of the world fleet
was insufficient to neutralise the effects of the decreasing demand.
The previous presentation of the causes and effects of the international shipping crisis
is a convenient backdrop for an analysis of three important transformations that took place in
the maritime industry and the Norwegian economy during the 1970s and 1980s. On the
international level, the structural development of the shipping industry was characterised by
the growth of the Emerging Maritime Nations and the corresponding reduction in the
importance of the Traditional Maritime Nations. This transformation embodies two features.
First, the increase of the Flag of Convenience-fleets (FoC-fleets) continued, as the share of
vessels registered in open registries increased from 18per cent in mid-1970 to 27,5 per cent in
mid-1986. Second, developing countries increased their share of the world fleet from 7,7 per
cent to 20,3 per cent over the same period.' The share of the world fleet which was registered
outside the traditional registries of the industrial countries thus doubled, from a quarter in
mid-1970 to half in the middle of the next decade. One of the aims of this chapter is thus to
answer the question "How did the structure of the shipping industry change during the
shipping crisis, and which factors can explain this development?"
On the national level, there was a simultaneous transformation of the Norwegian
economy, reflecting both the international development traits and factors which were specific
to Norway. Parallel with the reduction of the Norwegian fleet, the shipping sector lost its
hegemonic role as the most important export sector. The oil industry replaced shipping as the
major earner of foreign exchange. However, the development of the Norwegian oil industry
did not occur independently of the development in the shipping sector. Rather, Norwegian
shipowners played a key role with regard to the investments necessary for oil exploration on
the Norwegian continental shelf. They invested heavily in oilrigs, owned a large share of the
supply vessels engaged in the Norwegian oil sector and in some instances also invested
directly in oil exploration rights. Moreover, the reduction of the Norwegian-registered fleet
occurred concurrently with an increase in Norwegian ship management. By taking over the
operation of ships legally owned by foreign interests, Norwegian shipping agents succeeded in
I Sletmo, Gunnar K., "Shipping's fourth wave: ship management and Vernon's trade cycles", Maritime Policy
and Management, Volume 16, No.4, 1989, p. 299 - the figures deviate from those presented later due to
differences in the defmition of Flags of Convenience. Due to differences of this type, the figures should be seen
as indicative rather than absolute measures. It has been claimed that the term "Flags of Convenience" should be
avoided, as it is a value-laden term. Supporters of this institution prefer to use the term "Flags of Necessity". In
the following analysis I have chosen to use the former term, as it is considerably more common than the latter.
This is a conscious choice on my part, but it is a choice based on clarity of presentation rather than politics.
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utilising their competence in the shipping industry without owning the vessels themselves,
Another aim of this chapter is to describe and analyse these development traits in the
Norwegian economy and the Norwegian shipping sector.
This chapter is based on the assumption that the structural traits - the increased fleets
of the Flags of Convenience, the Norwegian shift from shipping to oil and the
internationalisation of Norwegian shipping - to some extent are related. On the one hand, the
structural transformation of the international shipping industry involved an apparent reduction
of the activity of the Traditional Maritime Nations. This was partly the continuation of a trend
that had been evident in most of the postwar period. However, the development accelerated
from the early 1970s onwards. On the other hand, the shipping disinvestment of Norwegian
shipowners can not be treated as isolated from the international development. Rather,
differences in expected returns between the shipping sector and the oil sector can explain the
Norwegian shipowners' foray into the offshore sector.
The negative development of the international shipping market had three important
implications. First, there was a change in the international distribution of the world fleet,
influenced by the low freight rate level and the reduced profits of shipping investments. The
depressed state of most parts of the shipping industry paved the way for the entry of non-
Traditional Maritime Nations and the increased use of low cost Third World labour in FoC-
fleets. Second, the low returns from the shipping sector following the freight market
breakdown can explain the increased attractiveness of alternative investments. This was
particularly evident in Norway, due to the opportunities presented to Norwegian shipowners
in the North Sea. Finally, the shipping crisis prompted changes in shipping policy and
business strategies which facilitated the internationalisation of Norwegian shipping.
10.1. The "Second" Shipping Crisis
The scope of the study has to be extended to fully facilitate the analysis of the three structural
transformations. If the analysis is based on the previous definition of the shipping crisis,
where the temporary freight rate increase in 1978/79 marked the end of the crisis, the
structural changes will be less pronounced than if we take into account the development in the
early and mid 1980s. The analysis thus focuses on the development from the early 1970s until
1987, which marked the end of the decline of the Norwegian-registered fleet. By 1987 new
mechanisms, eg the establishment of "open registries" in Traditional Maritime Nations, led to
another shift in the distribution of the world fleet. Moreover, although booms of the type
witnessed in the 1960s and 1970s did not appear, the shipping market had regained some of its
momentum, and the demand for shipping services increased from 1985 onwards.
It may be convenient to use the division offered by Norman and Wergeland and
consider the adverse conditions in the shipping sector as a manifestation of two different
crises.' The first crisis was caused by insufficient demand and a dramatic increase of tonnage,
2 Norman, Victor D. and Wergeland, Tor, Stortankmarkedetfrem til1985 - En analyse av markedet for tankskip
over 200.000 dwt [The market for large tankers until 1985 - An analysis of the market for tankers larger than
200.000 dwt], Center for Applied Research Report No. 5/1981, Norwegian School of Economics and Business
Administration, Bergen, 1981,p. l.
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and has been analysed in detail previously in the thesis. The second crisis appeared as a result
of the absolute decline of oil consumption and transport following the strong increase in the
oil price in 1979/80. The movement of crude oil in 1985 was slightly more than 4.000 billion
ton-miles, which was less than 40 per cent of the volume in the peak year 1977.3 As a result of
the second oil price increase, the imbalance between supply and demand in the market for
tanker transport was aggravated.
Figure 10.1. Tankerdemand and supply (1970=100),1970-864
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The different bases of the two crises are evident from Figure 10.1. In the first crisis,
shipowners were partly to blame for the malaise, as the imbalance between tonnage demand
and supply to a considerable extent was a result oftheir aggressive contracting. Moreover, the
adverse development of the demand side was a result of demand growth that was lower than
anticipated, rather than falling. The demand for tanker transport, which had increased steadily
in the postwar period, levelled off.
In the second crisis, the development of the world fleet plays a less prominent role.
The world tanker fleet was reduced after 1978, and the increased scrapping from 1982 actually
contributed positively to a reduction of the potential tonnage surplus. However, at the heart of
the problems lay a significant reduction of shipping demand. The fall in the demand for tanker
transport was so large that even a decrease in the world fleet was insufficient to bring about
anything resembling balance between supply and demand. The line showing transport demand
per dwt in Figure 10.1 illustrates this problem. Transport demand per dwt continued to fall
until 1982, when it stabilised, indicating a proportionate reduction of tanker demand
3 There was a small increase in the demand for transport of oil products in the period 1977-1985. Nevertheless,
even when this modest increase is taken into account, total seaborne oil movements were more than halved over
the period.
4 Figures adapted from the tables ofworld transport demand and world fleet in Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co.
Ltd., Review, various issues.
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and supply. However, the amount of oil transport undertaken by each unit of tonnage was
more than halved compared with the situation in the early part of the previous decade.
Figure 10.2. Tanker tonnage imbalance, million dwt, 1976-895
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Figure 10.2 reveals the increasing imbalance between tanker demand and supply at the
beginning of the 1980s. In April 1983, which represented the abyss of the crisis, total supply
of tankers and combinations carriers was 310million dwt, whereas basic demand was 137
million dwt. The actual surplus then amounts to 173 million dwt, indicating an overcapacity
of more than 100 per cent. This implies that more than two vessels were available for every
cargo of oil. Approximately a quarter of the surplus was reduced through the utilisation of
tonnage for storage purposes, the acceptance of part cargoes and extra waiting time in ports.
Of the effective surplus of 134 million dwt, more than a quarter was laid up and the rest
neutralised through slow steaming.
The drastic changes in the tanker market following the two peaks in the beginning of
the 1970s, and the continuation of the crisis into the 1980s are clearly illustrated by the
development of freight rates. Despite a reduction in the amount of tonnage available from
1978 onwards, the freight rates did not recover, and the booms of the early 1970s were not
repeated.
5 Based on monthly figures taken from Jenkins, Gilbert, Stopford, Martin and Tyler, Cliff, The Clarkson Oil
Tanker Databook, Clarkson Research Studies, London, 1993, Tables III-12 to III-25. Effective supply is
measured as total tanker and combination carrier tonnage available minus tonnage used for storage. At the peak
in late 1981,22 million dwt were used for storage purposes, implying that effective supply was almost seven per
cent lower than actual supply.
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Figure 10.3. Freight rates in current and real terms, dollar per ton, 1970-906
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The crisis of the 1980s was different from the situation of the 1970s, as demand side
developments overshadowed the effects of the supply side. In the 1970s a large amount of
tonnage was launched in a market characterised by reduced growth. In the first part of the
following decade the size of the world fleet was relatively stable, with the decrease in liquid
bulk carriers outweighing the growth of other types of tonnage. However, due to the fact that
the demand for crude oil transport was more than halved in the period 1980-1985, the total
demand for seaborne trade, measured in ton-miles, was reduced by approximately 25 per
cent.7
10.2. Structural Changes in International Shipping
There were large changes in the composition of the world fleet in the period after the freight
rate plunge. One significant development trait was the continuing growth of vessels registered
in "open registries", or Flags of Convenience, such as Bahamas, Liberia, Panama, etc. More
important for the shift in maritime dominance, however, was the increased participation of
some relatively newentrants in the maritime sector. These countries, often dubbed Emerging
Maritime Nations, were non-OECD developing countries, and it was especially Asian
countries which increased their share of the world fleet. The increase in the fleets of the
Emerging Maritime Nations was particularly prominent in the first half of the 1980s, by which
time the long-term effects of the freight market breakdown had begun to take their toll. By
1987 the whole structure of the maritime industry had been transformed, as the hegemony of
6 The figures are annual averages taken from Jenkins, Stopford & Tyler, op.cit., 1993 and Fearnley & Egers
Chartering Co. Ltd., Review, various issues. They have been deflated by the American wholesale price index,
with 1985 as the base year. The graphs depicting oil are spot rates on the distance Middle East-West (Northwest
Europe or US East Coast) The graphs depicting coal refer to a 50.000 dwt vessel on the distance Hampton
Roads-Japan. As the graph is based on averages, some fluctuations are concealed. For instance, the oil rates
increased from $3,5 per ton in January 1987 to almost $11 per ton in the middle of the year.
7 Calculated on the basis of Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review 1986, Oslo, 1987, p. 30.
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the Traditional Maritime Nations, represented by the OECD-registries, had been successfully
challenged by FoC-countries and Emerging Maritime nations.
10.2.1. The reduced importance of Traditional Maritime Nations
In most of the postwar period the traditional industrial powers, represented by the members of
the OECD, had controlled international shipping. Their position was reflected both in the
standing of their domestic fleets and in the amount of tonnage they operated under Flags of
Convenience. Indeed, the use of FoC-countries was largely an effect of intra-OECD
competition. Although the FoC-fleets to some extent were outside the jurisdiction of the
Traditional Maritime Nations, the companies having the controlling interest were generally
not.
Following the shipping crisis, the fleets of the Traditional Maritime Nations were
drastically reduced, both in absolute terms and as share of the world fleet. The reduced
position of the Traditional Maritime Nations was to some extent reflected in the increase in
the use of Flags of Convenience, but the main challenge to their position came from New
Maritime Nations.
Figure 1.0.4.Distribution of the world fleet, per cent of dwt, 1970-878
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Figure 10.4 illustrates the challenged position of the OECD-countries in the international
shipping market. The FoC-countries increased their share of the world fleet until 1977, but
then stagnated. The growth in the FoC-share from 1982 onwards was augmented by the
introduction of several new "countries" which opened for registration under the domestic flag,
including the Cayman Islands, Saint Vincent and Vanuatu."
8 The figures have been taken from the data on the international fleet measured in dwt in OECD, Maritime
Transport, various issues. All fleets of less than 400.000 grt have been included in the Rest of the World-fleet,
and there is some degree of movement between the various groups, though not to an extent which significantly
affects the results.
9 The Flag of Convenience-countries included in this study are Bahamas (1971 and 1982-), Bermuda, the
Cayman Islands (1985-), Cyprus, Gibraltar (1985-), Liberia, Malta (1982-), Panama, Somalia (1970-1977), Saint
Vincent (1986-) and Vanuatu (1987).
336 Chapter Ten - Three Structural Transforrnations
Stig Tenold: The Shipping Crisis of the 1970s: Causes, Effects and Implicationsfor Norwegian Shipping
The increase of the Asian fleet partly reflects the strong growth of China, Hong Kong
and Singapore. The group as a whole, however, increased their tonnage from 11,5million dwt
in 1970 to more than 93 million dwt in 1987.10 The same period witnessed an insignificant
increase of the OECD-fleet from 215,5 million dwt to 218 million dwt. The latter figure was
considerably lower than the OECD peak at 356 million dwt in 1978, and in the period 1970-
1987 the OECD-countries' share of the world fleet was practically halved, falling from 64,5 to
34 per cent.
The reduction in the fleet of the OECD-countries was particularly marked from 1980
onwards, ie after it had become evident that the crisis was a structural rather than a temporary
phenomenon. This reduction reflects two significant trends. On the one hand, it was the result
of a significant disinvestment in the shipping sector in Traditional Maritime Nations. On the
other hand, the apparent reduction was partly mitigated by the transfer of OECD-owned
tonnage to Flags of Convenience.
The increasing fleets of the Flags of Convenience
The amount of tonnage registered under Flags of Convenience increased considerably after
the introduction of such registries in the interwar period, and their share of the world fleet
more than doubled in the ten years after 1963.11 The existence of Flags of Convenience has
been controversial, and it has been claimed that these registries have become unregulated
refuges for the fleets of shipowners with sub-standard vessels. This discussion lies outside the
scope of this thesis."
On the international level, there have been attempts to regulate the nationality
composition of the world fleet, eg through the introduction of the genuine link-principle.
However, the fleets of the FoC-countries, and also the number of countries offering such
registries, increased considerably in the postwar period.
Figure 10.5 is based on grt, and for some countries with a fleet consisting of
predominantly large ships, eg Liberia, the use of dead weight tonnage would lead to a greater
share of the world fleet. However, some registries, eg Costa Rica, the Lebanon and Singapore
consisted of relatively small vessels, so the net effect of a conversion from grt to dwt will be
relatively small. The figures deviate from those presented in Figure 1DA, as Figure 10.5 is
based upon gross registered tonnage and includes some countries which have been excluded in
the other figures, eg Singapore in the period 1968-1983, and several minor maritime countries.
10 The countries included in the Asian fleet are China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia (1974-), the
Philippines, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan.
Il Flags of Convenience existed before this - for instance several British shipowners regarded Norway as a Flag
of Convenience in the late 19th Century. However, it was in the interwar period that some of the Flags of
Convenience that came to dominate the development in the postwar period first rose to prominence.
12 For an analysis of the loss records of vessels flying Flags of Convenience, see OECD, Maritime Transport
1974, pp. 88-105.
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Figure 10.5. FoC-tonnage as share of the world fleet, per cent, 1948-8713
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The amount oftonnage registered in FoC-countries temporarily culminated in 1979, with their
share of the world fleet reaching a temporary peak two years earlier. One reason for the
decline of FOC-registered tonnage after 1979 was the increased scrapping which was also
evident in Traditional Maritime Nations. Some countries, eg Liberia, had a relatively large
share of independent and oil company-owned tanker tonnage. Tanker tonnage comprised 62
per cent of the Liberian fleet in mid 1980, compared with 42 per cent for the world fleet as a
whole." As a result of the overcapacity oflarge tankers this tonnage was particularly suitable
for scrapping. Furthermore, the decline of the Liberian fleet can be explained by increased
political uncertainty. The vessels leaving the registry for this reason, however, were likely to
be transferred to other Flags of Convenience, rather than Traditional Maritime Nations.
Accordingly, the 20,7 million dwt reduction of the Liberian fleet in the period 1979-1982, was
partly reflected in a growth of almost 19 million dwt for the Panama fleet.
In 1983 Metaxas claimed that the slight reduction in the importance of the Flags of
Convenience was a temporary and basically cyclical phenomenon. In principle this was
correct, as the reduced share of world tonnage registered in FoC-countries only represented a
minor, temporary setback. From 1982 their share started to increase again. In addition to the
old stalwarts such as Cyprus, Liberia and Panama, new "countries" such as Vanuatu, Gibraltar
and the Cayman Islands entered the scene. IS The result of the increased competition was a low
level of tonnage fees and a reduction of standards, similar to the "race to the bottom" some
13 Based on grt-figures from Metaxas, Basil N., Flags of Convenience - A Study of Internationalisation, Gower,
London, 1985, p. 17, augmented by figures from the annuallists of the international fleet measured in OECD,
Maritime Transport, for the years 1983-1987. The FoC-countries included in the data are Bahamas (1983-),
Bermuda (1983-), the Cayman Islands (1985-), Cyprus (1966-), Liberia, Malta (1983-), Panama, Honduras (until
1983), Costa Rica (1953-1960 and 1975-1983), the Lebanon (1960-1983), Saint Vincent (1985-), Singapore
(1968-1983) and Somalia (1960-1983).
14 OECD, Maritime Transport 1980, Paris, 1981, p. 132. Percentages based on grt.
IS The definition of Flags of Convenience affects the timing of their resurrection. In the 1980s some countries,
such as Hong Kong, the Philippines and Singapore were defined by the International Transport Workers'
Federation as "Flags ofConvenience on a ship by ship basis".
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commentators claim to have observed in the manufacturing industry.
Figure 10.6. The major Flags ofConvenience, million dwt, 1970-8716
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In the latter part of the 1980s the increase of tonnage outside the traditional registries was
augmented by national "open registries" in Traditional Maritime Nations. These institutions
represented a supplement and alternative to Flags of Convenience. Vessels registered in open
registries were subject to some of the traditional maritime legislation, but were granted special
privileges which made them a credible and cost-effective alternative to Flags of Convenience.
The increase in the fleets of the FoC-countries represents only one facet of the
changing structure of the maritime industry. Moreover, the fact that roughly two thirds of the
total FoC-tonnage was owned by the OECD-countries in the late 1980s indicates that an
analysis of market share overstates the reduced importance of the Traditional Maritime
Nations. Indeed, the most important feature of the structural transformation in the shipping
industry was not the changes in the pattern of registration of OECD-tonnage, but rather the
entry into the shipping sector of countries at a relatively low stage of development.
The entry of non-OECD developing countries
Itwas particularly two groups of countries which increased their tonnage heavily in the period
after the shipping crisis. The fleets of the oil-producing countries were almost negligible in the
beginning of the 1970s, but had increased to approximately 3,5 per cent of the world fleet by
1983. The amount of tonnage owned by the oil-producing countries increased from
approximately five million dwt in 1975 to 21,7 million dwt in 1987, peaking at approximately
24 million dwt in 1983.17
16 The figures are based on the data on the international fleet measured in dwt in OECD, Maritime Transport,
various issues.
17 Figures on the fleets of the oil-producing countries from the table of the world fleet in OECD, Maritime
Transport, various issues. The countries included are Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, United
Arab Emirates and Venezuela.
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Figure 10.7. Oil-producing countries' fleet and share ofworld fleet, 1975-87
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Even though their fleet growth was strong, the oil-producing countries were relatively
unimportant in an international perspective. More significant, however, was the strong growth
of non-OECD developing countries, ofwhich a handful of Asian nations played a crucial role.
Figure 10.8. Five most important Asian Fleets, million dwt, 1970-87
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As Figure 1DA showed, the Asian share of the fleet increased from less than 3,5 per cent in
1970 to almost 15 per cent by 1987. The annual average growth of the fleets of Singapore and
Hong Kong was more than 20 per cent, and also China, Malaysia, the Philippines and South
Korea registered double-digit growth. The result was a massive transfer of shipping transport
capacity from the Traditional Maritime Nations to the Emerging Maritime Nations in Asia.
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10.2.2. The reasons for the structural transformation of the world fleet
In many respects, the relocation of the international maritime industry mirrors one of the most
important development traits of the international economy in the period since the 1960s. Just
like countries which had previously been at a low level of development gained importance in
the maritime sector, the momentum of world industrial production shifted from the OECD-
countries to Newly Industrialised Countries, particularly in Asia. The subsequent analysis is
based upon the hypothesis that the factors used to explain the transformation of international
manufacturing may be applied in a maritime context.
The transformation of the manufacturing and shipping industries was the result of an
interaction between the development in the countries which lost their position and the
development in the countries which increased their role in the international economy. The
development in the shipping sector might be explained by some of the elements which have
been used to account for the changes in international manufacturing. Most analyses of the
increased importance of the Newly Industrialised Countries in the international economy
focus on certain aspects of these countries." Common explanations include;
o The access to a large, relatively cheap and sufficiently skilled labour force
o High rates of investment, reflecting both a high domestic savings rate and a willingness to
attract foreign capital and technology
o Sensible economic policies which facilitated savings and investments, and which
sometimes targeted specific sectors
o Favourable international conditions, including access to internationally mobile capital,
high demand and reduced trade barriers
Notwithstanding the fact the basis of the growth differed between the various countries, the
elements presented above may be relevant to the changes in the international maritime
industry. The following analysis illustrates that the first three elements have made a positive
contribution to the fleet expansion of some of the non-traditional shipping nations in Asia.
Labour
As a result of the freight market breakdown, profit margins were squeezed and shipowners
were forced to focus on costs. Whereas the majority of costs are equal for shipowners of all
nations, with regard to wages, the costs are strongly affected by the choice of flag. In most of
the Traditional Maritime Nations domestic labour legislation made it compulsory to employ a
certain amount of nationals aboard vessels flying the domestic flag. The effect on costs could
be substantial - in 1973 the wage costs for the operation of a 6-8.000 grt dry bulk vessel in a
low labour cost country were 40 per cent lower than if the vessel had been flying the
Norwegian flag, representing an annual saving of approximately NoK 600.000.19
The close connection between the freight market breakdown and the increased focus
on costs implies that there is a direct link between the shipping crises and the changes in the
18 See Tenold, Stig, "Aspects of Economic Growth and Development in East and Southeast-Asia", NUPI Repon
No. 220, Norwegian Institute ofIntemational Affairs, Oslo, 1997 for an overview.
19 Stortingsmelding nr. 23 (1975-76), Om sjøfolkenes forhold og skipsfartens plass i samfonnet [On the
conditions for seamen and shipping's role in the society], p. 62.
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international shipping hegemony. When there was a considerable demand for shipping
transport capacity, the revenues were sufficient to allow shipping to be operated from high
cost countries despite higher variable costs. When the freight market broke down, it became
increasingly difficult for high cost countries to compete and operate profitably at the
prevailing freight rate level.
In several Asian countries the existence of a relatively cheap labour force with
maritime training and experience was an important stimulus to the growth of the domestic
fleets. Some countries had a long tradition of providing seamen for vessels flying foreign
flags. In 1978 personnel from South Korea, the Philippines and Taiwan made up more than 46
per cent of the personnel employed on Liberia-registered vessels." In addition to bringing
valuable foreign exchange to the domestic economy, some of the seamen utilised their income
and experiences from the shipping sector to establish their own maritime businesses. In other
countries, the attractiveness of a cheap labour force was supplemented by measures making it
advantageous to employ local labour. In the expansionary phase of the Singapore fleet,
benefits in the form of tax rebates were granted to shipowners registering their vessels in
Singapore and employing locallabour. The access to skilful, low cost labour has consequently
been important for the growth of some of the most important Emerging Maritime Nations.
Investment
High domestic rates of saving and investments are important in explaining the growth of the
Newly Industrialising Countries, in relation to other developing countries as well as in relation
to the industrialised nations. In both the manufacturing and the shipping sector the access to
foreign capital was crucial, and in both sectors capital was acquired through a combination of
high domestic savings, debt accrued abroad and Foreign Direct Investment. The latter element
is particularly important in an analysis of the relocation of the international maritime industry.
Several shipowning companies relocated some or all oftheir operation from Europe and North
America to Asia. This relocation was partlya response to the booming trade in the region,
partly motivated by cost factors. The capital and skills brought to the region by these
companies were important for the development of the domestic shipping environment. The
presence of the foreign subsidiaries supplemented the growth oflocally based shipping.
Measuring Foreign Direct Investment in the shipping sector is a difficult task." The
fact that foreign companies established sales offices, subsidiaries or shipowning companies in
the Emerging Maritime Nations was crucial for the growth of some of these countries as
maritime centres. Moreover, the development of some of the Asian fleets was the direct result
of strong linkages to other countries, as in the case of the shikumisen-deals between Hong
Kong shipowners and Japanese corporations. Domestic investments in shipping, and the
integration of the Asian countries into the international shipping finance market, enhanced the
20 Figures from Norges Offentlige Utredninger (1983:7), Skipsfartens konkurranseevne [The competitiveness of
shipping], p. 54.
21 See Tenold, Stig, "Norwegian Shipowning Companies and Foreign Direct Investment", SNF Working Paper
No. 23/00, The Foundation for Research in Economics and Business Administration, Bergen, 2000 for a
suggestion on how Foreign Direct Investment in the shipping sector should be analysed.
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growth of locally based shipping. Several of the countries had long traditions in the shipping
industry, and in many instances the increase in their fleets was the result of an expansion of
local companies which supplemented the relocation of shipping companies from the
Traditional Maritime Nations.
Policies
A common element in the growth of the Emerging Maritime Nations was the attempt to
encourage the entry of foreign maritime companies and the expansion of local companies
through specific policies. In the manufacturing sector the extent and effects of such policies
are controversial." In the shipping sector, however, it is fairly easy to see that policy measures
have been successful in expanding the fleets of certain countries. Singapore is perhaps the best
example ofthis relationship between shipping policy and fleet growth.
In 1968 the Singapore authorities decided to open their flag to shipowners of all
nations. The policy was based on measures similar to those in traditional Flags of
Convenience. However, the Singapore authorities tried to establish a relatively close link
between the national economy and the shipping sector, eg through the tax rebates offered to
shipowners employing domestic crews. The success of the scheme was overwhelming, and the
Singapore fleet increased from 230.000 grt to almost 8 million grt within a ten-year-period. In
an effort to clean up the image of the Singapore flag, the authorities in the late 1970s
introduced stricter regulation of the country's fleet. The shipping policy had nevertheless been
successful in creating a strong national fleet and a viable shipping environment, augmented by
the importance of Singapore as a regional maritime hub. The introduction of higher standards
did not lead to any significant flight of tonnage. In 1987 Singapore ranked 13th among the
world's maritime nations.
The provision of labour and capital, and the effects of specific policies, seems to have
been important for the growth of Asian manufacturing and shipping. The final elements
commonly used to explain the growth of the manufacturing production of the Newly
Industrialised Countries - access to internationally mobile capital, high demand and reduced
trade barriers - only to some extent apply to the shipping sector. As already shown, the access
to internationally mobile capital was important. However, it would be foolhardy to claim that
the shipping sector was subject to high demand. Rather, the opposite was the case - demand
for shipping services was falling. Nevertheless, the depressed state of the shipping market
may be important in an explanation of the shift of the world fleet from the Traditional
Maritime Nations to Emerging Maritime Nations and Flags of Convenience.
The combined effect of the increased focus on costs and the reduced competitiveness
of the Traditional Maritime Nations is perhaps the single most important explanation of the
transfer ofvessels to Flags ofConvenience and New Maritime Nations. The shipping policies
of several of the most important maritime nations were changed following the freight market
breakdown. The use of low cost foreign labour was facilitated by increased access to registry
22 See for instance the large differences between Linder, Staffan Burenstam, The Pacific Century, Stanford
University Press, California, 1986, p. 28 and Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, Shifting towards
the New Economy, Korea 's Five-Year Economic Plan 1993-1997, Seoul, 1993, p. 1
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abroad and relaxation of domestic manning policies." Judging by the changes in the world
fleet, the former option proves to have been particularly attractive. In the late 1980s, US
companies owned tonnage registered under 36 flags, and the United Kingdom, Japan,
Germany, Norway, Greece, Hong Kong and the Netherlands also operated tonnage under
more than 20 different flags.
Reduced trade barriers have been used to explain the growth of manufacturing in the
Newly Industrialised Nations. The experience of the shipping sector is to some extent
different. On the one hand, the Emerging Maritime Nations may have benefited from the low
barriers to trade encountered when offering bulk shipping services to and from the OECD-
countries, as well as the indirect effect of the trade liberalisation on the demand for seaborne
transport. At the same time, however, several countries have expanded their own shipping
activity through the introduction of restrictions on the transport of domestic imports and
exports. In the beginning of the 1980s, the UNCTAD Code of Conduct with its 40-40-20
cargo sharing arrangement, was put into effect after 50 countries had ratified the rules." This
arrangement enhanced the possibilities of Emerging Maritime Nations to develop domestic
liner fleets.
In addition to cargo reservation, some Emerging Maritime Nations used subsidies in
order to build up domestic merchant marines. Even though the overall costs of such schemes
generally exceed the benefits, cargo reservation and fleet subsidies may have been successful
in increasing the size of domestic fleets. The cargo sharing arrangements and use of subsidies
do not correspond well with the idea of reduced barriers to trade which is important in an
explanation of the rise of the Asian countries as manufacturing producers. Nevertheless, the
effect ofthese measures on the development of the fleets ofEmerging Maritime Nations may
be seen as positive when the expansion of the domestic fleets, rather than the net cost to the
countries, is used as measuring rod." Moreover, with regard to the manufacturing sector, there
have been barriers to trade relating to imports, similar to the protective mechanisms utilised in
the shipping sector.
Another reason for the increased attractiveness of Emerging Maritime Nations and
Flags of Convenience may have been the reduction of vessels standards. As a result of the
overcapacity in the shipping sector, investments in new tonnage dwindled. New investments
were unlikely to be profitable, and it became increasingly difficult for shipping companies to
accumulate the funds necessary for fleet modernisation and expansion. However, shipowners
were unwilling to scrap existing tonnage in the hope that a market upturn would generate
increasing demand for both transport services and second-hand tonnage.
The reduced construction of new vessels and the reluctance to scrap older ships led to
23 In the case of the Norwegian International Ship Register (NIS), established 1987, the only condition is that the
head officer is a Norwegian national, although this condition may easily be waived,
24 The number of countries necessary for implementation of the Code, which was set at 24, was no problem and
had been achieved by early 1978, However, there was the additional requirement that the contracting parties
should own at least 25 per cent of world tonnage, The accession of the European Economic Community secured
that both conditions were met.
25 See Yeats, Alexander l, Shipping and Development Policy - An Integrated Assessment, Praeger Publishers,
New York, 1981 for an introduction to some of the economic aspects.
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an increase in the average age of the world fleet and an apparent increase in ship casualties.
The proportion of tonnage older than 10 years increased from 41 per cent in 1980 to 61 per
cent in 1987. The tonnage lost increased from approximately 1 million grt, representing 0,25
per cent of the world fleet, in 1977 to 2,7 million grt, or 0,6 per cent of the fleet, in 1986.26
However, the casualty figures fluctuate strongly, and Peters claims that the loss ratio doubled
again between 1988 and 1991.27 Although there is no clear trend in the development of the
share of the world fleet lost, it is evident that the FoC-countries were responsible for a
disproportionate share of tonnage lost.
The reduction of vessel standards may have prompted the transfer of tonnage from
Traditional Maritime Countries to Flags of Convenience, as some of the countries in the latter
group were often regarded as having a more lenient attitude with regard to seaworthiness. The
claim that the reduced standard of vessels prompted the transfer to Flags of Convenience is
difficult to substantiate, but may nevertheless have played a minor role in an explanation of
the shift in the flag distribution of the world fleet. The main reasons for this shift in the
maritime hierarchy are the factors described above, with particular emphasis on the need to
reduce costs in a depressed market.
Helen Thanopoulou has offered an alternative explanation of the transformation of the
international distribution of the shipping industry." She has suggested the existence of a
feedback relationship between the entrance of less-developed countries in shipping and the
prolongation and deepening of maritime crises. In many respects her analysis is similar to the
one presented above, but her focus is on the dynamics of the international economy rather
than specific features of the Emerging Maritime Nations.
The basis for Thanopoulou's analysis is that depression periods in shipping adversely
affect the higher cost units' possibilities of staying in the market. Traditional Maritime
Nations attempted to increase specialisation, focusing on capital intensive segments in order
to maintain a competitive advantage. The effort proved unsuccessful, and the Emerging
Maritime Nations made a dynamic entry into all shipping segments, regardless of capital
intensity. According to Thanopoulou, this challenge can be explained by the fact that shipping
services in general had become relatively standardised, following the Vernon product cycle.
Sletmo has also used the framework of the Vernon product cycle on the shipping
industry. At the introductory stage, the product - ie the shipping service - is non-standardised,
implying that the provision is affected by technical and commercial experimentation. As the
product matures it becomes more standardised, a fact which changes the competitive
advantage of various suppliers. According to Sletmo, the changes in the distribution of the
world fleet are the result of the maturity of the bulk sector; "the impossibility of long-term
product differentiation in bulk shipping and the high degree of substitutability of highly
26 Figures for age distribution from Table XVIII and for losses from Table XX in OECD, Maritime Transport,
1981 and 1987.
27 Peters, Hans l, "The Maritime Transport Crisis", World Bank Discussion Papers 220, World Bank,
Washington, 1993, p. 23. The loss ratios cited are, however, far smaller than those calculated based on figures
from OECD, as used in my example.
28 Thanopoulou, Helen A, "The growth of fleets registered in the newly-emerging maritime countries and
maritime crises", Maritime Policy and Management, Volume 22, No. l, 1995, pp. 51-62.
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mobile services make the search for least-cost production systems even more essential in
shipping than in manufacturing. "29
The maturation of shipping services within aVernon product cycle framework
provides one explanation of the changes in the hierarchy of international shipping. In many
ways, the services offered by the shipping industry evolved in a manner which rewarded the
properties and factor relationships found in several Asian countries. For instance, the strong
fall in vessel values greatly reduced the investments necessary to partake in the shipping
industry, and in essence reduced the capital-intensity of several of the shipping segments.
Simultaneously, vessel ownership in Traditional Maritime Nations became unfavourable,
following developments in the shipping market, in terms of eg reduced freight rates, and in the
domestic economy, eg through increasing wages for seamen.
It is thus evident that the decline of the Traditional Maritime Nations can be
understood in the context of development traits which are familiar from the manufacturing
sector. Moreover, factors in both the countries with reduced importance and the countries
increasing their share of the world fleet was essential. Changes in the international division of
labour, the maturation and standardisation of products and services and the increasing
importance of Newly Industrialised Countries combined with the reduced viability of OECD
shipping to give considerable structural changes in the maritime sector.
10.3. Structural Changes in the Norwegian Economy
Norway was one of the countries that fell victim to the development traits analysed in the
previous subchapter. However, as illustrated in Chapter Five, the flight from the Norwegian
flag was more marked than for any other major shipping nations bar Great Britain. There were
two main reasons for the strong reduction of the Norwegian fleet. First, Norwegians were
more severely hit by the shipping crisis than shipowners in other countries. Accordingly, a
continuation of their shipping activities became unprofitable or impossible for several
Norwegian shipowning companies. Second, Norwegian shipowners were presented with a
more alluring investment alternative, which made diversification more attractive than it had
previously been. The basis for this can be found in the development of the Norwegian
offshore industry. This subchapter briefly presents the structural changes in the Norwegian
economy. Then, their implications for the Norwegian shipping sector are analysed.
10.3.1. The transformation of the Norwegian economy
The discovery of oil on the Norwegian continental shelfheralded a massive transformation of
the Norwegian economy. Up until the early 1970s, the surplus from the export of shipping
services had largely been sufficient to offset the Norwegian deficit in the merchandise trade.
From 1975 onwards, the Norwegian import surplus on goods and services accelerated. This
was partlya result of reduced revenues from the shipping sector, but mainly an effect of the
high growth of imports relative to exports. Whereas the value of Norwegian merchandise
exports increased by 40 per cent in the period 1973-1976, the value of merchandise imports
29 Sletmo, op.cit., 1989, p. 296,
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increased by almost 80 per cent." The situation was not as grave as it could have been, as a
new sector was ready to fill the gap relatively shortly after the shipping revenues began to fall.
Figure 10.9. From oil to shipping - sectors' share of total exports, 1970-8731
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Two important aspects are evident from Figure 10.9. The first aspect is the reduced
importance of shipping in the total Norwegian exports. The significance of the shipping sector
for the Norwegian Balance of Trade was more than halved in the period 1970-1987. In the
early 1970s the shipping sector had facilitated more than 35 per cent of the Norwegian
imports, whereas the share was approximately 15 per cent in most of the Eighties. However,
shipping retained its position among the internationally competing Norwegian sectors. In
"non-oil" Norway, shipping was still the most important export sector, with its share of total
exports stable at approximately a quarter of total exports for most of the 1980s.
The second conspicuous feature ofFigure 10.9 is the increasing Norwegian reliance on
'oil revenues. From being virtually insignificant in 1974, the exports of oil and gas comprised
more than 15 per cent of total Norwegian exports four years later, and peaked at 36 per cent in
1984. The amount of oil exported increased from less than two million tons in 1974 to 20
million tons in 1982 and almost 42 million tons in 1987Y
The heavy reliance on international prices is a common feature of the export revenues
from the shipping and oil sectors. Freight rates are volatile, and particularly so in the segments
where the Norwegian shipowners pooled most of their resources. The result was considerable
fluctuations in shipping export revenues. The oil price is subject to the same kinds of
fluctuations. The fall in the importance of oil in Norwegian exports in the mid 1980s was the
result of a reduction in the price of oil by two thirds within half a year. The average price of
30 Statistisk Sentralbyrå, Historisk Statistikk 1994 [Historical Statistics 1994], Central Bureau of Statistics, Oslo,
1994, Table 22.8. The figures refer to the groups "Other goods" and "Direct imports and exports in relation to oil
activities". Exports of crude petroleum and exports and imports of ships and oil platforms have been excluded.
31 Based on Tables 22.1 and 22.8 in Statistisk Sentralbyrå, op.cit., 1994.
32 Statistisk Sentralbyrå, op.cit., 1994, Table 16.13.
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Norwegian crude oil was halved between the fourth quarter of 1985 and the first quarter of
1986, and the reduced importance of oil in Norwegian exports occurred amidst increasing
Norwegian oil export volumes." It is obvious that the Norwegian economy changed their
dependence from one volatile industry to another. However, in the oil sector the fluctuations
were not caused by the kind of short-term supply and demand conditions creating fluctuations
in the shipping sector, but rather largely the result of OPEC's cartel policy and the degree to
which the OPEC members managed to implement this policy.
The transformation of the Norwegian economy was not only evident through the
development of export values and volumes. The shift is also obvious, but not as pronounced,
in the development of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Gross Fixed Capital Formation
(GFCF).
Figure 10.10. The development ofGDP- and GFCF-shares, 1970-8634
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The lines depicting Gross Fixed Capital Formation and Gross Domestic Product in the oil
industry in Figure 10.10 illustrate the heavy investments in the sector from the beginning of
the 1970s, and the lag between investments and revenues. As these figures represent the
overall activity of the Norwegian economy, the relative importance of internationally focused
activities such as the shipping and oil sectors is lower than in the analysis of export sectors.
However, the falling trend of shipping services and investments, and the corresponding
increase in the importance of oil, is conspicuous.
By the 1980s, when the activity in the oil sector constituted around fifteen per cent of
GDP, the Norwegian economy had undergone a fundamental transition. However, the oil
sector was of great importance even before it started creating substantial revenues. In the
33 Statistisk Sentralbyrå, Olje- og gass- virksomhet 4. kvartal 1988. Statistikk og analyse [Oil and gas activity 4th
quarter 1988. Statistics and analysis], Central Bureau ofStatistics, Oslo, 1989, p. 50.
34 Based on Tables 22.1 and 22.18 in Statistisk Sentralbyrå, op.cit., 1994. The figures are three year moving
averages.
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1970s the Norwegian economy was relatively unaffected by the international recession, and
Norway had the highest growth of the OECD-countries in the period 1973-1986. This was a
result of the large investments in the oil sector and expectations of future revenues enabling
the authorities to implement a countercyclical policy."
There are two reasons for the fact that the shipping sector's share of GFCF is
systematically higher than the sector's share of GDP until 1983. One is the greater
depreciation in the shipping sector, which implies that the sector's share of gross investments
is not fully reflected in the sector's economic importance. The second reason is the fact that
the return from shipping investments and the level of the activity in the shipping industry was
lowas a result of the crisis.
The increasing share of shipping in total GFCF in the period 1979 to 1982 reflects the
contracting which took place during the temporary rate increase in the late 1970s. However,
the negative GFCF-rate for shipping in the latter part of the period reflects the flight of
tonnage from the Norwegian registry, which represented a massive disinvestment in shipping.
Due to the establishment of the Norwegian International Ship Register in 1987 and the
improved market conditions, the negative capital formation in the shipping sector became a
temporary phenome~on. The sector's share of aggregate GFCF increased to more than seven
per cent in 1988 and almost 13,5 per cent in 1989. The large fluctuations in the shipping
sector' s share of GFCF in the latter part of the 1980s was to some extent the result of vessels
fleeing from - and later returning to - the Norwegian flag.
10.3.2. The reduction of the Norwegian fleet and shipping employment
One important effect of the shipping crisis was that the prevailing assessment of the
development of the shipping market changed as the agents realised that the problems were
fundamental and long lasting rather than the results of a temporary downturn. It is difficult to
establish a given date of this realisation, as various agents had different sentiments. The
relativelyabrupt cessation of tanker contracting after the oil price increase indicates that the
shipowners had realised that the existing fleet and newbuilding orders were large enough to
take care of future transport assignments. Furthermore, the large cancellations of newbuilding
contracts in 1975 indicate that the shipowners had gained an understanding of the magnitude
of the prospective imbalance in the tanker market.
Norwegian cancellations were concentrated around the first, second and fourth quarter
of 1975. In the fourth quarter of 1975 more than one million grt of Norwegian contracts were
cancelled at foreign yards, more than four times the level of the last quarter of 1974.36 The fact
that shipowners for quite a long period oftime hesitated to pay cancellation fees indicates that
they initially viewed the downturn as temporary. Indeed, previous periods with temporarily
low rates had presented shipowners with tonnage on order with considerable profit
opportunities when the freight market regained its momentum.
35 Hodne, Fritz and Grytten, Ola Honningdal, Norsk økonomi 1900-1990 [The Norwegian economy 1900-1990],
Tano, Oslo, 1992,pp. 255-271.
36 Data on Norwegian newbuilding contracts which have been cancelled or sold, based on foreign yards.
Statistisk Sentralbyrå, Statistisk Månedshefte [Monthly Bulletin of Statistics], Central Bureau of Statistics, Oslo,
No.2, 1975, p. 51 and No. l, 1976, p. 55.
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The decline of the Norwegian shipping industry can be explained by several
interrelated elements. The most obvious reason for the decline of the Norwegian fleet is that
several shipping companies fell victim to the forces of the competitive market place. High
costs and low revenues forced them to downscale or terminate their operations. In this respect,
the Norwegian experience mirrors the international development, although the reduction of
vessel ownership was particularly severe in Norway. Another reason for the decline of the
Norwegian shipping industry does not fit into the international pattern. Norwegian shipowners
were presented with a particularly favourable investment alternative that only to a limited
extent was available to their international competitors, viz participation in the Norwegian
offshore industry. Thus, specific domestic circumstances augmented the international
dynamics.
As shown in Chapter Nine, several traditional and some relatively new shipping
companies were unable to endure the effects of the crisis. Several companies had to sell some
oftheir vessels and continue operation at a lower level of activity. A common strategy was to
reduce ownership, but complement the shipowning activity by operating vessels on behalf of
foreign shipowners. In the more severe instances, the economic difficulties resulted in
bankruptcies, liquidations and voluntary or compulsory winding-up.
The analysis in Chapter Nine showed that the share of the vessels which were sold
within Norway was relatively stable until the beginning of the 1980s. However, in aggregate
more than three quarters of the vessels that were sold by Norwegian shipowners were
scrapped or sold to foreign interests with sufficient capital and the ability to operate the
vessels more cheaply.
Some companies chose internationalisation as a strategy for survival. This strategy
assumed many different forms, but a common element was that vessels were transferred to
lower cost registries. Several Norwegian shipowners sold vessels to foreign interests and
chartered them back, focusing on ship management rather than vessel ownership. Other
shipowners took advantage of the liberalisation of the Norwegian shipping policy and
registered their vessels abroad.
The end result of these development traits was an extensive disinvestment in
Norwegian shipping. From the peak in 1977 to the trough in 1987, before the introduction of
the Norwegian International Ship Register, the Norwegian fleet was reduced by almost 38
million dwt, representing more than 75 per cent of the 1977-fleet. The decline was particularly
violent from 1982 onwards."
37 Figures from OECD, Maritime Transport, which include all vessels above 100 grt show a reduction of more
than 80 per cent from the peak to the trough in 1987.
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Figure 10.11. Norwegian fleet, million dwt, 1975-8738
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The reduction of the Norwegian fleet after 1977 represented a clear break with the heavy
postwar expansion. In 1987 the Norwegian tonnage, comprising some 7 million grt, was at the
same level as it had been in the mid 1950s. Even when the reduction of the world fleet is taken
into account, the Norwegian case stands out.
This thesis has focused on the business aspects of the shipping sector, with emphasis
on the fleet and companies, and employment issues have thus largely been neglected. The
justification for this omission has been to reduce the scope of the thesis. However, in
connection with the analysis of the shipping sector's reduced importance in the Norwegian
economy, the changes in employment should be briefly mentioned.
The employment in the Norwegian merchant marine peaked in 1964, with
approximately 44.000 Norwegians and more than 13.000 foreigners." The subsequent
reduction of the employment was mainly a result of the technological development, in terms
oflarger vessels, and the exodus ofrelatively labour-intensive vessels.
From 1951 to 1964 employment increased by approximately two thirds. However, this
growth was low, compared with the growth of the Norwegian fleet, which increased by 140
per cent over the same period. The reason for the discrepancy was a reduction in the number
of seamen per grt. This trend towards lower manning per grt had continued throughout the
postwar period, and can partly be explained by an increase in the average size of the vessels in
the Norwegian fleet.
In 1951 the average number of seamen per 1000 grt was slightly lower than six. This
figure had fallen to less than four by 1964. However, the strong growth of the fleet more than
outweighed the effect of the reduction in the number of seamen per unit of tonnage. After
38 Figures from Fearnley & Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., Review 1986, Oslo, 1987, p. 40. The figures refer to
tankers, combined carriers and bulk carriers of more than 10.000 dwt and other seagoing cargo carrying vessels
of more than 1000 dwt. Passenger vessels, ferries, supply ships and research vessels are excluded.
39 The number of Norwegian seamen in the merchant marine peaked four years previously, at 44.445 persons;
see Statistisk Sentralbyrå, Historisk Statistikk 1968 [Historical Statistics 1968], Central Bureau of Statistics,
Oslo, 1968, Table 56. The figures refer to the crew on foreign-going Norwegian vessels on l November, and do
not take into account persons on paid- or sick-leave or unemployed.
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1964 the decrease in the number of seamen per grt accelerated as a result of the inclusion of an
increasing number of large vessels, with relatively low manning requirements, in the
Norwegian fleet. Figure 10.12 illustrates the strong decrease in the number of seamen per dwt,
as well as the overall reduction in the number of employed."
Figure 10.12. Crew on board Norwegian-registered, foreign-going vessels, 1964-8741
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The reduction in the number of employed per grt came to a halt in 1977 - the same year as the
aggregate tonnage and the average size of the vessels in the Norwegian fleet peaked." In the
following years, the number of persons employed in the Norwegian merchant marine was
relatively stable, despite an increase in the number of seamen per 1000 grt."
The development of the number of seamen can thus be explained by two different
trends. From 1964 onwards the falling employment can be explained by a reduction in the
number of seamen per unit of tonnage which was greater than the increase in the fleet. Due to
the development of the offshore industry and satisfactory onshore employment opportunities
the majority of the surplus labour was absorbed without difficulties. The stability in the first
years after 1977 can be explained by the fact that the number of seamen per unit of tonnage
40 The figures give a correct picture of the number of crew on board Norwegian vessels, but exaggerate the
reduction in the number of seamen due to an increase in the number of seamen per on board position. Due to a
reduction in the average time spent on board, the number of seamen per position increased over the period.
41 Based on Statistisk Sentralbyrå, op.cit., 1994, Tables 20.10 and 20.15, supplemented by figures from Statistisk
Sentralbyrå, op.cit., 1968, Table 56. The increasing employment in 1980 was a result of the inclusion of
foreigners employed in the ships' restaurants. The figures refer to November, and include NIS in the figure for
1987 - for an introduction to the basis for the figures, see Norges Offentlige Utredninger (1983:7), op.cit., pp.
75-79. The sharp drop in employees per grt from 1986 to 1987 can be explained by the relatively high number of
cruise vessels in the Norwegian-registered fleet prior to the introduction of NIS.
42 Average size based on Statistisk Sentralbyrå, op.cit., 1994, Tables 20.10. The figure differs from the one
presented in Figure 9.11 due to different statistical bases.
43 The increase in the crew shown in Figure 10.12 disappears when changes in the statistical base are neutralised
- see the alternative figures in Stortingsmelding nr. 53 (1984-85), Om skipsfartsnæringen [On the shipping
industry], p. 43. This implies that a considerable portion of the increase in crew per unit of tonnage also
disappears.
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neutralised the reduction in the fleet.
The apparent halt in the reduction of the employment in the late 1970s was a
temporary phenomenon. After 1981 the number of Norwegians on board Norwegian-
registered vessels started to fall, and the development was dramatic from 1984 onwards. By
the time the NIS was introduced in 1987, the number of seamen had fallen by more than
10.000, or 40 per cent, relative to the situation three years previously." Over the same period,
the Norwegian fleet had decreased by approximately 60 per cent.
It is thus evident that the reduction in the employment in the merchant marine in the
1980swas a direct result of the shipping crisis. The basis for the decline was reduced activity
- as seen through the declining amount of tonnage on the Norwegian register and vessels laid
up - rather than the influence from technological development traits or changes in the
manning requirements.
The foreigners employed on Norwegian vessels were largely engaged in the cruise
industry or on vessels operating in the regional market in Asia. The share of foreign
employees peaked in 1968, and then declined considerably over the next ten years. One reason
for this was that the number of vessels with a large amount of foreign crew was reduced from
154 in 1967 to 80 in 1975.45 From 1970 to 1981 the number of officers fell by 25 per cent,
whereas the number of "other crew" fell by more than 45 per cent. The latter group included a
higher share of foreigners, so a reduction in the share of foreigners should be expected." From
1979 onwards the number of foreigners relative to Norwegians started to grow, partlyas a
result of changes in the statistical base. Moreover, the share of officers in total employment
increased.
The shipping crisis manifested itself in a number of ways in the Norwegian economy.
Lay up-rates increased and freight earnings and employment dwindled. The Norwegian-
registered tonnage was considerably reduced, and although parts of the decline was offset by
increased Norwegian ownership of tonnage flying foreign flags, there was both an absolute
and relative decline in the Norwegian shipping activity. The end result was that the shipping
sector in many ways had to concede its important role in the Norwegian economy.
10.3.3. The foray into the offshore sector
The reduced attractiveness of shipping investments following the bleak market prospects -
which affected shipowners of all nations - provides only a part of the explanation of the
disinvestment in Norwegian shipping. Parallel with the fall in expected returns from shipping
investments, the profitability of domestic investment alternatives increased. In Chapter Six it
was claimed that the relatively low return from Norwegian manufacturing investments may
contribute to an explanation of the traditionally large Norwegian presence in the shipping
sector. After 1973 the offshore sector became an alluring alternative to manufacturing and
shipping investments. The development of oil production on the Norwegian continental shelf
44 Bakka, Dag jr., I hardt vær - skipsfartskrise og samlingsprosess. Norsk Sjøoffisersforbund 1995 [History
commissioned by the Norwegian Maritime Officers Association], Norsk Sjøoffiserforbund, 1999, p. 46. The
figures refer to the full employment, including crew on holiday or laid off.
45 Stortingsmelding nr. 23 (1975-76), op.cit., p. 29.
46 Norges Offentlige Utredninger (1983:7), op.cit., p. 75.
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was a particularly attractive alternative for Norwegian shipowners with experience from the
maritime industry, with foreign contacts and with capital available from vessel sales or freight
revenues.
The decline of the Norwegian shipping industry was thus the result of two trends, both
enhancing the flight oftonnage from the Norwegian registry. On the one hand, the state of the
shipping market made profitable operation difficult for vessels flying the high cost Norwegian
flag. A strong fall in expected revenues, which made all other investment alternatives more
attractive, is one reason for the disinvestment in Norwegian shipping.
Additionally, the development of oil production on the Norwegian continental shelf
presented Norwegian shipowners with investment alternatives that were more profitable than
those which they had traditionally encountered within Norway. Moreover, investments in the
oil sector could to a larger extent than traditional investment alternatives utilise the
competence already existing in the shipping organisations, including access to international
finance and experience with maritime labour. In short, the attractiveness of shipping
investments fell, whereas the attractiveness of the investment alternatives increased.
The link between the tanker market breakdown and the expansion into the offshore
industry is not only relevant for Norwegian shipowners, but also for Norwegian yards.
Following the termination of Reksten's newbuilding contracts, the Aker group suspended the
development of new ships, concentrating instead on the development and construction of
mobile rigs."
The effect of the oil price increase on the European offshore industry was significant.
Several discoveries that had previously been considered as uneconomical to exploit became
profitable following the increase in the price of oil. Moreover, the unstable political conditions
in some of the most important oil-producing countries encouraged operators to increase their
presence in more stable political environments such as the North Sea.
The Norwegian shipowners' engagement in the offshore industry can crudely be
divided into four different areas; participation in oil companies, investments in onshore supply
bases, investments in offshore rigs and investments in supply vessels. However, some
shipowners were indirectly affected through their interests in the shipbuilding sector.
Although the offshore industry was vital to the continuing existence of the shipbuilding sector
and the yards owned by Norwegian shipowners, this theme lies outside the scope of this
thesis. Moreover, other agents in the maritime market, such as the classification society Det
Norske Veritas, were also able to transform their operations to take advantage of the
opportunities in the Norwegian offshore sector. The following analysis focuses on
shipowners' engagements in the rig and supply ship sectors, but the other areas where
Norwegian shipowners participated will be touched upon briefly.
47 Nerheim, Gunnar, "Framveksten av det oljeindustrielle kompleks in Norge" [The emergence of the oil-
industrial complex in Norway], TMV Working Paper No. 80, Centre for Technology and Culture, Oslo, 1994, p.
39.
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Shipowners' investments in oil companies
Three of Norway's largest shipowning companies, Sig. Bergesen d.y. & Co., Anders Jahre
and Fearnley & Astrup, as well as Fred. Olsen through his Aker Group, participated in the
establishment of Noco, the first Norwegian oil consortium, in 1964. Other shipowning
interests joined a second consortium later the same year. The majority of the members of
Noco II came from the shipping sector. From Bergen, Westfal-Larsen & Co. and J. Ludwig
Mowinckels Rederi participated, R.S. Platou AS, primarily a shipbroker, invested in the
consortium, and Fred. Olsen and Sig. Bergesen d.y. also took part. The latter was a late
substitute for another shipowner, Einar Rasmussen of Kristiansand. In addition to the five
shipping companies, two insurance companies and two industrial groups participated in the
venture."
When the two consortia merged into a common partnership in 1965, two more
companies were admitted. Halfdan Ditlev-Simonsen & Co. and Smedvigs Tankrederi AS both
came from the shipping sector." The limited partnership Norwegian Oil Consortium AS,
formally established in October 1965, had 20 participants, 11 of which came from the
shipping sector."
In 1971 the participants of the two consortia invited other agents to join in a new
limited partnership. 78 Norwegian companies were willing to commit a total of NoK 683
million to the project, and approximately half of the participating companies were shipping
companies. Indeed, the majority of the board of the new company consisted of persons with
close ties to the Norwegian shipping industry."
The new company, Nocoto, became a part of Saga Petroleum in 1972. The list of
investors in Saga Petroleum shows the eagerness of Norwegian shipowners to participate in
the oil sector - the majority of the 96 participating companies were shipping companies.
Table 10.1 illustrates the extent to which the shipping companies listed on the Oslo
Stock Exchange participated in oil exploration. Almost 30 of the companies had invested in
Saga Petroleum, and the majority of the companies had investments in other offshore projects
as well. In addition to the 29 listed companies with interests in Saga, 28 non-listed shipping
companies had committed investment capital to the project.
48 Saga Petroleum, Sagaen om Saga [The Saga of Saga], Saga Petroleum ASA, Oslo, 1997, p. 12.
49 Ditlev-Simonsen and Smedvig bought the shares previously owned by Noco I and Sig. Bergesen d.y., as the
number of participants was limited to 20 and no participants could hold more than one share.
50 Prior to the merger, the shipowners Wilh. Wilhelmsen bought the stake of Europetrol, one of the original
founders ofNoco.
51 Hanisch, Tore Jørgen and Nerheim, Gunnar, "Fra vantro til overmot" [From Disbelief to Arrogance].
Norwegian Oil History - Volume 1,Norsk Petroleumsforening, Oslo, 1992, pp. 39-40 and 176-181.
Chapter Ten - Three Structural Transformations 355
Stig Tenold: The Shipping Crisis of the 1970s: Causes. Effects and Implicationsfor Norwegian Shipping
Table 10.1. Some listed shipping companies' interests in oil companies, million kroner"
Shipping company Saga Other mterests Shipping company Saga Other interests
Antarctic 0,5 Kosmos 20 Noco
Avenir l Polaris Nordheim 17,1 Noco
Beaulieu l Polaris Ocean 2 Polaris
Beaumont 1,5 Polaris Odd 6,66 Syracuse & 2514
Belship 8 Rosshavet 8
Bergehus 2 Noco Ruth 12 Polaris & Pelikan
Billabong 2 Seattle 0,75 Polaris
Bonheur 3 Noco Sigmalm 10
Borgå 3 Noco Skagerak - Scanpet
Den N. Middelhavslinje 4 Noco Tønsberg Hvalfangeri 0,5
Den N. Amerikalinje - Polaris Vestfold 2
Det Nordenfjeldske DS 6 Vestheim 0,95 Noco
Ganger Rolf 9 Noco Vito - Scanpet
Herlofsson Shipping 4 Pelikan Waage I 5 Polaris & Pelikan
Jelølinjen l Noco Waage II 3 Polaris & Pelikan
Klaveness DS 2 Ørnen 6,66 Syracuse & 25/4
Another link between the Norwegian shipping companies and the growing offshore sector was
through onshore supply bases. Among the agents entering this part of the offshore industry
were Peder Smedvig, Fred. Olsen, Wallem-Steckmest, Mosvold and Jacob Stolt-Nielsen."
However, the development of onshore supply bases was limited to a handful of shipping
companies. The investments in Saga Petroleum brought together a much larger share of the
shipping sector. Nevertheless, the value of the investments was low compared with the two
major areas of offshore expansion for Norwegian shipowners - investments in oil rigs and
supply vessels. Indeed, the investments in rigs in 1971 were higher than the aggregate
committed resources in Saga Petroleum.
Shipowners' investments in the oil rig sector
Although a considerable share of the Norwegian shipowning companies had been involved in
the offshore industry before the shipping crisis through their investments in Norwegian and
international oil consortia, the operation of drilling vessels and supply ships was to become
the main point of entry into the domestic offshore industry for Norwegian shipowners. In
time, the competence and resources acquired in the domestic offshore industry became a
steppingstone for the entry into the international market.
Norwegian Shipping News reported in late August 1971 that the Stavanger-based
company Smedvig had ordered the first drilling vessel on Norwegian account." The effect was
52 Figures taken from "Oversikt over norske børsnoterte selskapers engasjement i oljeleting" [Survey of
Norwegian listed companies' interests in oil exploration], published by the Norwegian bank DnC and reprinted
in Seeberg, Bjørn, Norsk skipsfart og dens engasjement i petroleumsaktivitetene i Nordsjøen [Norwegian
shipping and its participation in the petroleum activities in the North Sea], unpublished thesis, Norwegian School
of Economics and Business Administration, Bergen, 1973, p. 28. The figures in columns two and five refer to
the investments in Saga Petroleum, the columns labelled "Other interests" refer to investments in other
companies, some of which participated in Saga.
53 See Seeberg, Bjørn, op.cit., 1973, pp. 30-31 for a short introduction.
54 Norwegian Shipping News, No. 16, p. 656. However, Fred. Olsen had in the mid-1960s converted a whaling
factory to a drilling vessel, but this vessel turned out to be unsuitable for operation in the North Sea.
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conspicuous. As we have seen in other parts of the shipping sector, contracting tends to be
undertaken in swarms. The 1971 Platou Report states that "There was a rush for the earliest
building prospects, and in the course of a few autumn months nine semi-submersible
platforms were ordered, to be registered in Norway. "55 At the same time, a Norwegian
consortium headed by P. Meyer ordered the dynamically positioned drill-ship MS Havdrill in
the Netherlands, bringing the total number of drilling vessels contracted on Norwegian
account to ten. By conservative estimates, the Norwegian investments in semi-submersible
rigs in 1971 may be valued at $115 million, with the "Havdrill" adding another $20 million.
Table 10.2. Norwegian drilling rigs contracted 197156
Company Type and yard Participants
Semi-submersible Rederiet Odfjell AS, Westfal-Larsen & Co. AS, R.S. Platou AS,
KS Deep Sea Drilling AkerH-3, Wallem, Steckmest & Co. AS, Det Norske Oljeselskap, Vesta,
Co. AS Norway Gerrards Rederi, A.F. Klaveness & Co. AS, Mosvolds Rederi AS
Semi-submersible Gotaas-Larsen AS
Gotaas- Larsen I Aker H-3, Norw. Fearnley & Eger
Semi-submersible Gotaas-Larsen AS
Gotaas- Larsen II Voyager, Norway AS Thor Dahl
Semi-submersible Sigurd Herlofson & Co. AS, Halfdan Ditlev-Simonsen & Co.,
AS Norsedrill & Co. Pentagone, France Skibs-AS Belships, Olav Ringdal, two unnamed participants
Nordic Offshore Drillship, P. Meyer, R.S. Platou AS, Den Norske Creditbank, B. Holter-
Drilling Company AS Pelican, the Neth. Sørensen & Co., IHC (the Netherlands), Foramer (France)
Semi-submersible
Peder Smedvig Norrig-5, France Peder Smedvig
Semi-submersible
Hagb. Waage I Voyager, U.S. Hagb. Waage
Semi-submersible
Hagb. Waage II Voyager, U.S. Hagb. Waage
Semi-submersible
Waage-Wilhelmsen Voyager, Norway Hagb. Waage, Wilh. Wilhelmsen
Semi-submersible
Ugland group SS-3000, U.S. Ugland group, Zapata (U.S.)
Almost half of Norway's 25 largest shipowning compames participated in the rush for
newbuildings in 1971. Several of the companies that did not initially take part entered the
offshore sector at a later stage. The entry into the offshore sector was a combination of long-
term strategic changes and the herd behaviour often seen by Norwegian shipowning
compames.
Smedvig had originally considered the contracting of a drilling rig as early as 1968,
but temporarily shelved the plans due to the loss of key personnel. 57 When the decision to
contract was taken in 1971, several of Norway's most prominent shipowning companies had
signalled their intention to do the same. All except one of the companies ordering rigs in 1971
were relatively large, with dry bulk or tanker fleets in excess of 100.000 dwt." The "Deep Sea
55 R.S. Platou, The Platou Report 1971, Oslo, 1972. p. 23.
56 Information from list presented in Norwegian Shipping News, No.2, 1972, pp. 39-40.
57 Nerheim, Gunnar and Utne, Bjørn S., Under samme stjerne - Rederiet Peder Smedvig 1915-1990 [Under the
star - The shipowning company Peder Smedvig 1915-1990], Peder Smedvig AlS, Stavanger, 1990, p. 203.
58 The exception was B. Holter-Sørensen & Co. which participated in the consortium contracting the "Havdrill".
This company owned two medium-sized bulk carriers totalling 82.000 dwt.
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Driller", the vessel ordered by a consortium headed by Odfjell, was the first of the Aker H-3
rigs, a vessel type which came to playa crucial role for the Norwegian shipbuilding industry
as well as for Norwegian shipowners.
The Aker H-3 rig was central when the second contracting boom on Norwegian
account occurred in 1973 and 1974. In the latter year 19 new drilling rigs were contracted for
operation under the Norwegian flag, and Norwegian interests also participated in another
seven drilling vessels, not intended for the Norwegian registry. Within a month in the
beginning of 1973, the Aker yards received five orders for H-3 rigs, and Norwegian interests
were involved in all contracts." In February 1974, 25 Aker H-3 rigs had been ordered. The
demand for these rigs had been so high that the yards operated with a relatively long period of
delivery. Accordingy, eleven of the rigs were to be built at other yards that had licensed the
concept.
By 1974 Norwegian shipowners had entered the oil drilling sector on a large scale,
either through vessels already delivered or through newbuilding orders. By the end of 1974,
54 units had been ordered with Norwegian participation, and 390fthese were intended for the
Norwegian registry. Again, the herd behaviour is evident, and on the intemationallevel 30
newbuilding contracts for mobile drilling units were signed within a 45-day period in the end
of 1973 and beginning of 1974.60 The parallel to the shipping industry is obvious both with
regard to the contracting behaviour and with regard to the yards' response. The heavy demand
led to a strong increase in yard capacity, and the annual building capacity, which had been 30-
40 units in 1973 and 1974, was doubled in 1975 and doubled again in 1976.
Figure 10.13. Norwegian rigs, number and tonnage, 1000 grt, 1973-8661
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Figure 10.13 shows the Norwegian shipowners' investments in the rig sector. Originally, the
vessels were mainly semi-submersible rigs, but in 1976 the first self-elevating units were
59 Hanisch & Nerheim, op.cit., 1992, p. 247.
60 R.S. Platou, The Platou Report 1974, Oslo, 1975. p. 17.
61 Based on the database from the Veritas-registry. The data have been adjusted to represent date ofbuild, rather
than date of inclusion in the registry, and are thus end of the year figures. The figure includes the drilling vessel
MS Havdrill in the period 1973-1976 and the drilling vessel MS Pelerin from 1976 to 1986.
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delivered. A year previously, the first drilling unit had been converted to living quarters/
service units, and several Norwegian shipowners followed suit - by the end of 1977 the
Norwegian rig fleet was fairly diversified. Of the 34 vessels in the Norwegian fleet at this
time, 13 were traditional drilling units, 11 had been permanently or temporarily converted to
living quarters, three had been supplemented with special crane equipment, five were self-
elevating units and two were drill-ships."
The Norwegian shipowners' foray into the offshore industry had several similarities to
their investments in shipping. The favourable tax treatment with regard to depreciation was
the same as in the shipping industry, and it is therefore not surprising that the two spurts of
drilling vessel contracting in 1971 and 1973/1974 followed very good years for Norwegian
shipping. Moreover, the Norwegians also brought another aspect oftheir shipping strategies to
the offshore sector - speculation. According to Hanisch and Nerheim, "[Norwegian
shipowners} introduced a completely new element to the drilling sector. They built drilling
vessels on speculation, without having secured drilling contracts with oil companies in
advance. "63
The results of the herd behaviour were partly the same as those found in the tanker
sector - overcapacity, lay-ups and low rates. In 1975 the balance between demand and supply
deteriorated, following large deliveries and new tax rules which led to reduced growth of
exploration activity. By the end of 1975, six semi-submersible drilling vessels had been laid
up, and in 1976 the lay up-rate in the North Sea was approximately 30 per cent. In April that
year, Norwegian shipowners had invested in 42 offshore rigs, of which only half had been
delivered." The difficulties in the North Sea were the basis for the inclusion of drilling vessels
in the Norwegian authorities' initiatives toward the shipping sector, displayed through the
Guarantee Institute.
However, the crisis in the offshore sector was neither as dramatic nor as permanent as
in the shipping sector, and the market improved in 1977. There was a minor setback in 1978,
before the market picked up again. The daily rate for rigs increased from $16.000 to $40.000
from December 1978 to December 1979, and more than doubled again, to $90.000 by
December 1980. As a result of the improved market conditions, the value of a 1974-built Aker
H3 rig increased from $22 million in late 1978 to $80 million two years later." Due to the
increase in the value of the drilling rigs, the state intervention through the Guarantee Institute,
which had been established amidst bleak market prospects in the mid-1970s, could be
considered a success.
62 Stortingsmelding nr. 93 (1977-78), Om virksomheten i Norsk garantiinstitutt for skip og borefartøyer AS i
1977 [Report to the Storting on the activities of The Norwegian Guarantee Institute for Ships and Drilling
Vessels AS in 1977], p. IS.
63 Hanisch & Nerheim, op.cit., 1992, p. 233.
64 Stortingsproposisjon nr 186 (1975-76), Om utviding av statens garantiansvar overfor Norsk garantiinstitutt
for skip og borefartøyer AlS [Royal proposition on the expansion of the authorities' guarantee responsibility
towards the Norwegian Guarantee Institute for Ships and Drilling Vessels Ltd.], p. 3.
65 Figures from Stortingsmelding nr. 108 (1980-81), Om virksomheten i Norsk garantiinstitutt for skip og
borefartøyer AS i 1980 [Report to the Storting on the activities of The Norwegian Guarantee Institute for Ships
and Drilling Vessels AS in 1980], p. Il.
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Norwegian shipowners' entry into the rig sector was facilitated by their network of
international contacts, including their relations to the major oil companies, shipyards and
financing institutions. By the middle of 1975, the nineteen rigs delivered to Norwegian
owners had represented an investment of some NoK 2,5 billion. The average Norwegian share
of these vessels was approximately 75 per cent, so they represented an investment for
domestic shipowners of NoK 1.875 million. Moreover, 43 vessels, at a value of NoK 6,5
billion had been contracted, but not yet delivered. This represented another NoK 5.625 million
of capital from Norwegian shipowners."
Shipowners' investments in the supply ship sector
Although the amount of shipping capital invested in oil rigs was high, the Norwegian
shipowners' activities in the offshore sector were not confined to the rig segment. The
increased exploration and exploitation in the North Sea also led to a need for servicing, and
the supply ship sector presented investment opportunities for shipowners who could not afford
or did not want to be involved in rig ownership. As Table 10.2 shows, the first companies to
invest in drilling rigs were the established companies of the Norwegian shipping industry,
particularly operators of tankers and large bulk carriers. However, the booming offshore sector
presented opportunities for the minor players in the Norwegian shipping industry as well.
Several companies, a combination of large and small agents, entered the offshore
sector through investments in supply ships. In 1971 the first three supply ships had been
delivered and another 17 units had been ordered." Initially, the investments turned out to be
very profitable, but again, the herd behaviour was evident. By the end of 1973, 24 supply
vessels were registered in the Norwegian fleet, and an additional 46 were on order. The
following year another 75 contracts were signed."
To a larger extent than for other parts of the offshore and shipping sectors, the
investment in supply vessels took place outside the traditional shipping centres of Bergen,
Oslo and the South Coast. The cost of a supply ship was only a fraction of the price of a
drilling unit, usually in the region of five per cent. Accordingly, the supply ship sector
represented a gateway to the offshore adventure for smaller companies with limited resources,
who were unable or unwilling to commit themselves to rig investments. A considerable share
of the supply vessels was delivered from relatively small Norwegian yards.
Most of the supply vessels were owned through kommandittselskap [limited
partnerships], due to favourable taxation practices. Several of the limited partnerships
gathered companies both from the shipping sector - eg shipowners and brokers - and other
parts of the Norwegian business community. The shipbrokers Johan G. Olsen in Kristiansand
and Joachim Grieg in Bergen were vital to the establishment of some of the most important
supply ship operators.
For some of the shipping companies, the entry into the supply ship sector was a logical
and convenient step, based on their expertise in vessel operation and the depression in other
66 Stortingsmelding nr. 23 (1975-76), op.cit., p. 20. More than two thirds of the 62 vessels were registered in
Norway or intended for the Norwegian registry.
67 R.S. Platou, The Platou Report 1971, Oslo, 1972, p. 23.
68 Hanisch & Nerheim, op.cit., 1992, p. 228.
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segments of the shipping industry. The access to organisation through limited partnerships
gave further impetus to the development of the supply ship sector, and was particularly
important in attracting investors who had little or no previous engagement in the shipping
sector.
An analysis of the shipping companies engaged in the supply ship sector shows that
the majority of the companies had previously been engaged in small-scale shipping. Some of
the companies, like Ivarans Rederi AS, I.M. Skaugen, Peder Smedvig and Wilh. Wilhelmsen,
had experience from the operation of large vessels, and started supply ship services either
through their own organisations or indirectly through newly established companies. However,
the majority of the supply ship operators had their roots in a different part of the shipping
industry than the shipowners who entered the rig sector." Moreover, the supply ship sector
was characterised by a relatively high degree of concentration, with the six largest companies
controlling almost half of the fleet in the mid-1970s.
Table 10.3. Major supply ship operators, 197770
Company Vessels Traditional engagement Other interests
N.R. Bugge, Tønsberg 8 Tanker shipping Managing one foreign tanker
Wilhelmsen Offshore, Oslo 14 Part of Wilh. Wilhelmsen group Diversified within shipping
Peder Smedvig, Stavanger 6 Diversified shipping/industry Shipping and other offshore
Viking Supply Ships, Kr. sand 5 Shipping (Bendt Rasmussen) Shipping and other offshore
LM. Skaugen & Co., Oslo 4 Diversified shipping Diversified shipping
Stolt Nielsen, Haugesund 6 Diversified shipping Shipping and other offhsore
Normand, Haugesund 6 Various shipping companies Various shipping interests
KS Sandøy Supply, Brattvåg 6 Shipping and fishery interests Shipping and fishery interests
Johs. Larsen, Bergen 7 Tramp shipping One barge and one large ship
The history of the Haugesund-based Normand-group can illustrate Norwegian shipowners'
entry into the supply ship sector. The company's six partners all had their roots in the shipping
sector." When the company's first supply ship was launched in 1974, three of the participants
each had fleets of more than 40.000 grt, and were ranked from 90th to 100th on a list of
Norway's largest shipowners. The fleet expanded both as a result of vessels jointly owned by
the former participants and vessels contracted by one of the participants, Solstads Rederi,
which managed the fleet.
In 1974 Solstads Rederi owned a fleet of eight cargo vessels, mostly engaged in Asia.
These vessels were gradually disposed of, and by 1982 the company has become an offshore-
company, rather than a traditional shipowning company." By this time the company's supply
vessels operated both in the North Sea and in distant waters. The experience of Solstads
69 Løvberg, Atle and Reinholdsen, Egil, Norsk engasjement innen supply-skipsfart [Norwegian involvement in
supply shipping], Institute for Shipping Research, Norwegian School of Economics and Business
Administration, 1977, pp. 8-12.
70 Adapted on the basis of Bøe, Harald and Kvammen, Ivar Neerland, Forsynings- og servicetjenerster - en ny
skipsfartsnæring [Supply- and service-provision - a new shipping segment], Institute for Shipping Research,
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, 1977, pp. 77-79.
71 The three major owners were DS AS Produce (Sverre Odland) and KS Skips-AS Solhav (Solstads Rederi AS),
both with 25 per cent, and DS AS Vestland (Rich. Amlie) with 20 per cent. Moreover DS AS Notos, John K.
Kyvik and R.G. Hagland AS participated, with shares ranging from five to 15 per cent.
72 Misje, Magne, Solstads Rederi AlS 1964-1989, Solstads Rederi, Skudeneshavn, 1989, p. 30.
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Rederi shows both that the offshore industry presented an alternative for traditional
shipowners, and that the engagement in the North Sea facilitated the expansion into newareas.
The supply sector fell victim to the reduced growth of exploration activity in the North
Sea in the mid 1970s. Again, the supply side swelled while the demand side increased less
than anticipated. One participant blamed the limited partnerships and the preferable tax
treatment of supply ship investments for the overcapacity." Like in the rig sector, the
alternatives to accepting the low rates in the North Sea were conversion or increased operation
outside the Norwegian sector. By the early 1980s Norwegian interests were among the
world's largest supply ship owners, and their vessels were engaged in several different
regions.
10.3.4. From shipping to shipping and offshore
The transfer of funds from the shipping sector to the offshore sector was considerable. In July
1975 Norwegian shipowners had oil rig contracts at a value of more than NoK 5,5 billion.
Moreover, NoK 1.500 million worth of supply vessel contracts, representing approximately
100 vessels, had been signed. The value of Norwegian shipping companies' investments in
drilling and supply vessel contracts can thus be estimated at more than NoK 7 billion. At the
same time, the total value of Norwegian ship newbuilding contracts was some NoK 26.500
million."
The figures above show that the offshore investments of Norwegian shipowners
amounted to more than a quarter of their shipping investments. The value of the shipping
contracts were however still influenced by the backlog of vessels ordered during the
contracting heyday, but not yet delivered. Itmay thus be reasonable to assume that Norwegian
shipowners in 1974 and the beginning of 1975 invested considerably more in oil rigs and
supply vessels than they did in newbuilding contracts for traditional ships. Moreover,
Norwegian shipping interests had substantial investments in oil exploration and exploitation
companies such as eg Saga Petroleum, in addition to the drilling and supply vessel
investments.
The offshore investments were not confined to the Norwegian continental shelf, but
gave Norwegian shipowners a chance to operate in foreign waters as well. By the beginning of
the early 1980s, Norwegian supply ship owners had more vessels operating outside
Norwegian jurisdiction than they had in Norwegian waters. The Norwegian shipping
companies' investments in offshore oil sector continued into the 1980s, and totalled an
estimated NoK 25 billion in the period 1974-1984.75
The offshore industry represented a manner through which the Norwegian shipping
companies could diversify from the depressed shipping sector, yet utilise some of the
competence inherent in their organisations. Their main competitive advantage was the
maritime experience, reflected both in the management of vessels, the competence of the
73 Rasmussen, Bendt, Gjennom bølger på sjø og land [Through waves at sea and on shore], Vigmostad &
Bjørke, Bergen, 1996, p. 224.
74 Figures from Stortingsmelding nr. 23 (1975-76), op.cit., p. 20.
75 Lykke, Knut, "Norsk skipsfart - strategi og politikk" [Norwegian shipping - strategy and policy],
Sosialekonomen, No.5, 1985,p. 16.
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labour force and the similarity between shipping and offshore investments." Moreover,
Norwegian shipping companies actively tried to develop offshore expertise within their own
organisations."
The importance of the offshore sector for Norwegian shipping companies has its
parallel in the importance of Norwegian shipping companies for the offshore sector. By the
early 1990s the Norwegian rigowners had become major players in the international market,
with a market share of approximately 40 per cent. Only one of the most prominent drilling
companies had its roots outside the shipping sector."
10.4. Norwegian Shipping in a New Context
During the shipping crisis, the character of the Norwegian maritime industry was transformed.
By analysing the development of the Norwegian shipping industry in the period 1970-1987,
we can clearly see some of the effects of the international shipping crisis, but the development
traits also reflect the increased internationalisation of the shipping industry. As previously
shown, it is difficult to differentiate the effects of the crisis from the general, long-term
development of the shipping sector. However, with regard to Norwegian shipowners, some of
the development traits were clearly the results of new opportunities following the
liberalisation of the Norwegian shipping policy brought about by the crisis.
1004.1. Changes in shipping policy
One way of measuring the influence of the shipping crisis on the development of the shipping
industry is to examine the premises for the changes in the Norwegian shipping policy. Such an
evaluation reveals that the effects of the shipping crisis, and the ensuing depressed state of the
Norwegian shipping industry, have been extensively used as justification for the shift in
policy. Consequently, the internationalisation of the Norwegian shipping industry, visible
through increased foreign registry and a focus on ship management as a substitute for or
supplement to vessel ownership, would not have occurred to the same extent if the freight
markets had been good and revenues sufficient for continued profitable operation under the
Norwegian flag.
Traditionally, the Norwegian legislation affected the structure of the shipping industry
through two mechanisms. On the one hand, the legislation constrained foreign agents' access
to the Norwegian register by laying down strict rules for vessels included in the Norwegian
register. On the other hand, the legislation restricted Norwegian subjects' access to owning
ships outside the Norwegian registry.
76 The existence of a well-functioning second-hand market is one important similarity between the shipping and
the rig sectors.
77 See Nerheim, Gunnar and øye, Kristin Gjerde, Uglandrederiene - verdensvirksomhet med lokale røtter [The
Ugland shipowning companies - international business with local roots], Andreas K.L. Ugland & Johan Jørgen
Ugland, Grimstad, 1996, pp. 248-258 for an introduction to the various manners in which this was
accomplished.
78 Reve, Torger, Lensberg, Terje and Grønhaug, Kjell, Et konkurransedyktig Norge [A competitive Norway],
TANO AS, Oslo, 1992, p. 158-159.
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Foreign shipowners were not allowed to register their ships in the Norwegian registry
according to Sjøloven av 20. juli 1893 [The Norwegian Maritime Act], which had been partly
motivated by foreigners' use of Norway as a Flag of Convenience. Paragraph l of this act lays
down the conditions for the inclusion of a ship in the Norwegian registry:
o Norwegian subjects had to hold at least 6110 of the capital.
o Norwegian subjects should be entitled to exercise at least 611O of the voting rights in the
company.
o The chairman and the majority of the members of the board must be Norwegian citizens
resident in Norway, and have lived there for the preceding two years."
The condition that Norwegians should have a controlling interest in the company in fact
eliminated foreign ownership ofvessels in the Norwegian registry. Prior to the Second World
War there was no direct parallel limiting the Norwegian ownership of vessels in foreign
registries.
In the postwar period, however, Norwegian investments abroad were restricted under
the provision of Valutaloven [The Currency Control Act], originally a provisional ordinance
dated 1944, but later passed as an act and amended several times. Due to the foreign exchange
legislation, Norwegian agents were generally not allowed to invest in foreign shipowning
companies. Shipowners wishing to invest abroad had to apply to the Ministry of Trade and
Shipping for exemption from the general rules." In accordance with the increased foreign
investments of Norwegian companies, the practice was gradually liberalised in the postwar
period. However, the authorities claim that the enforcement of the regulation was relatively
strict for shipowning companies.
Shipowners' direct investments abroad can be placed in two categories. The first
category is subsidiaries with a similarity to the sales offices of industrial companies,
undertaking import and marketing of goods produced in Norway. The equivalent in the
shipping sector would be agencies or broker offices, and in this area the licensing practices of
the authorities have been liberal. The second category, the founding of new shipowning
companies or purchase of foreign companies, is equivalent to investment in foreign
production facilities in the industrial sector. In this area the licensing has differed; industrial
companies would be granted a license, whereas the licensing of shipowning companies would
be restrictive."
Norwegian exchange controls have thus been used as a tool of Norwegian flag policy,
restricting the foreign investments of Norwegian shipowning companies. Despite this policy,
some Norwegian-owned vessels were flying foreign flags, either as a result of exemptions
from the general rule, or through investments in "unregulated companies", ie companies
79 See Gombrii, Karl Johan et.al., Nordisk skipsfart under fremmed flagg [Nordic shipping flying foreign flags],
Nordic Institute of Maritime Law, University of Oslo, 1981, p. 11-110.
80 For a thorough account of Norwegian legislation regarding investments in foreign shipping, see Breistein,
Gisle Stray, Valutaregulering og skipsfart [Currency control and shipping], Institute for Shipping Research,
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Bergen, 1984. For most companies outside the
shipping sector, Norges Bank was responsible for the licensing. Licensing in some other sectors, eg fisheries and
agriculture, was also allocated to their respective ministries.
81 Norges Offentlige Utredninger (1980:45), Uteregistrering av skip og skipsfartens egenkapital [Foreign
registry of ships and the equity of shipping], p. 26.
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established before the strict foreign exchange control regime was introduced during the
second World War.
Norwegian shipowners' foreign investments were low compared with most of their
competitors. However, some ownership of or interests in foreign vessels existed even before
the shipping crisis. As a result of the need for dispensation from the general rules in
connection with Norwegian shipowners' investments abroad, we have access to detailed
information about the basis for these investments:
D Local regulations implying that vessels can only be operated under a given flag.
D Local activity which makes it unnatural, from an operational point ofview, to register the
vessels in a distant, foreign country, eg coastal fishing, barges etc.
D Dependence upon near contact with foreign business associates.
D Dependence upon foreign legislation giving special financing arrangements necessary for
the accomplishment of the project.
D Dependence upon transport contracts which otherwise would not be attainable.
D Cooperation on major projects where the risk is spread among several types of interests,
eg banks, yards and shippers.
D Dependence upon and utilisation offoreign managerial and technological competence."
The list shows the declared reasons for ownership abroad. However, the licensing policy was
strict, in particular when compared with the legislation in other countries. Licenses had not
been granted in connection with applications where the main reasons were to exploit
advantages with regard to lower taxes, cheaper crews, lower social expenses or to exploit
advantages in connection with subsidies or national preferences. There might of course be
discrepancies between the reasons shipowners reveal when applying for licenses and their
actual reasons, eg due to the fact that shipowners are likely to have some idea about the
conditions necessary for licenses to be granted.
In the period 1962-1975 the authorities granted 121 licenses, and only 20 applications
were turned down. The authorities, however, claim that a restrictive policy was followed.
They refer to their "relatively restrictive attitude" and also claimed that "the traditional
practice of allowing registration under foreign flags can be considered restrictive. "83 The fact
that six out of seven applications for foreign ownership were rewarded with a license does not
intuitively correspond with the authorities' assertion that a restrictive policy had been
followed. Moreover, a former bureaucrat in the Ministry of Trade and Shipping has claimed
that the licensing practice had in fact been liberal, but was influenced by a great deal of
arbitrariness."
The share of total applications which was granted a license is not necessarily a good
measure in an evaluation of the strictness of the policyenforcement. Despite the possible
arbitrariness, the potential applicants would have information about the legal framework and
the bureaucrats' implementation of this framework. Accordingly, there is reason to believe
82 Stortingsmelding nr. 23 (1975-76), op.cit., p. 24.
83 Quotes from Stortingsmelding nr. 23 (1975-76), op.cit., p. 24 and Norges Offentlige Utredninger (1980:45),
op.cit., p. 27.
84 Breistein, op.cit., 1984, p. 83.
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that several shipowners wishing to register ships abroad, but for the "wrong reasons",
withheld their applications because they knew that they would not be given a dispensation.
Accordingly, the number of vessels which would have been registered under foreign flags in
absence of the licensing policy is likely to be considerably higher than the 20 applications
which were turned down.
In 1975, the government emphasised that "Norwegian shipping, as a main rule, shall
be based on vessels flying the Norwegian flag and employing Norwegian crews. "S5 Although
the government made provisions for the flagging-out of vessels due to high Norwegian costs,
this possibility was refuted by the parliament. It is thus evident that there was some movement
towards liberalisation of the flag policy, but that there was no majority support for such a
change. However, the shipping crisis made the problems even more acute, and paved the way
for changes in the policy. In 1979, a parliamentary committee supported temporary flagging-
out of Norwegian vessels as an alternative to the sale of these vessels to foreign-owned
companies.
The large outflow of Norwegian tonnage after the restrictions on foreign registry were
eased might indicate that there had been an unsatiated need for foreign registry which the
previous legislation had been able to hold back. However, two trends were working in
tandem, both affected by the sad state of the shipping market. On the one hand, vessels were
sold to foreign shipowners which could operate them in a more effective manner. On the other
hand, Norwegian shipowners transferred parts oftheir fleets to foreign registries in an attempt
to increase their competitiveness. The analysis in Chapter Nine showed that both mechanisms
were prominent in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
In 1984, Norwegian shipowners held interests in almost 400 foreign-registered vessels,
totalling more than lO million dead weight tons. The basis on which licences were granted,
can be put into eleven different categories:
Table 10.4. The basis for licenses for registration abroad, 198486
Number of Tonnage Norwegian share
Basis for license vessels 1000 dwt. (per cent)
Discrimination 70 467 78
Access to equity 93 3.391 84
Access to cargoes 97 3.235 64
Technically obsolete tonnage 14 74 100
Renewall:l 19 708 97
Temporary registration abroad 32 1.377 100
Nordic cooperation 5 225 85
Local business 22 230 87
Cooperation with developing countries 8 133 36
Minority shares 15 158 9
Other licences 7 462 100
Total 382 10.460 80
When regarding the reasons for applications for licenses, we can see that the motives are very
much policy induced. The Norwegian shipowners who wanted to establish themselves abroad
85 Stortingsmelding nr. 23 (1975-76), op.cit., p. 25.
S6 Based on Stortingsmelding nr. 53 (1984-85), op.cit., p. 36
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- and were allowed to do so - often did this as a response to nationallegislation. There is thus
reason to believe that a large share of the Norwegian vessels owned abroad did not fit into the
historically most dominant frame of Norwegian shipping, viz large scale bulk shipping. This
can be confirmed by the fact that only in three categories - temporary registration abroad,
Nordic cooperation and other licences - is the average size of the vessels for which licences
were granted more than 40.000 dead weight tons. The average size of vessels registered
abroad, 27.400 dwt is considerably smaller than the corresponding average for the Norwegian
fleet, which was approximately 54.000 dwt at the time. This supports the idea that the
Norwegian vessels registered under foreign flags to a large extent were engaged in liner and
special trades, where the average size of the vessels is smaller than in the bulk trades."
In the middle of the 1980s, the authorities realised that "a flexible flag policy is
necessary to maintain a Norwegian shipping sector. "88 After some parliamentary wrangles -
brought about as a result of the change from conservative to Labour government - the
Norwegian policy was further liberalised." The end result was that the act establishing an
open Norwegian shipping register was passed, and the register came into effect from I July
1987. At the same time, liberalisation of the foreign exchange legislation had made it easier
for Norwegian shipowning companies to establish subsidiaries abroad.
The changes represented a reorientation of the Norwegian flag policy and contributed
to a considerable influx of tonnage in the Norwegian fleet. The basis for the major turnaround
in Norwegian flag policy was twofold:
D that "the access to operation under a foreign flag in many cases is a condition for the
operation of shipping from Norway" and
D that "this kind of shipping implies that the most profitable functions, demanding the
highest competence, are maintained as Norwegian businesses"
The establishment of the Norwegian International Ship Register (NIS) was a means through
which the authorities sought to maintain and develop Norwegian maritime competence, while
at the same time countering the flight of Norwegian tonnage to foreign flags.
Like in the case of the structural transformation of the world fleet, the
internationalisation of Norwegian shipping and the policy changes which facilitated this
development, was the result of two concurrent trends. The shift in Norwegian policy was both
a response to the shipping crisis and a result of more long-term changes in the maritime
hegemony and the structure of the shipping sector. An investigation of the parliamentary
proceedings illustrates this, and also indicates when and to which extent the various elements
have been important.
The liberalisation of the Norwegian flag policy in the late 1970s can be considered a
direct response to the shipping crisis. The proposition to the parliament refers to previous
87 Figures for the Norwegian fleet are taken from Review 1983. However, these figures are not necessarily
directly comparable with the figures from Stortingsmelding nr. 53 (1984-85), op.cit., due to the fact that the
classification of vessels may differ.
88 Stortingsmelding nr. 53 (1984-85), op.cit., p. 40.
89 Nordvik, Helge W, "From Benign Neglect to Active Intervention: Norwegian Government Shipping Policies
from the 1970s Shipping Crisis to the Present", paper presented to the lAME-Conference held at City
University, Department of Trade, Shipping and Finance, London, September 20-22, 1997, pp. 13-20.
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consideration of the flag issue, and emphasises that "the possibilities for profitable operation
under the Norwegian flag have been considerably reduced after the parliament 's discussion
of the Shipping-report [1975-76}. ''90 In the recommendation from the extended Committee on
Finance and Economic Affairs "the current state of the shipping industry", ie the shipping
crisis, is used to justify the liberalisation of the possibilities for foreign registry." The first
steps towards a more liberal shipping policy can thus be attributed to the effects of the
shipping crisis on Norwegian shipping.
The second stage of liberalisation was not a result of the shipping crisis per se, but
rather a reflection of the increasing discord between the Norwegian shipping policy and the
shipping policies of other nations. The Department of Trade and Shipping emphasised that
"[ijn the evaluation of the flag policy it must be made allowances for the fact that an
increasing share of the world fleet is registered in countries with free registers. " As a result
of the policy changes, Norwegian shipowners were allowed to transfer "technically obsolete
tonnage" as a means to diversifying their operation. 92
By the mid-1980s the third stage of liberalisation came into effect. The authorities had
realised that "[aj restrictive flag policy will only delay the development towards operation
under foreign flags. "93 Accordingly, the government suggested that the procedures prior to
foreign registry should be simplified. The general prohibition was terminated, and replaced
with general access to foreign registry. Instead of a policy disallowing foreign registry, which
given certain conditions could be waived, the policy became one of tolerance, but with two
specified prohibitions. Applications were no longer dealt with on an individual basis. Rather,
all applications were endorsed, unless there were specific reasons for refusal.
As shown in Figure 10.11 the reduction of the Norwegian fleet was dramatic in the
period leading up to the changes in flag policy. However, three features of the Norwegian
shipping policy may have delayed the outflow. First, it is reasonable to assume that some of
the vessels which were transferred to foreign registries would have been transferred at an
earlier point in the absence of a restrictive flag policy. Second, the Norwegian authorities
introduced tax measures, particularly in connection with the taxation of limited partnerships,
which were only available for vessels flying the Norwegian flag. Third, the existence of the
Guarantee Institute contributed to the preservation of large tankers and bulk carriers on the
Norwegian registry.
90 Stortingsproposisjon nr. 46 (1978-79), Om støttetiltak for skipsfartsnæringen [On support measures for the
shipping industry], p. 10
91 Innst. S. nr. 167 (1978-79), Innstilling fra den forsterkede finanskomite om støttetiltak for skipsfartsnæringen
[Recommendation from the extended Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs about support measures for
the shipping industry], p. 9.
92 Quotes from Stortingsmelding nr. 52 (1980-81), Om skipsfartsnæringen [On the shipping industry], p. 31 and
p.30.
93 Stortingsmelding nr. 53 (1984-85), op.cit., p. 41.
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1004.2. The internationalisation of Norwegian shipping
The complexity of ownership in the shipping sector leaves a lot to be desired with regard to
the determination of a ship's nationality. As Cashman puts it, "[ijt is a brave man who will
address the question of who owns the fleet and put forward a hypothesis without some inner
feeling of disquiet and vulnerability. "94 In the following analysis, two approaches have been
chosen to present the increased internationalisation of Norwegian shipping. First, I focus on
the tonnage registered in the two most important FoC-registries, Liberia and Panama, but
where the managing owners are registered in Norway. Second, I present the tonnage leaving
the Norwegian registry, but which was still managed from Norway the subsequent year.
The number of vessels and amount of Norwegian-managed tonnage registered under
Flags of Convenience represent a crude measure of the internationalisation of the Norwegian
shipping industry. Nevertheless, the development is remarkable. In 1970, five Norwegian-
managed vessels were registered in Liberia, and five years later the figure had been doubled."
In the next five-year-period, from 1975 to 1980, the number of Norwegian-affiliated Liberia-
registered vessels increased to 33, and another three vessels were registered in Panama. From
1980 to 1986, there was an average annual increase of 20 per cent in the number of vessels
managed by Norwegian shipowners and registered in Liberia and Panama. Moreover, the
average size of the vessels increased by 15 per cent over the same period.
By analysing the amount of Norwegian-managed tonnage registered in the two most
important FoC-countries, Liberia and Panama, the two notable trends towards
internationalisation are illuminated. First, the figures reveal the tonnage owned by Norwegian
shipowning companies, but registered under Flags of Convenience. Second, the figures show
the increased use of Norwegian management companies by foreign shipowners. The latter
trend is likely to be underestimated as the main source, the Veritas-regi stry, is unable to
capture the chartering-in of foreign vessels on long timecharters, bareboat charters etc.
The tonnage registered in Liberia and Panama only captures a portion of the
Norwegian-owned, foreign-registered vessels. According to official figures, Norwegian
shipowners participated in the ownership of 136 vessels, amounting to 3,3 million dwt, in late
1974. The Norwegian share of these vessels was approximately 40 per cent. The number of
licences for foreign projects increased from an annual average of 20 in the period 1975-1980,
to more than 60 annually in 1983 and 1983, and further to 115 in 1984.96 By 1984 the tonnage
with Norwegian participation had increased by more than 200 per cent, to almost 10,5 million
dwt. More importantly, the average Norwwegian share had increased from 40 per cent to 80
per cent. In June 1984, approximately 45 per cent of the vessels were registered in Liberia or
Panama, whereas a third was registered in other OECD-countries.97
94 Cashman, John P., "Shipping Statistics - Who Owns the Fleet", in Strandenes, Siri Pettersen, Svendsen.
Arnljot Strømme and Wergeland, Tor (eds.), Shipping Strategies and Bulk Shipping in the 1990s, Center for
International Business, Bergen, 1989, p. 73.
95 All figures in the subsequent analysis refer to vessels of more than 5.000 grt. They are based on the Veritas-
register, and consequently do not necessarily include all relevant vessels.
96 Stortingsmelding nr. 53 (1984-85), op.cit., p. 35.
97 Ibid., p. 36.
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Figure 10.14. Liberia- and Panama-vessels managed from Norway, 1000 grt, 1970-8698
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Figure 10.14 gives an indication of the increase in foreign-registered tonnage with Norwegian
management. Until 1978 ore carriers managed by Sig. Bergesen d.y. & Co accounted for more
than 50 per cent of the Liberia-registered tonnage. The company was allowed to register these
vessels abroad due to cooperation with international ore conglomerates. It is important to
emphasise that the increase in Norwegian-affiliated tonnage registered in FoC-countries is as
much a result of the political development previously described as of changing economic
considerations.
From 1980 onwards, foreign registry was allowed to secure the profitable operation of
vessels which were to be sold abroad after an expected increase in second hand-values. In the
period 1980-1983,64 vessels were transferred abroad as an alternative to sale." This practice
is one of the reasons for the relatively high turnover of the Norwegian-managed vessels in the
Liberian and Panamanian fleets. However, several companies had to apply for an extension of
the initial two year temporary waiver, as the anticipated value increases failed to materialise.
Later, foreign registry was still considered an exemption from the general rule, but the
practice became so liberal as to facilitate large-scale registry under foreign flags. By the
middle of the 1980s, the dire conditions in the shipping industry had forced the authorities to
make a total reversal oftheir flag policy. The aim was no longer, as in 1975, that "Norwegian
shipping, as a main rule, shall be based on vessels flying the Norwegian flag and employing
Norwegian crews", but rather that "[ajccess to operation under a foreign flag in many cases
98 The chart is based on a database consisting of figures from the list of national fleets by owner in the Veritas-
registries, 1970-1986. Vessels managed by Gotaas-Larsen's and Stolt-Nielsen's Norwegian affiliates have been
excluded. The same applies to vessels managed by foreign affiliates of Norwegian companies, such as the Hong
Kong arms ofWallem and Thoresen International! AS Bruusggard Kiøsterud/ Ame Teigen. The figures include
ships above 5.000 grt, as well as the drilling vessel Pacnorse I in the period 1978-1982, one semi-submersible rig
in 1978 and 1986 and two rigs in 1984 and 1985.
99 Stortingsmelding nr. 53 (1984-85), op.cit., p. 36.
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is a condition for the operation of shipping from Norway. "100 The policy change was
accompanied by a quadrupling of the Norwegian-controlled tonnage registered in Liberia and
Panama.
The effects of the changes in the Norwegian shipping policy are evident from Figure
10.15 which is based on the Veritas-database. The figure shows the tonnage and number of
vessels sold abroad from Norwegian shipowners, where the management of the vessels the
following year was a Norwegian company.
Figure 10.15. Vessels sold abroad with continued Norwegian management, 1970-1986101
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Figure 10.15 illustrates several of the trends that have been presented in the preceding
discussion. First, the relatively low number of vessels leaving the Norwegian fleet in the first
half of the 1970s may be an indication that foreign registry was partly motivated by the crisis
- the numbers begin to rise when the crisis had become evident, but were reduced in the
period of very good rates around the tum of the decade. Second, the changes in flag policy are
evident. The number of vessels transferred to foreign registries increases considerably after it
became possible to transfer vessels abroad as an alternative to disposal. The trend accelerated
after the shift in shipping policy from "prohibition with possible waivers" to "free-for-all with
some exceptions" in the mid 1980s.
The data on which Figure 10.15 is based also reveal a strong tendency towards
increasing average size of the tonnage sold abroad, but managed from Norway. Nine of the 13
vessels transferred in the period 1970-1975 were bulk carriers, and the average tonnage was
approximately 23.000 dwt. In the period 1976-1980, the average tonnage increased to almost
40.000 dwt, largelyas a result of the inclusion of some medium-size tankers. In the period
1981-1986 fourteen mammoth tankers were transferred abroad, but still operated from
Norway, contributing to an increase in average vessel size to almost 53.000 dwt.
100 Quotes from Stortingsmelding nr. 23 (1975-76), op.cit., p. 25 and Stortingsmelding nr. 53 (1984-85), op.cit.,
p.41.
101 Based on the Veritas-database, as presented in Chapter Nine
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10.4.3. Ship management
The increased number of foreign vessels managed from Norway was the result of two trends.
On the one hand, there was the previously mentioned transfer of Norwegian tonnage abroad,
with continued Norwegian ownership and management. On the other hand, Norwegian
companies increasingly managed vessels owned by foreign entities which had no other link to
the company. In this respect, the Norwegian companies undertook some or all of the business
operation of the ship. The service which was sold was thus not transport in the conventional
sense, but rather the technical and operational competence necessary to provide the transport
service. Ship management is a complex term, embracing eg commercial management,
technical management, manning management and provision management. The first two types
of management are the most common, and those which will be focused upon in this context.
The growth of ship management was an international phenomenon, but like in other
parts of the shipping industry, Norwegian companies became eager participants. There were
two major causes for the increase in ship management. First, the increasing capital intensity in
the shipping sector, coupled with advantageous tax treatment of shipping investments, brought
several non-shipping agents into the industry. These investors, exemplified by the "doctors
and dentists"-shipowners of Germany, the Netherlands and Scandinavia, often used an owner
or a specialised manager for the daily operation of their vessels. Second, the shipping crisis
itself represented an impetus for the growth of management companies. When traditional
shipowners encountered liquidity problems after the freight market breakdown, a considerable
amount of tonnage was taken over by creditors with limited shipping experience. Due to the
state of the second-hand market, the creditors usually chose to keep the ship for a limited
period of time, hoping for a recovery of the values. This facilitated the entry of specialised
management companies, sometimes founded upon the remains of the original owners.
According to Spruyt, who has analysed the phenomenon in detail, business for ship
managers expanded at an annual rate of nine per cent in the 1980s. According to estimates
from the latter part of the 1980s, somewhere between 3.000 and 4.000 vessels were managed
by other companies than the actual owners, and the number of companies offering
management services was thought to be in the region of 300 to 500.102 The large deviation with
regard to the number is a result of the fact that the extent of such arrangements depends upon
the definition of ship management used. Moreover, there has only been a very limited amount
of research on this part ofthe shipping sector, and no precise statistics exist.
The degree of concentration among ship management companies has been higher than
among traditional shipowning companies. Nevertheless, some Norwegian companies have
attained an important position in the industry. Barber International, a part of the Wilhelmsen-
group, was among the five major management companies in the mid- and late 1980s. The
development of the company illustrates the shift in the Norwegian shipping industry. Based
on the shipping competence of the Wilhelmsen-group, Barber International Ltd. was
established in 1975. In the late 1980s, approximately 15 per cent of the tonnage managed by
the company was Wilhelmsen-owned. This shows that ship management in many cases
102 Spruyt, John, Ship Management, Lloyd's of London Press Ltd., London, 1994, p. 2.
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became a supplement to the vessel ownership of Norwegian shipowners, rather than a
complimentary activity.
For some companies, the link between the shipping crisis and the growth of
management services is evident. Havtor Management AS was founded upon the ruins of P.
Meyers Rederi. By means of support from the Guarantee Institute and the creditors the
company was allowed continue their operation. In the early 1980s the company was managing
20 vessels amounting to I million dwt of tonnage. The fleet was a combination of co-owned
vessels and vessels on management contracts.'?'
In an analysis of the ship management industry it is claimed that the Norwegian
management company Osco Shipping AS "is a direct creation of the shipping crisis of
1974. "104 When the shipping companies of Ole Schrøder encountered liquidity difficulties, the
creditors were persuaded that the company should retain management, but not ownership, of
the vessels. Osco Shipping AS grew as a result of the management of the old Schrøder-fleet
and new vessels.
The entry into ship management was a rational solution to the development of the
shipping market after the crisis. By managing ships for other owners, Norwegian shipowners
were able to utilise their knowledge of the commercial and technical side of shipping, without
necessarily investing in shipping capacity themselves. In addition to the companies mentioned
above, Norwegian Ship Management, a cooperation between several Norwegian shipowners,
Irgens Larsen, specialising in reefers, and Gerrard Management, another company which
operated previously owned vessels which had been taken over by the creditors, took
advantage of the opportunities for professional ship management. lOS
10.5. Summary
This chapter has shown that the period after the shipping crisis was characterised by major
changes in the international maritime hegemony, the Norwegian economy and the Norwegian
shipping industry. According to the analysis, some of the development traits were a direct
consequence of the shipping crisis, whereas others were the result of more long-term
structural trends in the shipping sector.
The three structural transformations presented in this chapter are to some extent
related. The reduction of the fleets of the Traditional Maritime Countries was particularly
prominent in the case of Norway. The temporary diminution of the Norwegian fleet has three
main causes. First, it can be explained by the effects of the shipping crisis, which sounded the
death-knell for a large number of Norwegian shipping companies and which made shipowning
with a Norwegian base a relatively unprofitable enterprise. Second, the reduction of the
Norwegian fleet was affected by the advantageous investment possibilities in the offshore
sector, which enabled several Norwegian shipowning companies to diversify their operations.
By the middle of the 1980s Norwegian shipowners had invested more than NoK 25 billion in
103 Norwegian Shipping News, No.6, 1981, pp. 35-38.
104 Storhaug, Håkon, Ship management industrien - en analyse [The ship management industry - an analysis],
unpublished thesis, Norwegian School of Management, Oslo, 1989, p. 92.
lOS Ibid., p. 96.
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the offshore industry. Third, it was a result of the increased internationalisation of the
Norwegian shipping industry, made possible by changes in the Norwegian shipping policy.
One aspect of this internationalisation was the increase in foreign-registered, Norwegian-
owned vessels. Another implication was the increased focus on vessel management rather than
vessel ownership.
The foray into ship management and the offshore industry was based upon the
maritime heritage of Norwegian shipowning companies. In both instances Norwegian
shipping companies were able to utilise their managerial, commercial and technical
knowledge, without having to invest heavily in ships.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The aim of this thesis has been twofold. First, to analyse the causes and effects of the
international shipping crisis of the 1970s. Second, to explain why Norwegian shipowners were
particularly severely hit by the crisis, and to trace the effects of the crisis on the Norwegian
shipping sector.
11.1. What Were the Causes of the Shipping Crisis?
In several areas the early 1970s represented a severe break with the development of the first
postwar decades, and most sectors were faced with the need for readjustment from heavy
expansion to lower growth. For the international shipping industry, the basis for the crisis can
be found on both the demand and supply sides. The demand growth dwindled while the fleet
increased, resulting in a severe and escalating imbalance. On the demand side, three
development traits are of particular importance for an understanding of the crisis in the
shipping industry.
First, the OPEC-initiated oil price increases fundamentally transferred the status of oil
from being a source of energy to becoming the means in an economic and political battle. This
was of particular importance for the tanker industry. Oil was by far the most important
commodity for this segment of the shipping sector, and the uninterrupted growth in tanker
transport demand of the first postwar decades was initially replaced by stagnation, but later by
absolute reduction.
The oil price increases are to some extent related to the second shift in the world
economy, from high growth of production and trade to recession. Several economists believed
that the increased understanding of the economic environment and improved government
intervention had facilitated a transformation from business cycles to growth cycles. The
development of the 1970sproved them wrong, as governments had to combat the twin evils of
accelerating inflation and increasing unemployment. Monetary and fiscal policies directed
towards controlling the inflationary forces aggravated the recession.
The slump in economic activity, which was aggravated by the oil price increases,
affected all segments of the shipping sector, including the bulk and liner trades. In 1975 ten
industrial countries recorded a reduction in economic activity. The shipping crisis was thus to
some extent one aspect of a more general economic crisis, in which several of the most
important sectors were affected by overcapacity and falling demand. However, the difficulties
in the shipping industry were more severe and lasted longer than in most other sectors.
The demise of the gold-dollar standard, which marked the end of the stable postwar
monetary regime, was the third major transformation affecting the international market for
shipping services. The breakdown of the international monetary regime resulted in increased
uncertainty and played havoc with the previous stability of international exchange rates. To
some extent, the monetary development of the pre-crisis years is important, as it led to
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escalating inflation and low real interest rates facilitating large investments in the shipping
sector. Moreover, the end of the gold-dollar standard resulted in larger exchange rate
fluctuations. The result was an increase in the exchange rate risk for shipowners who operated
in the international market, and consequently generally had income and costs in different
currencies.
The effect of these developments was a severe shift in the fundamentals on the demand
side in the shipping market. The demand for seaborne trade had grown substantially in the
postwar period, both as a result of larger volumes and longer trading distances. The positive
trend was expected to continue, but after 1973 the anticipated demand growth failed to
materialise.
On the supply side, the crisis was exacerbated by the high volume of newbuilding
contracts signed prior to the crisis, in anticipation of persistent demand growth. Due to the lag
between contracting and completion of vessels, large amounts of tonnage entered a saturated
market. In this respect, two questions are of particular importance:
o What can explain the widespread contracting in the period leading up to the crisis?
o Why did the world fleet continue to grow even after the massive oversupply was evident?
The mechanisms of the shipping market are important to answer these questions. More
specifically, it has been a traditional feature of the shipping sector that periods with slack
demand and laid-up tonnage alternate with relatively shorter periods of high demand and
freight rates. Indeed, when the crisis of the 1970sbecame evident, the majority of shipowners
acted as though they faced a temporary reduction in demand growth. As the crisis escalated,
however, the agents realised that the imbalance between supply and demand was more severe
than previously anticipated and experienced.
What can explain the widespread contracting in the period leading up to the crisis?
In early 1974, the amount oftankers and combination carriers on order represented more than
eighty per cent of the existing fleet. The basis for the growth of the supply side was presented
by means of an analysis focusing on three groups of agents; shipowners, shipyards and
financial institutions. In the analysis of the high level of contracting, the following elements
were emphasised:
o The belief among shipowners and oil companies that the demand for oil transport would
continue to grow. Their belief can be attributed to the adaptive expectations-hypothesis,
which posits that shipowners put inordinate emphasis on the current and historical rate
levels and development. Moreover, the contracting may be understood in terms of the
general consensus in the shipping market at the time, which implied that continuing
demand growth was expected.
o The high rate level in the latter part of 1973, which induced shipowners to order new
tonnage. It is evident that current market conditions playa crucial role in determining the
contracting of shipowners, and the contracting boom may have been affected by the fact
that some of the most successful shipowners in the previous decades had been the ones
who had contracted most eagerly.
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D The massive subsidisation of the shipbuilding industry in most Western countries and
Japan. The subsidies inflated the growth of the world fleet and can be understood in terms
of domestic regional, labour and industrial policies. Moreover, the subsidies contributed to
the contagion and prolongation of the crisis.
D The access to easy financing. This was a result of the American Balance of Payments
deficit, the abundance of capital in the Eurodollar market, government subsidies to
shipbuilding and the entry of new and relatively inexperienced agents into the ship
financing market. Moreover, vessels were considered "floating real estate", and prior to
the crisis the return frommortgages to the shipping sector had been good for most banks.
D The increasing rates of inflation. As a result of the high price increases in the early 1970s,
real interest rates were relatively low. Additionally, the tax system in several of the major
shipping nations made large investments attractive for shipowners with high revenues. The
combination of low real interest rates and advantageous tax deductions often resulted in a
negative post-tax real interest rate on shipping investments.
The high pre-crisis contracting can thus be explained by the fact that, given the historical
development, the expectations of the most important agents and the influence from the
authorities through subsidies and tax policies, contracting was considered profitable. The
individual investment projects' profitability was enhanced by the influence from the strong
competition among shipyards and bankers, as well as by the influence oftax regimes.
Why did the world fleet continue to grow even after the massive oversupply was evident?
The main reason for the continuing growth of the world tanker fleet after the freight market
had broken down was the lag between contracting and delivery, which is particularly long in
periods of large order books. Some of the vessels on order in 1973 were scheduled for
delivery in 1978/79. Another reason for the relatively slow reaction to the oversupply was that
the agents in the maritime sector were unable to fully fathom the extent of the crisis, and
viewed it as a temporary phenomenon of the kind often experienced in the shipping sector.
Cyclical downturns are a regular feature of the shipping industry, and are - at least in
the short term - difficult to differentiate from the kind of fundamental shifts experienced in
the 1970s and 1980s. The lag between the freight market breakdown and the large
cancellations of newbuildings indicates that a considerable period of time passed before the
shipowners recognised that the crisis was so severe that paying cancellation fees was
favourable to accepting delivery. The agents in the shipping sector were not alone in regarding
the problems as transitory.
The supply surplus in the tanker market was diffused to other parts of the shipping
market. Initially the crisis was spread through the entry of combination carriers previously
operating in the tanker segment. The conversion of newbuilding contracts from tankers to
other vessels increased the non-tanker fleet in the medium term. The contagion was
aggravated when shipyards, unable to secure new tanker orders, offered generous terms to
attract orders for the building of other types of vessels. Falling demand following the
economic recession in several of the most important industrial nations added to the problems
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in the non-tanker shipping sector.
In short, the shipping crisis was the result of a tremendous disparity between expected
and actual development. The supply side increased, based on expectations about consistently
strong growth in the demand for shipping services. Due to the oil price increase and the
economic recession, the actual demand growth was negligible, and even negative for some
segments. By the time the agents on the supply side realised that the expected demand growth
would not materialise, it had become impossible to adapt the size of the supply side to the new
circumstances.
11.2. What Were the Effects of the Shipping Crisis?
The first outcome of the changed conditions in the shipping sector was a drastic fall in tanker
freight rates and reduced activity in the charter market. Freight rates on some voyages fell by
more than 80 per cent within a month. Tanker lay-ups, which had been negligible at the end of
1973, increased to more than 18 per cent of the fleet in the second quarter of 1976. A
reduction of the average speed of the vessels - a practice which became more profitable
following the increased price of bunkers - contributed to a reduction of the supply surplus.
The use of tankers for. storage purposes, the acceptance of part cargoes and extra waiting time
in ports were other alternatives to lay-up.
As the shipping crisis unfolded, the amount and average size of tankers scrapped
increased. However, as new, large vessels entering the market more than made up for the
volume of tonnage scrapped, the tanker fleet continued to grow until 1978. Moreover,
shipowners were hesitant to scrap underutilised assets, as they were hoping for a market
recovery which would increase the value of their tonnage.
Due to the freight market breakdown - and the strong correlation between freight rates
and the price of second-hand vessels - the value of the world fleet plummeted. Again, the
reductions recorded in the tanker sector were particularly violent. A 220.000 dwt turbine
tanker, which had been valued at $52 million in 1973, was valued at $23 million in 1974 and
$10 million the following year - a value reduction of more than eighty per cent within two
years.
The shipping crisis led to serious liquidity problems for a large share of the shipping
companies, particularly those that had invested heavily in the tanker sector. As profit margins
were squeezed, the high level of costs in Traditional Maritime Nations forced shipowners in
these countries to reduce their operations or to transfer their tonnage to Flags of Convenience.
The large disinvestment in shipping in the Western industrial nations was reflected in the
increasing importance of Emerging Maritime Nations, particularly Asian countries, and there
were large changes in the distribution of the international fleet in the period 1975-1985.
The growth of the supply side is particularly important in explaining the predicament
of the shipping industry in the 1970s. The transport capacity of the world fleet increased by
more than 50 per cent in the period 1973-1977, spurred by an increase in the tanker fleet of
more than two thirds. This massive growth of the supply side aggravated the negative effects
of the reduced demand growth following the oil price increase and the recession in the
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industrialised countries.
However, in connection with the increasing imbalance in the shipping market in the
1980s, which I have called "the second shipping crisis", demand side developments attained a
more significant role. The transport of crude oil fell by more than 60 per cent in the period
1977-1985, contributing to a 25 per cent reduction of seaborne transport. Even a decrease in
the tonnage supply was insufficient to neutralise the effects of the falling demand for transport
services.
11.3. Why Were Norwegian Shipowners Particularly Hard Hit?
Norwegian shipowners had been particularly successful in the growth period of the 1950s and
1960s. In the expansion phase of international shipping in the first postwar decades, demand
for shipping services often exceeded supply. This was partly a result of the fact that the
capacity within the shipbuilding industry was insufficient to meet the constantly increasing
demand for newbuilds, partlya reflection of the unanticipated growth of transport capacity
demand. The shipowners who were eager in the contracting market, ordering new tonnage
which could utilise the increasing economies of scale and find profitable employment
immediately after delivery, were particularly fortunate. Even though there were periods of
slack demand, the profits from the freight rate peaks secured the profitability of the
investments.
The most favourable investment alternative in this period of high growth was large,
relatively fast vessels, in particular tankers. Owners of supertankers were able to earn
considerable amounts of money, as their vessels could utilise economies of scale and transport
large cargoes efficiently. Several Norwegian shipowners had channelled much of their
resources into the fast-growing bulk sector, and a large share of the Norwegian fleet consisted
of mammoth tankers and flexible combination carriers. This allowed Norwegian shipowners
to reap the benefits from the favourable demand situation before the oil price increases.
The oil price increases from 1973 onwards paved the way for a structural change in the
markets for shipping services and energy, and exacerbated a negative trend in the international
economy. The unfavourable demand situation implied that the tables had been turned; those
who had benefited from the development in the 1960s were the ones who were the least
adapted to the new circumstances. The vessels that had previously been among the most
advantageous became particularly ill-suited to the new conditions. The reduced demand
growth was particularly manifest in the market for large tankers. Due to the increased price of
bunkers, turbine-driven vessels lost competitiveness to motor tankers, which used fuel more
efficiently.
The state of the shipping market in the 1970s was diametrically opposite to the
situation in the 1960s. As demand growth faltered and bunkers prices increased, a fleet
consisting of large turbine tankers became a burden rather than an advantage. As the market
was characterised by oversupply, a large "fleet" of newbuilding contracts became a liability
rather than an asset. The winners of the 1960s in many cases became the losers of the 1970s,
as their strategy was no longer treated favourably by the market forces.
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It is difficult to assess to which extent Norwegian shipowners were harder hit by the
crisis than their international competitors. In this thesis, two features have been presented to
illustrate the disparate Norwegian experience. First, lay up-rates were compared. The
comparison shows that Norwegian lay-ups were considerably higher than the international
average, and that Sweden was the only country with lay up-rates at the Norwegian level.
Second, the long-term development of national fleets was analysed. The flight from the
Norwegian flag was particularly large in an international perspective. Moreover, the reduction
of the Norwegian fleet occurred earlier and was more pronounced than for any other major
shipping nation bar Great Britain.
Due to the heterogeneity of shipping companies it is difficult to draw conclusions
based on aggregates. However, both the high lay up-rates and the strong reduction of the fleet
in the wake of the crisis indicate that Norwegian shipowners were harder hit by the changed
fundamentals of the shipping market than their competitors. The reasons for the unfortunate
Norwegian experience can be found by an analysis of the Norwegian shipowners' strategic
decisions. In this thesis, three "policy instruments" - fleet structure, chartering and contracting
- have been used to highlight the differences between Norwegian shipowners and the
international agents.
Structure of the fleet
A relatively large share of the Norwegian fleet consisted of vessels operating in the segments
of the shipping market that were hardest hit by the crisis. In 1975 tankers and combination
carriers constituted 70 per cent of the Norwegian fleet, compared to an average ofless than 60
per cent for the Rest-of-the-World fleet. Moreover, the average Norwegian tanker was more
than 50 per cent larger than the average vessel in the foreign tanker fleet, and the average
Norwegian ship was more than twice as large as the average vessel in the international fleet.
The disproportionate Norwegian investments in these types of ships can be explained by the
relative price of labour and capital in Norway, which made investments in modem, capital-
and technology-intensive vessels relatively profitable.
Although the structure of the fleet implied that Norwegian shipowners were
particularly severely affected by the crisis, the investments were not irrational given the
conditions under which Norwegian shipowners were working. On the one hand, operation of
older, labour-intensive vessels would not be profitable as a result of the high Norwegian
manning costs. On the other hand, given the widespread expectations about continuing strong
growth in the demand for bulk shipping services, investments in large tankers and bulk
carriers were considered favourable.
The fact that Norwegian shipowners had invested massively in the vessels that were
hardest hit by the decrease in freight rates implies that the fall in the value of Norwegian
vessels was particularly large. This put Norwegian shipowners in a difficult position towards
their creditors, and paved the way for the involvement of the authorities through the
Norwegian Guarantee Institute for Ships and Drilling Vessels Ltd. The government
involvement mirrored the positive expectations of the Norwegian shipping community, as it
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was based on the assumption that there would be a relatively swift recovery of the freight
markets. The institution secured that tonnage which was perceived to be valuable was kept on
Norwegian hands rather than sold abroad.
In the period following the crisis, Norwegian shipping lost its important position both
in the Norwegian economy and in the international shipping community. By 1987, the
Norwegian fleet had been reduced by almost 38 million dwt, or more than three quarters,
compared with the peak ten years earlier. The reduction was partly the result of foreign
registry of Norwegian owned vessels, but this was insufficient to avoid a massive reduction
of the Norwegian-controlled share of the world fleet.
Chartering policy
Traditionally, Norwegian shipowners had operated a relatively large share oftheir tonnage in
the spot market. In the initial period after the freight market breakdown, shipowners who had
secured employment for their vessels through long-term contracts were considerably less
affected by the crisis than owners operating in the spot market. However, the analysis
presented in this thesis suggests that the focus on the Norwegian chartering strategy should
be modified. Several sources have claimed that Norwegian shipowners were responsible for
"fifty per cent of the tonnage in the spot market", and that this overproportion can explain
their subsequent predicament. My analysis shows that the Norwegian share of the tonnage
offered in the spot market peaked at 27 per cent in 1967, and averaged 18 per cent in the
1970s.
Indeed, in the beginning of 1974 the Norwegian share of the vessels offered in the spot
market corresponded well with their share of the world tanker fleet. The share of the
Norwegian vessels offered in the tanker spot market was 14 per cent, the same proportion as
the Rest-of-the-World fleet. Accordingly, the Norwegian chartering strategy does not appear
to be fundamentally different from that of their competitors. Moreover, a comparison of the
return from the various market segments shows that the additional risk presented by the spot
market had been more than sufficiently rewarded through higher average return in the period
before the freight market broke down.
However, two aspects of the chartering policy put Norwegian shipowners at risk. First,
they generally operated on shorter charters than their competitors. Accordingly, they would
be able to weather a temporary downturn, but not a fundamental break of the kind
experienced in the 1970s. Second, Norwegian shipowners were responsible for a large share
of the mammoth tanker tonnage contracted, and the degree of charter cover for these vessels
was extremely low. More than 80 per cent of the large Norwegian tankers on order were
intended for the spot market, compared with roughly a third for the international fleet. The
analysis of chartering policies indicates that it was not the amount of Norwegian tonnage in
the spot market, but rather the shorter duration of charter agreements and the large amount of
unfixed tonnage on order that put Norwegian shipowners in a difficult position.
Chapter Eleven - Summary and Conclusion 381
Stig Tenold: The Shipping Crisis of the 1970s: Causes, Effects and Implicationsfor Norwegian Shipping
Contracting
Norwegian shipowners had traditionally had a large share of tonnage on order. This can be
explained by their focus on new, technologically advanced and large vessels which utilised
economies of scale and reduced the unfavourable effects of high manning costs. The fact that
the Norwegian fleet was relatively modern means that a lower share of the loans necessary for
the financing of the ships had been repaid. This posed problems due to the minimum value-
clause, a common feature of international financing contracts, which enabled the creditor to
demand extra collateral or additional instalments if the value of the mortgaged property fell.
In 1974 Norwegian tanker orders were more than 30 per cent higher than the size of
the existing fleet, whereas foreign shipowners' newbuilding orders constituted approximately
90 per cent of their current tonnage. The focus on modern vessels, and hence the large amount
of tonnage on order, reflected the competitive advantages of Norwegian shipowners, and can
be seen as a consequence of the relative price oflabour and capital in Norway.
Although the investments were sensible given their expectations and resources, when
the freight market broke down, Norwegian shipowners were in a particularly vulnerable
position. The large amount of newbuilding contracts could either be cancelled, involving an
expensive cancellation fee, or the new vessels could enter a market where there was little hope
of profitable employment. Severallarge tankers went straight from the building berth into lay-
up. For some Norwegian companies the fees paid in connection with the cancellation of
newbuildings represented a smaller drain on resources than accepting delivery of a tanker for
which no market existed.
The high level of contracting undertaken before the freight market breakdown
hampered several Norwegian shipowners' ability to adapt to the changes in market conditions.
Due to the backlog of ordered, undelivered vessels, the Norwegian fleet continued to grow
until 1977, although contracting all but dried up after 1973.
During the 1973 boom, the international newbuilding orders had acquired a
"Norwegian" character, dominated by large vessels, in particular tankers. The differences in
size and vessel type were therefore more pronounced for the existing fleet than for the vessels
on order in the beginning of 1974. Accordingly, the difference between Norwegian and
international contracting was to a higher degree related to the amount of contracts than to the
vessels contracted.
A new view on the predicament of Norwegian shipowners
The strategic elements analysed in this thesis are important for our understanding of the
predicament of the Norwegian shipping industry. However, the commonly presented view that
Norwegian shipowners were victims of their own willingness to take risks should be
modified. Rather, the Norwegian misfortune can to a large extent be understood in terms of a
combination of risk propensity and rational decisions based on expectations that did not come
true.
First, the failure to anticipate the massive changes in the shipping market and the
international economy was not confined to Norwegian shipowners. Most economic agents
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were taken by surprise by both the magnitude of the changes and the length of the crisis, and
their adaptation to the changed conditions was initially based on the notion that the downturn
was temporary.
Second, the focus on large and modem vessels was largely the result of the
competitive advantage of Norwegian shipowners in the management of technically advanced
tonnage, and can be explained by the relative price of labour and capital in Norway. Indeed,
the Norwegian shipowners channelled their resources to the part of the shipping market where
they were able to make a profit - that this was the segment in which the collapse would be the
most dramatic was impossible to foresee.
Third, the analysis indicates that the importance of the chartering strategy of
Norwegian shipowners has often been exaggerated. On the one hand, the Norwegian presence
in the spot market in the period prior to the freight market breakdown was equal to the
international average. On the other hand, the crisis turned out to be so severe and long-lasting
that even shipowners who had chosen what was traditionally considered a more prudent
chartering strategy, with emphasis on medium-term charters, were severely affected by the
difficulties.
In one respect, the view of Norwegian shipowners as risk-takers may be justified. The
amount of unfixed large tankers on order was extremely high in an international perspective.
80 per cent of the largest Norwegian tankers on order had not been secured employment,
compared with 31 per cent for the Rest-of the World fleet. The difference is less conspicuous
if we leave out the three most risk-loving Norwegian shipowners - Biørnstad, Reksten and
Waage - but nevertheless substantial. Then, 73 per cent of the Norwegian tonnage on order
was unfixed, compared with 45 per cent for independent shipowners in other countries.
However, the contrast is still striking, and the financial drain stemming from tankers ordered
during the heyday of the early 1970s haunted several Norwegian shipowners for a
considerable period of time.
Due to the importance of the shipping sector in the Norwegian economy, the shipping
crisis prompted public action. The Norwegian authorities responded to the crisis in two ways.
Initially, they reacted by establishing the Norwegian Guarantee Institute for Ships and Drilling
Vessels Ltd. in order to assist Norwegian shipowners and "preserve valuable tonnage on
Norwegian hands." As the crisis turned out to be more fundamental than originally
anticipated by the shipowners and authorities, the value of the tanker tonnage kept on the
Norwegian registry by means of guarantees from the Guarantee Institute never recovered. The
authorities were forced to accept considerable losses. However, the analysis in this thesis
shows that the Guarantee Institute had important positive effects, both with regard to drilling
vessels, the Norwegian shipbuilding industry and the Norwegian ship financing institutions.
From the early 1980s onwards, the authorities eased the access to registration of
Norwegian vessels abroad - which made it possible to take advantage of less expensive
foreign crews. The combination of a relatively strict flag policy and the existence of the
Guarantee Institute had led to a pent-up demand for foreign registration. An exodus oftonnage
commenced when the restrictions were relaxed and the Guarantee Institute's engagements
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abandoned. The Norwegian fleet was reduced by more than 75 per cent from the late 1970s to
the mid-1980s. However, in the late 1980s, after a reorientation of the shipping policy led to
the introduction of the Norwegian International Ship Register, the Norwegian fleet started to
growagain.
11.4. How Did Norwegian Shipowners Adapt to the Crisis?
In Chapter Eight, four Norwegian shipowners were analysed in order to evaluate how strategic
decisions influenced the fate of various Norwegian shipowning companies. The four
companies, all of which had considerable interests in the tanker sector, were to varying
degrees affected by the crisis.
The differences in the fate of the four shipping companies considered here correspond
well with the heterogeneity of the Norwegian shipping sector in general. Some companies
survived relatively unscathed due to advantageous business decisions undertaken prior to or
shortly after the freight market breakdown, whereas the obligations of other companies were
so large as to make an adaptation to the changed state of the shipping market impossible.
Moreover, the companies that were severely affected by the crisis chose different strategies to
cope with their predicament. The four cases analysed in this thesis show that:
D Shipowners operating in the spot market earned spectacular amounts of money during the
1973-boom, but were particularly hard hit by the breakdown of the market. In previous
periods high revenues during the freight rate peaks would offset their low income in a
depressed market. After 1973, there were no such peak periods.
D For some shipowners, the cancellation of newbuildings was vital to the continuing
existence of the company. However, for the most expansive shipowners, the sheer amount
of newbuildings on order implied that only a relatively rapid freight rate recovery could
have saved them from bankruptcy.
D Shipowners operating in more than one market segment were able to recuperate some of
their tanker sector losses through profits from other segments. However, as the shipping
crisis deepened, few segments remained unaffected.
D Companies with a sound financial base were able to take advantage of the unfortunate
development of companies with economic difficulties.
By means of a purpose-built database comprising all shipowners with vessels greater than
5.000 grt, the development of the aggregate Norwegian fleet has been analysed. The analysis
illustrates the drastic reduction of the Norwegian shipping activity in the wake of the shipping
crisis. The tonnage on the Norwegian registry fell from 40 million dwt in 1973 to less than ten
million dwt in 1987, after peaking at almost 50 million dwt ten years earlier. The number of
Norwegian ports with companies owning vessels of more than 5.000 grt was almost halved in
the period from 1970 to 1987. Moreover, the number of owners with ships above this size on
the Norwegian registry fell by more than 100, representing a decline of more than two thirds.
The reduction in the number of shipping companies was almost 50 per cent even when
companies which transferred their vessels to foreign flags are included.
The analysis of the figures from the database reveals that the shipping crisis coincided
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with a trend towards increased concentration in the Norwegian shipping industry. This trend
was evident both at the geographical and at the company level, as the shipping crisis sounded
the death knell for a large number of Norwegian ports and shipping companies with a long
maritime history.
The share of the Norwegian-registered fleet belonging to Oslo-based companies
increased from approximately 50 per cent in 1970 to 70 per cent in 1987. However, when
foreign-registered vessels are included, Oslo's share declines. This reflects the fact that the
shipowners based in Western Norway and on the South Coast had been more eager to take
advantage of the liberalisation of the Norwegian shipping policy. When foreign-registered
vessels are included, the share of the fleet based in Western Norway and on the South Coast
did not change significantly between 1970 and 1987.
The Oslofjord-region was particularly hard hit by the shipping crisis. The decline in
the Oslofjord-fleet from 1970 to 1987 was almost 80 per cent, even when foreign-registered
vessels are included. In 1987 the amount of Norwegian-registered tonnage in the Oslofjord-
region amounted to only 8,4 per cent of the tonnage registered during the peak ten years
earlier. The decline followed a reduction in the number of companies, but a strong decrease in
the average size of the companies was even more important.
The shipping crisis had different effects on the importance of the various ports as well.
On the South Coast, Grimstad-based shipowners managed to increase their tonnage, whereas
the fleet of Arendal was virtually eliminated. On average, the Norwegian-owned fleet fell by
slightly less than 30 per cent from 1970 to 1987. However, this figure hides large regional
differences. The Oslo-fleet contracted by 12 per cent, and other important ports such as
Bergen and Kristiansand lost less than a fifth of their tonnage. However, the reduction in
Sandefjord was almost 80 per cent, and the tonnage owned by Haugesund-based owners was
reduced by more than three quarters.
The increased regional concentration reflected a similar trend among shipping
companies. In the early 1970s the five largest shipowners accounted for a quarter of the
Norwegian fleet, and approximately half of the fleet belonged to the twenty largest companies.
By 1987 the twenty largest companies owned almost 90 per cent of the tonnage flying the
Norwegian flag, and the five largest companies accounted for more than sixty per cent of the
fleet. This trend towards greater concentration is a common result of economic crises, as
companies with a strong financial base increase their presence in the market at the expense of
less viable companies which are forced to exit from the sector.
The figures indicate that Norwegian vessels operated by relatively small shipowners
contracted substantially - the share of tonnage owned by companies outside the Top 20-list
fell from approximately 50 per cent in 1970 to less than 12 per cent in 1987. However, if we
adjust for Norwegian owned tonnage registered abroad, the trend in the latter part of the
period is less pronounced. The share of the Norwegian-owned tonnage managed by the five
largest and twenty largest companies had stabilised at the levels from the mid-1980s - around
40 and 70 per cent respectively. There was thus a clear tendency towards increased
concentration, but the development was not as pronounced as the figures depicting
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Norwegian-registered tonnage indicate. Accordingly, it is evident that the access to foreign
registry to a larger extent was utilised by the smaller Norwegian shipowning companies than
by the larger companies.
The increased concentration was also influenced by the fact that the largest companies
were particularly eager in the expansive period of Norwegian shipping from 1970 to 1977.
Indeed, more than 63 per cent of the expansion of the fleet in this period occurred within nine
of the ten largest companies. During the subsequent contraction of the Norwegian fleet, the
majority of the companies - III out of 158 - disposed of their Norwegian-registered tonnage
altogether. In the period from 1977 to 1987, the increasingly important position of the larger
companies can be understood in terms of less severe contraction, rather than heavier
expansion.
Another distinct trend is the continuity among the largest Norwegian shipowning
companies. Seven of the ten largest Norwegian shipping companies in 1970 were among the
ten largest in 1986 as well. Of the remaining three companies, two had gone through massive
restructuring but were still among the 15 largest companies, and one company ranked 22nd, but
was among the fifteen largest when foreign-registered tonnage was included. The
sustainability of the larger companies was influenced by the creditors' and the authorities'
willingness to save the larger companies through moratoria, restructuring and guarantees.
Nevertheless, the development indicates that the effects of the shipping crisis were more
severe for the smaller Norwegian shipowning companies - the majority of which disappeared
altogether - than for the larger companies.
The organisation of the companies in the Norwegian shipping sector also changed
during the turbulent period. The share of the Norwegian tonnage owned by one limited
liability company or interessentskap [general partnerships] declined, whereas the share of the
tonnage owned by other firms, and in particular kommandittselskap [limited partnerships],
increased.
Parallel with the reduction of the Norwegian fleet from 1978 onwards, the Norwegian
merchant marine became increasingly diversified, as individual shipowners focused on more
specialised segments of the shipping sector. A comparison based on compensated gross
register tons, a measure which takes into account the sophistication of the vessels, reveals that
the reduction of the Norwegian-owned fleet was far less dramatic than indicated by an
analysis based on dead weight tons. This can be explained by the fact that Norwegian
shipowners had scaled down their involvement in the bulk sector, focussing instead on more
advanced types of tonnage.
11.5. What Were the Structural Effects of the Crisis?
The examination of the structural development of the Norwegian fleet in the period
surrounding the shipping crisis details the dramatic flight from the Norwegian flag from 1978
onwards. The reduction of the Norwegian fleet is explained both by the economic problems of
the Norwegian shipping industry and in terms of changes in the Norwegian shipping policy.
The analysis shows that the changes in the Norwegian flag policy to a considerable extent was
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brought about by factors which were directly related to the crisis, in particular the reduced
viability of Norwegian-flag shipping.
However, the reduction of the Norwegian fleet was to some extent a reflection of an
international trend. This development - involving a reduction of the fleets of the Traditional
Maritime Nations and an increase in the fleets of Flags of Convenience and Emerging
Maritime Nations - was particularly prominent in the case of Norway. Moreover, it was partly
the continuation of a trend that was evident prior to the freight market breakdown and partly
the result of circumstances that were more directly related to the crisis.
The shipping crisis signalled the end of the industrialised countries' domination of the
shipping industry. The share of the world fleet registered in the OECD-countries fell from
64,5 per cent in 1970 to 34 per cent in 1987. The reduction in the fleet of the OECD-countries
was particularly marked from 1980 onwards, ie after it had become evident that the crisis was
structural rather than transitory. The decline reflects the significant disinvestment in the
shipping sector in Traditional Maritime Nations, but was partly mitigated by the transfer of
OECD-owned tonnage to Flags of Convenience. The analysis of the Emerging Maritime
Nations in Asia shows that several of the factors that are commonly used to explain the
growth in Asian manufacturing are applicable to the shipping sector as well.
The tonnage sold from Norway in the period 1970-1986 confirms the international
development traits. Only 23 per cent of the tonnage went on to be registered in OECD-
countries, and the majority of this tonnage was registered in Greece. However, shipowners
based in the OECD-countries were the actual owners of more than 70 per cent of the tonnage
leaving the Norwegian fleet. In the period from 1984 to 1986, after the liberalisation of the
Norwegian flag policy, Norwegian shipowners retained the management of almost two thirds
of the tonnage that was deleted from the Norwegian registry.
Parallel with the shipping crisis there was a major transformation of the Norwegian
economy. The shipping sector had to concede its hegemonic position in Norwegian exports,
and the gap was filled by the flourishing oil sector. The gross receipts from shipping, as share
of total exports, were more than halved in the period 1974-1982, whereas the export of crude
petroleum and natural gas increased from less than 1 per cent to almost one third of total
exports over the same period.
The possibilities in the offshore industry presented Norwegian shipowners with an
alluring investment alternative. The reduction of the Norwegian shipping sector was thus not
only a reflection of the lower expected returns from this sector, but also a result of the higher
profit opportunities represented by the offshore sector. In addition, the offshore sector made it
possible for the companies in the shipping industry to utilise some of their business contacts,
organisational competence and knowledge of an international maritime sector in anew, non-
depressed market.
The shipowners' engagement in the oil sector was considerable, partlyas investors in
onshore bases and oil exploration companies, but primarily with regard to investments in oil
rigs and supply vessels. By the middle of 1975Norwegian shipowners' rig and supply vessel
contracts were valued at more than NoK seven billion, which represented more than a quarter
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of the value of the contracts for traditional vessels. The offshore investments of Norwegian
shipowners amounted to more than NoK 25 billion in the period 1974-1984. Moreover, the
initial investments in offshore activities in the North Sea provided a stepping stone for their
participation in the international offshore market. The emergence of the offshore industry
alleviated the effects of the shipping crisis, for the Norwegian economy in general, and for
several Norwegian shipowners in particular.
Another trend was the increased focus on ship management, as a substitute for or
supplement to conventional vessel ownership. This was a common trait in the international
shipping industry, reflecting the increased importance of creditors and institutional investors
in shipowning in the wake of the crisis. Some of the Norwegian management companies were
founded upon the ruins of traditional shipowning companies. By focussing on ship
management, Norwegian shipowners were able to utilise their knowledge of the shipping
sector, including its commercial and technical aspects, without necessarily owning ships
themselves.
11.6. Further Research
The analysis of the most important agents of the shipping industry - shipowners, shipyards
and financial institutions - was facilitated by some studies of particular aspects of the crisis.
However, the current literature leaves a lot to be desired when it comes to detailed analyses of
the interaction between the various agents. Were shipowners encouraged to overinvest due to
the positive demand expectations which the oil companies communicated through timecharter
rates? Were banks and shipyards blinded by the strong postwar growth of shipping demand
and the positive expectations of shipowners, or were they willing to take risks because they
expected to be bailed out if the market collapsed? Moreover, the motivation for and effects of
government policies and intervention are other topics that deserve further examination. Did
the OECD-restrictions on shipbuilding subsidies accelerate the downsizing of shipyard
activity in Europe and contribute to the shift of activity to non-OECD countries? To which
extent did subsidies contribute to the contagion of the shipping crisis outside the tanker
sector?
The focus on Norwegian shipowners in this thesis was partly hampered by the lack of
similar analyses of shipowners of other nations. Whereas the Norwegian experience has been
contrasted with that of foreign shipowners at an international level, studies of a more national
character may be important in explaining the importance of the various strategic choices. How
did the shipping crisis affect shipowners with a different strategy than Norwegian shipowners?
Were long charters a sufficient basis for Hong Kong shipowners to acquire their important
position in the shipping industry?
Other future research topics relate to the individual agents in the Norwegian shipping
industry. The basis for the Norwegian shipowners' strategic decisions - which left some of
them extremely vulnerable and others less affected - is interesting from a business history
point of view. Another important aspect - which may have implications for future policy
recommendations - is the influence of the tax system. To which extent did the tax system
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contribute to the overcontracting? How could this unwanted effect of the tax system be
moderated or eliminated?
The analysis has shown that there was a shift in the maritime hegemony concurrent
with the shipping crisis. However, the nature of the relationship between the crisis and the
structural changes should be more firmly established. In particular, the question of whether or
not the crisis amplified or expedited the structural transformation should be further analysed.
This latter aspect can be examined both at the Norwegian and at the internationallevel.
Although some of the structural features of the shipping industry have changed
following the crisis, the shipping sector is still characterised by several of the elements which
contributed to the crisis in the 1970s. Accordingly, there is still a need for research on the
influence of and relationship between elements such as financing, rate level, chartering,
contracting and shipbuilding subsidies. A thorough understanding of the mechanisms of the
shipping"industrymay alleviate the effects of future crises or reduce the probability of a crisis
of the magnitude experienced in the 1970s.
11.7. Conclusion
This thesis endeavours to be the first substantial examination of the international shipping
crisis of the 1970s. The analysis shows among other things that the shipping crisis was caused
by a fundamental and unexpected shift in the development of seaborne trade after the oil price
increases of the early 1970s. The strategic judgements of and the relationship among three
groups of agents - shipowners, shipyards and financing institutions - augmented the effects of
the negative demand development. As a result of the discrepancy between the actual and the
anticipated development of demand, the shipping sector fell victim to a long-term crisis. The
effects were far-reaching, particularly for countries with a considerable shipping sector, such
as Norway.
The fact that Norwegian shipowners were particularly hard hit by the malaise can be
understood in terms of their strategies in the period leading up to the crisis. The Norwegian
predicament resulted from a combination of structural traits and unfortunate strategic
decisions. However, the analysis shows that soine of the factors that have previously been
emphasised in the explanation of the Norwegian misfortune should be modified. Moreover,
the strategies followed by Norwegian shipowners were rational given their working conditions
and the growth expectations which were prevalent in all parts of the international economy at
the time.
The shipping crisis coincided with massive changes in the international maritime
hegemony, one aspect of which was the temporary diminution of the Norwegian fleet. The
effect on the Norwegian economy was mitigated by the oil exploration and exploitation on the
Norwegian continental shelf. Norway's dependence shifted from one volatile, maritime
industry to another.
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